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The viewing of Japanese and South Korean TV dramas in Taiwan represents an 
opportunity to explore foreign media popularity as a cultural phenomenon. In 
addition, we can also examine the relationship between youth audiences and their 
construction of a sense of collective social identity in relation to their cultural 
‘others’. This thesis examines how Japanese and South Korean TV dramas are 
incorporated into the lives and cultural practices of young people in Taiwan by 
looking at the varying degrees and levels of acceptance they enjoy, as well as the 
different purposes these dramas are used for. In addition, this thesis investigates the 
process of modern nation-building and the (re)construction of ‘local’ Taiwanese 
cultures in the context of transnational cultural flows. It focuses on how Taiwanese 
youth construct their own interpretations of national identity in the space which lies 
between the traditional Chinese national/cultural identity imposed in the pre-1987 
period, and the new world of free media which heralds different models of identity 
emerging from the regional flows of cultural goods.  
 
Methods of data collection include: distribution of a questionnaire (278 in total) 
which was designed to give a general understanding of the consumption of both 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas. This was then followed by four group discussions 
with secondary school students and ten one-to-one interviews with university 
students. In this fashion the research investigates at a concrete level the cultural 
consumption of Japanese and Korean ‘trendy dramas’ (television dramas) and 
examines the ways in which young Taiwanese audiences utilise their new 
transnational cultural resources in order to construct a Taiwanese cultural identity that 
is orientated towards a specifically East Asian context. Although this work attempts 
to understand the ideas young Taiwanese have about national and cultural identity 
within the context of regional popular culture flows – focusing on the reception of 
Japanese and Korean popular TV dramas during late 1990s and early 2000s – it also 
demonstrates the way in which local, regional and global cultural flows contribute 
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First there was the “Japanophile” (Hari-zu),1 then there was the “Korean Wave”2 
(Hanliu in Chinese; Hallyu in Korean): Japanese and South Korean popular culture 
have taken most East Asian countries by storm since the early and late 1990s 
respectively. These regional cultural flows and their popularity amongst young 
Asians have attracted everyone’s attention, including politicians, historians, local 
media reporters and cultural critics. In the early 90s, Japanese popular media 
products, such as TV programmes, fashion magazines, animations (anime/manga), 
video games, films and pop idols have been enthusiastically consumed by Asian 
youths and have created a particular regional cultural and social field of consumption 
(see Ho and Lee 2002, Kim 2008, Iwabuchi 2002, 2004, Lee 2003).  
 
After the financial crisis in 1997, South Korean media/cultural producers employed a 
specific mass distribution marketing strategy in many Asian countries, by presenting 
their media products as almost as good – if cheaper – than their Japanese 
counterparts. Since then their media products have thrived in Asian countries and 
other parts of the world (see Chua 2008, Shim 2006). Meanwhile, these regional 
cultural flows and their popularity amongst younger generations have raised some 
concerns from local commentators ranging from media figures and politicians to 
scholars. Issues that have been discussed include cultural imperialism (Japan as a 
former coloniser and economic regional superior), cultural proximity (e.g. a common 
geo-cultural region and Asian modernity), postcolonial sentiment and mimicry, to 
media commercialisation and asymmetrical flows. Among these media/cultural 
product flows, Japanese modern dramas, also known as “Japanese Idol/Trendy 
Dramas” are often considered as the initiator of this particular regional popular 
culture circulation, and South Korean (hereafter Korean) TV dramas, a relative 
latecomer, have also followed suit. After the lifting of martial law
3
 in 1987, which led 
                                                 
1.
 This term is generally understood as someone who is infatuated with anything Japanese and is 
commonly used in a Taiwanese media and social context. The term was originally coined by Hari 
Singzi (1996) in Good Morning! Japan to express her great enthusiasm for Japanese culture, language, 
history, lifestyle and so on.      
2
 ‘Korean wave’ refers to the success of South Korean cultural/media products in Asia since the late 
1990s.  
3
  The introduction of martial law and other related laws combined to create an extraordinary legal 
system in the ROC. In the period after World War II, martial law was declared in Taiwan on three 
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to media deregulation and commercialisation in the early 1990s, media industries and 
Taiwanese youth became part of this regional media flow, not as distributors 
themselves but as receivers.  
 
Early research carried out by the ICFP (International Communication Flow Project, 
2001) demonstrated that, in terms of both number of Japanese programmes (194) and 
number of hours (3,848) exported to Asian countries, Taiwan was the lead consumer. 
Previous research conducted by the Japanese scholar Koichi Iwabuchi (2002) in the 
late 1990s also suggested that Taiwanese people are the most enthusiastic external 
audience for Japanese popular culture. In terms of Korean TV dramas, they gained 
popularity amongst a Taiwanese audience from 2001 (Kim 2005) and it is arguable 
that local media industries also play an important role in contributing to this success. 
The San-Li, GTV28, ETTV and Wei-Lai television stations are amongst the most 
frequently viewed cable channels by Taiwanese audiences (see Gallup Taiwan, INC, 
2001) and these channels have devoted several hours a day to air Korean TV dramas 
since 2000
4
. Despite the well established popularity of Japanese and South Korean 
media products in Taiwan and East- Asian countries, there is still rather limited 
empirical research carried out in the field, in particular relating to the comparative 
study of these two regional sources of TV dramas and their young audiences
5
.   
 
The historical connections, geographical proximity and cultural traditions of these 
three nations suggest a common cultural ground for the reception of TV dramas 
(which often depict a more locally based “reality”). Therefore the concept of ‘cultural 
similarity’ or ‘like us but different’ is often used here to investigate their popularity in 
this research. In my opinion this approach only partially explains the situation and 
                                                                                                                                           
separate occasions; after the February 28 Incident in 1947, on December 10, 1947 and on May 19, 
1949. In the third instance, martial law remained in place for 38 years, until it was lifted on July 15, 
1987 (Encyclopaedia of Taiwan). Available from: http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/en/content?ID=3861. 
Further readings see, ‘Taiwan ends 4 decades of martial law’ in New York Times (15th July, 1987) 
Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/15/world/taiwan-ends-4-decades-of-martial-
law.html; ‘Taiwan ends martial law after 38 years but…no dancing in the streets’ in Taiwan 
Communique, September, 1987. Available from: http://www.taiwandc.org/twcom/tc31-int.pdf 
4
 Due to the high volume of broadcast Korean TV dramas over the years, GTV28 has recently been 
urged by the NCC (National Communication Commission) to air more than 12.5 % of locally produced 
programmes in order to renew its licence for the following year (28/10/2011, United Newspaper online 
version). 
5
 Apart from Leung’s conference paper (2004) An Asian formula? Comparative reading of Japanese 
and Korean TV dramas and Ko’s (2004) paper at the same conference (13th JAMCO Online 
International Symposium), From “Hari” to Hanliu”, there has been a lack of empirical research and 
comparative study of both TV dramas’ reception amongst youth audience of one nation in the region.   
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overlooks the more complicated cultural and social implications of young people’s 
desire and ability to negotiate the cultural information which they receive via regional 
popular cultural products. Thus, I argue for a comparative approach to the study of 
the reception of Japanese and Korean TV dramas and its relation to Taiwanese 
youth’s patterns of cultural consumption and identification. This would allow the 
development of a valuable empirical case study based on a de-centred globalised 
media studies, which would also facilitate insight into the cultural logic of 
regionalisation.   
       
Comparing the reception of these two regional TV dramas, allows us to ask to what 
extent the notion of ‘cultural proximity’ interweaves with local, regional and global 
contexts. Furthermore, are TV dramas that are locally produced necessarily more 
acceptable and emotionally connected to, and culturally more understandable by, the 
local audience than those which are foreign-made? Looking at the popularity of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas in Taiwan, I suggest that we should also take into 
account these questions: “Who are the audience?”, “How do audience members 
articulate the foreign TV programmes’ content?” and “To what extent are these 
foreign programmes used as another cultural resource by young Taiwanese audiences 
in the process of social change and cultural identification?” This research, focusing 
on the case of Taiwan, challenges Western-focused media research within the 
discourse of cultural globalisation and suggests that only by further examination of 
the regional popular cultural interaction will we be able to get a better picture of 
transnational audiences’ TV reception and its implications in the field of media 
studies.  
 
This thesis aims to answer the following questions: first, what is transnational media 
consumption within a more regionally-based context? What and how do geographical 
closeness, cultural proximity (e.g. Sinclair 1999, Straubhaar 1991), historical 
connection (e.g. past colonial experience, see Leo Ching 2000a), ‘Asian modernity’ 
and youth consumer culture (e.g. Chua 2000) play in the process of media reception 
and cultural consumption? Second, and focussing on the case of Taiwan, I question 
why and how Japanese and/or South Korean TV dramas have gained in popularity 
among young Taiwanese audiences? What does this social and cultural phenomenon 
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mean to young Taiwanese and how are their perceptions of Japan and South Korea 
affected by their media reception and popular culture consumption over the years?  
 
The first part of this thesis explores young Taiwanese people’s everyday experience 
of Japanese and South Korean pop culture, with a particular focus on youth TV 
dramas (Idol/Trendy dramas) and how these TV dramas’ reception, cultural 
appropriation, comparison and active audience combine to formulate cross-cultural 
media influence. It argues for a more comparative approach to audience reception and 
intra-Asian media studies in the age of globalisation. This is in order to understand 
the complex and active links between the young audience and regional popular 
culture flows, thereby moving beyond commonplace models of Western domination 
and local resistance. I shall further discuss this issue in the second section of Chapter 
2. In addition, during the empirical research on how Japanese and South Korean TV 
dramas are consumed, articulated and negotiated amongst university and secondary 
school students in everyday life, this thesis encountered another dimension of media 
reception and cultural referencing within the ever-changing political discourse of 
nation-building and education reforms on the island, which led to the second part of 
the discussion in this thesis. This is concerned with the dramatic social and political 
changes that have taken place since the early 1990s, and focuses on regional media 
flow and Taiwanese youth’s transnational cultural participation within a specific 
socio-political context which is above all the search for a national identity. The 
second part of the thesis aims to contribute to the study of the relationship between 
youth regional (e.g. geo-cultural regions) popular TV dramas’ reception and national 
cultural identification, and how this dynamic relationship generates different levels of 
social recognition and political awareness in relation to its on-going national 
transformation and cultural reconstruction (e.g. cultural localisation and education 
reforms). 
 
The core of the argument I will put forward is that Taiwan youth transnational media 
consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas not only shapes their cultural taste 
and practice in everyday life but also generates different layers of political 
recognition and cultural identification on the island. Japanese and Korean TV dramas 
and their pop culture as ‘cultural others’ have become a form of “everydayness” 
embedded in young daily life. Ultimately, this transnational negotiation and 
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appropriation of regional popular culture has underlined how the politics of 
Taiwanese identity always implies a rearrangement of relations of cultural 
identification locally, regionally and globally. In other words, young Taiwanese 
people’s reception of regional popular TV dramas suggests that a constant negotiation 
and repositioning in relation to the concept of Taiwanese identity has become a daily 
affair on the island.  
 
 
Political transition and education reform in Taiwan in the 1990s 
 
What is a nation? What is Taiwan? Chang Hui-Chung and Rich Holt suggest that 
‘Taiwan manifests itself as a geographical location, but not a nation; it reflects 
physical reality, but not necessarily national identification. Taiwanese identity must 
be defined through the lens of “Chinese-ness”’ (2007, p. 137). According to Mark 
Harrison’s observations (2006), the publication of secondary school textbooks called 
Renshi Taiwan (Understanding/Knowing Taiwan) in 1997, offered a relatively 
politically and culturally acceptable Taiwanese historiography: Aboriginal, Dutch, 
Zheng Chenggong (Ming Dynasty), Qing Dynasty, Japanese and Republican. The 
island had undergone a series of colonisations and shifts of political power. This has 
resulted in a level of anxiety and complexity in terms of the recent identity formation 
of the “Taiwanese” since 1987. As Lu Hsin-Yi’s powerful quotation from The 
Economist suggests, ‘if Taiwan is a person, Freud might well have been interested in 
the case’ (2002, p. 2). The search for an “authentic” Taiwanese identity, and the 
negotiation of its multi-polar Chinese, Japanese, or Taiwanese elements, as well as 
the absence of “nation” status and international political recognition, remains a 
central issue on the island. The definitions of Taiwanese identity or consciousness 
include deliberate distancing from historical and cultural ties with China; reinforcing 
its “positive” colonial links with Japan, and reinventing and reconnecting with its 
locality. Moreover, the attempt to combine regional and global influences suggests 
that “being” Taiwanese is at the same time “becoming” Taiwanese for younger 
generations. 
 
In 1998 the Taiwanese president, Lee Teng-Hui, suggested the phrase “New 
Taiwanese”, as a slogan for Ma Ying-jeou’s campaign to become Taipei City mayor: 
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Today, all of us who have grown up and lived together on this land, are 
Taiwanese. No matter whether we are aboriginal, or came hundreds of years 
ago or in the last few decades, we are all masters of Taiwan. We have all 
contributed to the development of Taiwan to now, and we all have a 
responsibility to Taiwan’s future. The bigger problem is how to transform our 
love of Taiwan and our feeling towards our compatriots into specific action. 
This is the mission of every “New Taiwanese” (Taiwan de zhuzhang 
[Taiwan’s Position], 1999, p. 264). 
 
The main purpose in creating the concept of the “New Taiwanese” at the time was to 
reconcile the conflict between benshengren (identified as “natives of Taiwan”, or 
“Taiwan inhabitants”) and waishengren (post-1949 mainland refugees, or 
“Mainlanders”), and to integrate yuanzhumin (Taiwanese aborigines). Benshengren, 
in a broader definition, consist of two groups of Han Chinese who speak Chinese 
dialects – Minnan or Hakka – and who migrated to the island pre-1945. Waishengren 
refer to Chinese people who followed Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan after the Chinese 
Nationalist Party lost the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and all their descendants born in 
Taiwan. Yuanzhumin are the earliest inhabitants on the island, and during KMT rule 
they were forced to adopt Han Chinese customs. In Allen Chun’s ‘Fuck Chineseness: 
On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity’ article, he argues that ‘the 
recent emergence of a Taiwanese consciousness that sees itself as a resistance to 
Chinese cultural hegemony can be seen as a direct consequence of a cluster of 
discursive spaces that served to reify such dualistic conceptions’ (1996a, p. 132). 
Arguably, “New Taiwanese”, the representation of the people in Taiwan as a 
symbolically bonded set of aboriginal groups, bensheng ren and waisheng ren – 
creates a sense of community, a singular collectivity, and therefore a national place 
called “Taiwan”. 
 
The reformation of the national education system in the early 1990s (mainly 
concentrated on secondary school textbooks) added the Renshi Taiwan 
(Understanding/Knowing Taiwan) textbooks to the school curriculum in 1997, which 
was proposed to promote the concepts of localisation, internationalisation, and 
normalisation of Taiwan. The goal was lizu Taiwan, xiong-hual dalu, fangyan shjie 
which Daniel Lynch translated (2004, p. 515) as “establish themselves on Taiwan, 
have concern for the mainland, and open their eyes to the world”. Nevertheless, 
according to Mark Harrison:  
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Although the Understanding Taiwan textbooks are a key example of the 
legitimisation of Taiwanese identity by the state, they also legitimise precisely the 
same appeal to a Taiwanese nationhood made by many commentators, academics, 
and politicians in the 1990s. The identity debates through the 1990s narrated a 
teleology of national realisation through the notion of an identity crisis, invoking an 
assumed nation by writing as if a Taiwanese nation were waiting for its realisation 
and fulfilment. Therefore, the basis of Taiwanese national identity in the post-martial 
law period is its very contestability (2006, p. 196). 
 
The definition and construction of a “new” Taiwanese identity and consciousness is 
considered simultaneously by looking backwards and forwards, what Bhabha (1990, 
p. 297) calls ‘a sense of double time.’ A political interpretation of time from the 
distant past to the present is clearly future-oriented, not simply a retracing of the past. 
Furthermore, Harrison argues that: 
  
Taiwanese identity is not naturalized or commonsensical. Its urgency and 
unease, the way it continues to be invested with emotion even in the every day 
by many Taiwanese people, reflects its contestation and its disturbed 
boundaries, both within Taiwanese society and in Taiwan’s relations with its 
“others’: China, the rest of Asia, or the West (2006, pp. 162-163).  
 
The unsettled political ideology and power shifts, the reformation of the education 
curriculum, the promotion of “native” languages (mother tongues linked to ones’ 
ethnic group, such as Hakka, Minnan and the several aboriginal languages), and the 
intensive transnational cultural flows, leave young people in present-day Taiwan 
constantly debating not only their sense of belonging but also the idea of “What does 
‘Taiwan’ mean?” “What makes Taiwan?”  
 
Megan Morris (1992) characterises the nation-state as a “workable context”, an 
articulation of regional and global flows. “The national” is not to be conceived of in 
terms of an authentic, primordial identity, nor is it to be theorized in isolation from 
regional and global articulations of power and culture (cited in Wiley 2004, p. 89). 
Arguably, the notions of re-inscription and relocation of Taiwanese local culture 
emerge out of national political power shifts and merely survive in the face of global 
contestation. To be Taiwanese, now, is to be implicated in local, national, regional 
and global spaces and being Taiwanese is about managing the political, cultural and 
social transitions in everyday life. Instead of viewing the nation as a certain kind of 
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place that is determined by, or resistant to, outside forces, we can see it as an 
articulated context composed of these forces. In the face of these circumstances, this 
thesis asks, how do Taiwanese young people deal with the continuous, unsettling 
political and cultural transitions around them, and what kind of role do transnational 
TV programmes play in this process, in particular?  
 
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
Initially, this thesis sets out to examine the relationship between the reception of 
regional TV dramas and youth transnational cultural consumption, drawing on Ang’s 
notion of the ‘pleasure of recognition’ (1985, p. 20) and Iwabuchi’s ‘sense of social 
and cultural articulation associated with the pleasure of text’ (2002, pp. 133-135). It 
seems fair to assume that the cultural consumption of foreign TV dramas which 
depict day-to-day life would have a deep impact on the Taiwanese young audience’s 
understanding of their own society. Based on this presumption, I initially expected to 
witness these young people actively consuming popular cultural products from either 
Japan or South Korea or both, and also showing a wide range of knowledge about 
both Japanese and Korean society and way of life.  
 
However, during my fieldwork I realised my assumption was overly simplistic and I 
had possibly overlooked the complexity of young people’s cultural consumption of 
foreign TV dramas (which also included reflection and negotiation), particularly in 
relation to their daily “embeddedness” within a larger political, social and economic 
context. Indeed, the Taiwanese national anxiety over its status as an independent 
nation and the constant struggle for recognition within the international community 
consciously “erases” its cultural relationship with mainland China, and has constantly 
challenged young people to (re)negotiate their sense of being or becoming 
“Taiwanese”. Sequentially, I reflect on the outcomes of data collection and interviews 
in relation to the notion of “Taiwaneseness” and the political discourse of cultural 
identification. The second part of this thesis is designed to further explore whether 
this recognition develops into a particular mode of identity formation or cultural 
identification and challenges one’s own sense of national cultural identity. At the 
same time, how the students negotiate or incorporate “otherness” into their everyday 
lives will also be discussed in the second part of this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 discusses the methods, data-collection techniques and the analytical 
approach to empirical data.  It will also explain why this thesis has been divided into 
two parts to apprehend the complexity of regional media culture flows and its 
implications in the recognition of cultural identity in Taiwan. In so doing, I argue that 
transnational media consumption amongst young people is not limited by the daily 
practice of consumer culture or transnational cultural imagery, as early research 
suggested. Rather, through the comparative reading of both regional TV dramas and 
different levels of popular cultural acceptance among different audience groups in 
Taiwan, the outcomes of this empirical research have shaped the second part of this 
thesis. Thus, I will discuss how Taiwanese youth actively integrate foreign cultural 
elements and local socio-political transformations as a way of constructing and 
positioning a sense of Taiwanese consciousness, all in an age of intense regional 
popular culture and media flows at the beginning of the 21st century.      
 
My research subject is predominantly a young audience, although Korean TV dramas 
do attract a strong audience of middle-aged women in Taiwan. My research focus is 
on the consumption of transnational media products through youth culture, focusing 
particularly on TV dramas and the possible cultural identification with “others,” all 
within the context of recent nation-building processes in Taiwan. My choice of 
subject is, therefore, concentrated on secondary school and university students. 
 
The groups of choice also allow the advantage of understanding the possible contrasts 
between different younger generations, especially in relation to their cultural and 
national identifications. Methods of data collection involved the distribution of a 
questionnaire which was designed to obtain a general understanding about the 
consumption of both Japanese and Korean TV dramas. This was then followed by 
group discussions or one-to-one interviews, which function as an important way to 
diagnose and record youth perceptions, thoughts and actions in relation to the foreign 
TV dramas.  
 
Chapter 2 consists of literature reviews relevant to the first part of the thesis. It is 
divided into two sections. The first section discusses Western media studies’ cross-
cultural readings of soap operas/TV dramas (Allen 1995, Ang 1985, Katz and Liebes 
1990), and focuses on transnational audience reception and meaning-making in 
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relation to the notion of symbolic cultural consumption and transnational cultural 
identification (see Gillespie 1995, Miller 1994). The second section of the chapter 
reviews trans-regional popular media consumption amongst youths in East Asian 
countries with a particular focus on the popularity of so-called “Trendy/Idol dramas” 
(Iwabuchi 2002, Chua 2004). In addition this examines how Taiwanese youth 
audiences consume “Japanese Idol/Trendy Dramas” in relation to cultural symbolic 
consumption, and the pleasures, images and dreams this generates. In turn this leads 
us to question to what extent this transnational television consumption has added 
different cultural ingredients in terms of youth cultural identification and social 
imagination given issues of cultural proximity and hybridisation (Lee 2003, Yu-ling 
Su 1999). Equally important is the rise of the so-called “Korean Wave” phenomenon 
since the early 2000s, and its popularity in relation to Asian modernity and traditional 
Confucian values (see Leung 2004, p. 3) and the similarities and differences between 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas. In so doing, I propose a comparative studies-based 
model in which trans-regional media reception moves beyond a “local TV dramas vs. 
foreign TV dramas” paradigm or the notion of cultural similarity vs. ‘cultural 
discount’. Thus, I have explored these regional TV drama flows as a social and 
cultural phenomena through an integrative framework which draws on 
transnational/trans-regional media studies, media consumption and everyday life 
studies. This will illustrate the dynamic interaction between external cultural 
resources and local cultural practice.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 are based on empirical research related to the initial research 
project. Chapter 3 traces university students as they (re)interpret Japanese and Korean 
TV dramas and as they become more conscious of the programmes’ genre and 
contents. These chapters ask why they are in favour of one over the other and how the 
cultural consumption of “Japaneseness” has shifted from object consumption to 
“abstract meaning” which is reproduced outside of Japan and translated from its 
original source. The university viewer’s narrative sentimental reflexivity on regional 
TV dramas contents (arguably, Japanese ones) coincides with Iwabuchi’s ‘a story 
about us’ (2005, p. 24) and Ang’s ‘pleasure of recognition’ (1985, p. 20). The 
narrative reading and emotional connection with the characters’ story generate a 
shared sense of a ‘structure of feeling’ (Williams 1977, p. 128). In other words, it 
suggests a common set of perceptions and values shared by a particular generation, 
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and is clearly articulated in particular artistic forms and conventions (ibid., pp. 132-
133). Nonetheless, I will argue that the students’ reception of regional TV dramas is 
not limited to emotional connections or pure entertainment, but rather it becomes a 
way of formulating perceptions of Japan and Korea in a more complicated social, 
political and cultural sense. After analysing university students’ reception of both 
foreign TV dramas and their cultural practices in daily life, which encompass their 
narrative-sentimental reflexivity, I discuss how the consumption of TV drama’ by-
products, such as soundtracks, posters, original comic books and novels which 
represent a particular cultural symbolism for their consumers, has changed over time. 
To conclude, I argue that university students’ preference for Japanese TV dramas is 
closely related to their perceptions of both countries and their reception habits, and 
also examine to what extent TV dramas reinforce their cultural misconceptions.  
 
In Chapter 4 I delineate university and secondary school students’ different methods 
of textual interpretation and consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas in 
terms of their textual interpretations, the influence of programme merchandising and 
the diverse range of emotional connections to the programmes. This is outlined in 
direct relation to the students’ particular social and educational status. In addition, my 
research demonstrates that the place and space of secondary students’ television 
viewing is rather different from that of university students. Different programmes 
often involve different family members as viewers (Morley 1986). The viewing of 
TV dramas in most Taiwanese families often involves the mother, elderly family 
members and young teenagers, whereas most university students are more likely to 
watch programmes on their own. Occasionally, for secondary school students, 
relevant discussions in relation to the content of these programmes will be raised 
during the process of watching. Japanese animations were not part of my initial 
research; however, when I conducted research with secondary school students their 
interest in Japanese animations was constantly on display. In contrast to the idea of 
Japanese animation as ‘culturally odourless’ products (Iwabuchi 2002, p. 27), Herng 
Su’s (1999) research shows that the consumption of Japanese animations and their 
by-products has created their own – to borrow Lee’s term – ‘Japanised cultural 
consumption space’ (Lee 2003, p. 48). Based on secondary school students’ 
responses, it has been suggested that their consumption of Japanese animations (and 
by-products) not only displays the awareness of the products of origin – hence, that 
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they are not culturally odourless – but also often shows their in-depth knowledge and 
positive perception of the productions concerned. 
 
Chapter 5 is a literature review corresponding to the second part of the thesis. It maps 
out the theoretical background of national and cultural identity which paves the way 
for the discussion of the modern construction and (re)invention of Taiwanese identity 
and its ambivalence. Using Benedict Anderson’s notion of ‘nation as imagined 
political community’ (1991, p. 6) and Anthony Smith’s (1999) emphasis on the 
importance of myths and memories of the nation, I explore how these two contrasting 
approaches somehow match two opposing Taiwanese political parties’ (Democratic 
Progressive Party, DPP and Chinese Nationalist Party, Kuomingtan, KMT) 
ideologies. I also discuss the recent political construction of Taiwan as an 
(independent) country since the lifting of martial law in 1987, looking at notions such 
as the (re)connection and search for a Taiwanese local cultural consciousness (e.g. the 
bentuhua movement). Focusing on Homi K. Bhabha’s (1990) concept of narrating the 
nation and the ‘third space’ (1988, p. 21) in relation to national culture, I aim to 
explore the absence of Taiwanese subjectivity and the “politics of identity” in Taiwan 
within the fields of post-colonial approaches with a particular focus on cultural 
hybridity as a cultural logic of globalisation (see Kraidy 2005). In the last section of 
the chapter I will briefly outline recent debates about national and cultural identity 
and the decline of the nation-state in the age of globalisation. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 are the second part of the main body of the thesis based on the 
empirical research. Chapter 6 discusses how by “making sense” of the popularity of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas in Taiwan, university students come to recognise the 
cultural difference or similarity between these three countries as a way of negotiating 
and articulating their perspective on Taiwan as a nation, and how it reflects on their 
cultural positioning and subjectivity, which forms one of the key elements in the 
development of the national idea in Taiwan. In this chapter I also investigate how, 
through the process of recognising difference and similarity of the foreign culture that 
is being represented on screen, university students become active cultural observers. 
By comparing the cultural consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas amongst 
younger generations, this study moves beyond the concept of cultural proximity, 
cultural imperialism and nation as an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991, p. 6); 
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instead it argues that in the construction of national and cultural identity in Taiwan, 
both foreign TV dramas have provided a cultural ‘third space’6 (Bhabha 1988, p. 21) 
for young people to negotiate and translate their sense of belonging and ways of 
identification. Moreover, the temporality of negotiation, articulation and translation of 
transnational media cultures also suggest generational cultural identification 
difference as well as youth self-reflexivity and cultural repositioning in relation to the 
nation-building project in Taiwan. The formation of youth cultural identity in Taiwan 
appears to not only be a specific project but it also questions the concept of nation, 
national consciousness and cultural identity which should not be seen from a binary 
perspective, such as past/present, here/there, or tradition/invention, but as something 
“in-between”, to be constantly negotiated and translated. 
 
Chapter 7 explores how the reformation of the education system and curriculum – e.g. 
‘Understanding Taiwan’ (Renshi Taiwan) textbooks and the search for national and 
cultural identity in Taiwan since the late 1990s – suggest that secondary school 
students, who are affected by these reforms, articulate and negotiate their ideas of 
Taiwanese identity by incorporating this influence based on their textbook 
knowledge. All of this is taking place in an age of intensive transnational cultural 
flows. For instance, some have declared that being Taiwanese is to have “Taiwanese 
spirit” (Taiwan jingshen) and some believe being Taiwanese is to know one’s 
community history and to celebrate local folk culture and customs. The complexity of 
“Taiwanisation” and the bentuhua (localisation/indigenisation/nativisation) 
movement, which emphasises the notion of locality and a sense of community has, to 
a certain extent, provoked local differences since the late 1990s. Within this socio-
political context, I suggest that regional popular culture consumption, which can be 
referred to as ‘referential cultural others’, has formulated and reinforced secondary 
school students’ perception of the cultural difference between north and south in 
Taiwan. To put it bluntly, those who easily accept and consume foreign culture (e.g. 
Japanese, Korean and/or American popular culture) have been perceived as not 
identifying with Taiwan, and lacking Taiwanese spirit (Taiwan jingshen) by young 
teenagers from the south. This chapter also shows that an analysis of the political 
discourse of Taiwanisation and youth consumption of regional popular culture in 
                                                 
6 ‘The intervention of the Third Space, which makes the structure of meaning and reference an 
ambivalent process, destroys this mirror of representation in which cultural knowledge is continuously 
revealed as an integrated, open, expanding code’ (Bhabha, 1988, p. 21). 
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everyday life suggests the need for further exploration of the meaning of regional 
cultural flows in relation to national identification, social formation and cultural 
transformation.  
  
Chapter 8 concludes that the complexity and ambivalence of national identity for 
Taiwanese youth is influenced by and reflected in their reception of Japanese and 
Korean popular culture, in this case TV dramas (Idol/Trendy Dramas). Diverse 
cultural experience and viewing practices reveal that young Taiwanese audiences 
construct their personal narratives and the structure of their cultural imagery as a 
result of different levels of identification with “sameness” and “otherness”. The 
ability of these young audiences to negotiate, appropriate and contest their ideas of 
Taiwanese national and cultural identity under the influence of foreign popular 
cultural products indicate that “mimicking” regional (mainly Japanese and South 
Korean) popular cultures serves to fill a void: the absence of a clearly defined 
Taiwanese identity.  
 
Popular Japanese and South Korean television dramas have opened up a cultural 
space for alternative forms of agency by situating their cultural practices in the 
recognisable reality of young Taiwanese people’s lives. Hence, the perspectives of 
making and translating Taiwanese identity since the lifting of martial law in 1987 will 
remain incomplete until the influence of foreign TV programmes are taken into 
consideration. I believe that the modern construction of a nation in Taiwan and its 
cultural identity in the context of regional popular cultural flows has provided the 
younger generation in Taiwan with a ‘third cultural space’ where they can articulate, 
negotiate and translate in relation to their social and cultural status, and self-
consciously create a sense of “Taiwaneseness.” On the basis of these quantitative and 
qualitative opinion surveys, and in conjunction with my further research, I conclude 
that for the younger generation in Taiwan the meaning of “being” and/or “becoming” 
Taiwanese is inevitably caught up in the triple pull of the local (Taiwanisation), the 










Reception and cultural consumption: Researching young people’s 




In the David Buckingham edited book Reading Audiences: Young People and the 
Media he points out that ‘the media play a significant role in young people’s 
relationships with their families and their peers, and in the process by which their 
identities come to be formed’ (1993, p. 5).  Nonetheless, he also stresses that instead 
of seeking evidence of media effects, one should ‘investigate the ways in which 
young people use and make sense of the media in the context of their lived social 
experiences’ (ibid., p. 6). The media, to him, are not to be seen as ‘a powerful source 
of dominant ideologies’, but as a ‘symbolic resource’ which young people use in 
making sense of their experiences, in relating to others and in organising their daily 
lives (ibid., p. 13). In his review of research on young people and media as these 
relate to the concept of ‘power’, Buckingham also argues that:  
          
Power is not something which can be identified in the abstract, or 
appropriated according to some generalised theoretical equation. On the 
contrary, it is very much an empirical issue, that needs to be addressed in 
relation to specific audiences, specific media and specific social contexts of 
use (ibid., p. 14). 
 
It is with this objective in view that this thesis is based largely on field research-based 
questionnaires, relatively small-scale group and individual interviews, and on the 
detailed analysis of written or spoken data. In many instances, Taiwanese young 
audiences’ comparative reading of two different imported media resources from the 
region (Japan and South Korea in this case) contributes not only to the study of youth 
culture and media, but also provides much needed empirical research data on young 
people’s transnational media use within the larger context of their social activities and 
experiences.  
 
This chapter looks at the process through which the fieldwork was carried out and 
discusses the techniques of data collection – questionnaires and in-depth 
interviews/group discussions. I will also demonstrate the advantages and limitations 
of this research method and argue the importance of comparative reading in the field 
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of audience research and transnational TV consumption. Furthermore, reflecting on 
the process and outcomes of data collection, I shall explain why and how this 
research project is presented in two separate parts. Part 1 focuses on transnational 
media consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas and their cultural 
appropriation in young people’s everyday life. Part 2 discusses the role of Japanese 
and Korean TV dramas as cultural others in relation to the (trans)formation of a sense 
of national and cultural identity in Taiwan.  
 
 
Methods of data collection and limitations 
 
a. Questionnaire design and distributions    
 
My research began with the design and delivery of a questionnaire
7
 which was carried 
out between 2003 and 2005. The questionnaire was intended to investigate many 
aspects of audience relations to Japanese and Korean TV dramas, how the reception 
of foreign programmes might vary, and furthermore to explore how the modes of 
reception have been shaped – at least in part – by the cultural practices and social 
conventions within the local contexts.      
 
According to Bourdieu, quantitative survey methods are ideally suited to the purposes 
of establishing broad patterns of media consumption and taste, particularly if used in 
conjunction with more qualitative methods (cited in Gillespie 1995, p. 52). In order to 
add reliability and validity to the information the combining of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches has been employed in this thesis. Questionnaires as a 
quantitative method may suggest questions suitable for further investigation through 
means of in-depth qualitative methods. A quantitative survey (questionnaire) was 
carried out before the in-depth interview and a small group discussion was held. 
Questionnaires were self-completed by 276 students from different gender and age 
groups (distributed in the classrooms and divided into three groups: junior secondary, 
senior secondary, and college and university students). Closed-ended questions were 
designed as the basic framework for the questions in the questionnaire. Arguably, the 
                                                 
7
 A sample questionnaire is included in Appendix 1. 
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closed-ended questions are easy to “answer” therefore they tend to cut down non-
responses (Ruane 2005, p. 131). As my research subjects are teenagers and young 
adult audiences whom I located via educational institutions, closed-ended questions 
can encourage students’ quick and easy responses within a limited time. The age 
range was made consistent by using three groups based upon the educational 
institutions they attended: junior secondary school (13-15); senior secondary school 
(16-18), (two age groups which I have categorised as secondary school students in my 
empirical chapters) and university students (19-22) (although some mature students 
from university are over 22 years old, but not older than 25 – in this case I still 
consider them as belonging to a ‘young adult’ audience). 
 
The questionnaire sample consists of 276 Taiwanese young people who are studying 
in secondary schools (118) and universities (158). To explore the wider range of the 
reception and consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas among young people, 
the content of the close-ended questionnaire was divided into three sections. Section 1, 
Media reception of Japanese and South Korean TV dramas, consisted of twelve 
questions which are designed to investigate the respondents’ general reception of 
Japanese and South Korean TV dramas, including hours watching per week, viewing 
experience, medium used, level of engagement while viewing and motivation of 
programme choice, and so on. The aim of this section is to obtain general knowledge 
of Taiwanese youth TV reception which also provides the opportunity to statistically 
evaluate the actual viewing participation of Japanese and Korean TV dramas amongst 
young audiences.  
 
Section 2, Consumer behaviour and the consumption of idol dramas by-products, 
consists of three questions concerning their consumption of related commodities and 
programme by-products. The questions are based on early scholarly debates and 
research on the relationship between media and consumption. According to Don 
Slater (1997), consumption is a cultural processing, a meaningful activity, and the 
consumer culture is formed by the pattern of cultural production. This section is 
therefore designed to inquire into what sort of programme related commodities are 




Section 3, General knowledge and cultural recognition of Japan and South Korea, is 
based on five questions relating to respondents’ understanding and recognition of 
Japan and South Korea as nations (such as national status, lifestyle, culture and 
languages) and their personal desire to live in or visit these two countries. This 
section aims to examine the notion of cultural proximity and geo-cultural regions in 
terms of youths’ perspectives on, and knowledge of, both nations to tease out their 
self-reflexive response to the last question of this section: ‘Do you categorise yourself 
as Japanophile/Koreanophile?,’ which proved to be valuable as an opening question 
during the interview and group discussion.        
  
Closed-ended questions were used as the basic framework the questions posed in this 
research, but in order to ascertain the youths’ opinions of Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas in Taiwan and test their willingness to engage in further research, three open-
ended questions were included in Section 4, Comparative readings on Japanese and 
Korean idol dramas. In this section respondents were able to further express their 
opinion on their personal viewing experience of Japanese and Korean TV dramas, 
their reasons for programme preference and critical response in terms of production 
quality, contents desirability and so forth.        
 
In addition, at the end of the questionnaire I asked the respondents who might be 
willing to take part in further group discussions or interviews to leave their contact 
phone number or e-mail address. In this way I was able to have two discussion groups 
of junior secondary school students, each with a group of seven and eight participants; 
two discussion groups of senior secondary school students, each with groups of three 
and six participants; and nine individual university interviewees (two of them via e-
mail correspondence).  
 
Overall, drawing on the results of the questionnaire, one of the advantages was to be 
able to use some part of the responses to formulate questions before I conducted my 
interview and group discussion. For instance, secondary school students are more 
likely to watch TV dramas with family members (47.2%) in comparison with 
university students (29.5%) in a multiple choice of viewing companionship (Section 1, 
Question 4). Thus, during my group discussion with secondary school students, the 
power dynamic in the living room (i.e. who gets to decide what programme to watch) 
 26 
and the content-related discussion on during the family viewing time illustrates that 
teenagers’ reading of TV dramas is less about self-reflexivity but is rather a means of 
social and cultural formation through discussion and negotiation among family 
members which I will further discuss in Chapter 4, Section 2. 
 
Numeric results of the questionnaire from university students and secondary school 
students are presented in Appendices 3 and 4 respectively. The comments made at the 
end of open-ended questions will be cited anonymously throughout the thesis. In 
general discussion groups with secondary school students were only held once, and 
each lasted about one hour and a half. The individual interviews with university 
students each lasted approximately forty-five minutes, apart from the two which were 
completed via email correspondence. Both one-to-one interviews and group 
discussions were recorded by tape recorder or mini disc during the session. The first 
names and ages of the interviewees and group discussion participants are listed in 
Appendix 2. 
 
b. One-to-one interview with university students 
 
The original plan was that from the questionnaire respondents I would seek out 
around 4-6 students in each group to participate in the group discussion. Why groups? 
One of the main reasons is that focus group interviews ‘allow the researcher to 
observe how audiences make sense of media through conversation and interaction 
with each other’ (Hansen, 1988, p. 258). Earlier research has suggested amongst 
young audiences transnational TV dramas function as daily gossip or as fashion 
guides (see, Gillespie, 1995, Iwabuchi, 2001, Miller, 1995). Therefore I was hoping 
the group discussion would create a sense of the daily conversational atmosphere 
amongst peers in order to generate detailed and complex data about how young 
people interpret, negotiate, appropriate and use media content. However, with the 
university students I failed to accomplish this due to the fact that most of the 
respondents were either too busy with their schedule or preferred a one-to-one 
interview. Therefore, the small discussion groups were only held with junior and 
senior secondary school students (each divided into two groups). 
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Most interviews were conducted at fast food restaurants or cafés, a less formal setting 
which made the interviews feel more like a friendly conversation. The advantage of 
this kind of setting is that the interviewee feels more relaxed and more inclined to 
discuss their viewing experience and how they appropriate these dramas in a more 
self-reflexive manner and without self-consciousness or worrying that their ‘guilty-
pleasure’ will be interpreted or labelled as “Japanonphile” or “Koreanophile”, given 
that the local media often associate these terms with manic and irrational fan 
behaviour. I had a number of key questions in mind when I set out for these in-depth 
interviews, such as: “Can you talk about your viewing experience of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas?”; “Do you have any preference for either TV programme?”; 
“What cultural and social elements do you find interesting or disapprove of while 
viewing the programmes?”; and “Any favourite drama and why?” Because I had 
chosen to apply a comparative approach and investigate the transnational reading of 
these two regional TV dramas amongst young people in Taiwan, the aim of these 
questions was to get a better understanding of what cultural role these two regional 
TV dramas played in the young adult audiences’ daily lives and how they interacted 
with regional media flows in relation to their social formations. In retrospect, I was 
assuming a stable understanding of what being Taiwanese was. 
 
Interviews with university students were conducted in a rather straightforward and 
pleasant fashion. However, I also realised that during our conversations, university 
students often see themselves as people who are not being influenced by regional 
popular flows and TV drama consumption, but instead, were expressing their 
concerns regarding how teenagers are being overwhelmed by regional popular culture 
and media products. I will further discuss their comments and their political and 
cultural implications within the discourse of Taiwan’s national and cultural 









c. Group discussion with secondary school students 
 
Initially my approach to group discussion with secondary school students was not 
very different from university students apart from those which were conducted in the 
classroom or a common room on campus. I had almost the same set of questions 
which I used to conduct my interviews with university students. Not long after, 
various difficulties were encountered in the course of carrying out this project. 
Therefore I had to respond flexibly and self-reflexively, adjusting my way of 
interviewing or handling the discussion group accordingly throughout my research. 
For instance, with junior secondary school students I had to encourage them to speak 
their own mind most of the time; it happened several times that once someone stated 
his/her opinion, others would just follow and add “I think so, too”. In this instance, I 
would suggest that young audience readings of TV programmes not only respond to 
the programme itself but also to others’ reading of the programme during group 
discussions.  
 
Another unexpected outcome from the group discussion was the fascination with 
Japanese animation and Korean cuisine, which I did not anticipate. Japanese 
animation, despite being categorised as ‘culturally odourless’ by the Japanese scholar 
Koichi Iwabuchi (2001, p. 55), has historical and cultural roots in Taiwan since the 
late 1970s and has been consumed enthusiastically by both male and female students 
(see Chen 2005, Shiraishi 2000, Herng Su 1999, Yu-ling Su 1999). According to 
Herng Su’s (1999) research, in late 1990s Japanese animations (cartoons) were the 
most popular foreign programmes in Taiwan: almost 42.7 per cent of his respondents 
watched Japanese programmes regularly. I will further elaborate on this particular 
cultural consumption and its possible connection to viewing Japan as a creative 
country, and how it formulates youth’s positive perception of Japanese TV dramas in 
Chapter 4, Section 3.   
 
The growing consumption of Korean cuisine was due to the massive success of the 
Korean period drama, Dae Jang-geum (Jewel in the Palace)8 which was broadcasted 
                                                 
8
 Dae-Jang-geum first aired on MBC in South Korea from September 2003 to March 2004. The story 
was based on the real historical figure Jang-geum, who became the first head physician to the King in 
the patriarchal Confucian society of the Chosun Dynasty of Korea in the mid-sixteenth century.  The 
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in Taiwan in May 2004 and achieved six per cent in the ratings, a surprising figure for 
a foreign programme in Taiwan (Kim, 2009, p. 739). This popularity has led to the 
burgeoning number of Korean restaurants in Taiwan and a Dae Jang-geum-inspired 
cookbook was published in 2005. I visited one of local Korean restaurants during my 
field work in 2005, and noticed that not only is the Dae Jang-geum book displayed in 
the restaurant, but one is also offered a Dae Jang-geum special set menu. However, 
due to the lack of sufficient evidence from my field work, I decided not to discuss this 
particular cultural phenomenon in this thesis further. 
 
d. Limitations and challenges  
 
Reflecting on my method of data collection and manner of conducting fieldwork, I 
realised that while my research was focused on cross-cultural comparative readings of 
regional TV dramas amongst Taiwanese youth and their transnational media 
consumption and cultural practice in everyday life, there may have been some absent 
voices. In the collection of my data, notably at university level, I may have possibly 
excluded groups of young people who do not participate in the higher education 
system.  This can lead to a possible criticism regarding the issue of class and 
questions such as “who represents Taiwanese youth?,” and was my group of choice 
already leaning toward those who had access to the subject material and who were 
also more likely to give me “intellectual” responses. Indeed, when I set out to conduct 
the research with limited networking, time and financial support, I believed that my 
research choices were the best possible way to collect enough data samples, as well as 
facilitating follow-up group discussions and interviews. Thus this thesis, to an extent, 
only represents a specific group of Taiwanese youth and within a specific social 
context of use. Nonetheless, I still believe this thesis maintains its importance in 
terms of understanding the role transnational TV dramas play in Taiwanese local 
youths’ (university and secondary school students) everyday lives.  
 
Arguably, when the questionnaires were completed in the classrooms, this allowed 
for a quicker turnaround in terms of data collection and produced higher response 
rates than postal questionnaires. Therefore, through friends of mine who teach in 
                                                                                                                                           
main story is that Jang-geum enters the royal palace at the age of 10 and dedicated herself to learning 
how to cook based on the philosophy that the goal of cooking is to foster the recipient’s good health 
and happiness (Sujeong Kim, 2009, p. 739-740).   
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junior/senior secondary schools and universities I went to schools and asked the 
students to fill in the questionnaire when the class had just begun. It takes between 
fifteen to twenty minutes to complete the six-page questionnaire. All the 
questionnaires were carried out in classrooms. The advantage of this method of data 
collection is that respondents were in a quieter environment and they could 
concentrate on the questions, and also could raise queries if they were unclear about 
the questions. However, there is also the risk that they might discuss their “answers” 
with peers (particularly among junior secondary students), in order to compose a 
“correct” answer or so as not to feel left out.  
 
In addition, one of the possible imbalances in the data collection is that due to a lack 
of networks I was only able to base my research groups on junior and senior 
secondary schools in the south of Taiwan (which may be considered rural areas and 
quite different from the so-called metropolitan city of Taipei), and university students 
in Taipei. Koichi Iwabuchi (2002) believes that when he conducted audience research 
in Taiwan, Japanese TV dramas were considered as attracting more young people 
who live in metropolitan areas than those who live outside. Nevertheless, my 
questionnaire shows that most respondents had access to and view both Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas. Due to the fact that I did not conduct research in Taipei-based 
secondary schools, it will be impossible for me to compare the possible differences 
between regions regarding the consumption and reception of foreign programmes. 
Yet, it is also difficult and problematic to define those students who are from urban 
areas and who are from rural locales: for instance, the university students who study 
in Taipei can be originally from rural areas. However, I would suggest that this topic 
needs further research in terms of transnational media consumption in relation to 
geographical variations and individual responses which are mediated and limited by 
cultural taste and social structure.   
 
 
Unexpected turns:  
From youth transnational media consumption to cultural referential 
positioning  
 
David Morley argues that ‘We do need always to be prepared for the possibility that 
our research trajectories will take us to destinations which we had not anticipated’ 
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(Morley and Brunsdon 1999, p. 198). Fascinated by the popularity of Japanese and 
South Korean popular culture amongst Taiwanese young people in the 1990s and 
2000s respectively, I started my research project by choosing to focus on TV dramas 
for several reasons. First, the melodrama/soap opera/telenovela is often considered as 
a highly “local” audience-based programme due to its content and often understood as 
closely depicting a local way of life thus providing opportunities for common cultural 
understandings. Second, and in contrast to the early research on cross-cultural reading 
of one particular programme – Dallas – this was defined as closely depicting an 
‘American way of life’ and perceived as a form of Western (American) media 
imperialism by its foreign audience. My study is to examine the popularity of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas to provide a more comparative reading of foreign 
TV dramas and their cultural implications in an East-Asian context. Thirdly, I aim to 
explore how Raymond Williams’s notions of ‘culture as a whole way of life’ (1977, 
p. 13) and ‘culture as a structure of feeling’ (ibid., p. 128) are depicted in Japanese 
and Korean TV dramas and embedded in the youth’s everyday life practices, and how 
the intimacy of transnational TV dramas viewing is not just personal but can also be 
cultural. In other words, TV drama viewing is not limited to individual emotional 
connection and pleasure of recognition via different means of cultural articulation 
with texts. Rather, foreign TV drama viewing and transnational imagination should 
be seen as a dynamic and contested field of cultural practice and negotiation.      
 
However, over the years this project has evolved into a wider socio-political 
investigation of transnational media reception and consumption, in particular in its 
relation to youth cultural identification and nation-building in Taiwan. This is partly 
due to Taiwan’s unique situation, namely its historical connection with Japan, shifts 
in its political ideology and its attempts at national modernisation in the context of 
regionalisation and globalisation, as well as a sense of “Taiwaneseness” which 
involves both inward searching and outward borrowing. In the process of my research 
I have encountered young people of different generations who have grown up in 
specific social, cultural and political contexts which have shaped their sense of 
collective sensibility and “national” awareness in relation to cross-culture 
consumption of regional TV dramas which show various forms of negotiation and 
contestation.  
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For instance, university students are more likely to express a sense of anxiety 
regarding the popularity of Japanese and Korean popular culture in Taiwan, 
particularly in relation to the formation of Taiwanese identity, during interviews, even 
when they often regard young people’s consumption of regional TV dramas as a form 
of entertainment. Conversely, secondary students are more “relaxed” on the issue of 
identity, often showing their assertion of “being Taiwanese” by referencing school 
textbooks and interpreting their Taiwanese identity by emphasising the notion of 
locality or so-called “Taiwanese grass-roots culture”. In this sense, younger viewers’ 
cultural readings of transnational TV dramas are the result of the articulation of 
different experiences of educational reforms, as well as ongoing political transitions 
and local cultural formations in Taiwanese. I will further elaborate on this in Chapter 
7. 
 
As part of a generation who witnessed dramatic political, economic, social and media 
changes in Taiwanese society since the early 1990s, I was anxious about, but also 
excited by the political transformation in society in the age of globalisation and 
regional cultural flows. My perspective was simply that of an observer of youth 
reception of Japanese and Korean TV dramas and what I was hoping to achieve in 
this project was to explore what this cultural phenomenon meant and how it was 
experienced through various means of commodity consumption and cultural 
appropriation. It was from this viewpoint that I conducted my research with the 
younger generation, and I often found myself astounded by young viewers’ cultural 
knowledge of Japan and South Korea as well as their points of view on the “building” 
of Taiwanese identity and Taiwan as a nation in general. The comparative reading of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas amongst young people is not merely a transnational 
media experience which simply reflects on individual preference for dramatic texts 
and sentimental connections.  Regional popular TV dramas also function as a form of 
alternative cultural reference amongst youths in terms of making sense of what 
Taiwanese identity is and also offer an opportunity to reflect on how Taiwan as a 
nation can be “re-imagined” in modern times.  
          
In the process of conducting my research the issue of Taiwanese identity in terms of 
its daily social and cultural experience and practice has gradually been incorporated 
into my discussion with Taiwanese youth in relation to the popularity of Japanese and 
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Korean TV dramas. Throughout the research, in group discussions and interviews 
with both secondary school and university students, the popularity of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas was ascribed to the fact that ‘we do not have our own identity and 
culture’. However, when I asked what was meant by “our own identity and culture”, 
sometimes I found myself having to further explain to most of the secondary school 
students what national/cultural identity or what Taiwanese identity might be in order 
to carry on the discussion. Therefore, what I offered them was an outline of concepts 
that I have interpreted from Western scholars, combined with my own understanding. 
Certainly, there is a potential danger that their interpretations of those identities could 
lean towards mine, moreover, I might have inadvertently “inserted” something into 
their minds that they had never been aware of, or considered, before. However, in 
order to carry on the discussion, I was, to a certain extent, like a teacher who tries to 
give them examples or ideas about what national/cultural identities are. Indeed, such 
distinct differences (such as age, educational background, etc.) and the power 
relations between the researcher and respondents would often turn interviews or 
discussions into a Q&A format. Although the students may not deliberately try to 
give me the “correct” answer, however, their responses to the concepts of 
national/cultural identities are very much based on their school textbooks. For 
example, they constantly refer to the “Taiwanese” language (in this case, Minnanese) 
or local festivals and customs which they used to define as their Taiwanese national 
and cultural identity. This is partly because the language policy was biased towards 
Mandarin and it was the only official medium of communication in school during the 
postwar period. Speaking Minnanese in school was treated as a “sin” and might lead 
to punishment (Ou, 1995, cited in Law 2002). At the beginning of political 
liberalisation and reconstruction of local grassroots culture in Taiwan after the lifting 
of martial law in 1987, speaking Minnanese (Taiwanese, Tai yu) was considered as an 
important political statement and signifier of being Taiwanese. Politicians, for 
example, make particular efforts to address the general public in “Taiwanese” during 
election campaign speeches.   
 
Being one of the generation that learnt everything about mainland China at school (at 
least throughout elementary and secondary education), and who has been haunted by 
the confusion of who I am – Taiwanese, Chinese, both, neither – it occurred to me 
that the school curriculum reforms in the late 1990s, played an influential role in the 
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construction of  so-called “Taiwanese consciousness”. This also goes some way to 
explaining why, when I ask university students (most of whom had finished 
secondary education around the late 1990s) about their understanding of the concept 
of national/cultural identity in Taiwan, they responded that there is certainly a 
national and cultural identity in Taiwan but it is “blurred”. Furthermore, there is also a 
self-awareness that, as the last generation before education reform, they feel they 
have got caught up in something “in-between” (i.e. that they are Chinese and/or 
Taiwanese). Hence, I realised that it is necessary to address the important issue of 
reform of the educational system in Taiwan and its implications in terms of youth 
transnational media consumption and cultural identification. How different are the 
views between university and secondary school students in the construction of the 
idea of national identity and what does it mean to be a Taiwanese under the influence 
of education reforms in Taiwan? And in what way is the consumption of regional TV 
dramas and their cultural elements negotiated and appropriated by a young audience 
in the process of developing a Taiwanese identity?     
 
To give an interesting example, a friend who teaches in an elementary school asked 
her students one day what they thought about the current President of the Republic of 
China (ROC), and none of them knew what ‘ROC’ stood for. My friend explained 
that the Republic of China means Taiwan, and the students responded to this by 
saying that “if that is so just say Taiwan. Why do you even use the term Republic of 
China in the first place?” My friend was shocked by the response from her students, 
for to her, ROC has always signified Taiwan and she assumed that her students had 
the same understanding. To a certain extent, this demonstrates that reform of the 
educational system (i.e. Taiwanisation) has constructed a different understanding of 
the concept of Taiwan as a nation and the national identity in Taiwan between 
different generations. How does it feel, we might therefore ask, to live in a society 
that has gone through a political transformation from “Chinese” to “Taiwanese” in 
approximately one generation? Moreover, how has the redefinition of “national” 
identity through educational reform and the flow of globalisation/regionalisation 
constructed youth national/cultural identities?  
 
Before I conducted my field work, the initial aim of this project was to see how 
regional popular TV dramas were negotiated and made meaningful amongst young 
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people in their everyday lives. My assumption was that this cultural negotiation is 
appropriated and reproduced by use of particular cultural commodities and image 
consumption, as suggested by earlier studies (see Garcia Canclini 1995, Lee 2003, 
Miller 1994, Yu-ling Su 1999). This assumption led me to see regional TV dramas as 
a powerful cultural symbolic resource and to adopt a questionnaire design which was 
intended to provide statistical evidence and an indication of youth consumer 
behaviour and its cultural implications. However, when I started analysing the data, I 
realised that a young person might not be as keen a consumer of Japanese and Korean 
popular commodities or TV dramas by-products as previous research suggested. For 
instance, almost 56.3 per cent of university students and 45.8 per cent of secondary 
school students never purchase any TV drama by-products (for further detail, see 
Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 Section 2, Question 1). One of the possible explanations 
is that the role of Japanese and Korean TV dramas has become less significant in 
terms of the symbolic cultural resources which young people use in experiencing a 
sense of Asian modernisation and transnational cultural imaginary.   
 
Hence, I started to question what role regional TV dramas played amongst young 
people. Has my questionnaire design completely missed the point? Is the outcome of 
the questionnaire an indication that Japanese and Korean TV dramas have become 
irrelevant to youth cultural consumption and everyday life practices? My answer is 
that one should further examine these regional TV dramas on their own terms as a 
particular social and cultural phenomenon and also examine their implications in 
relation to the concept of the audience as acting as cultural observers and executors in 
modern times. In other words, one should question what young audiences make of the 
popularity of these regional TV dramas, given that my research has shown that 77.8 
and 73.7 per cent respectively of university and secondary schools students had 
experience of watching both regional TV dramas in the past.  
 
Some researchers argue that discovering how audiences make sense of the media 
message is not easily done through survey research. Rather, in order to get a better 
picture of how or why this audience-media relationship works, more qualitative 
methods should be employed (Hansen et al. 1998, p. 257), such as participant 
observation (see Hobson 1982, Morley 1986), or by ethnographic research on 
television audiences (see Lull 1990). Despite the fact that my research is about 
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television drama reception, there are some distinctive features due to the fact that the 
genre and format of these regional TV dramas are different from soap operas or 
telenovelas, as they often end in 13 episodes (Japanese trendy dramas) and between 
20-50 episodes (Korean modern dramas). In this sense, the relationship between a TV 
drama and its audience is relatively “temporary” in comparison to early research on 
soap operas (e.g. Dallas, Coronation Street). Therefore the possibility of generating a 
deeper understanding of how the audience makes sense of the media message via 
participant observation in this case is less available. I employed semi-structured 
individual interviews and group discussions as a qualitative way to “talk” about 
young audience’s transnational TV drama viewing experiences and how they use TV 
dramas as a cultural resource in their everyday lives.    
       
The “talking” method allowed me to identify a pattern among my interviewees and 
group participants, where they displayed concern about the “cultural invasion” of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas. This is by no means an indication that they do not 
enjoy the programmes themselves, but it is closely related to their daily experience of 
on-going cultural localisation, political transformation (e.g. Taiwanisation) and 
education reform over the years, which I did not anticipate before I conducted my 
fieldwork. Unpacking this result, I realised that my research demonstrates how the 
young audience and transnational media research often closely relate to their personal 
narrative reflexivity and cultural negotiation in everyday life via comparative 
viewings of regional TV dramas. More importantly, it uncovers another aspect of 
youth cultural interpretations of the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas in 
relation to the notion of cultural identification in Taiwan. These regional TV dramas 
are used by young people to work alongside their sense of being Taiwanese and 
differentiate cultural similarities and differences within the region’s political and 
historical context.   
 
Whereas I initially sought to examine the relationship between youth and 
transnational TV drama reception in relation to local cultural appropriation and 
consumer culture, I ended up realising that young viewers have incorporated regional 
TV dramas into their structure of meaning-making and use them to redefine local 
cultural practices and identities. Thus, I have provided provisional answers which are 
informed by group discussions and in-depth interviews sensitive to how young 
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people’s transnational television reception changes have become integrated in 
specific cultural forms and practices, and under specific political and historical 
circumstances over the years, as outlined in Chapters 6 and 7. In doing so, I can only 
hope that my empirical obstacles could be turned into analytical insights by studying 
the role of transnational media in young people’s cultural negotiations in everyday 
life, and in the process outlining how this negotiation has transformed into more 
complicated levels of cultural appropriation, negotiation and identification in the age 
of regional media cultural flows. Filtering through this “problematic” material not 
only questions what I have possibly overlooked in the realm of my research practice 
but also challenges me to overcome this difficulty as part of the process of my 
intellectual exploration and development.   
 
 
Stumbling through my research method: On “working” and “walking” 
through the material  
 
Admittedly, I began my research design aiming to explore what the possible media 
effects of the consumption of regional popular TV dramas on the young Taiwanese 
audience are with questions such as to what extent is the early concept of ‘pleasure of 
recognition’ still relevant to the viewing of TV dramas. In addition to this I asked 
how the cultural consumption of regional TV dramas related to youth consumer 
behaviours and cross-cultural identification; and how and why the notion of ‘cultural 
proximity’ is often associated with the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas 
in Taiwan. Young Taiwanese as a given generation are highly exposed to 
transnational media flows as well as being affected by drastic political, social, 
educational and cultural changes in Taiwan since the late 1990s, particularly in regard 
to how the space between the “nationalisation” and “transnationalisation” of Taiwan 
is negotiated. However, within a media reception and cultural consumption 
framework, the questionnaire I designed and the interviews and group discussions I 
conducted during my fieldwork soon presented their development as a more 
challenging and diverse task.  
 
Here, I have borrowed from John Ellis’s (2000) concept of working through which is 
used to make sense of the ways in which television and its audience is related to the 
wider world of individual and cultural experience. This was a useful technique during 
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and after my fieldwork with young people in Taiwan, as my research subjects were 
divided into two different groups based on educational background – university and 
secondary school – and their cultural and individual experience is rather different 
from one another. How do I take age and social differences and sensitivities into 
account in terms of approaching the method? Later on, and in relation to data 
analysis, this was a learning process which also led to a more nuanced study of the 
audience’s transnational reception of TV dramas in an East Asian context.    
 
In the early stages of reviewing my questionnaire data, I came to realise that although 
most of the young audiences have experience of viewing both Japanese and Korean 
TV dramas (university students 77.8 per cent and secondary school students 73.7 per 
cent), the hours of viewing are rather limited. 76.5 per cent of university students 
spent less than 3 hours per week watching Japanese TV dramas and 80.3 per cent 
Korean TV dramas. A similar situation applies to secondary school students, with 
83.3 per cent spending less than three hours per week watching Japanese TV dramas 
and 84.7 per cent on Korean TV dramas. Simply by looking at the numbers it might 
be interpreted that the consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas has relatively 
limited influence on young people’s everyday lives. However, it was when I 
conducted my one-to-one interviews and group discussions with university and 
secondary school students respectively that I captured the “additional” role of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas in relation to their understandings and making sense 
of “What is Taiwan and what does it mean to be Taiwanese?” Our conversations and 
discussions on the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas in Taiwan, on the 
one hand, often led to concern or anxiety about the lack of a unique Taiwanese 
identity among the young participants. On the other, the consumption of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas is often used as an alternative choice or sometimes as a defensive 
mechanism during the discussion of Taiwan’s ambiguous relationship with, and 
attitude towards, mainland China, particularly in terms of its historical connection, 
cultural identification and political estrangement. In response to my interview/group 
discussion question: “how and why the reception of Japanese and Korean TV dramas 
becomes the daily cultural practice in Taiwanese society” (which is a following up 
question from “why do you enjoy watching those regional TV dramas?”) The topic of 
(a lack of) Taiwanese cultural identity or Taiwanese consciousness (Taiwan yishi) 
came up during individual interviews with university students and group discussions 
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with secondary school participants on several different occasions. Despite the fact 
that there is no clear indication of what facilitates the popularity of regional TV 
dramas in Taiwan, young participants (university students in particular) often make a 
quick comment on the historical connection between Japan and Taiwan as well as the 
fact that “Taiwan lacks its own identity, that is why we accept foreign culture so 
easily” (Female, 16, group discussion).  
 
The conversation amongst secondary school students appeared to be more 
complicated. Some say they do not understand what national identity means when 
others mentioned it, some had ambiguous attitudes about what Taiwanese identity is 
while others were more confident in showing their understanding. In this instance, I 
argue that young audiences’ used their viewing of Japanese and Korean TV dramas, 
not only to reflect upon their personal life experience and gain sense of the ‘pleasure 
of recognition’ (Ang, 1985, p. 20), but they also used comparative readings of both 
TV dramas as a means of cultural referencing and reflexively positioning Taiwanese 
identity in a wider social and political context. Hence, the question arises as to how 
effective questionnaire collections and interviews are as a measurement of audience 
reception of TV dramas. This case has demonstrated that the result of young 
audiences’ reception of regional TV dramas inevitably meant stronger regional 
cultural influence, more complex and diverse audience reception and consumption of 
transnational media content, and a shift to a more socially embedded and multi-
culturally articulate young audience. In order to understand the contemporary 
audience reception of media, it is important to take into consideration transnational 
media flows and their broader implications in relation to cultural exchange and 
borrowing as well as how these are situated within the processes of cultural and social 
transformation.   
 
Youth consumption of Japanese and Korean popular TV dramas, therefore, needs to 
be located in a social, cultural and political context which is complicated by its 
unique historical trajectory and the current political use of “localisation” and 
“globalisation” as a means of constructing Taiwan’s national cultural identity. In 
other words, the significance of the unexpected outcomes from the research data is 
partly due to the recognition of the regional popular culture flows and the 
interpretation and appropriation of media contents as a means of self-reflexive 
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understanding and formation of social changes amongst the young generation. 
Therefore this thesis has developed into two different parts in relation to the 
discussion of transnational media consumption. Part 2 examines the cultural 
consumption of regional TV dramas in a wider setting, in order to encompass the 
political changes, including the construction of “Taiwanese” identity and the impact 
of educational reforms in the mid-1990s.  
 
My attempt has been to acknowledge and address these questions via a cultural 
approach to audience reception and media studies as well as its relation to its wider 
political and social setting. As a result, this thesis can be thought of as a media studies 
research project which starts with a Taiwanese young audience’s reception and 
comparative readings of regional popular TV dramas, and then develops into a more 
complex project in relation to the construction of Taiwanese identity based on a body 
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Chapter 2 is the first part of the literature review of the thesis, and corresponds with 
the empirical research in chapters 3 and 4. This chapter reviews studies of cross-
cultural readings of soap operas/TV dramas, and focuses on one of the main 
dimensions of reception studies: audiences’ meaning-making and interpretation in 
everyday life. I intervene in the debate about the existing relationship between the 
audience’s cultural recognition and media reception, by suggesting that this 
relationship has shifted from and moved beyond the notion of the ‘pleasure of 
recognition’ (Ang 1985, p. 20, Yu-ling Su 1999) to share a sense of social and cultural 
similarity which is associated with the pleasure of text (Iwabuchi 2002, pp. 133-135). 
In other words, audience reception of and meaning-making in transnational TV 
dramas is perceived as a form of continual cultural contestation and negotiation which 
is often associated with the audience’s sense of recognition of, and articulation with, 
texts in a particular way. And doing so we understand how these interactions shape 
audiences’ cultural subjectivity and explore different dimensions of narrative-
audience relationship in the age of global media flows.  Furthermore, I examine in 
what ways, and how this sense of articulation and association with the text has been 
reproduced and assimilated through the symbolic consumption of material objects in 
the consumer society.  
 
I will briefly outline the historical development of reception studies and audience 
research and I shall position my project as an envisaging of how young audiences 
perceive, interpret and appropriate transnational TV programmes (here, TV dramas). 
These programmes not only associate with an inner emotional level at the particular 
moment of recognition but also in the course of everyday life practices. Then I shall 
 43 
re-visit and evaluate some of the approaches employed by media researchers on 
transnational TV viewing and textual readings in relation to the pleasure of 
recognition (Ang 1985), referential readings or critical readings (Katz and Liebes 
1990) and the notions of cultural proximity and articulation (Iwabuchi 2002). My aim 
here is to argue that the audience’s viewing of transnational soap opera/TV drama has 
shifted from passive emotional connection or a means of social activity of escapism 
to a more “active” meaning-making and cultural practice outside the living room. 
This argument also leads to the final part of the literature review, which deals with the 
concept of symbolic consumption and consumer culture. This part investigates in 
what way the content, images, and by-products of transnational TV dramas are 
actively appropriated by the audience via objects consumed in everyday life and how 
this imaginative pleasure is reproduced and fulfilled.   
 
Overall, Section 1 of this chapter allows us to have a general understanding of foreign 
television genres and texts as well as their relationship to the local audience. It also 
discusses in what way notions of pleasure of recognition, emotional realism and 
transnational imaginative pleasure might be applied during the process of the 
audience’s cultural articulations and meaning-making. However, I would also argue 
that concepts such as the pleasure of recognition or cultural proximity cannot fully 
explain youth audience transnational media reception because it often overlooks the 
complex levels of meaning-making in relation to one’s social status and cultural 
practice in local everyday life.  In media studies, Matt Briggs argues that ‘meaning-
making is always “embedded” in a cultural context formed by historical events and 
processes, discourses, politics as well as moralities and identities, it would also be a 
mistake to see the television audience as a homogenous mass’ (2010, pp. 8-9). More 
importantly, I would add that meaning-making is also embedded in cultural and social 
transformation generated by the on-going political events, social movements, cultural 
activities as well as individual everyday life.  Hence the relationship between the 
young audience’s meaning-making and their transnational television viewing 
experience within the discourse of everyday life is much in need of further 
exploration.   
 
The main aim of this thesis is to convey Taiwanese youths’ experience of 
transnational media reception of Japanese and South Korean TV dramas and its 
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cultural implication within the process of nation-building in the age of globalisation. 
Examining the East-Asian regional popular cultural/media flows since the 1990s and 
“regional” scholars’ (i.e. Iwabuchi 2001, 2002, 2004, Chua 2004, 2006, Kim 2008, 
Lee 2003) views based on their empirical research evidence can provide me with an 
important entry point in assessing the case of Taiwan. Section 2 discusses the flows of 
regional (East Asia) popular TV dramas in relation to cultural globalisation and 
“Asian identity”. In this section, I illustrate the cultural phenomenon of the popularity 
of Japanese and South Korean popular culture in the region, mainly focusing on the 
debates about the popularity of so-called “Trendy/Idol Dramas”. I would suggest that 
transnational television reception has added different cultural ingredients in terms of 
youth cultural consumption and social imagination within the context of a sense of 
being ‘culturally proximate’ (Iwabuchi 2002, p. 135) and being part of an Asian 
modernity (Chua 2000). Second, instead of looking at single regional cultural 
products in Taiwan, I choose to compare two regional TV dramas which are imported 
from Japan and South Korea. Thus, in the last part of this section, I trace the 
distribution and circulation of Japanese and South Korean media/cultural products, 
and their reception and consumption in Taiwan.  
 
Whilst engaging with theoretical debates in transnational media and audience studies, 
and examining the regional popular cultural flows and its political and cultural 
implications in the age of globalisation, my overall aim is to understand how 
Taiwanese young people deal with media change and make sense of their everyday 
lives and identities in relation to transnational cultural consumption of TV dramas. In 
addition I examine how the process of media consumption is mediated by different 
generations and appropriated into their social and cultural understanding of others. 
Thus I propose a more comparative reception study in this thesis, focusing on the 
cross-cultural reception of both Japanese and Korean TV dramas and comparing them 
with the reception of local TV dramas in Taiwan. In doing so, the first part of thesis 
not only explores the various textual readings of foreign TV dramas amongst different 
audience groups but also provides a more complete approach in examining the 
transnational media consumption which I will further discuss in chapters 3 and 4, 
based on my empirical research. 
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Audience studies and transnational media reception, consumption and 
cultural appropriation in consumer society  
 
a. Reception study and audience research from a socio-cultural perspective  
 
The dynamic relationship between TV viewing and the audience’s reading of texts 
has been reassessed frequently according to the ways in which it contributes to 
different understandings of the audience and the role of television in everyday life.  
This section looks at the historical trajectories of audience reception studies and its 
importance in understanding viewers’ readings of different television programmes 
and genres. Based on the theoretical framework of reception analysis and media 
consumption, I want to situate my audience research within the field of study 
focussing on the relationship between the audience’s textual interpretations, media 
consumption and cultural practice in everyday life.  
 
According to Pertti Alasuutari’s (1999) division, reception studies and audience 
research has expanded into three generations. The first generation dates back to Hall’s 
(1980) encoding/decoding model which involves a shift from a technical to a semiotic 
approach to the media’s message. A message was no longer understood as some kind 
of package or “injection” to the audience, but is dependent on how the audience 
decodes these messages. As a result, the role of the audience has acquired a central 
place in media studies. The second generation is audience ethnography which was 
influenced by the first generation of research by taking an ethnographic turn in 
empirical audience studies. It also known as qualitative audience reception studies, 
focusing on analysing programmes and its reception among a particular audience by 
conducting in-depth interviews with its viewers or through participant observation. 
This was enthusiastically practised by several scholars (e.g. Morley 1980, Katz and 
Liebes 1990, Lull 1990). Their findings at the time were an important indication of 
the role of television as a social resource for conversation, where television is used 
for reflecting and reproducing power relations in family life, which later led to 
research on the social use of television and other media (see Silverstone 1994). The 
third generation, which Alasuutari suggests we are currently in, is a constructionist 
view which argues that the audience and media should be seen from a discursive or 
constructionist perspective (1999, pp. 2-8). In other words, it is a study of audience 
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interpretations and uses of media text as well as the cultural place of the media in the 
contemporary world. This generation’s approach to the idea of audience, according to 
his observation, is that ‘there isn’t really such a thing as the “audience” out there; one 
must bear in mind that audience is, most of all, a discursive construct produced by a 
particular analytic gaze’ (ibid., p. 6). The main concerns in this generation included a 
‘rethinking of the place of the media in everyday life, the concept of “audience” and 
along with that, the place of media research itself in the whole picture’ (ibid.). He 
proposes three key elements of third generation reception studies: ‘an increasing 
reflexivity, a move from audience psychology to sociology, and a development 
towards addressing a whole “media culture”’ (ibid., p. 9) in the field of mass 
communication studies. The notion of reflexivity not only applies to the audience, but 
also to the researcher in relation to different aspects of media policy, media use or 
discursive practices. This change from a psychological to a sociological perspective 
of audience studies and the emphasis on an audience’s viewing and reading of text is 
not only associated with the individual’s inner emotional level, but also with a 
broader social and political context. Hence, the study of ‘media cultures’ treating the 
media, programmes and messages as part of social reality – media as a cultural form 
is embedded in everyday life (ibid., pp. 9-17). By and large, a relatively contemporary 
reception studies approach has shifted its attention from the audience’s individual 
(active) text reading towards a more comprehensive research methodology on the 
process of audience viewing and text reading from a sociological perspective.   
 
Reception analysis may well have been developed (or at least been widely quoted) 
from Hall’s encoding/decoding model. However, as David Morley points out, the 
problem is that ‘Hall’s original model tends to blur together questions of recognition, 
comprehension, interpretation and response’ (1992, p. 21). In a sense, traditional 
audience reception research tends to finish within an inner emotional level and at that 
particular moment of response ignores the follow-up external behaviour in everyday 
life. In a similar vein, Grossberg argues that reception should be seen as one field of 
‘the complex and contradictory terrain, the multi-dimensional context, within which 
people live out their everyday lives’ (1988, p. 25). Thus, the relationship between 
television and audiences is not just a matter of negotiation between texts and 
audiences but also the possibility for structuring social relationships, identities and 
desires through the process of television consumption (Ang 1996, p. 51). These 
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arguments have alerted us to ‘the importance of not reducing reception to an 
individualised, essentially psychological process, but conceptualised it as a deeply 
politicised, cultural one’ (ibid., 137). David Morley’s (1992) emphasis on the need to 
integrate the analysis of the broader questions of ideology, power and politics (as a 
vertical dimension of communications which he borrowed from Hall) with the 
analysis of the consumption, use and function of television in everyday life (as a 
horizontal dimension), underlines the important shift in the relationship between 
audience and media in the field of reception studies. This theoretical framework, in 
my view, is a crucial approach to understanding the role of the media in relation to 
“power” and “taste” in everyday life. This is close to Douglas Kellner’s proposal that 
‘media cultural studies’ analyses the complex relations between texts, audiences, 
media industries, politics, and the socio-historical context in specific conjunctures 
(1995, p. 37). Both scholars point out that by situating reception analysis within a 
broader socio-political framework and the discourse of everyday life, the audience 
reception and interpretation of the media text model can contribute to a better 
understanding of the relationship between audiences and their use of media in general. 
In addition, the critical media and cultural approach does not discredit the importance 
of the audience’s role but also acknowledges the existing social infrastructure and 
political ideology. By the same token, Ien Ang suggests that an important way of 
understanding audience activity is to consider the ‘embeddedness’ of ‘audience 
activity’ in a network of ongoing cultural practices and relationships (1996, p. 42). 
She insists that ‘what matters is not the certainty of knowledge about audiences, but 
an ongoing critical and intellectual engagement with the multifarious ways in which 
we constitute ourselves through media consumption’ (ibid., p. 52). By and large, all 
these arguments avoid falling into the simple-minded cultural populism trap and also 
indicate the continuously changing interaction between media and audience in 
contemporary society.  
 
Previous approaches in reception studies commonly assumed that cultural practices as 
well as individual acts of interpretation are relatively autonomous in relation to 
political, cultural and economic structures. It is accepted that viewers use elements of 
their shared social knowledge to determine the relative quality and significance of a 
programme. This approach was partly developed from the Uses and Gratifications 
model. It considers audiences as empowered active individuals who can intervene in 
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media in terms of consumption, decoding and social use (Jensen and Rosengren 
1990). In other words, how television is used and attended to by the audience in their 
daily life has provided fabric to the idea that receivers construct different meanings 
according to their experience. For instance, Fiske’s (1987) (in)famous celebration of 
the semiotic power audiences have in creating their own meanings and pleasure has 
been widely interpreted as a confirmation of the liberal pluralist paradise. However, 
as Morley fairly argues, texts remain ‘structured in dominance’ by the preferred 
reading; that is, the meaning which producers encoded and which they want the 
audience to receive. He argues that ‘the power of viewers to reinterpret meaning is 
hardly equivalent to the discursive power of centralised media institutions to 
construct the texts which the viewer then interprets, and to imagine otherwise is 
simply foolish’ (1997, p. 125). Supported by Ang’s insight into the notion of ‘active 
audience’ which should be understood not as an example of ‘audience freedom’, but 
as a moment of cultural struggle, an ongoing struggle over meaning and pleasure 
which is central to the fabric(ation) of everyday life (1996, p. 43).  As she famously 
puts it: while the ‘audience may be active, in [a] myriad [of] ways, in using and 
interpreting media…it would be utterly out of perspective to cheerfully equate 
“active” with “powerful”’ (Ang 1990, p. 247).  
 
Rather, ‘what matter[s] is how the idea of activeness’ is articulated with a more 
general theory of social agency and power’ (Ang 1996, p. 41). In other words, the 
interaction between text and audience is articulated and mediated within a 
predetermined social and cultural structure. Thus the audience’s reading of the texts is 
often limited. In a more recent take on studying audience, Jenny Kitzinger usefully 
suggests:  
 
There is no need to go further than simply documenting the various ways in 
which people ‘decode’ or ‘resist’ messages to identify the origin of such 
diverse readings and reflect upon why they matter. Rather than seeing these 
patterns of evidence as ‘consumer sovereignty’, we should examine how they 
are shaped by their socio-political context, including by the conduct of 
people’s social interchange (2004, p. 189). 
 
To sum up, a reformed audience research can reveal how people are actually using 
cultural texts and what sort of effects these texts are having on everyday life. 
Therefore, by combining questionnaire surveys and in-depth interviews/group 
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discussions as a data collection method and applying this to reception studies, this 
thesis provides important data-based media cultural research on how young audiences 
receive and interact with transnational media texts and formulate their cultural 
consumption of media.    
 
b. Meaning-making and transnational viewing of TV dramas in everyday cultural 
practice 
 
In this section, I revisit audience use of transnational media products in relation to the 
social formation of identity within local contexts in the past. Meaning-making and the 
interpretation of media texts are often seen as closely associated with individual 
socio-cultural experience in everyday life.  In the age of globalisation, media flows 
have been one of the most predominant cultural flows not only in terms of 
distribution, production and dissemination of information and image, but also as a 
daily cultural practice in most countries (see Appadurai 1996, Chapter 2, Featherstone 
1990, 1995). Due to the nature of my thesis topic I want to focus here on examining 
cross-cultural receptions of soap operas in relation to political perception, social 
(trans)formation and cultural appropriation. In doing so my emphasis is that in the 
past the study of audiences’ meaning-making was largely a socially determined 
practice and seen as way of resistance to foreign media products. In addition, this 
form of interpretation often conveniently celebrates the notion of “active audience” 
and ignores the shortcomings of active readings, mainly, that it does not necessarily 
guarantee a resistance to media texts. Therefore, in my research, I examine to what 
extent different regional TV dramas (here, Japanese and Korean) allow for the 
meanings of text to be “actively” interpreted by local Taiwanese audiences and how 
the process of textual interpretation, media consumption and cultural appropriation is 
contested and negotiated amongst different young audience groups. 
 
Transnational viewing of TV dramas (soap operas, telenovelas, and TV series) has 
been one of the most popular and common cultural practices amongst audiences. In 
the late 1980s, the cross-cultural readings of Dallas were well documented based on 
empirical research by scholars such as Ien Ang (1985) and Liebes and Katz (1990). In 
the 1990s, despite the dominant force of American TV programmes in transnational 
media flows, there were several important empirical studies on transnational TV 
viewings. Minu Lee and Chong Heup Cho (1990), for example, looked at how 
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Korean women living in the United States shared a pleasure in viewing Korean soap 
operas, which gave them a sense of connection with “home.” In London, Marie 
Gillespie (1995) conducted ethnographic research with young Punjabis, looking at 
how a migrant or diasporic community experiences transnational TV consumption 
and how television (such as Australian Neighbours and the Indian version of 
Mahabharata) is central to the formation and transformation of identity within this 
group.   
 
In the 1990s, media cultural studies scholars argue that the relationship between 
audience and media is often not linear, ideological, contradictory or predetermined by 
encoding and decoding, but rather it is the interactive link between audience, text, and 
context (see Ang 1996, Jensen and Rosengren 1990, Kellner 1995, Morley 1992, 
1996, 1997). Within a larger context of media globalisation and consumption, how 
audiences use imported media content often requires what Matt Briggs calls a 
‘modality of response’:  
 
Meanings are generated in response to audiences’ embeddedness, to their 
wider cultural experiences and practices, the range of everyday routines which 
the media are an essential part of, and uses to which television is put (2010, p. 
13). 
 
Hence, influenced by early cultural studies, reception analysis refers to the media 
message as culturally and commonly coded discourses, and regards audiences as 
agents of meaning production. In general, ‘reception analysis has intensified our 
interest in the ways in which people actively and creatively make their own meanings 
and create their own culture, rather than passively absorb pregiven meanings imposed 
upon them’ (Ang 1996, p. 136). However, ‘a cultural approach to reception’, 
according to Ang, can ‘address the differentiated meanings and significance of 
specific reception patterns in articulating more general cultural negotiations and 
contestations’ (ibid., p. 137). In other words, it is not about audience meaning-making 
but rather about what is meaningful to the audience within a particular socio-cultural 
context.    
 
In Ang’s (1985) earlier research on watching Dallas in the Netherlands, she argues 
that under different social and cultural circumstances, audiences’ “pleasure of 
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recognition” and interpretation of media text is formulated and expressed sometimes 
in contradiction to the original texts or characters but often acknowledged as such (i.e. 
emotional realism). The idea of ‘emotional realism’, as she famously put it, is a 
‘tragic structure of feeling’, a profound and melodramatic recognition of life’s 
emotions (ibid., p. 44). Hence, by pointing out the importance of understanding the 
inter-relation between media text (soap opera), fantasy/reality and its audiences 
within different socio-cultural contexts, to me, Ang’s approach within the field of 
reception studies provides a useful insight in analysing the domestic audience 
reception of foreign television programmes in terms of cultural imaginary as well as 
self-identification and reflexivity. I will further discuss the notion of “pleasure of 
recognition” in terms of TV genre choice and textual reading and examine if it is still 
a valid argument in young audience’ consumption of transnational TV dramas in the 
next section. 
 
In the field of cross-cultural reading of television programmes (here, Dallas), 
according to Liebes and Katz (1990), the process of negotiation between the viewer 
and the foreign programme involves selection and a transformed appropriation of the 
message such as a form of domestication and familiarisation.  The aim of their 
research was to compare cultural differences and differential positioning in relation to 
the text; to understand the dynamics by which viewers from different cultural 
backgrounds situate themselves in relation to the narratives of the programmes; and 
also to understand how those differences could be identified in terms of discrete sets 
of social-psychological relationships (cited in Silverstone 1994, p. 149). Generally 
speaking, Liebes and Katz suggest domestic audiences’ reception of foreign 
programmes can be divided into two different camps: ‘referential readings’ which are 
more emotionally involving, and ‘critical readings’ which are more cognitive. 
Nonetheless both are ‘pleasurable’ (with the exceptional case of Japan) (1990, p. 100). 
In the case of Japan, they proposed several explanations: Japanese viewers regarded 
Dallas as incompatible with their values and tastes; inconsistencies in the storyline 
and viewers’ own sense of their inability to become emotionally involved with the 
programme (ibid., pp. 131-138). Hence, rather than simply implying the notion of 
cultural imperialism, they argue that programmes like Dallas deserve serious 
attention because they reveal something about the ways in which a programme of this 
type is used, often quite creatively, by viewers in very different social circumstances 
 52 
(ibid., p. 155). Their studies of the relationship between foreign popular TV 
programmes and domestic audiences have provided an important empirical reference 
point and alternative analytical tool in the field of reception studies. Following their 
approaches, one of my aims here is to re-examine this type of cross-cultural reading 
of TV programmes. By posing questions at the moment when young audiences 
become more “familiarised” with foreign popular TV programmes, in the age of 
transnational media systems, we come to understand how they consume, (re)interpret 
and appropriate those “foreign” cultural elements in their daily lives? We can also ask 
to what extent foreign television programmes have become a critical experience and 
cultural imaginative practice for domestic young audiences in the process of self-
identification and reflexivity?    
 
In the context of recent Asian media and audience studies debates, Koichi Iwabuchi 
suggests that in the field of transnational regional cultural flow and consumption  
 
Transnational cultural power does not necessarily mean the straightforward 
embodiment and recognition of one culture’s superiority over another but can 
be defined as capacity of a culture to produce symbolic images and meanings 
which appeal to the senses, emotions, and thoughts of the self and others 
(2002, p. 133). 
 
Both Ien Ang and Iwabuchi emphasise the notion of ‘articulation’, although in 
different ways. Through examining the concept of pleasure of recognition, Ang 
suggests that audiences express their experience at a more emotional level: a 
‘structure of feeling’ which is often tragic (1985, p. 44). This sense of articulation can 
be defined as more in tune with a personal interpretation of what is “real” and 
“fantasy” which operates as a mean of “escapism” or “attachment” for the audience, 
accordingly. Iwabuchi, on the other hand, examines the notion of cultural proximity 
in relation to Japanese transnational cultural power in the East-Asian region in the 
1990s. He argues that one should ask ‘under which historical conjuncture does the 
idea of cultural similarity become associated with the pleasure of a text’ (2002, p. 
133). For Iwabuchi, ‘cultural proximity is not something “out there.” It is articulated 
when audiences subjectively identify it in a specific program and context’ (ibid., pp. 
133-134). It can be seen from the above empirical research that in terms of 
transnational viewing of soap operas and TV dramas it has become evident that the 
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cultural consumption of foreign TV programmes amongst domestic audiences is not 
only about textual reading/story retelling or the ‘pleasure of recognition’ but more 
importantly how they appropriate the narrative and position themselves in relation to 
cultural “others” in daily social practice.   
 
However, their research focus was limited to one particular programme (Dallas; 
Tokyo Love Story) and one particular audience group. Ang (1985) mainly analyses 
fans’ responses, while Iwabuchi’s (2002) research was restricted to young female 
audiences as well as placing the reception of TV dramas within the binary dichotomy 
of East (Japan) vs. West (America). While Liebes and Katz (1990) emphasise the 
cultural process of negotiation between viewers and foreign TV programmes in terms 
of domestication and familiarisation of narrative, their research excluded an important 
element of the domestic media industry. To a certain extent it justifies the active 
audience theory regarding their ability to make divergent and resistant interpretations 
of the storyline based on their different cultural backgrounds. This thesis investigates 
young Taiwanese audiences’ reception of regional TV dramas as a form of cultural 
and social practice within the context of Asian modernisation, and in doing so it aims 
to avoid reducing youth popular culture to a subculture or indeed seeing the local 
audience as an active agent in resisting imported media content. Instead, by looking at 
the media consumption of regional TV dramas as a form of cultural practice and a 
social phenomenon which is closely interwoven with the local young audience’s 
everyday lives, I choose to use a comparative approach to better understand the 
relation between youth transnational viewing experiences and narrative appropriation, 
and the role of different regional TV dramas in general.      
 
c. Audiences’ narrative-reflexivity: soap operas and pleasures of text   
 
In this section, I examine earlier research on the relationship between TV genres and 
audience reception, and in particular I explore the notion of the ‘pleasure of 
recognition’ in soap opera (Ang, 1985). In so doing, I shall use this concept as the 
entry point to understand the relation between soap opera and its audience’s 
emotional engagement and meaning-making. I will further argue that the audience’s 
experience of soap opera/TV drama viewing in everyday life cannot be assumed to 
constitute a passive emotional connection and expression. Rather, it should be seen as 
 54 
a means of creating the reflexivity of different audience groups (e.g. Korean women, 
Kim 2004), as articulated by the individuals’ social status and cultural backgrounds 
by dialectical process. It is with this understanding in mind that my research on youth 
comparative reading of regional popular TV dramas in Taiwan is not about the 
content analysis of a particular programme or concerned with the foreign popular 
media’s influence on local youngsters per se. Rather, my focus is to understand the 
popularity of regional TV dramas in Taiwan as a cultural phenomenon and social 
reality, which will be analysed in relation to the youth viewing experience of this 
particular genre and their cultural appropriation of it in everyday life. 
 
Arguably audience research has shifted from being concerned with interpretation of 
specific television programmes to the study of patterns of engagement with materials 
of different types or genres. Cultural theorists, who have paved the way for its 
application in reception analysis have firmly established the concept of pleasure as an 
important concept. What is crucial is that we can begin to understand how particular 
genres of material offer certain audience groups particular pleasure in a specific social 
context. As Livingstone rightly states, genre expectations may not only help account 
for the approach audiences use with texts from particular genres but it also helps 
account for discrepancies between actual and predicted readings (1991, pp. 293-297). 
The concept of pleasure has been applied to reception analysis, and John Corner 
(1991) has based his understanding on three notions: meaning, genre and context by 
locating them within the wider ‘influence/interpretation’ question. This divides media 
between being an agency of public knowledge and of popular culture projects. 
According to him, the public knowledge project is concerned mainly with the 
investigation of factual media, broadcasting and the press, and the ways in which they 
inform or produce ‘knowledge’ in the reader. The popular culture project, conversely, 
focuses on fictional or ‘entertainment’ texts, and is concerned with the ‘imaginative 
pleasure’ offered to readers by such texts. To him, ‘the characteristic properties of 
text-viewers relations in fiction television are primarily to do with imaginative 
pleasure, particularly the pleasure of dramatic circumstance and of character’ (ibid., p. 
276). Corner’s suggestion concerning the relationship between audience imaginative 
pleasure and dramatic elements in fictional TV programmes as a way of examining 
audience reception of particular TV genre and contents, to a certain extent underlines 
that the audience demonstrates different layers of TV reception and predetermined 
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expectation of media texts. Nonetheless, his statement is also problematic because he 
conveniently links the pleasure effect to the elements of the ‘unreal’ (i.e. dramatic) 
and hence this only occurs at the moment of reception within a specific time and 
space. It also fails to explain the complex process of audience association with the 
programme in terms of individual negotiation with the text which is formulated by 
various socio-cultural experiences.        
                  
Moreover, Corner’s division has been challenged by several scholars such as Ann 
Gray (1999, pp. 23-24) who argues that this distinction has fallen into the ‘new 
audience studies’ and a ‘gendered division’ paradigm. Barbara O’Connor and 
Elisabeth Klaus (2000), on the other hand, argue for the possibility of bridging the 
gap between these two projects in an effort to link pleasure to the concept of 
hegemony and ideology. To an extent, I agree with John Corner’s division when it 
comes to the process of viewing and interpretation but not in terms of gender division 
(which Gray has criticised). However his critique, I would suggest, of viewers’ genre 
expectations can be applied to how the local audience constructs comparative 
readings of regional television programmes based on their presumptions and cultural 
knowledge of two nations. As Feuer rightly suggests, the meanings of programmes 
for viewers are influenced, even manipulated, by the genres they are fitted into (cited 
in Fiske 1987, p. 111). To this extent, when viewers choose a certain TV programme 
they tend to situate themselves in a particular mood and manner of meaning-making 
to fit it into specific social contexts of use. For example, when audiences watch TV 
news they expect to gain certain knowledge from the text; on the contrary, when 
audiences watch soap operas they are more relaxed and more cathartically and 
emotionally involved in the texts. Certainly the nature of pleasure between these two 
genres is rather different. In textually analytical terms, the sources of pleasure that 
specific genres offer to their audiences are linked to the genres’ textual characteristics 
and their intertextual possibilities (Fiske 1987, pp. 111-117). The relationship 
between different genre, the degree of involvement, the textual interpretation and the 
question of pleasure is intertwined. Hence, my approach in this thesis will be based 
on the concept of the ‘imaginative pleasure’ of TV drama viewing, with the aim of 
understanding why and how this pleasure is transformed and constructed by young 
audiences in relation to their daily cultural practice.      
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Ien Ang’s earlier research, Watching Dallas, on the pleasure that a specific audience 
group experienced famously applied Pierre Bourdieu’s critique of taste in ‘The 
aristocracy of culture’  suggesting that:  
 
Popular pleasure is characterised by an immediate emotional or sensual 
involvement in the object of pleasure. What matters is the possibility of 
identifying oneself with it in some way or other, to integrate it into everyday 
life. In other words popular pleasure is first and foremost a pleasure of 
recognition (1985, p. 20). 
 
Following this statement she asks the question: ‘what do Dallas-lovers recognise in 
Dallas?’ Clearly, one part of that identification for women audiences was that soap 
operas give expression to gender contradictions and provide an escape from 
patriarchy. Soap operas clearly work on a level of empirical realism (especially UK 
soap operas), however this realism is not only of an empirical kind. The stories can be 
recognised as both realistic and fantastical at an emotional level: as Ang puts it, ‘what 
is recognised as real is not knowledge of the world, but a subjective experience of the 
world: a “structure of feeling”’ (ibid., p. 45). To a certain extent, this sort of 
identification with desire is similar to what Richard Dyer labels ‘utopianism’ (1992, p. 
18). He argues that entertainment does not offer ‘models of the utopian world’ but 
offers its consumers the possibility of experiencing ‘what utopia would feel like rather 
than how it would be organised’ (ibid.). Furthermore, I would argue that the idea of 
the “real” can be interpreted in two ways in the context of soap operas and TV dramas. 
It can mean “authentic” and it can also signify that context/narrative reflect a reality 
as constituted by everyday life experience. 
 
There is a similar finding in scholarship on the reception of Japanese TV drama in 
Taiwan, which was carried out by Koichi Iwabuchi in the late 1990s. This highlighted 
how Taiwanese audiences refer to the content of Japanese TV Dramas as a “story 
about us” or “our” stories (Iwabuchi 2002, pp. 146-157). When Taiwanese young 
female audiences refer to the content of TV programmes as their “stories” they not 
only compare them to their everyday life but also to the life that they maybe looking 
for. Hence, the pleasure of watching Japanese TV drama is a pleasure of making 
meaning or sense of their lives. In addition, in accounting for their pleasure in 
watching soap operas, viewers distinguish between fantasy (fiction) and escapism 
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(reality) (Ang 1985, Livingstone 1988). Nonetheless, the pleasure of soap opera is 
problematic, for it includes not only the pleasure of escapism and various emotional 
experiences, but also the pleasure of recognition and the validation of one’s own 
everyday experiences (see Fiske 1987, Livingstone 1991). Therefore the “pleasure” of 
watching soap opera is continuously shifting back and forth between the reality and 
fantasy. Furthermore, the pleasure occurs not just at the particular viewing moment 
but also has the possibility of being tested and verified in real life afterwards. This 
leads us to questions such as how this pleasure fulfilment can be achieved through 
related commodity consumption? Hence, the process of television viewing is not just 
simply a textual reading or decoding but more importantly it is a process of 
recognition, comprehension, interpretation and negotiation which links back to the 
larger socio-historical context and cultural background.  
 
From this point of view Livingstone is led to suggest that ‘Maybe we can conceive of 
television effects broadly as the ways in which television constructs, prioritises, 
undermines, or elaborates the interpretative frameworks with which the viewer makes 
sense, not only of television, but also of everyday life’ (1991, p. 303). For example, 
why is the relationship between soap opera and everyday life so intimate? One of the 
reasons is because regular viewers build up substantial relationships with the 
characters over the years. Soap operas are long-running TV programmes (especially 
in UK) and therefore audiences get more and more involved with those characters 
whom they have been watching over the course of ten or twenty years. Consequently, 
British audiences are not just the viewers but “become friends” closely identified with 
these TV characters. Therefore, the pleasure of viewing no longer consists of just 
simply enjoying watching TV but rather seeing and gossiping about what happened to 
“imaginary” neighbours or friends on the screen in their everyday life. This pleasure 
of recognition and the feeling of a sense of intimacy with the characters from soap 
operas has developed over a long period of viewing time, and has become part of 
everyday practice. 
 
However, Japanese and Korean TV dramas tell different stories, unlike American teen 
dramas such as Dawson’s Creek or Australian soap operas like Home and Away. 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas run to between 12 and 20 episodes, no matter how 
popular they are (occasionally, with special editions or sequels). Here, I mainly refer 
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to what is called “modern” TV drama in Japan and South Korea, as there are also 
period dramas (30-50 episodes) and family dramas (100+ episodes) regularly 
produced in South Korea
9
. How youth audiences interpret and understand the content 
and gain pleasure from these programmes is different from Western research findings 
about soap operas. It seems that the “stories about us” also apply on different levels 
and need to be further explored and differentiated. For instance, previous research 
about the pleasure of identification, and recognition in soap operas seems more 
“passive” in nature and the audiences’ “inner” functions, whether psychological or 
social, were considered more important in Western-based research. What I mean by 
“passive” is that the viewers envy, desire or long for those ways of life (particularly 
those seen as glamorous or as constituting an escape from patriarchy) which they 
cannot have in real life or a public narrative creates the space for a private emotional 
reaction (see Ang 1985, p. 49, Geraghty 1991, pp. 40-51). The consumption of 
foreign TV dramas and the “activity” of the young television audience is the focus of 
this thesis, which is different from previous research which mainly discusses the 
relationship between women and soap opera. My questions, therefore, focus on these 
aspects: Do young audiences tend to fulfil their imaginative pleasure and desire in a 
more materialistic approach?; What role does the foreign TV drama play in mediating 
youth’s taste, lifestyle and culture in contemporary consumer society?; How do young 
people formulate their sense of cultural identification and social formation in the 
recognition of cultural otherness that is represented on the TV screen? In Chapters 3 
and 4, I examine how different levels of pleasure of recognition, cultural 
appropriation and social articulation are associated with the consumption of regional 
TV dramas. In doing so I try to intervene in some existing debates on the media 
reception and cultural consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas and how they 
relate to young audiences’ self-reflexivity, the notion of cultural proximity and Asian 
modernity, all in relation to their daily experience and social formation.  
 
According to Roger Silverstone the study of media consumption in modern society 
can be categorised by four themes: commodification, symbolisation, articulation and 
globalisation/fragmentation (1994, p. 107). In terms of television’s role in articulating 
those dynamics he further suggests: ‘One can certainly argue that television does 
                                                 
9
 For further reference: http://www.koreandrama.org 
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indeed provide in its programmes, through its narratives, its genres, and its rhetorics, 
one way in which the logics of commodity culture are articulated with the concerns, 
values and meanings of everyday life’ (ibid.).   
  
One of the important findings concerning teenagers’ reception of American TV 
programmes in Daniel Miller’s article, ‘The consumption of soap opera: The Young 
and the Restless and mass consumption in Trinidad’ (1994), suggested that the 
reception of soap operas has evolved since young people have more money to fulfil 
the desires and dreams derived from viewing TV programmes (such as those 
concerning fashion). This observation can also be extended to the relationship 
between individuals and society. By the same token, Liebes and Katz (1990) 
underline different cultural readings, not as evidence an absence of effects, but rather 
as being likely to validate or reinforce the different perspectives of the viewers in the 
age of transnational media systems. The variance in audience reception research 
seems to move toward a rather different stage in the debate. Therefore, in the 
transnational reading of TV programmes in terms of cultural identification and 
consumption one should avoid simply dividing the field into two opposite camps: on 
the one hand, homogenisation and on the other, the fragmentation and disintegration 
of cultures and tastes (see Featherstone 1991). Rather one should further explore how 
the television audience, through the consumption of foreign TV programmes and their 
related products, fulfils their own desires and examine what mode of consumption 
leads to the fulfilment of dreams, imagination and pleasure. In so doing we can then 
understand how young audiences use television in the course of their everyday life in 
terms of the formation and transformation of their social relationships with foreign 
cultures.  
 
This also raises issues around the topic of “otherness” in the age of the transnational 
media system and the rise of regional popular culture flows, which is this thesis’s 
starting point. Hence, it can be thought of as a more comprehensive study of audience 
reception that is complicated and informed by local social interactions, cultural 
consumption practices and cultural exchanges in the age of transnational cultural 
flows. In other words, the study of cross-cultural readings of TV dramas and audience 
meaning-making needs to be situated within a broader socio-cultural discourse. It also 
needs to be more sensitive to individual interactions with the texts as well as narrative 
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reflexivity during the process of cultural appropriation and social formation.     
 
d. Consumer society and transnational media consumption in everyday life 
       
As I mentioned in the previous section, early research on the relationship between 
texts and the audience is often associated with the notion of the ‘structure of feeling’, 
reality and fantasy, imaginative pleasure, and the different ways in which lives have 
been imagined. However, there has been a lack of follow-up research into how the 
audience integrates these feelings and elements of imagination into everyday routines 
and practices. Given the desire to experience in reality what has been imagined, in the 
age of affluent hedonistic consumerism the audience has different “active” ways of 
relating to TV texts, images and meanings. Early research on the popularity of 
‘Japanese Trendy Drama’ in East Asian countries is often associated with how the 
drama represented an urban or ‘aesthetic’ way of life (see Yu-ling Su 1999, p. 133, 
Iwabuchi 2004, p. 9). The important factor in the promotion of the ‘aestheticisation of 
everyday life’ (Featherstone 1991, p. 47) is the proliferation of images, according to 
Abercrombie & Longhurst (1998, p. 87). This section discusses the relationship 
between youths, popular media reception and consumer culture in relation to the 
consumption of sign values and symbolic economy. Drawing on these discussions, I 
want to examine to what extent Taiwanese youths’ transnational TV reception and 
cultural consumption shapes their identification with the foreign TV narratives and 
characters and how they materialise the notion of an ‘imaginative pleasure’ and way 
of life. This will be further discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
Within the discipline of media studies, debates about the effects of the consumption 
of television, film, fiction and related forms continue unabated. In these arguments it 
is the audience’s consumption of symbols and meanings in media messages which are 
brought into central focus. However, we need to take one step further in order to try 
and understand the audience as consumer, the process of TV consumption and the 
patterns of ‘symbolic consumption’ in everyday life, all of which may be influenced 
by the media messages and social context. Therefore, we need to try and understand 
how young audiences, through media reception, determine a role for themselves 
within consumer societies.   
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From The Consumer Society through to his later writings, Baudrillard (1998) 
emphasises the endless reduplication of signs, images and simulations through the 
media, erasing the distinction between the image and reality. He argues that the 
overwhelming flood of signs and images that pushes us beyond the social are usually 
taken from the media, such as television, rock videos and MTV. This, together with a 
wide range of symbolic goods and experiences produced by the culture industries, 
inevitably mean that these relationships are stronger than ever in consumer societies. 
The relationship between media and consumption, according to Andy Ruddock, is 
that ‘media give symbolic clues to the audience on how to position themselves in 
consumer culture [and] acts of consumption provide examples of how mediated 
meanings become actualised’ (2001, p. 166). In a sense consumption has been 
theorised to the point where it embraces all forms of social activity. Hence, it is as 
important to understand the connections between media and everyday life at the same 
time as one investigates the cultural meanings in relation to the concept of symbolic 
consumption.   
 
Arguably, the images in television often connect to a way of life for the audience due 
to the congestion of commodities on screen which create a certain type of stylish life. 
Earlier research on media effects or reception analysis was more focused on the 
“degree” of direct effect and therefore it always led to debates about the power of the 
text or/and the power of the audience. However, merely measuring how much effect 
media messages can cause is a rather limited perspective. What I am concerned with 
is how media can be used as an informational tool for audiences, because to a certain 
degree we are aware that the media has an influence on its audience; what we do not 
know is how particular audiences can be influenced by, respond to, or use the 
information they obtain from the media and how they might carry on practically 
everyday life within various political, cultural, economic and social situations. As 
Denis McQuail observes: ‘Media use can ... be seen to be both limited and motivated 
by complex and interacting forces in society and in the personal biography of the 
individual. This is a sobering thought for those who hope to explain as well as 
describe patterns of audience behaviour’ (1987, p. 136). 
  
The key issue is not so much whether an audience is active or not but rather how the 
activity is significant or makes a difference. Many commentators, therefore, have 
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suggested that television offers the possibility for truly active engagement which 
involves great pleasure and even transcendence (see Silverstone 1994, p. 154). 
Moreover, theories of pleasure or of fantasy are one route to an exploration of that 
potential.  
 
Quite often the pleasure of viewing TV is seen as the pleasure of meaning-making, 
celebrating what ‘specific genres offer to their audiences are linked to the genres’ 
textual characteristics and their intertextual possibilities’ (Klaus and O'Connor 2000, 
p. 375), which I have discussed in the previous two sections. Nevertheless, what has 
been neglected is how the audience contextualise and materialise the ‘structure of 
feeling’ or ‘pleasure of recognition’ in everyday life. Thus I would argue the role TV 
dramas play in how audiences connect with their personal lives is often linked to 
emotional connections. It is therefore important to examine how audiences, through 
the reception of the texts, images and the consumption of goods, create their own 
fantasy worlds which may have been captured by TV programmes. 
 
With the rise of commercial TV stations, Graham Murdock and Peter Golding (1995) 
have developed the concept of ‘television economics’, which indicate the ways in 
which programmes generate profit by developing by-products such as books, videos, 
soundtracks and so on. Therefore the whole “package” of TV consumption and 
everyday life has become more complete and integrated in the age of consumer 
culture. Hence the audience’s cultural practices associated with TV content in 
everyday life are no longer confined to emotional involvement but also comprise 
material and solid contact. For instance, modern Japanese TV drama is categorised as 
‘Trendy drama’ (also known as ‘Idol drama’) in Taiwan, as this type of drama was 
produced as a “packaged” commercial product featuring original elements, such as a 
high-profile theme song, pop idols, and romantic settings that flag certain products 
(commodity-signs) (Iwabuchi 2002, Yu-ling Su 1999). Therefore in the process of 
viewing foreign TV programmes, audiences are not merely reading or making 
meanings from the content and plot but they are also consuming the additional 
symbols and images inscribed within these texts. The cultural consumption of media 
has grown more complicated and fragmented in the age of globalisation (although 
some might argue that it has instead become homogenised). Thus one cannot ignore 
the importance of the role of media as a cultural reference point and how audiences 
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fulfil their desires and imaginative pleasures through different forms of appropriation 
and interpretation.  
 
According to Jean Baudrillard (1970/1998), commodities consist of two different 
values, first the ‘use value of things’: the value which is based on the quality, function 
and usefulness of goods, providing actual benefits and needs to consumers; second, 
the sign-value: the images of things which operates through advertising, the media, 
displays and performances create the romantic, fantastic and aesthetic fabric to 
consumers in daily life. Don Slater argues, following Baudrillard: 
                
We no longer consume products but rather signs, and indeed the system of 
signs: what we buy in and through the consumer good is the social place it 
maps out in relation to all the other commodity signs in the system. The value 
of goods no longer arises from their use or even from their abstract economic 
exchange: rather, it is their sign-value that defines them (1997, p. 199).          
  
This is similar to what Bourdieu says about taste, where it ‘functions as a sort of 
social orientation, a “sense of one’s place”, guiding the occupants of a given place in 
social space towards the social positions adjusted to their properties, and towards the 
practices or goods which befit the occupants of that position’ (1987, p. 466). 
 
It can be seen from the above arguments that the notion of consumption has shifted 
from a materialistic approach to a 1990s focus on its cultural implications, after which 
the concepts of modernity and modernisation were reconsidered and reformulated. 
One account of mass cultural theories of consumerism argues that ‘consumer culture 
comprises systems of signs or codes which determine the meanings of all goods for 
all people (generally through advertising) and indeed “constitute” the people 
themselves through their positioning within discourses’ (Slater 1997, p. 143). The 
overabundance of commodity-signs in consumer society together with the 
development of technology, especially the mass media, means the reproduction of 
signs, images and pictures has blurred the distance between the imaginary and the real. 
The output of goods has become the production of ‘sign-value’ leading to the problem 
of consumption making a distinction between a “real” or “false” image, not the 
system of needs.   
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According to Ubonrat Siriyuvasak’s research on the consumption of J-pop (Japanese 
popular culture) and K-pop (Korean popular culture) in Thailand, Thai youths 
deliberately articulate cultural practices that would differentiate them from other 
social classes (2004, p. 178). In a sense, the link between the consumption of 
commodities and TV dramas can be understood as a different yet similar means of 
fulfilling one’s desires or dreams, thus making sense of their conscious choices which 
they had formed in their daily lives. Consequently, looking at the consumption of 
Japanese ‘Trendy Dramas’ and fashionable commodities in Taiwan in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s from the perspective of symbolic consumption indicates that 
consuming behaviour is not only economic behaviour Yu-ling Su, in her (1999) 
dissertation ‘Romance Fiction and Imaginary Reality: Reading Japanese Trendy 
Drama Socially’, she points out that the culture and the way of life portrayed by 
Japanese TV dramas have been widely accepted and practised by Taiwanese 
audiences. According to her research, Taiwanese young people do not just consume 
Japanese goods but also the abstract meaning and cultural values which the TV 
dramas portray. In other words, it is the cultural consumption of meanings, images 
and signs which constitute what Featherstone describes as the general 
‘aestheticisation of everyday life’ (1991, pp. 67-68). Previous research states that 
through the consumption of Japanese magazines, music, comic books, novels, 
commodities and even foods, Taiwanese consumers believe that they are experiencing 
a Japanese way of life as portrayed by the Japanese TV programmes. Hence, Su 
argues that when Taiwanese young audiences are watching Japanese Trendy Dramas 
they not only receive the content but also the additional signs and images, and 
through consuming behaviours fulfil certain imaginative pleasures.   
                    
To summarise, in a postmodern society consuming is not only the activity of being 
fascinated by, or the use of, things, it also involves the formation of a self-image 
during the progress of an individual life. Featherstone (1991) points out that 
consumer culture involves self-expression, self-development and personal 
transformation. The social activities that surround it offer opportunities for young 
people to actively and collectively construct their own social identities. In earlier 
research, the media are seen not as a powerful source of dominant ideologies, but as a 
‘symbolic resource’ which young people use in making sense of their experiences, in 
relating to others and in organising their daily lives (Buckingham 1993, p. 13). Hence, 
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it is important to question what role transnational media programmes play in 
producing those dreams and desires which lead to the process of symbolic 
consumption and appropriation in the formation of the transnational cultural 
imagination in consumer society. This process also involves how young audiences 
weave regional TV dramas into their local daily experience, thus allowing us to 
reflect on their social formation and cultural identification or differentiation. In 
addition, this thesis explores further the concepts of ‘cultural proximity’ (Straubhaar 
1991, La Pastina and Straubhaar 2005), the notion of ‘Asian modernity’ (Iwabuchi 
2004) and the ‘cultural image bank’ (Chua 2000), all in relation to the Taiwanese 
audience reception of Japan and Korean TV dramas. Based on a body of empirical 
research this thesis will contribute to our understanding of the cultural complexities of 
television genres and texts and their relationship to their audience in the age of 
transnational media flows.     
 
  
The flows of regional (East Asia) popular TV dramas: From cultural 
globalisation to ‘Asian identity’? 
 
a. Popular consumption of Japanese and South Korean TV dramas in East/Southeast 
Asia: From Hari-zu (Japanophile) to Hanliu (Korean Wave) 
 
It is arguable that television dramas (i.e. soap operas, telenovelas) have often been 
understood and mostly articulated within – not outside – the nation. This does not 
mean that TV dramas could not cross national boundaries. Instead, they are more 
likely to succeed in doing so and in more limited and culturally specific ways: some 
scholars have characterised this process as becoming ‘culturally proximate’ (see 
Iwabuchi 2001, p. 54, Iwabuchi 2002, pp. 130-135). Koichi Iwabuchi consistently 
argues that ‘the perception of cultural proximity...needs to be understood less as the 
manifestation of given cultural attributes and values than the dynamic process of 
becoming’ (2004, p. 42 my emphasis). In other words, in the process of transnational 
television reception, cultural negotiation and social (trans)formation, the role of 
audience is central to the discussion, particularly in terms of the subject’s articulation 
and identification with a particular programme and context. According to Iwabuchi 
(2004) in recent East Asian popular media/cultural flows, the notion of cultural 
proximity in the consumption of Japanese TV dramas has been articulated positively 
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via Asian modernisation, Americanisation and globalisation.   
 
Previous research has suggested that elements of cultural proximity, the return to an 
Asia/Asian identity policy, together with the rise of geo-cultural markets and 
consumer culture are making the intra-Asian cultural flow more active than ever. 
However, this does not necessarily suggest that the inter-regional cultural flow is 
equal, since most of these countries are still on the receiving end (Japan and South 
Korea are dominant forces in the region). Some of these nations react to this intra-
Asian cultural flow from a more positive perspective, seeing it as an opportunity to 
create a new pan-Asia cultural identity, thus forming a buttress against Western 
cultural imperialism (e.g. Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand). Most of these countries 
are also aware that media liberalisation in the age of globalisation has forced the 
television industry landscape to change rapidly. However, apart from Koichi 
Iwabuchi’s analysis of the cross-culture audience reception of the regional cultural 
flow in the late 1990s, most debates have focused on the issues of political (e.g. 
imperialism, cultural colonisation) and economic (media industries and regulations) 
impacts which have overlooked youth cultural and media reception of TV dramas and 
their implications for everyday life.   
 
What I am proposing here is that by examining regional popular cultural flows within 
the discourse of political relations, the historically specific moment and media 
liberalisation in relation to the globalisation and Asian modernisation, one can begin 
to unpack the complexity of the youth audience’s reception of regional popular 
dramas rather than merely seeing it as the pleasure of recognition or youth subculture. 
Part 1 of the thesis explores, from the point of view of university and secondary 
students, to what extent the elements of pleasure of recognition, cultural proximity 
and the return to an Asia/Asian identity and consumer culture are interwoven into 
their reception of the programmes, if at all.  
 
Sinclair, Jacka and Cunningham’s (1996, p. 8) notion of a ‘geolinguistic region’ of 
audiovisual production flows, such as Mexico and Brazil in Latin America and Egypt 
in the Arab world captures the increasing complexity of international television flows, 
while Hesmondhalgh (2002, p. 19) revises it as the ‘geocultural market.’ He argues 
that the concept of the geocultural is more suitable than geolinguistic in terms of 
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categorising regional cultural flows as language is only one of a number of potential 
cultural connections between places and peoples. Cultural connections can work 
across enormous distances that transcend geographical proximity. In my opinion, the 
notion of geocultural markets can be one explanation as to why intra-Asia popular 
cultural flow has become so profoundly active since the 1990s. This is because, 
despite the lack of linguistic commonality, the popular reception of regional TV 
dramas is often perceived as the consequence of sharing cultural similarities and a 
sense of modernisation (see Ching 2000b, Chua 2000, 2004, 2006, Iwabuchi 2002, 
2004, Chua and Iwabuchi 2008).       
 
However, Japanese popular culture products have more or less dominated 
East/Southeast Asian markets throughout the 90s, although there was some resistance 
from local governments, such as those in Taiwan and South Korea (Hong and Hsu 
1999). Even though the consumption of Japanese popular cultural products may lead 
to another form of “cultural colonisation” or cultural imperialism, this sense of 
feeling threatened by a former coloniser has little impact on younger generation. 
Today, most of Asia’s youth has never experienced that former period of colonisation 
and therefore Japanese popular culture is just something new, more advanced, 
superior, something they can identify with and, at the same time, easily consumed. On 
the other hand, the sudden popularity of Korean popular culture products in Asia is so 
prominent that in Taiwan it is called Hanliu, the literal meaning of which is “cold 
wave/current”, because the Chinese pronunciation of “cold” and “Korea” sounds the 
same. Therefore, Hanliu has been used to indicate the popularity of Korean TV 
dramas, pop music, food, fashion styles and so on. As Jessica Kim, vice president for 
MTV Network Asian, announced in Time Asia magazine, ‘Korea is like the next 
epicentre of pop culture in Asia, it’s the next Japan10’. 
 
The prospect of South Korea overtaking the Japanese popular culture industry in 
Asian pop markets has become possible and more apparent in the recent years due to 
South Korea’s booming cultural industry and government involvement. According to 
Lee, Scott and Kim:  
 
                                                 
10
 Time Asia, 29 July 2002 online issue, accessed http://www.time.com/time/world/article 
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Hallyu has spurred travel to Korea. The Korea National Tourism Organisation 
(KNTO) reported that approximately 3 million Hallyu induced tourists visited 
Korea as of November 2004. Many cultural commentators in Korea attribute 
such a sudden influx of East Asian tourists to the dramatic success of TV 
dramas (e.g., Winter Sonata and Great Jang-Geum) and an avid interest in 
Hallyu actors and actresses (2008, p. 811). 
 
Korean TV dramas have become so popular in East Asia that organised tours bring 
TV drama fans to their filming locations in South Korea. For instance, according to 
an online survey carried out by the Korean government, Seoul ranks as the most 
popular Asian city for tourists, followed by the TV dramas’ shooting locations11. The 
“Korean Wave” has swept across much of Asia since the early 2000s. For example, in 
Thailand, Korean TV dramas are scheduled regularly on television and enjoy a high 
viewing rate; in Singapore, Korean TV dramas are scoring higher viewing rates than 
Japanese dramas in 2002 (Dator and Seo 2004); in Japan, Winter Sonata was first 
shown on NHK in 2003 and due to popular request rebroadcast in 2004 (Chua 2006). 
That is to say inter-regional TV dramas’ consumption has become a cultural and 
social norm since the 2000s amongst most East Asian countries, with South Korea 
gradually dominating most cultural and media industries owing to its government’s 
specific attempts and efforts.  
 
Several assumptions have been made about the popularity of Korean popular culture 
in East/Southeast Asia by Dator and Seo (2004, pp. 31-36). Firstly, the phenomenon 
could be seen as nothing more than a passing fad since Japanese popular culture has 
passed its high point and pop culture promoters and vendors are constantly in search 
of new material. Korean media products are also considered as the cheaper option 
when compared to Japanese counterparts, and for the foreign media industry the 
combination of economic benefits and culturally “exotic” (i.e. different from Japan) 
elements have provided the opportunity for Korean popular culture to shine. Secondly, 
a convergence of Pan-Asian culture, as the sociologist Habib Khondker argues ‘is 
kind of a pan-Asianism. You can look for alternative cultures, not necessarily 
European or American’ (cited in Dator and Seo 2004, p. 33). In this case, family 
values, the concept of “pure” love, Confucian values and conservatism can be cited as 
the distinguishing cultural elements of Japanese and Korean TV dramas when 




compared to Western ones. Thirdly, the South Korean government believes that the 
success of media products not only boosts the economy, but also strengthens its 
international image. It is the government’s involvement which promotes popular 
cultural products, including for instance, a funding policy designed to boost the film 
industry, the appointment of an award-winning film director as Minister of Culture 
and Tourism (ibid., p. 34) and it was also suggested that the Korean Government 
Information Agency has actively prompted Korean TV dramas throughout the Middle 
East which started from August 200412.  
 
In addition, it is made clear from Dator and Seo’s argument that ‘Korea may be the 
first nation consciously to recognise, and, more importantly, then to form official 
policy and take action towards, becoming a dream society of icons and aesthetic 
experience’ (ibid., p. 36). They use the term ‘a dream society of icons and aesthetic 
experience’ to reference five futuristic theories: Ernest Sternberg’s (1999) idea of ‘the 
economy of icons’ which proposes that the driving force of newer economy is not 
information but image; Rolf Jensen’s (1999) notion of ‘the dream society’ where 
societies are mediated by pictures; Joseph Pin and James Gilmore’s (1999) assertion 
of ‘the experience economy’ that recognises ‘experiences as a distinct economic 
offering [providing] key future economic growth’ and Virginia Postel’s (2003) 
comments on ‘the substance of style’ and the rise of aesthetic value in economic life 
(cited in Dator and Seo 2004, pp. 34-35).  In other words, what Dator and Seo argue 
is that Korean government leaders, to some extent, recognise that the ‘dream 
economy of icons and aesthetic experience’ is the wave of the future (ibid.).  
 
President Roh said in Digital Times (2004), ‘the 21st century is the age of knowledge 
and the creative mind. A powerful cultural nation will become an economically strong 
nation’ (cited in Dator and Seo 2004, p. 37). Although the assumption is still open to 
further debate there is no doubt that the South Korean Government certainly plays an 
important role in promoting the “Korean Wave” in the age of global cultural flows.    
Since the 1990s, Japan and South Korea are considered major players in exporting 
their popular cultural products to other Asian countries in the region. This intense 
                                                 
12
 Under the agreement between KBS and ERTU, the Egyptian broadcast station received the dramas 
free of charge and the Government Information Agency produced the Arabic subtitles (Asian Film 
Foundation, http://www.asianfilm.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=34). 
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intra-regional cultural and media flows has made an ‘East-Asian identity’ imaginable 
(Chua 2006, p. 35) amongst the younger generation. The popularity of Japanese and 
Korean media/popular products in East and Southeast Asia – in contrast to Western 
ones to an extent – can be explained as the natural outcome of the latest phase of 
modernisation in Asian countries. Whether one can assume that the East Asian 
popular cultural flow is an indication of de-Westernisation remains to be seen. 
Nevertheless, this cultural phenomenon has challenged the notion of cultural 
globalisation.   
 
While the US remains the most important global player exporting media products to 
most Asian countries, the growing inter-penetration of media markets and products in 
Asian countries suggests a new order of complexity within the global television 
market (see Berry et al. 2009, Iwabuchi 2002, 2004, Kim 2007, 2008). The 
deregulation of television in most Asian countries in the early 1990s led to a 
proliferation of domestic television production companies across the region, which in 
turn led to the emergence of regional markets based on geo-linguistic affinities and 
similarities, for instance, the so-called ‘Chinese speaking’ media market, including 
Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore. The transnational 
flow of media products such as pop music, television dramas, light entertainment 
programmes between those countries suggests that language plays a primary role in 
facilitating audience reception, and the profitability of TV stations and the music 
industry (Chua 2004).  
 
The so-called regionalisation strategies have been viewed as another way of resisting 
globalisation/Americanisation/Westernisation. It has become perceptible that the 
composition of the region does not simply depend on geographical, economic and 
political elements, but also includes a common sense of psychological and cultural 
familiarity. According to Eric Ma and Joseph Chan ‘regionalisation of Asian 
television refers to the flow of Asian produced programmes and the exchanges of 
expertise within the Asian region; it also refers to the production and distribution of 
programmes which are tailor-made for regional audiences’ (1996, p. 53). 
  
In most East Asian countries, it is becoming evident that local, national and regional 
media markets are emerging with Japan and South Korea as the dominant forces. In 
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contrast to previous research, which was heavily based on the popularity of American 
TV programmes (e.g. Dallas, Dynasty) in the rest of world and how this imposed a 
homogenised ideology on its audience, recent research on trans-regional cultural flow 
challenges the concept of the West and the rest in part as well as suggesting the 
importance of the booming media markets in East Asian countries.  
 
Moreover, if Asian regionalism has been, more often than not, articulated on cultural 
grounds rather than economic or political grounds, as Leo Ching (2000b) proposes, 
then this explains perhaps why the intra-Asian TV drama flows are becoming 
increasingly evident as the result of the dynamics of audience preference rather than 
the cultural content of Western media. Ching suggests that ‘A theory of culture, in 
this case regional culture, is not “about” culture/regional culture per se, but about the 
concepts that culture generates, concepts that are themselves related in more or less 
complex ways to other concepts associated with other practices’ (ibid., p. 249).  
 
The notion of culture as generating the possibility of imagining an Asian identity has 
been a dominant political and theoretical approach to understanding regional 
integration in contrast to the European and North American power blocs. This 
assumption is arguably based on so-called traditional values and the shared sense of 
morality in creating a regional identity. However, as Japanese politician Ishihara 
Shintaro (1994) points out:  
 
If the so-called high culture girded the unity of Asia in the era of high 
imperialism, it is mass culture in its intra-regional formation, that substantiates 
Asianism in the postcolonial present: the popularity of ‘Japanese’ mass culture 
(such as melodrama, animation, pop music, etc) signals ‘commonality’ and 
‘resonance’ within Asia today (cited in Ching 2000b, p. 234).  
 
What he suggests is that within the region, the consumption of Japanese popular 
culture, to a certain extent creates a common ground for young people to form and 
transform their sense of being Asian. In a similar vein, in the article ‘The Asianisation 
of Asia’, Washington bureau chief of the Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Newspaper) Yoichi 
Funabashi argues that ‘regional awareness in Asia does not derive from reactive 
attitudes. Asia’s “Asianisation” is paradoxically the result of the globalisation of its 
economy and media’ (1993, p. 79). Therefore the contemporary search for a new 
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Asian identity, according to Ching, Ishihara and Funabashi, is predominantly 
affirmative and forward-thinking, not reactionary or nostalgic. Then the questions that 
direct this research project are: what is this future-oriented assumption based on? 
Who is leading the way? How are the intra-Asia popular cultural flows perceived as 
an important dynamic force in the construction of a new Asian identity? Moreover, 
how has the trend of cultural regionalisation altered the media industry in Taiwan (e.g. 
through Taiwanese idol drama) and changed the consumption of material production 
and taste amongst young people thus far? I will elaborate these issues in Chapters 3 
and 4 based on my field research amongst university and secondary school students in 
Taiwan between 2003 and 2005.  
 
In my view, the notion of forward-looking sentiment in searching for a sense of 
modern collective cultural identification amongst Asian youngsters according to Ien 
Ang (2004) is similar to what Iwabuchi suggests as a sense of becoming ‘culturally 
proximate’ (Iwabuchi 2001, p. 54, Iwabuchi 2002, Chapter 4), an observation based 
on his research on the popularity of Japanese TV dramas in Taiwan. Thus it is 
important to note that countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore went through a very rapid modernisation process in the past few decades 
and young people in the 1990s were among the first generation faced with the task of 
figuring out how to be truly modern in a modernised Asian context. Ang stresses the 
argument in conjunction with the Singaporean sociologist Beng Huat Chua’s (2000) 
perception that:  
 
Youth in Asia, as in other parts of the world, draw from an “image bank” that 
is internationalised through popular mass media. The reference point in the 
imaginary is, therefore, a globalised image of youth rather than local cultural 
images. It is the global rather than the local that provides their identity as 
“youth” (cited in Ang 2004, p. 306). 
 
Ang argues that youth in Asia may draw from several ‘image banks’, both 
international and local but their main reference point may not be some generic 
‘globalised image of youth’ (ibid.). Instead they choose a more culturally specific and 
inspirable image, represented by the cultural image of Tokyo or even Seoul – the 
regionalised image of youth.  
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Since the early 1990s, the idea of the “New Asia” and “New Asianism” have been 
raised as a political issue in Japan, such as in the famous book, The Japan That Can 
Say No (1991) by Shintaro Ishihara and Aiko Morita. Ishihara and Mortia argue that a 
return to and the re-creation of an Asian identity has been considered a necessity. 
Notably in the 1990s the relationship between Japan and other Asian countries 
became a central issue of discussion within Japan. The following introduction to an 
exhibition on manga (animation and comic books) from various Asian countries by 
the Japan Foundation Asia Centre in Tokyo explained how Japan takes the shared 
feeling and common concerns for granted:  
 
Taking into consideration that we modern citizens of Asia today live in a time 
of shared feelings and common concerns, Asia Centre has organised this 
comic exhibition as a channel of communication among our Asian youth for 
better comprehending and appreciating the circumstances of each other’s 
societies and daily living (cited in Gossmann 2001, p. 4 my emphasis).  
 
In its opening statement, it acknowledges the popularity of Japanese popular cultural 
flows in Asia as well as its importance in the construction of an Asian identity 
amongst youngsters. The distribution and popularity of manga and anime (Japanese 
animated films) products may be considered as a means of improving communication 
and sharing cultural commonality between youth in Asia, according to the Japan 
Foundation. Within the notion of Asian values in the attempt to regionalise political 
and economic alliances in combination with a shared historical background and 
cultural imagery, it seems that East Asian countries are aiming to follow the European 
paradigm. Consequently, the intra-Asian cultural flows are seen as being as lively as 
ever.  
 
As opposed to previous research that emphasises the popularity of manga and anime 
in the global scale, my focus is to look at the popular phenomenon of Japanese and 
South Korean TV dramas in Taiwan. Why TV dramas? As I mentioned in the 
introduction, in the field of media research on the reception of TV dramas (such as 
soap operas, telenovelas and TV series) there is not much attention to the significant 
popularity of foreign TV dramas locally. Liebes and Katz suggest on the basis of their 
cross-cultural readings of Dallas that the value of foreign TV programmes such as 
Dallas comes from viewers’ negotiation with the programme (e.g. referential readings 
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and/or critical readings), often intertwined with their various social, cultural and 
ethnic backgrounds and therefore ‘the actual interaction between the programme and 
its viewer must be studied’ (1990, p. 4). The approach in my thesis is different from 
earlier research which examined the popularity of one particular TV programme via a 
different approach such as audience research, content analysis and the study of effects. 
My intervention is that the relationship between the popular consumption of regional 
TV programmes and its audience needs to be examined as a common form of cultural 
practice as well as a social phenomenon and in doing so we can move toward a 
general theory of transnational reception studies based on these efforts. 
 
d. Japanese and Korean TV dramas as a social and cultural phenomenon in Taiwan 
since the 1990s 
 
 
1.  Distribution and Circulation  
 
This section outlines the socio-cultural phenomenon of Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas and its implications in terms of media products distribution and circulation in 
Taiwan. The section highlights how the local media, cable television stations and the 
circulation of pirated VCDs (Video Compact Disc)
13
have played an important role in 
facilitating and generating audience taste during the process of media globalisation 
and commercialisation in the early 1990s. Despite my research focus on young 
audience’s comparative reading of regional TV dramas, I also want to point out that 
different media uses can potentially create a different sense of imaginative pleasure 
by formulating different cultural dimensions of viewing experience and narrative 
reflexivity. For instance, the use of VCDs is considered as a more desirable viewing 
experience and created a sense of private space amongst secondary school students 
(although most of the time they do not have the luxury to create this private space) 
which I will elaborate further in Chapter 4.  
 
Over the years, there have been serious concerns about the heavy dependence on 
foreign programmes in Taiwan (Hong and Hsu 1999). According to Hwang (1996), 
since Taiwan’s Cable Television Act was enacted in 1993, the penetration rate of 
                                                 
13
 Typically, the VCDs will be sold in sets of eight to twelve, with each set featuring ten to twelve 
episodes from a single three-month season of weekly broadcasts of a particular TV drama (Hu, 2004, p. 
210) 
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cable television has increased rapidly and reached a record high of 71 per cent in 
1995, compared to only 19 per cent in 1991. The main reason for cable operators to 
broadcast foreign programmes instead of domestic ones was the lack of financial 
resources. Moreover, the high profits made by TV companies through the 
broadcasting (and re-broadcasting) of foreign programmes also give them a good 
reason to follow this pattern. As Iwabuchi also points out: 
 
One of the most important factors in the increasing presence of Japanese 
popular culture in Taiwan - as evidenced by the recent rise of Japanese 
television programmes there – is the fact that Japanese culture industries have 
not actively promoted them. Rather, there has been a strong local initiative as 
local companies have grabbed business opportunities to sell Japanese TV 
programmes during the process of media globalisation in Taiwan (2001, p. 59).  
 
Thus owing to local media industry demands, the dissemination of Japanese TV 
dramas in Taiwan was the outcome of television companies purchasing cheap foreign 
productions in order to gain maximum economic profits.  
 
The amount of Japanese programming on Taiwan’s cable TV increased significantly 
after the lifting of the long-standing ban on importing Japanese audio-visual products 
in 1992 and the new Cable Television Act in 1993. The media commercialisation in 
Taiwan has led cable operators to schedule more of what the competition perceives as 
successful (such as Japanese and Hong Kong TV dramas) than counter it with 
different types of programmes. According to research carried out by the ICFP 
(International Communication Flow Project, 2001) on the number of Japanese 
programmes (194) and the number of hours (3,848) exported to Asian countries, 
Taiwan holds the first place. Almost all variety programmes that have been popular in 
Japan are being broadcast on some channels in Taiwan. Research conducted by 
Koichi Iwabuchi (2002) in the late nineties also suggests that Taiwanese people are 
the most enthusiastic consumers of Japanese popular culture: over seventy cable 
channels continuously look for new content to fill airtime, and five of these cable 
channels broadcast Japanese dramas and variety shows around the clock. 
 
The most popular genre of Japanese TV programmes in Taiwan, according to rating 
surveys, is the TV drama. Amongst these, the so-called “Trendy Drama” (or post-
trendy drama) which targets the younger generation has made a significant impact in 
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many places as well as in Taiwan (Iwabuchi 2002, pp. 122-124). Japanese Trendy 
Drama is also recognised as an established genre, called Japanese Idol Drama in 
Taiwan, which was named by Star TV group when it started the “Japanese Idol 
Drama Hour” in 1992. The title suggests that Star TV has used the strategy of 
promoting young Japanese idols to attract Taiwanese audiences (see Iwabuchi 2002, 
Yu-ling Su 1999). I will come back to this point to demonstrate how the images of 
those idols have been generally present and how this strategy coincides with the 
production system of trendy dramas in Japan. 
 
Following the success of the Japanese, Korean TV dramas experienced an unexpected 
wave in Taiwan around the late 1990s. Korean programmes are however different 
from the Japanese case, as there is no Korean cable channel in Taiwan, and most 
Korean TV dramas rely on local cable stations to be broadcast. In recent years, three 
terrestrial stations, TTV, CTV and CTS also broadcast two to three Korean TV 
dramas on a daily basis. San-Li, GTV28, ETTV, TVBS-G and Wei-Lai are amongst 
the most frequently viewed cable channels by Taiwanese audiences (see Gallup 
Taiwan, INC, 2001) and these are the channels that frequently broadcast Korean TV 
dramas. GTV28 and Wei-Lai are both drama-centred channels that since 2000 devote 
several hours a day to air Korean TV dramas regardless of the limited availability of 
the programmes on Korean television stations. Due to its Korean-focused 
programming over the years,  the NCC (National Communication Commission) has 
recently ordered GTV28 to broadcast more than 12.5 per cent locally-produced 
programmes in order to renew its licence for the following year (28/12/2011, United 
Online Newspaper). 
 
The popular phenomenon of Japanese and Korean media products and pop culture in 
Taiwan also owed much to local media promotion, such as daily newspaper columns 
and entertainment news coverage on various cable channels. This phenomenon 
corresponds to McManus’s (1994) theory of market-driven journalism, i.e. that the 
media make every effort to catch the attention of the audience, and a larger audience 
will bring in more advertisers, therefore more profit. For instance, based on the 
popularity of Japanese Trendy/Idol Dramas, the tabloid dailies soon started a massive 
coverage of Japanese popular culture such as fashion styles, foods, cosmetics, the 
stars’ daily life and travel information. Entertainment news on television stations also 
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widely cover information about the Japanese stars’ activities, pop music, and the 
latest drama release (Iwabuchi 2002, pp. 114-115, M.-t. Lee 2004, p. 133). Thus, it is 
fair to say that the relevant inter-media institutions such as newspapers and television 
stations also play influential roles in the construction of the newly created imagined 
community of the so-called “Japanophile” (hari-zu). Furthermore, Japanese television 
fans have gradually developed into Japanese culture fans in a more thorough and full-
scale manner in terms of their daily life and cultural practices. For instance, relevant 
books have been published describing modern Japanese way(s) of life; the authors are 
devoted fans of Japanese TV dramas and popular culture (such as, tourism, fashion 
guides, food) (Huang 2011, pp. 10-11). To borrow Livingstone and Bovill’s term, 
these authors have transformed themselves from ‘passive spectators to active 
performers’ (cited in M.-t. Lee 2004, p. 134). It has also been suggested in local 
newspapers that when the Korean TV dramas gradually gained popularity in Taiwan, 
the same kind of market promoting strategy was actively applied. 
 
Arguably, the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas owes a lot to the fever 
that was generated by the local media, especially in the case of Taiwan. Local 
journalists asked if the sudden popularity of Korean TV dramas was actually created 
and over-exaggerated by Taiwanese local media. The distribution and circulation of 
regional popular media productions is driven by the local liberal media market’s 
greed in the case of Taiwan and penetrated into various aspects of local daily life 
activities, cultural appropriations and social formations. It is with this observation, 
instead of analysing cross-cultural readings of one particular TV drama (i.e. Dallas), 
that I argue for the importance of examining the popularity of regional TV drama as a 
phenomenon encompassing the changes of local political, social, cultural and 
economic elements, as well as the asymmetrical flows of regional media commodities. 
 
Another unique circumstance in terms of the early distribution and circulation of 
Japanese TV dramas in Taiwan is pirated VCDs. It is a public secret that apart from 
watching TV dramas on television, pirated VCDs14 sales was the other major way of 
circulation of Japanese TV dramas during 1990s as it can be as cheap as £3.00 for a 
complete series. As Ming-tsung Lee (2004) and Yu-ling Su (1999) observed, Japanese 
                                                 
14
 For further information about the production and circulation of pirated VCDs in Chinese networking 
see Kelly Hu (2004).  
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TV dramas have created their own cultural flows and consumer space in Taiwan. The 
function of VCDs is believed to liberate viewers from restrictive broadcasting 
schedules. With VCDs, the audience can be freed from the slavery of time and they 
can therefore easily indulge themselves in the dramas without any interruption, 
potentially finishing a whole drama series in one viewing session. Consequently, the 
audiences own the drama and can view it repeatedly if they like, and such possession 
of the text lets fans gaze more closely and chew over the plot and dialogue over and 
over again. In contrast to earlier research, television viewing (especially soap operas) 
is easily disrupted and not one hundred per cent focused, hence the influence on the 
audience is sometimes regarded as limited (see Fiske 1989). The degree of viewers’ 
involvement with media texts and messages while watching TV dramas in VCDs 
format thus deserves careful examination in terms of personal viewing space and the 
intimacy of narrative reflexivity. Based on the outcomes of my questionnaires and 
interviews/group discussions the use of VCDs was arguably more common practice 
amongst university rather than secondary school students. However, due to the fact 
that I did not conduct audience ethnography research I could only tentatively propose 
that the use of VCDs amongst university students deepened individual sentimental 
connections and narrative reflexivity, which are closely associated with the 
individual’s life experience – a notion I will develop further in Chapter 3. 
 
2. TV Genre and Early Reception   
 
This section illustrates the genre of Japanese and Korean TV dramas, and looks at 
how and why the narrative and format of this genre is considered by some scholars as 
crucial explanations of why these dramas attract young viewers in Taiwan and the rest 
of the Asian region. Their research on specific TV viewing experiences suggests that 
these regional dramas depict the ideas of Asian modernisation and an urban/atheistic 
way of life providing several ‘image banks’ and a sense of cultural intimacy (Ang 
2004, pp. 306-307) which regional youth desire. Their research contributes an 
important message: that one should begin to pay more attention to local/regional and 
regional/global connections; nonetheless, they often place the audience within an 
Asian camp with their own traditions and values that are different from the West but 
at the same time modernised. What is lacking in this field is a more comparative 
reading of these two regional TV dramas based on empirical audience research. In 
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doing so my argument is that the notions of cultural proximity and geocultural region 
only partly explain the popular consumption of regional media products. Rather, local 
young audience’s comparative readings of two different regional TV dramas would 
suggest a more dynamic and complex process of transnational media reception, 
cultural appropriation and social formation.  
 
Early research suggests that Japanese trendy drama is believed to be famous for the 
glamorous representation of urban youth. Some based their arguments on how the 
audiences encounter the characters in the TV drama repeatedly and over a longer 
period of time when they are more prepared to imagine and enter into the spaces of 
Japanese culture. For instance, Koichi Iwabuchi (2004, p. 9) points out that the 
productions of Japanese trendy drama at an early stage (during the late 1980s) were 
generally understood according to their depictions of stylish urban lifestyles and 
trendy nightspots, designer clothes and accessories, sets with chic interior designs, 
and the latest pop music, all of which clearly reflected the then prevailing highly 
materialistic consumerism Japanese young people enjoyed under the so-called bubble 
economy. Therefore, the dramas’ narratives at the time were considered rather 
vacuous and superficial until 1991 when Tokyo Love Story aired. This programme 
gained significant popularity and the storyline was considered more sophisticated; 
some consider it as the beginning of ‘post-trendy drama’ in Japan (see Toru 2004, pp. 
69-86). Although the narratives of this particular genre were considered as unrealistic 
at the time, Japanese trendy dramas as media commodities have cleverly combined 
three important elements of the postmodern mediascape: ‘the image, the imagined 
and the imaginary’ (Appadurai 1996, p. 31, original emphasis). The portrayal of 
luxurious lifestyle, beautiful settings, pop idols and the pursuit of individuality and 
love in modern consumer society are all elements that direct its audience to the notion 
of what Appadurai described as ‘the imagination as a social practice’ (ibid., original 
emphasis).     
 
In addition, it invites young audiences to gaze at and imagine contemporary Japanese 
society and culture, which they have been interpreting, leading to a vigorous cultural 
identification with Japan, which will ultimately affect Asian youth identity as a whole. 
The early success of Japanese trendy dramas amongst a young female audience in 
Taiwan coincided with the initial audience target groups designed by Japanese TV 
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producers Ota Toru from Fuji TV, one of the pioneers of this genre. His idea was 
based on a simple heterosexual desire – the desire to be admired by a young woman. 
He therefore deliberately included the notions of fashion, music and trendy places 
where young Japanese young women would want to go on a date (Toru 2004, p. 70). 
The important elements in the storyline often involve the young individual’s life 
experience as well as their cultural practices and social reality in modern Japanese 
society. Much to Toru’s own surprise, when (post)Japanese trendy dramas became a 
cultural sensation in most East Asian countries (ibid., p. 69) what he had achieved 
was that cultural imagination itself became a social fact and the key component of the 
new global economic and cultural order. Thus, Japanese trendy dramas in the 1990s 
were a successful story of selling the narrative and genre to young audiences in the 
region by constructing a transnational imaginary landscape in their desire for a 
modernisation that smacks of traditions. 
 
In terms of modern Korean TV dramas, according to Dong-Hoo Lee’s observation 
(2004) in the 1990s Japanese dramas became the inspiration of many Korean 
producers to take up the newest trends in television production. Despite being 
criticised for imitating Japanese trendy dramas, Korean TV producers also creatively 
appropriated and transformed Japanese TV dramas into their own productions. The 
so-called Confucian values and conservatism are the two main points that have been 
raised to distinguish between Japanese and Korean TV dramas (see Ko 2004a, Leung 
2004). Unlike Japanese TV dramas in which the urbanity and individual happiness are 
key themes (in a way, neglecting the real world), familial relationships are an integral 
part of Korean TV drama texts. According to Leung (2004), this also explains why 
Korean TV dramas are generally more popular and accepted than Japanese ones in 
mainland China, and the reason why Japanese dramas are criticised by some 
mainland Chinese audiences as too Westernised (i.e. not traditional). By the same 
token, she suggests that perhaps this is one of the great elements that Korean TV 
dramas offer to their Asian neighbours: the hybridisation of nostalgia, romance, pure 
love, but also commodified idolatry in an exotic setting which Japanese TV dramas 
somehow lack.  
 
As she argues, the consumption of Japanese dramas is partly due to the audience’s 
need for inspiration and appropriation, and Korean dramas might be similarly 
 81 
favoured by audiences in less modernised areas (such as in China, Indonesia, 
Vietnam). Hence, to an extent, they have made the ‘economically determined’ cultural 
hierarchy even more visible (Leung, 2004, n.p.). In a way, Leung is not wrong in 
suggesting that the preference for and the consumption of Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas is very much related to domestic viewers’ taste, their historical past and 
political context (for example, mainland Chinese audiences). However, she 
oversimplified and overlooked the more complicated historical and political issues 
between Japan, China and South Korea, as well as local media coverage and systems 
which are tightly controlled by local governments (in the case of China). For instance, 
according to Sujeong Kim’s research on social discourse on a Korean TV drama in 
local newspaper reports, the success of Korean TV drama Dae Jang-geun in China is 
facilitated and manipulated by various local media (2009, p. 750).  It is therefore 
important to take into consideration the role of local media in generating the 
popularity of foreign TV programmes as well as to understand the cultural and social 
characteristics of the society itself in relation to a transnational pop cultural 
acceptance and appropriation.  
 
Arguably, the similarities of context reception and cultural consumption between 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas in Taiwan have been widely accepted as: urban 
appeal, beautiful settings and music, romance, the idol effect and melodrama (see 
Iwabuchi 2002, Lee and Ho 2002, 2003). According to Yu-fen Ko (2004b), there are 
five aspects of the popularity of Korean TV dramas in Taiwan: first, a hierarchy that 
has been drawn whereby Japan is at the higher end of modern culture, and Korea at 
the lower; so Korean cultural and economic status more closely resembles that of 
Taiwan. Second, Korean TV dramas are more family-oriented, therefore more 
suitable for family viewing (or attracting a wider range of age groups). Third, the 
‘struggle over tradition and controversial female characters are appealing to a 
younger audience. Korean TV dramas usually explore the conflicts between 
Confucian tradition and social modernity which the younger (mostly female) 
audience can easily relate to. The fourth dimension is the difference in narrative 
structures between Japanese and Korean TV dramas. In terms of length, Korean TV 
dramas occupy a middle ground compared to Japanese and Taiwanese TV dramas: the 
Japanese idol dramas are well-structured and run between twelve to fifteen episodes, 
with each storyline clear and well defined; the Taiwanese local dramas are tediously 
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long, some might suggest, with series lasting for forty episodes or even a hundred, if 
the ratings are high. In terms of content, the Korean TV dramas are considered more 
realistic because they contain both idol-oriented and family-oriented values. Finally, 
even though both feature combined packaging of idol stars and commodities to 
promote their dramas, Korean TV dramas rely more on internet promotion at the early 
stage of their general popularity.  
  
To sum up, early research has suggested that there are similarities but also 
distinguishing elements between Japanese and Korean TV dramas in terms of 
understanding Taiwanese audience reception and consumption of both types of TV 
drama. However, more importantly, what needs to be addressed and explored is the 
field of media studies and youth daily cultural practice and social formation within 
intense intra-regional consumption of television dramas. The dynamic interaction 
between external cultural influence and local cultural practices is one of the key 
aspects of this thesis; as Roger Rouse argues ‘the transnational has not so much 
displaced the national as resituated it and thus reworked its meanings’ (1995, p. 380). 
The popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas in Taiwan has created a social and 
cultural phenomenon which cannot be explained without examining how they have 
been appropriated by local young audiences. Following Thompson’s definition, ‘to 
appropriate a message is to take hold of its meaningful content and make it one’s 
own’ (1995, p. 42), this thesis analyses how young audiences appropriate and 
assimilate the message from regional TV dramas and incorporate it into their lives – 
‘a process that sometimes takes place effortlessly, and sometimes involves deliberate 
application’ (ibid.). Following this insight and based on my research data, Chapters 3 
and 4 investigate the complex process of Taiwanese youths’ comparative readings of 
regional TV dramas, including a sense of narrative self-reflexivity, programme 
choices, social justification, cultural appropriation, individual negotiation and 
identification in the formation of cultural knowledge of others and transnational 








In this chapter I have focused on audience research. In doing so I have employed a 
historical retrospective on the definition of reception analysis to map out different 
aspects of TV drama viewing and its implications for the notion of the pleasure of 
recognition, narrative reflexivity, cross-cultural readings, meaning-making and 
symbolic cultural consumption. I have also sought to respond to the various ways of 
cross-cultural reading of soap opera/TV dramas in conjunction with individual 
perception, cultural sectors and socio-political reality. The arguments made in this 
chapter so far constitute an alternative approach to the examination of audience 
reception of transnational TV dramas, that is: transnational media reception as daily 
social practice amongst local (young) people is a dynamic process of cultural 
negotiation and appropriation. The notion of ‘cultural proximity’ or ‘cultural discount’ 
(Hoskins and Mirus 1988) has its importance in analysing local audience’s reception 
of foreign TV dramas. Nonetheless it needs to be considered in conjunction with 
different aspects of social reality (e.g. local media industry, modernisation) and 
cultural sensibility (e.g. colonial past).    
 
In view of East Asian popular cultural/media product flows since the 1990s, as Ien 
Ang (2004) rightly argues, there is no such thing as a monolithic Asian modernity, 
especially not at the level of everyday culture and experience. Therefore the existing 
cultural distance can be the discounted factor for the consumption of media products 
of cultural neighbours. For instance, the Japanese TV dramas are better received in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong compared to China as the content of Japanese TV dramas is 
often criticised by mainland Chinese audiences for being too Westernised (Leung 
2004). Hence, the intertwined perception of cultural similarity and difference between 
TV dramas is articulated in each locality. This image of “a way of life” or “structure 
of feeling” can both be shared and not shared by Asian youth, to borrow Ang’s and 
Stratton’s argument that ‘we have come to live in a world where all the cultures are 
both (like) “us” and (not like) “us” (1996, p. 24).       
 
Still, there are a lot questions that need an answer. Yu-Fen Ko has pointed out at least 
three concerns about the popularity of Japanese popular culture within Taiwanese 
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cultural contexts that need further discussion. Firstly, why Japan is, culturally, 
considered more threatening than other foreign popular cultures (such as America or 
South Korea); secondly, why the, arguably, more familiar Japanese culture has 
become the target of criticism and finally, how the audience defined Japanese dramas 
as more “real” which goes beyond their own experiential and operational reality 
(2004b, pp. 119-120, original emphasis). Moreover, the popularity of Korean TV 
dramas and popular music amongst young Taiwanese in recent years also suggests the 
other possible dimension of understanding the rise of intra-Asian cultural flows and 
its interaction in the construction of regional identity. The dynamic of popular cultural 
flows, focusing on TV dramas which depict the “way of life” as a platform to 
experience and practise transnational culture across the nation, has become an 
important resource for the young to construct their sense of identity both culturally 
and socially.   
 
Part 1 of this thesis encompasses Chapters 3 and 4 which are based on research on 
Taiwanese university and secondary schools students’ transnational media and 
cultural consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas respectively. Building on 
the insights of ‘pleasure of recognition’ (Ang, 1985, p. 20) and ‘story about us’ 
(Iwabuchi, 2005, p.24) in the field of cross-cultural readings of soap opera/TV dramas, 
in Chapter 3 I will argue that university students’ narrative-sentimental reflexivity in 
relation to Japanese and Korean TV dramas’ contents is not restricted to either 
emotional connections or pure entertainment values. Rather, regional TV dramas as 
an alternative cultural reference with a sense of cultural familiarity is actively 
incorporated into university students’ daily experience and formulated at different 
levels of cultural articulation based on their comparative readings of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas. In addition, employing the notion of consumer culture and 
symbolic cultural consumption in relation to audience’s reception, I will point out that 
cultural consumption of Japanese TV dramas and its by-products may not necessarily 
suggest the longing for a “Japanese way of life”. Instead, the symbolic cultural 
meaning of Japanese TV dramas has been translated and represented as an aesthetic 
way of living, which becomes tangible for everyone in everyday life and relevant 




In Chapter 4, I will demonstrate the different ways of cross-cultural readings of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas between university and secondary school students, 
building on the notion of meaning-making and sentimental connection which is 
closely associated with individual socio-cultural experience. In doing so, I suggest 
that one shall not take local audiences’ transnational reading or meaning-making of 
the programmes as one position but rather focus on how it generates the difference 
within the local cultures of a specific audience group. Additionally, I will discuss how 
the way “TV dramas talk” as a means of social formation and cultural confrontation 
takes place in teenage audiences and their family members during TV drama viewing. 
In the last section, I will discuss the popularity of Japanese animation amongst 
teenagers which challenges the idea of ‘culturally odourless’ (Iwabuchi 1999) 

























A comparative reading of Japanese and South Korean TV dramas 




Chapter 3 corresponds to the research project which was originally envisaged and the 
data which I collected, and it brings into the discussion university students’ reception 
and consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas in Taiwan.  It focuses in 
particular on the university students’ reception of both foreign TV dramas and their 
cultural practice in daily life, and encompasses their narrative-sentimental reflexivity 
and the consumption of TV dramas’ by-products which represent a particular 
symbolic social meaning for its consumers; university students’ preference for 
Japanese TV dramas in relation to their perceptions of both countries; and to what 
extent TV dramas reinforce cultural misconceptions. 
 
In the first section, I intervene in existing debates on the context of the consumption 
of Japanese and/or Korean TV dramas in East Asia (including the case of Taiwan) and 
how they relate to young audiences’ self-reflexivity in relation to their daily 
experiences and cultural practice. I explore how the different levels of cultural 
appropriations and articulations that are associated with the consumption of regional 
TV dramas have been perceived and negotiated by university audiences. Based on the 
analysis of these data, I argue that university audiences identify with the intensity in 
terms of transcultural resonance and imagination at the site of regional media 
consumption. Moreover, it shows that the incorporation of their daily viewing 
experience of regional TV dramas also generates an alternative understanding of the 
linkages between national, regional and transnational consumption in relation to 
modern cultural practice and identification amongst the young. My one-to-one 
interview results demonstrated that in the process of regional TV dramas consumption, 
university viewers’ narrative-sentimental reflexivity in relation to TV context is to a 
certain extent similar to Iwabuchi’s approach of ‘a story about us’ (2005, p. 24) or 
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Ang’s ‘pleasure of recognition’ (1985, p. 20). Nonetheless, I would argue that young 
people’s reception of regional TV dramas is neither limited to emotional connections 
nor pure entertainment values; more often than not they are very comfortable 
applying their conceptions or opinions about these two countries in terms of way of 
life, culture or social morale based on their knowledge obtained in the viewing of 
programmes over the years. In other words, regional TV dramas are not simply 
perceived as popular cultural products but are instead important cultural resources 
and references amongst young Taiwanese adults.  
 
In the second section I discuss why the preference for Japanese TV dramas has been 
an overwhelming phenomenon amongst university students, suggesting that the 
elements of TV genre and familiarity, cultural proximity, national perception, idols 
preference and language learning purposes have all contributed to the popularity of 
Japanese TV dramas under different circumstances. All these elements indicate that 
university students’ choice of regional TV programmes are often closely related to 
their personal desire (e.g. emotional connection) and taste (e.g. lifestyle) as well as a 
sense of connection and familiarity with Japanese pop culture and as a nation. 
However, one should not readily assume that these sentiments of familiarity and “like 
us but different” in relation to the popularity of Japanese TV dramas amongst 
university student is a predetermined condition due to the colonial past and a 
primordial cultural similarity between the two nations. Koichi Iwabuchi (2002) has 
rightly argued that the notion of cultural proximity should be seen as a dynamic 
process in examining the popularity of Japanese TV dramas in Taiwan, which 
provides important insight in terms of local young audience’s reception and cultural 
consumption of foreign TV dramas. Nonetheless, his emphasis on agency (i.e. Taiwan 
youth) in examining transnational media consumption has overlooked the role of 
structure (i.e. the local media system and cultural industry) which, I would argue, 
systematically reproduces and disseminates cultural commodities that cultivate the 
desire and taste for a sense of “Japaneseness” amongst young consumers. The media’s 
(re)creation – or (re)appropriation – of Japaneseness has become a neutral and rather 
invisible cultural component in everyday life and hence encounters no resistance in 
Taiwan. In light of this, I would argue that it is also important to recognise the 
marketing strategies and cultivation of the audience’s tastes deployed by the local 
media and cultural industry which I will further elaborate in this chapter.  
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In the third section I investigate how the concept of Japanese TV dramas has had a 
symbolic cultural meaning or a particular “cultural odour” which has been integrated 
and translated into the local media industry, and how and to what extent university 
students’ own adaptation of Japaneseness has corresponded to the local media’s 
marketing strategy. In contrast to the notion of ‘Japanese culturally “odourless” 
commodities, such as animation and computer games, as questioned by the Japanese 
scholar Koichi Iwabuchi (2002, pp. 24-35), I would argue that the popularity of 
Japanese TV dramas, modern Japanese literature (e.g. Murakami Haruki, Yoshimoto 
Banana) and original screenplays have accelerated a deeper sense of Japanese 
‘cultural “fragrance”’ (ibid., p. 31) in modern Taiwanese society. This cultural 
phenomenon also challenges the notion of the relationship between “localisation” of 
global culture (i.e. "glocalisation", see Robertson 1995) and limited foreign influence 
at the local level. Rather I would argue that a transnational audience’s appropriation 
and negotiation within a local context does not necessarily suggest the negation of the 
“foreign odour” of media products. Often the elements of authenticity, originality and 
exoticism associated with the idea of being different are what young consumers 
search for in the age of globalisation. Hence, local media and cultural industries 
willingly and consciously reproduce culturally symbolic values and meaning that 
associate with a sense of Japaneseness (e.g. sophistication, modernisation). In 
Taiwan’s case, this also suggests that the imposition of cultural hegemony does not 
always happen from outside but also from within. 
 
 
What’s on Offer?: Differences and similarities between readings of 
Japanese and South Korean TV dramas  
 
There have been a number of studies on the reception of Japanese and South Korean 
TV dramas in East and Southeast Asia. For instance, Iwabuchi (2004) has edited a 
book in English, Feeling Asian Modernities, which brings together a wide range of 
studies on the transnational consumption of Japanese TV dramas in the East Asian 
region. Analysis of the reception of South Korean TV dramas and films (also known 
as the Korean Wave) can be found in Chua Beng Huat and Koichi Iwabuchi’s (2008) 
co-edited book, East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave. As I discussed 
in Chapter 2, the general reception of Japanese and South Korean TV dramas 
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amongst young audiences (and/or middle-aged women) has become a social and 
cultural phenomenon in Taiwanese society and most East Asian countries. Their 
impact on youngsters and their cultural practices, ranging from fashion sense, 
language learning, travelling aspirations and the application of emotional connections 
in their life experience in Taiwan, is one of the main issues that I wish to address. In 
doing so, I suggest that the consumption of foreign TV programmes needs to be taken 
into consideration when we examine the relationship between the young generations’ 
cultural identification and negotiation within the context of cultural otherness which 
they encounter on a daily basis in Taiwan.   
 
Since the 1990s, it has become commonplace to emphasise the importance of the 
consumption of Japanese popular culture in Taiwan. Amongst the 158 questionnaires 
that I collected from university students between 2003 and 2005, 93.0 per cent have 
experienced viewing Japanese TV dramas. Within the last decade, researchers have 
raised several serious concerns surrounding the formation of youth cultural 
identification. It has been suggested, for instance, that they are developing a 
‘transnational identity with Japan’ (Lee & Chen cited in Ko 2004b, p. 110), or 
undergoing a possible ‘cultural Japanisation’ (Chiou 2002, pp. 58-63) or even that 
they are in the process of experiencing another ‘inner colonisation’ (Ho and Lee 2002, 
pp. 44-46). One previous research project that took a particular interest in examining 
the popularity of Japanese TV dramas and their young female audience in Taiwan was 
conducted by Koichi Iwabuchi in the late 1990s. Iwabuchi’s research compared the 
Taiwanese audiences’ preference and perception of the Japanese TV drama, Tokyo 
Love Story, and the American drama, Beverley Hills 90210, and argued that Japanese 
TV dramas were better received amongst younger audiences in Taiwan. Iwabuchi 
concluded that there were several reasons for this preference: 1) Taiwanese audiences’ 
emotional involvement in Japanese dramas is fostered by a perceived cultural 
similarity between Japan and Taiwan; 2) that the love relationship is expressed more 
delicately and elegantly in Japanese TV dramas; and 3) the reputed subtlety of the 
Japanese programmes that led the Taiwanese to frequently lament the poor quality of 
their local dramas (2002, pp. 148-150). While Iwabuchi was conducting his audience 
research in Taiwan, Korean TV dramas were not yet in competition with Japanese TV 
dramas. Therefore he focused on Japanese, American and Taiwanese local TV dramas 
to compare to audience preferences and their perception. The cultural differences 
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between the “West” and the “East” were constantly raised, and after the interviewees 
compared Japanese to American TV dramas, the outcome was that Taiwanese 
audiences are much more culturally and emotionally connected to Japanese TV 
dramas than to American ones. In this instance, the notion of “cultural proximity” 
does play a part in the popularity of Japanese TV dramas. However, he also points out 
that one should not simply consider it as the sole explanation of the popular 
consumption of Japanese TV programmes: rather one needs to ask ‘under which 
historical conjuncture does the idea of cultural similarity becomes associated with the 
pleasure of text’ (Iwabuchi 2002, p. 133). His approach is mainly situated within the 
context of how young Asian audiences consume Asian media products in relation to 
historical connections from the past and in the context of the current “Asian 
modernisation” movement which provides an important insight into modern East 
Asian regional popular cultural flows and their implications. His early research also 
suggests one important reality – asymmetrical relationships between Japan and the 
rest of Asian countries on the ebbs and flows of regional popular culture (with Japan 
as a dominant force in the market) which have been challenged by the so-called 
“Korean Wave” since the early 2000s.   
 
Given the undeniable evidence of the rising popularity of Korean TV dramas in East 
Asia since early 2000s, in my questionnaires 81.6 per cent students confirmed that 
they have experienced viewing of Korean TV dramas. Unlike the work of Iwabuchi, 
however, this chapter examines the audience consumption and reception of Japanese 
and Korean TV dramas amongst the young in Taiwan, and in doing so, suggests that 
the consumption of foreign/regional TV programmes is not necessarily dominated by 
cultural proximity or limited by cultural difference; rather it is about audience cultural 
positionality and self-reflexivity in relation to their personal experience as well as 
their perception of cultural “others”. The comparative readings of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas amongst student viewers from my questionnaire and interview 
results demonstrate that the attractiveness of Japanese TV dramas can sometimes 
associate with audiences’ familiarity with the genre, pop idols, and language: in other 
words, they are used to it. In terms of Korean TV dramas, on the other hand, although 
they do find some cultural similarity, they feel that their level of emotional 
involvement is lessened or more distant in comparison with Japanese TV programmes. 
In some cases, some students consider the format and storyline of Korean TV dramas 
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similar to Taiwan local dramas, which make them less desirable. From this 
perspective, the notion of familiarity of TV genres and contents can work both ways 
regarding the audience’s taste and choice of programmes. I will further elaborate and 
investigate this issue in the section It is an obvious choice: university student’s 
preference for Japanese TV dramas later in this chapter.  
 
In general, university students’ perception of Japanese and Korean TV dramas was 
based on how and which TV dramas they watched and to what extent they found 
recognition and cultural reflection in these. They often recalled their first encounter 
with Japanese and/or Korean TV dramas during the interview; they vividly 
remembered the title of the TV drama, the story line, the names of the protagonists 
and the reasons they found it interesting or distasteful. Jia-ling, a 21-year-old female 
interviewee, recalls that her first encounter with Japanese TV dramas was Tokyo 
Cinderella Story when she was 13 years old. Wan-yi, a 20-year-old female student, 
states that she was deeply attracted to the Korean TV drama, All about Eve, when she 
first came across the programme and since then has been more interested in Korean 
TV dramas than Japanese ones. 
 
On the other hand, Yi-jun, a 22-year-old female interviewee relates her viewing 
experience of Japanese TV dramas when she was in junior secondary school and 
vividly recalled the drama, Terms of a Witch (Majo no Joken, 1999) and, subsequently, 
the Korean TV drama, Autumn Story (2001), showing no particular preference for 
either Japanese or Korean TV dramas. University students do not consider viewing 
foreign TV dramas as an important daily activity, but they would normally tune in to 
check what is on offer (if there is a new programme showing) and then decide 
whether they follow the story or not. Most of my informants (in their early 20s when I 
conducted my research between 2003 and 2005) first encountered Japanese TV 
dramas when they were at junior secondary school (13-15 years old), with the 
exposure to Korean TV dramas occurring later.  
 
The popularity and high viewing rate of Korean TV dramas in Taiwan since the early 
2000s firmly underlines its arrival and possibly signals the decline of Japanese TV 
dramas. Overall and during my research I have come to the conclusion that students 
of this age group have an extensive knowledge of Japanese and Korean TV dramas 
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but also show concern about the popularity of those imported TV programmes and 
pop cultures amongst youngsters. Responses from questionnaires include answers 
such as ‘over-idealised those foreign idols and imitated other’s culture without a 
sense of realisation of one’s own culture’; ‘plastic surgery becomes an acceptable 
social norm just as in South Korea’; ‘cultural confusion, social morale and values are 
under challenge, and so forth. In this instance while distancing themselves from 
younger audiences, university students often cautiously protest against teenagers’ so-
called inappropriate behaviours (e.g. Japanophile/Koreanophile) and interpret such 
behaviour as “cultural imperialism” and “media effects”. Hence university students 
have “subjectively” implicated others’ viewing of these two regional TV dramas or 
the popularity of regional TV dramas and popular culture as a form of cultural 
invasion, which can lead to negative social impacts on Taiwanese youth. In Taiwan, 
the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas constitute several different 
dimensions of cultural appropriation, practice and social implications which reinforce 
the young adult audiences’ ambiguous attitude towards the notion of national and 
cultural identities in Taiwan 
  
I asked the students to state the differences and similarities between Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas at the end of the (open-ended) questionnaires to establish a 
general understanding of the consumption of TV dramas in Taiwan. Most of them 
responded with varied answers. The ideas and opinions on these two types of TV 
dramas are diverse but they also share some similarities. They can be roughly divided 
into the following categories: 1) the (un)realistic qualities, 2) the diversity of the 
content and high quality TV productions, 3) idol effects, 4) the representation of their 
cultural difference and ways of life, and 5) the professional shooting skill, the 
dazzling scenery and well-written dialogues and plots. In this instance, my findings 
do not show much of a difference from that of Iwabuchi’s research on the reception of 
Japanese TV dramas in Taiwan in the late 1990s mentioned earlier. Arguably, the 
popularity of soap opera/ TV dramas often requires a sense of local and cultural 
intimacy from its audience. Over the years university viewers’ transnational viewing 
experience however suggests that the notion of ‘cultural discount’ (Hoskins & Mirus, 
1988) has been integrated into their viewing practice. Having said that, I do not wish 
to suggest that there is no difference in the reception of Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas in terms of pleasure of recognition, social articulation and cultural 
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appropriation, but rather that the regional TV dramas as a particular genre and a 
cultural medium across national borders and transcending cultural difference have 
cultivated a specific yet common cultural ground in modern Taiwanese society.   
 
Unlike Iwabuchi’s research, a comparison of university students’ responses to 
Japanese, Korean and sometimes Taiwanese TV dramas suggests that the awareness 
and appreciation of the diversity of Japanese TV dramas is shown to be much more 
explicit than in previous research. My questionnaire and interview results manifested 
five aspects of Japanese and Korean TV dramas that drew common attention from 
university students. In each case the responses were somewhat similar to Iwabuchi’s 
suggestions (2002, pp. 146-151, 2005, p. 25) concerning  the popularity of Japanese 
TV dramas in Taiwan in the late 1990s, with emphasis on how young (female) 
viewers associate “realism” with cultural similarities between Japan and Taiwan, 
Asian modernisation and so on but with some differences. As regards the first aspect, 
(un)realistic elements, I suggest that the notion of “realistic” often identifies with 
“close to the heart” amongst university students, maintaining the pattern noted in 
Ang’s earlier research on ‘emotional realism’ or ‘tragic structure of feeling’ (1985, p. 
20) but the idea of realistic elements is not limited by emotional involvement for 
university students. It also ranges from the character of the hero or heroine in the 
dramas, the dialogue, acting skills and the storyline. For the second aspect, (diversity 
of) content, my findings show that in terms of the genre and its audience’s tastes the 
love relationship or romantic element is not a dominant factor in the popularity of 
Japanese TV dramas as others previously suggested. The viewing and reading of 
Japanese Idol Drama amongst university students do demonstrate greater awareness 
and appreciation of the diversity of content such as sensitive social issues or taboos 
which were addressed in the programmes. In the case of the third aspect, idol effects, 
my findings do confirm Iwabuchi’s (2002) and Chua’s (2000) earlier research that 
suggests that the presence of pop idols often generates youth popular consumption of 
regional TV dramas and its by-products. Nevertheless, my fieldwork shows more 
complex and somehow more rational consumer behaviour from young Taiwanese 
audiences and also the limitation of idol effects on different media products. The 
fourth aspect, the elements of cultural representation in the programmes, can be 
divided into three different programme reading behaviours from the young audience: 
content format, modernisation versus traditionalism and cultural comparison between 
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Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. In the case of the final aspect, professional shooting 
skills and language preference, I will demonstrate that young audiences pay great 
attention to the quality of production and are in thrall to the scenery depicted in the 
programmes, which draws their attention to regional TV dramas.   
 
a. Transnational consumption of “realism”: TV dramas as cultural representations of 
social reality 
 
In my questionnaire, around 82 per cent and 75.5 per cent of university students 
consider the contents of the TV dramas very important indicators of their motivation 
to view Japanese and Korean TV dramas respectively. In this regard, they often refer 
to the realistic elements of the storylines, and although it is very subjective to define 
what realistic is, it is one of the ideas most mentioned in the questionnaires and 
during the interviews. Some students state that Japanese TV dramas are more realistic 
or “close to the heart” in comparison to Korean TV dramas and the term realistic is 
used as an essential element when citing their preference for Japanese TV dramas. 
The notion of (un)realistic qualities can be assumed and interpreted in different forms, 
such as the character of the hero or heroine in dramas, the dialogue, the storyline and 
so forth. For instance, one female student stated in the questionnaire that “Japanese 
TV dramas are more realistic whilst Korean ones are too fairytale-like”; another 
stated that “The storyline of Korean TV dramas are all in typical Cinderella format, 
Japanese TV dramas are more interesting with varied storylines or sometimes, serious 
social issues”. Yan-chi, a 19-year-old female student who self-identifies as a 
“Japanophile”, mentions: ‘Japanese TV dramas are more realistic and reflect on the 
society we live in, whereas in Korean TV dramas, the characters often suddenly suffer 
from incurable illnesses and have a tragic ending. I don’t like it’. 
 
However, some informants have completely opposite views; one female student 
stated in the questionnaire that ‘Japanese TV dramas are so unrealistic, the dialogues 
would not take place between normal people and the storyline seems to be pretty 
unreasonable. Korean dramas reflect real life better’. Similarly, two female students 
suggest that ‘Japanese TV dramas are too dreamy and unreal’. These comments 
demonstrate how audiences have a very different reading of Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas based on their experiences and interpretation, so what is real for one can be 
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totally unreal for someone else.  
 
In some cases, the realistic elements do not concern some students as much as others, 
as their interest is drawn to the quality of the television productions, shooting skills of 
the director, scenery, location, fashion style and acting abilities. For instance, a 
twenty-one-year-old male student mentioned in the questionnaire that ‘Korean and 
Taiwanese TV dramas are similar, not very creative, [whereas] Japanese TV dramas 
are more original and the shooting skills are much better’. Moreover, 69.6 per cent 
and 57.8 per cent of students pay great attention to actors’ acting skills while 
watching Japanese and Korean TV dramas.  
 
Earlier research also suggests that Taiwan’s younger generation’s favouring of 
Japanese products as highly desirable social behaviour is due to the cultural 
perception of Japan as a frontier of modernised society amongst Asian countries (Lee 
and Ho 2002, p. 29). Hence, information such as the latest fashion trends (cosmetics, 
designer clothes and accessories), pop music, urban lifestyles, culinary culture and so 
on which are often depicted and represented in this type of TV drama attracts and 
fulfils young audiences’ expectations of cultural modernity. My research 
demonstrates a similar outcome: around 70.3 per cent and 62.1 per cent consider that 
watching Japanese and Korean TV dramas respectively is a common way of 
obtaining the latest and most desirable information from both and/or either countries. 
To a certain extent, university audiences act as distant critics, regarding TV-watching 
as a form of entertainment or even as educational, rationalising their reception of 
programmes as a way to understand and improve their daily lives. I will elaborate on 
this in more detail when discussing the fifth category – how professional shooting 
skills, dazzling scenery and well-written dialogues and plots capture young audiences’ 
imagination and endow those locations with particular cultural symbolic meanings, to 
the extent that even though these young audiences have never been to the places 
shown in the TV dramas, they can still feel a sense of familiarity and connection. 
 
b. Audience reception: “Diversity” in format and content 
 
The second category is the diversity of the content and its quality which illustrates 
one of the main differences in university audience’s perceptions of Japanese and 
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Korean TV dramas. According to Iwabuchi’s early research conducted in Taiwan 
between 1996 and 1997, Japanese idol dramas are favoured by young (aged 13-25), 
and female (aged 26-35) audiences. One of the main attractions is their storyline 
(2002, p. 141). His finding suggests that Japanese dramas are diverse in terms of 
storylines, setting and topics, ranging from urban love stories to family dramas by 
way of detective series, but those that become popular in Taiwan are stories about 
younger people’s loves and lives in an urban setting (Iwabuchi 2001, p. 63, 2002, p. 
143). My findings display similar perceptions for university students in terms of 
Japanese TV drama viewing but not exclusively in the case of the depiction of love 
relationships or urban lifestyles.   
 
In the questionnaires, around 85.7 per cent and 73.7 per cent of students consider 
themselves as paying a certain degree of attention to the storylines and plots of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas respectively. Most of them assert that Japanese TV 
dramas are of better quality than Korean TV dramas (or Taiwanese TV dramas), 
whereby the phrases “delicate”15, “better quality”, “new and original” and “interesting 
storyline” are often linked to Japanese ones. In particular, the ‘diversification’ of 
Japanese TV dramas is frequently appreciated by the young adult. Most students 
believe that Korean TV dramas have a formulaic storyline – a “Cinderella syndrome”, 
surrounded with stories of love (often unrequited) and relationships that lead to tragic 
endings. Others suggest that Korean TV dramas are quite similar to Taiwanese ones: 
“boring”, “conservative”, “normal”, “slow-paced” and “exaggerated”. In contrast, 
Japanese TV dramas have a great diversity in terms of social reality and they not only 
often show a typical love story, but also depict social taboos and issues such as love 
relationships between high school teachers and students, or issues that concern 
minorities like disabled people and immigrants and so forth. During an interview, Jia-
ling pointed out: 
  
In Japanese TV dramas, some concepts and narratives can be controversial. 
However, the way they have been represented mean it is not weird or difficult 
to accept the ideas. Instead the storyline makes you think that there is always 
hope for life or provides a certain understanding of those social problems. To 
me, it is very inspirational and that is why I think Korean TV dramas cannot 
compete with Japanese ones (age 21, Female).  
                                                 
15
 “Delicate” is often used in Chinese when something is well-produced, elegant and very precise. 
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A 26-year-old male student stated in the questionnaire: ‘Japanese TV dramas are more 
stimulating and focus on a sense of realism in relation to life; Korean TV dramas are 
more sentimental and expressions of social moral values’. Another 21-year-old male 
student suggested that: ‘You can find many varied storylines in Japanese TV dramas 
whereas Korean TV dramas are similar to Taiwanese local dramas, more 
standardised.’ In this instance, young audiences believe that Japanese TV dramas 
reflect their life expectations better, seeing Japan as a modernised country, more 
creative, diverse and aspirational whereas South Korea has somehow remained 
conservative, old-fashioned and less intriguing.   
 
This difference between Japanese and Korean TV dramas’ contents also corresponds 
to the outcome of their viewing habits. According to the questionnaires more than 
74.7 per cent (with 43.5 per cent well aware) of students declared that they were 
aware of who the screenwriter is during the viewing of Japanese TV dramas, whilst 
those who watch Korean ones are less aware, with 65.4 per cent aware and 34.5 per 
cent well aware. The high percentage of interest shown in Japanese TV drama 
screenwriters can be partly explained by the popularity of modern Japanese literature 
and original screenplays in Taiwan. For instance, famous Japanese Trendy Drama 
screenwriters such as Kitagawa Eriko, whose works include a series of well-received 
Trendy Dramas16 dating back to the early 1990s, have gained a great reputation and 
celebrity status amongst young female fans. Overall, the fact that 106 out of 158 
university students expounded their opinions regarding the difference (and few 
similarities) between Japanese and Korean TV dramas in the questionnaires suggests 
that the reception of Japanese and Korean TV dramas has not only provided 
entertainment value to a young audience, but also another form of common cultural 





                                                 
16
 Such as Love White Paper (1993), Tell Me You Love Me (1995), Long Vacation (1996), Overtime 
(1999), Beautiful life (2000), Love story (2001), and Orange Days (2004) just to name a few. All these 
dramas enjoyed a great success while broadcasting in Taiwan along with their original soundtracks and 
screenplay   
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c. The attraction and impact of idols: image consumption and its limitations  
 
This section examines the so-called “idol effect”. Ota Toru, a Japanese television 
drama producer at Fuji TV, admits that:  
 
In a Japanese drama’s production process, casting comes first, even before   
scriptwriting ... We try to book these actors according to their popularity in 
that moment, and about six months before the broadcast of the drama, we start 
thinking of their role and the story (2004, pp. 75-76).  
 
For many people in Taiwan, according to Iwabuchi (2001), one of the attractions of 
viewing Japanese dramas is that they feature good-looking Japanese idols. The most 
important format of Japanese Trendy dramas and Korean TV dramas  features young, 
good-looking actors and actresses (sometimes well-known pop-idols), and these 
celebrities are the main attraction for Taiwanese youngsters. Around 68.7 per cent and 
50.3 per cent university students admitted that “idols/actors attraction” is one of their 
most important motivations in choosing and viewing Japanese and Korean TV 
programmes respectively. This “idol attraction” effect indicates that 65.2 per cent and 
54.7 per cent of respondents take notice of an actors’ appearance, while around 82.4 
per cent and 72.7 per cent have a general awareness of actors’ reputations and 
popularity in Japanese and Korean TV dramas. One female student stated in the 
questionnaire: ‘I think both Japanese and Korean actors are good-looking but Korean 
actors often have plastic surgery, so female actors often look alike’. Another female 
student said: ‘I like to follow the make-up and fashion trends in both TV dramas, and 
I think those actors/actresses are better looking and better actors/actresses than the 
Taiwanese ones’. The images, the acting skills and the popularity of actors and 
actresses in the TV programmes, in this sense, are considered as the programmes’ 
attractions and sometimes as an indication of the difference between these two 
regional TV dramas and local productions.   
 
The local media tend to label those audiences who might be in favour of foreign stars 
as “Japanophile” or “Koreanophile”, particularly fans of male idol groups: for 
instance, Japanese male pop groups such as SMAP, Kinki Kids, and ALASHI, or 
Korean boy-bands like H.O.T, Shinhwa, TVXQ (Tong Vfeng Xien Qi), and Super 
junior. The cultural image of Japanese and Korean idols circulated and was well 
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received amongst young Taiwanese. Despite this so-called “idol effect” on the 
audience, it seems that this effect only works in a rather limited range of media 
products, mainly dramas and pop songs. Occasionally the idol effect does not 
guarantee a great success amongst the young Taiwanese audience. For instance, 
Japanese and Korean movies may have the most well-known and popular actors 
and/or actresses as protagonists, but they do not necessarily attract large audiences to 
the cinema. Examples include the box office failure of the Korean movie Untold 
Scandal (2004), despite starring one of Asia’s most popular actors, Bae Yong-joon, 
whose TV drama, Winter Sonata, was a hit in most Asian countries. It is fair to argue 
that the notion of idol effect might have an impact on young audiences and fans, but 
this relationship is often embedded within a particular media genre or image. It also 
suggests that ‘idol dramas’ are a well-cultivated genre for the young Asian audience 
market which facilitates its popularity in the region yet is limited particularly in the 
cultural and media-consuming space.  
 
d. The transnational cultural gaze and the consumption of cultural otherness  
 
The fourth category analysed here is “the representation of its own cultures; different 
yet somehow familiar”. The notion of cultural proximity or similarity is often 
considered in relation to the common flow of regional TV programmes, including 
language (see for example telenovelas in the Latin American ‘cultural-linguistic 
market’ (Sinclair 1999), or in the case of East Asia, sharing of contemporary 
modernity (Chua 2000, 2004). For example, some students believe that Korean TV 
dramas, both in terms of genre and structure, are similar to Japanese ones. One female 
student asserted in the questionnaire that: ‘Both programmes are the same, because 
sometimes when I tune in to watch, I cannot tell the difference between the Japanese 
and the Korean drama’. Another female student stated in the questionnaire that ‘in 
terms of content, Korean TV dramas are a copycat of Japanese ones’. Some believe 
that the Korean TV industry uses the same marketing and promotional strategy as the 
Japanese. A 22-year-old male student stated in the questionnaire that ‘Both TV 
dramas have been as well-represented and packaged as the good quality foreign TV 
dramas in Taiwan, especially after the success of Japanese TV dramas. Many Asian 
countries try to use the same format. Korean TV producers just add a different 
flavour’.  
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However, many also believe that those TV dramas are a true representation of the 
cultures and ways of life of each country. Around 54.4 per cent and 46.5 per cent of 
university students take a great interest in cultural representation in the storyline of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas respectively, which suggests that the university 
audience typically recognises the cultural differences between the two countries, or at 
least they seem to confidently have thought about it. In the questionnaire, one female 
student simply stated ‘their cultural difference is quite obvious’, while another female 
student mentioned, ‘I think the cultural difference (between these two countries) 
becomes very obvious in dramas – (South) Korea is more conservative and traditional 
whereas Japan is more modernised and westernised’. In a similar comment, one 
female student noted in the questionnaire that ‘there might be some similarities in 
terms of storylines; however the idiosyncrasy in the plots can be very different 
because of the nationality and characters’. Furthermore, one male student pointed out 
in the questionnaire that ‘Japanese people are more polite, with good manners, 
whereas Koreans can be very stubborn and rude’.  
 
Pei-xin had a similar response, showing a rather positive perspective and affection 
toward Japanese youth culture in the interview: 
 
You know, Japanese young people are very independent and romantic, they    
celebrate Valentine’s Day and girls will make chocolate for the boys they like. 
If the affection is mutual, then one month later (14
th
 March) the boy will give 
a present to the girl and this is very much reflected on the TV dramas. On the 
contrary, Korean people are a lot more reserved in terms of expressing 
gestures of love (age 22, Female).  
 
Similarly, Yi-jun suggested that:  
 
Japan is more modernised and advanced in terms of lifestyle, Korea is more or  
less similar to or behind Taiwan (in terms of modernisation). So I think the 
dramas are very different between these two countries. Younger people prefer 
Japanese dramas whereas middle-aged women are more likely to stick with 
Korean ones (age 22, Female).  
 
From these various comments, it seems that many young university audiences in 
Taiwan have rather extensive knowledge of Japanese and Korean popular youth 
cultures and their way of life based on watching TV dramas. Nonetheless whether 
 101 
those comments are culturally and objectively accurate or otherwise, they reflect the 
fact that many individuals have their own opinions about these two foreign TV 
dramas, and to a certain extent, the cultures of these two countries. By comparing 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas, university students develop their opinions about 
these two countries in relation to the cultural and social situations in Taiwan. In this 
sense, the reception and consumption of foreign TV dramas provides a platform for 
university students to negotiate the cultural difference amongst the three countries and 
translate those elements that help situate their cultural recognition of others. I will 
discuss this further in Chapter 6 which focuses on how university students negotiate 
their idea of Taiwanese identity in relation to their appropriation of the idea of 
cultural globalisation and regionalisation as form of cultural configuration. 
 
e. Audience as TV critic?: Elements of modernisation and professionalism in regional 
TV   drama productions 
  
The fifth category I address are the professional shooting skills, the filming location 
and language acquisition, to which many believe that regional TV dramas owe their 
particular popularity in Taiwan. Respectively 62.5 per cent and 57.2 per cent of 
students take an interest in the scenery/filming locations while viewing Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas where the most popular and well-known settings amongst a young 
Taiwanese audience would be the Tokyo Tower and Rainbow Bridge (both located in 
Tokyo). In the case of Korea, although this may be less obvious, many university 
students believe that the shooting and directing skills of TV dramas are of excellent 
quality (in comparison with Taiwanese TV dramas). They often refer to the term 
‘aesthetic shooting skill’. For example, a 26-year-old female student noted that ‘In 
terms of TV dramas’ style, Japanese and Korean ones look beautiful and attractive, 
because the shooting skills are excellent and aesthetic, despite the fact that sometimes 
the storyline can be boring and typical but because of the scenery, I would still watch 
them. Also it makes you want to visit the country.’ 
 
My findings also suggest that the appreciation of professional shooting skills in 
combination with the romantic narrative associated with certain locations amongst the 
young adult audience has facilitated regional tourism (see Lee 2003, pp. 42-73, Ming-
tsung Lee 2004, pp. 129-154). Around 82.3 per cent and 56.4 per cent of university 
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students show great desire to travel to Japan and South Korea and some also showed 
the intention during the interviews to visit particular shooting sites from TV dramas.   
 
Some of those questioned were more interested in the dialogue. Nearly 68.7 per cent 
and 57.2 per cent of university students took an interest in the dialogues during the 
viewing of the TV dramas. One female student declared that, ‘According to my 
friend’s comment, the dialogues in Japanese TV dramas are “quieter” and Korean 
ones are “noisier” and high pitched so rather unpleasant’. A few suggested that the 
bad quality of dubbing is another annoying issue, especially in the Korean ones. 
Certainly, the dubbing is not the original format of these two types of TV dramas. 
Typically Japanese TV dramas would have been dubbed into Chinese as well. A 
particularly negative view of the dubbing quality in Korean TV dramas was 
highlighted several times in the questionnaires. Most of the Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas broadcast in Taiwan are either dubbed and/or subtitled, as the TV companies 
want to attract more housewives to watch the programmes. They assume therefore 
that dubbing is a better idea than broadcasting in the original language.  
 
According to my 2005 interview with Xiao, a staff member at GTV station, TV 
stations believe that housewives cannot sit in front of the TV watching subtitled 
programmes all of the time, therefore dubbing would make it a lot easier for them to 
follow the story. However, university students, who either live away from home or 
watch TV dramas alone or with friends, appreciate the dramas a lot more when they 
are broadcast in the original language with subtitles. My findings also indicate the 
different ways of consuming Japanese and Korean TV dramas between younger 
audiences and middle-aged housewives. University students watch with a sense of 
purpose, such as language learning, fulfilling their curiosity in foreign cultures or 
ways of life. This provides a sense of cultural originality in TV series to a certain 
extent and therefore encourages the young audience to participate in transnational 
cultural experiences. Such patterns of consumption undoubtedly emphasise cultural 
particularity and originality and suggest that youths crave a distinct “Japaneseness” or 
“Koreanness” in TV dramas. In this instance, the language barrier when viewing 
foreign TV dramas becomes an attraction and motivation and the element of 
otherness is therefore celebrated by the local young audience.  
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Overall, Japanese and Korean TV dramas have become social and cultural 
phenomenon in modern Taiwanese society, which suggests that it has become a daily 
experience that younger generations negotiate and translate into a sense of 
“otherness” via the consumption of popular culture. As Tim Edensor suggests in his 
book National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life:  
 
The incorporation of otherness into everyday life generates an intersubjective 
understanding of the linkages between people, spaces and things, though not 
one that is always articulated through discourse and representation. It acts to 
epistemologically and ontologically install things and people in place (2002, p. 
34).  
 
Acknowledging the similarities and differences between Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas enables or reinforces university students’ subjective preference for either or 
neither of the nations. The process of cultural consumption of foreign TV dramas 
amongst university students overcomes territorial distance yet reinforces their sense 
of cultural identification with Taiwan. More importantly, by recognising cultural 
differences, university students are able to construct their sense of understanding of 
what is Taiwan and Taiwanese culture within the cultural space of Japan and South 
Korea. In Chapter 6 I will further explore how Japanese and Korean TV dramas as 
“cultural others” become primary cultural resources and references for university 
students to situate their sense of cultural belonging. 
 
 
“It is an obvious choice”: University students’ preference for Japanese 
TV dramas 
 
According to Koichi Iwabuchi’s research in the early 2000s, the young Taiwanese 
audience favours Japanese TV dramas over American or Taiwanese ones. This is 
because the audience found them “easier to relate to”. Arguably, when Taiwanese TV 
companies began to legally import Japanese TV programmes from the early 1990s 
onwards there was a lack of TV dramas produced specifically for younger audiences; 
Taiwanese TV dramas are more family-oriented and aimed primarily at housewives 
(2002, p. 143). Therefore, the Japanese idol dramas almost instantly became the 
greatest hits amongst youngsters; furthermore, everything with a “Japanese 
odour/aura” was represented as something desirable and trendy in Taiwanese society. 
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From music, fashion, popular culture to food, Taiwanese youth indulged themselves 
in this abundant ‘image bank’ (Kellner 1995, p. 257) to travel through ‘time’ and 
‘space’  in a dynamic of ‘becoming’, according to Iwabuchi (2002, p. 143). He rightly 
points out that regardless of the actual historical relationship between Taiwan and 
Japan, ironically, young people there regard modern Japanese cultural products with 
admiration:  
 
Historically overdetermined by Japanese colonisation, under simultaneously 
homogenising and heterogenising forces of modernisation, Americanisation, 
and globalisation, all these elements interact in a complicated dynamic to 
articulate the cultural resonance of Japanese TV dramas for some Taiwanese 
viewers who synchronously, contemporaneously, and self-reflexively 
experienced “Asian modernity” in late-twenty-century East-Asia (ibid., p. 
156).  
  
This is not the first time ‘becoming Japanese’ has been discussed in the historical 
context of Taiwan. Leo Ching argues in his book Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial 
Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation: 
  
Unlike the Koreans, who vehemently detested and tenaciously opposed the 
Japanese and their colonial occupation, the Taiwanese are said to have 
retained a fairly positive image of the Japanese and recollected approvingly 
the virtues of Japanese rule. If the Koreans speak of oppression and resistance, 
the Taiwanese speak of modernisation and development. This diametrically 
opposed view of Japan and its colonial rule, despite substantial documentation 
of resistance and collaboration in both colonies, remains the “commonsense” 
and “plebeian” understanding of the difference between Korean national 
character and the neo-colonial psychology of Taiwanese nativism (2001, p. 8).  
 
The notion of cultural proximity between Taiwan and Japan and the fear of cultural 
Japanisation demonstrate that the historical connection has complicated the 
discussion of youth consumption of Japanese-produced mass culture. On the one hand, 
young people express the desire for modernisation and an inspirational way of life, 
and Japanese popular culture somehow fulfils this desire. On the other hand, within 
the context of the construction of Taiwanese identity, particularly in relation to the 
movement of nativisation, the cultural legacy of colonialism in Taiwan serves as an 
assertion of its cultural significance and differentiation from that of the Kuomintang’s 
(KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) imposition of Chinese culture. The integration of 
‘cultural (not so) otherness’ marks an important cultural politics of post-martial law 
Taiwan, hence the youth consumption of Japanese popular cultural products is a way 
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to fulfil the ‘fantasy to participate in the globalisation of consumerist culture and the 
fantasy to create an independent Taiwanese nation’ (Ching 2000a, p. 764). Thus, by 
analysing the reasons given by the university students for preferring Japanese TV 
dramas in general, we should be able to understand to what extent the concept of 
cultural familiarity can, in certain circumstances, facilitate audience interpretation of 
the Japanese way of life and Japan as a nation as they are represented in TV dramas. 
Therefore, I argue that this form of desire is not so much about becoming Japanese 
but rather about making sense of how to become Taiwanese, which I will discuss 
further in Chapter 6. 
 
When Japanese idol dramas dominated no other foreign TV dramas were in a position 
to compete until the late 1990s, when Korean TV dramas became better known and 
more widely distributed by Taiwanese TV stations. Naturally, the popularity of 
Japanese idol dramas was affected and showed signs of decline, particularly for TV 
stations that had invested in Japanese dramas. According to local news reports, 
Korean TV dramas are now more widely circulated and distributed than Japanese 
ones in Taiwan. Between several different TV stations, they spent a startling total 
amount of roughly around £3,750,000 annually to purchase Korean TV dramas in 
2005 (Xiao, personal interview, 2005), and more than seven channels broadcast 
Korean TV dramas in prime time nowadays (Taiwan Yahoo, Television schedule, 
2005). The local TV stations’ profit-making concerns and promotional strategies have 
shifted their imported programmes in favour of Korean TV dramas. However, what 
do university students really think about Japanese and Korean TV dramas and what 
are the reasons they choose one over the other? How do they relate to one another in 
terms of cultural practice and life experience?  
 
In the questionnaires 76 university students state that they prefer Japanese TV dramas 
in comparison with 16 who favour Korean ones (23 like both, 35 no preference and 7 
dislike both). According to my findings, there are several reasons why most university 
students are in favour of Japanese TV dramas, some of which refer back to the 
previous section concerning their perception of Japanese and Korean TV dramas’ 
contents and genres. Most university students have more knowledge about, and prior 
engagement with Japanese TV dramas than with Korean ones, and therefore the 
number of outcomes and opinions indicating why they favour one over the other is 
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not equally adjusted. Based on the questionnaire responses, the reasons for those in 
favour of Japanese TV dramas can be divided roughly into five reasons: 1) language 
acquisition , 2) idols preference, 3) familiarity with content and genre, 4) national 
preference (cultural familiarity), and 5) better production quality. To a certain extent, 
the overall outcomes do not display a significant difference between that of Iwabuchi 
(2002) and that of other researchers (see Lee and Ho 2002, pp. 30-32, Y.-l. Su 1999). 
Nevertheless, my research focuses on a comparison of the reception of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas in Taiwan which has not been done before. Hence by comparing 
these two regional TV dramas, this project provides a new insight into regional 
cultural flows as a form of socio-cultural intervention which is articulated and 
negotiated by the younger generation in Taiwan. 
 
Firstly, they are motivated by the acquisition of language skills; some of my 
informants are Japanese studies majors, a few in Korean studies, hence Japanese TV 
dramas are one of the important resources for them to practise their language skills. 
There is, however, still some dubbing used in Japanese TV dramas while they are 
broadcast but most are broadcast in the original language with subtitles, especially 
those in VCD format. Therefore students consider it a rather useful and somehow 
more “authentic” way of viewing programmes. Overall, 81 students consider 
language learning as an important motivation for them to watch Japanese TV dramas. 
A 22-year-old female student noted that ‘because I am studying Japanese, therefore, 
by watching all those TV dramas, my language skills will not only improve but I will 
also understand their way of life, society and culture better’. Another 21-year-old 
male student stated: ‘Mainly for the purpose of language, besides, I am used to 
Japanese TV dramas’. In a similar response a 23-year-old male student wrote: ‘I 
prefer Japanese TV dramas because I watched them when I was young, also I am 
quite interested in the language itself’. A 19-year-old female student noted that ‘[most] 
Korean TV dramas are dubbed and sounds really artificial’; a 23-year-old female 
student simply stated that ‘Japanese sounds better than Korean’ while another 20-
year-old female student said that she is ‘not used to listening to Korean or dubbing 
(which is in Chinese)’. Many authors have argued that in order to sell TV 
programmes (especially TV dramas) to foreign countries, language is one of the main 
concerns, which explains, for instance, the popularity of telenovelas in South 
American countries (e.g. Cunningham et al. 1996, Straubhaar 1991). In contrast to 
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these research projects, in the case of the Taiwanese audience, it seems that young 
audiences enjoy the TV dramas more when they are broadcast in the original 
language. It is therefore evident that the notion of authenticity or originality is more 
important than “being localised” when it comes to the consumption of foreign TV 
programmes amongst the young adult audience in Taiwan. The language barrier 
becomes another form of attraction and television viewing has become more 
purposeful and educational for younger generations.  
 
Secondly, the observation that university students favour Japanese idols/actors 
corresponds to the promotional strategy of the Taiwanese TV stations, which relies 
heavily on the ‘idol effect’. This strategy has created a notion of “Japanese stardom” 
amongst teenagers and “fan” effects of Japanese TV drama, which has popularised 
Japanese culture, music and fashion industries since the 1990s. One of my 
interviewees, Pei-xin admitted that: 
 
I like this male group (Kinki Kids) so much that any performance they are 
involved in I would follow, such as their music albums, concerts, TV dramas, 
even the books they published. I also join their Taiwan-based fan club. So I 
met up with people from this club sometimes, we would exchange the latest 
information about Kinki Kids. I know some of the fans would organise a tour 
to Japan to see their concert and buy all the by-products from the concert. I 
have never been though, it’s too expensive for me ... (age 22, Female) 
 
A 20-year-old female student stated that ‘I like Kimura Takuya 17 a lot, so prefer 
Japanese TV dramas and would like to learn Japanese so that I can read the latest 
news about him in Japanese’. One female student believed that ‘because Japanese 
actors are natural beauties unlike most Korean female actors who might have plastic 
surgery, they all look quite the same to me’. A few of the questionnaire responses just 
simply stated that ‘I like Japanese idols’ or ‘I know most of the Japanese actors but 
not Korean ones’ or ‘More familiar with Japanese TV dramas and actors, Korean 
[actors] all look the same because of plastic surgery’. Regardless of whether it is true 
that certain Korean actors and actresses have plastic surgery, some university students 
dislike Korean TV dramas for this reason. This suggests that in the consumption of 
this particular genre of foreign TV dramas (i.e. idol dramas or trendy dramas), the 
                                                 
17
 Kimura Takuya is one of the most well-known Japanese pop stars in Asia; he is a member of a boy-
band called ‘SMAP’.  
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actors’ appearance and familiarity can be a decisive factor in the audience’s 
preference. The celebrity attraction certainly helps to sell foreign TV dramas to the 
young Asian market, and it also coincides with the marketing strategies which are 
employed by Japanese TV production companies which are targeted at a specific local, 
young female audience. 
 
Thirdly there is a sense of familiarity with Japanese contents and genres. As I 
mentioned earlier, this age group of students started watching Japanese TV dramas 
when they were in junior secondary school (13-15 years old), and Korean TV dramas 
about three to four years later. Many students who favour Japanese TV dramas simply 
declare as much in the questionnaires: they are more familiar with or used to the 
Japanese drama genre. Yi-jun explained: 
 
I started to watch while I was a kid as a result I am much more familiar with 
the (Japanese) genre and can understand the plots better. To me, Japanese TV 
dramas are more sophisticated, storylines are more unique not standardised. 
For instance, sometimes they touched on social issues and so on. In a way, I 
have certain expectations for Japanese TV dramas (age 22, Female).   
 
Wei-ren, a 22-year-old male student noted that he was: 
 
‘[m]ore familiar with the storylines and ... acting technique in Japanese TV 
dramas, so [I am] not bothered with Korean TV dramas, since [I do not] really 
spend much time watching TV programmes anyway’.  
 
As Ya-wen, a 21-year-old female interviewee pointed out: 
 
Japanese idol dramas often have around 12 episodes and the pace is quick but 
Korean ones often have longer episodes similar to Taiwanese local TV dramas. 
Besides, I can buy those programmes in VCDs format quite cheaply and 
watch it in one go. Anyway, I think I am just more used to watching Japanese 
idol dramas.   
 
Overall this familiarity with Japanese idol dramas amongst university students has 
influenced their viewing choices. In this instance, after more than a decade of 
dissemination of Japanese popular culture and TV entertainment programmes in 
Taiwan, Japanese TV dramas have established their genre and have created 
expectations amongst the Taiwanese audience. Thus, considering the decline of 
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Japanese idol dramas’ popularity, they are still regularly broadcast on at least two 
channels during prime time and sustain a solid number of viewers.  
 
The fourth justification is the national perception and admiration of Japan. The notion 
of “cultural proximity” can be explained under certain circumstances as one main 
reason for the popularity of Japanese TV dramas in Taiwan. Taiwan was colonised by 
Japan for fifty years
18
 and cultural homogenisation was carried out at the time (see 
Ching 2001, Chapters 1-3) and it seems that the Taiwanese people were never short of 
experience or encounters with Japan’s influences. South Korea is to a certain extent as 
foreign as other countries for most Taiwanese people until recently. Despite the fact 
that most university students admit not to have much knowledge of the Japanese 
modern political situation and current affairs (only 25.4 per cent consider themselves 
to have good knowledge of the country), nearly 56.9 per cent show admiration and 
51.5 per cent have a good impression of the nation itself. By comparison 13.6 per cent 
consider themselves to have good knowledge of South Korea, only 28.5 per cent 
show their admiration and 25.5 per cent have a good impression of the country. 
University students’ cultural preference and positive impressions of Japan do not 
necessarily suggest it is closely related to their choice of TV dramas. Indeed what it 
demonstrates is that the incorporation of TV dramas as a way of understanding Japan 
as a nation has been a common cultural practice amongst university students. As 
Iwabuchi (2002, 2004) suggests, the idea of cultural proximity can be used partly to 
explain intra-Asia popular cultural flows, which is why the notion of becoming 
culturally proximate is a possible explanation for the preference of young audiences 
for Japanese TV dramas. Ying-rong said that: 
 
I prefer Japanese TV dramas, partly for language reasons. In comparison with 
Korean TV dramas which often have a tragic format, Japanese ones have 
diverse subjects. I do not have a good impression of Korea because of the 
2002 Football World Cup incidents, the way they did whatever it took to win 
the match. It is very annoying. There are some Korean students at my college; 
they are often very loud and noisy so with those bad impressions I kind of 
boycott the Korean TV dramas (age 22, Female).   
 
One male informant stated that ‘I am more interested in Japanese culture and prefer 
Japanese people. For what Korean people have done in most of sports events, I have 
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 Between 1895-1945 Taiwan was colonised by Japan.  
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no comment’. Another male student noted that ‘Korea is not as advanced as Japan and 
maybe even less modernised than Taiwan. So there is no point in watching their 
dramas since there is nothing to learn’. Few students believed that the Japanese way 
of thinking is similar to the Taiwanese. To some extent, some university students still 
have a stereotypical understanding of South Korea as a nation, which reflects their 
choice of TV dramas. The negative comments about South Korea from university 
students suggest, on the one hand, the stereotype or misconception of South Korea as 
a nation due to their personal experience and media encounters which influence their 
programme choices. On the other hand, it also indicates that through the TV dramas 
they watch, audiences construct their cultural preference as a way to articulate or even 
reinforce their perceptions of other nations.  
 
The fifth commonly stated reason is that the production of Japanese TV dramas is of 
better quality. In general, most university students consider that Japanese TV dramas 
have better qualities, which informs their programme preferences, with Japanese 
dramas being described using popular phrases such as “elegance”, “quick-paced”, 
“diverse”, “fashionable” and so forth. One female student suggested that Japanese TV 
dramas have “splendid plots, representation of society, unique contexts and variation 
of action, [so] Japanese TV dramas are better quality, more enjoyable and desirable”. 
Another 22-year-old male student noted that “Japanese TV dramas are more creative 
and use more colloquial language”. A 20-year-old male student who spends an 
average of 7-9 hours per week watching Japanese TV dramas stated that “I think 
Korean TV dramas are similar to Taiwanese ones; you can easily predict the outcome, 
so I am not interested in watching Korean TV dramas”. The comments also connect 
to their depiction of Japan as a more advanced and modernised country yet with a hint 
of sophistication and originality in its media productions that catches university 
students’ attention and imagination and is highly appreciated. Overall, the preference 
for Japanese TV dramas has been an overwhelming phenomenon amongst university 
students and suggests that Japanese TV dramas provide Taiwanese young audience 
with several desirable cultural forms and resources.  
 
To sum up, university students’ preference for Japanese TV dramas intertwines with 
several possible dimensions from an audience point of view. The quality and content 
of Japanese TV dramas stand out as a desirable choice in comparison to Korean 
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and/or Taiwanese productions. The reception of TV dramas aside, most university 
students demonstrate a general admiration and preference for the Japanese way of life, 
cultural customs and language. For instance, out of a total of 158 students, 117 show 
their desire to travel to Japan, 114 would like to learn Japanese as a second language 
and 76 would seriously consider living in Japan. In this regard, Japanese TV dramas 
have not only depicted a modern way of life that young audiences aspire to, they also 
feed into the youth’s own distant imagination of Japan as a nation. A nation they 
might never have been to but somehow have a vivid memory of and an abstract 
personal sentimental connection to which is facilitated by the consumption of 
Japanese TV dramas; a sentiment expressed by Jia-ling during the interview: 
  
I have never been to Japan, my imagination (idea) of Japan is mainly via the 
reception of Japanese TV dramas, travel books and the remains of Japanese 
colonial architecture in Taiwan, such as shrines. So I would like to go to Japan 
one day, searching for this wonderful memory that I have in my mind (age 21, 
Female, my emphasis). 
 
Jia-ling’s desire to search for memory, in this sense, is an ‘imagined nostalgia’ to 
borrow Appadurai’s term (1996, p. 77); a nostalgia without actual living memory but 
through the pleasure of recognition with TV dramas and cultural representation of 
(Japanese) national images which is associated with the viewer’s personal imaginings. 
The reception of foreign TV programmes in relation to transnational cultural practice 
and consumption of commodities has been discussed by several Asian scholars in the 
past. In the next section, I examine those debates based on my research data and also 
suggest that the Japanese TV by-products are not as actively consumed amongst 
young audiences as previous research assumed, but rather the sense of Japanese 
“odour” that has been disseminated and simulated by local cultural industries. 
 
 
Japanese TV dramas and the sense of “Japaneseness”: The consumption 
of symbolic cultural meanings and commodities  
 
Much of the previous research on the impact of Japanese popular culture on the 
Taiwanese youth from 1990s, such as TV dramas, animations, pop music, fashion 
styles, expresses much concern with respect to the so-called “Japanophiles” (Hari-zu) 
who indulge in Japanese popular commodities in order to live “the Japanese way of 
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life”. Drawing on the postmodern dimension of consumption, the consumption of 
commodities (such as soundtracks, original comic books, novels, clothes) related to 
Japanese TV dramas is often believed by the researchers to carry a specific meaning 
which is portrayed in the content of dramas (Lin 2000, Y.-l. Su 1999). However, 
based on the outcomes of my questionnaires, almost 65 per cent of this group of 
university students have never purchased any products directly related to these TV 
dramas. And even if they do, the primary motivation was musical preference (68.9 per 
cent) and the quality of the products (61.3 per cent). While it was previously believed 
that Japanese TV dramas sell the whole package of products this has not been 
necessarily the case in my research. However, this does not necessarily suggest that 
Japanese TV dramas do not have any impact on the consumption of the idea of 
Japaneseness. What we need to consider is which concept of Japanese TV dramas is 
actually provided for and represented, and what Japanese TV dramas create outside 
their actual intertextual patterns which in turn interact with the local cultural practices 
and communities of everyday life. How does the term “Japanese Trendy Dramas” 
become culturally meaningful and generated by the local media/cultural industry? 
How do these images become a distant “collective memory” amongst youth in 
Taiwan? The standpoint of the reception of Japanese TV dramas in Taiwanese society 
is essentially a re-orientation from production to consumption – or from the depiction 
of Japanese lifestyles – to the practices of everyday life. 
 
In Herng Su’s article (1999), ‘All Things Japanese - Children’s TV Viewing and 
Spending on Imported Cultural Goods in Taiwan’, the researcher targeted children of 
10-15 years old in the Taipei metropolitan area. The findings demonstrate that 
viewing Japanese animation and viewers’ preferences for animation are significantly 
related to the attitudes and purchasing behaviour of young Taiwanese viewers. 
According to Su’s research:  
 
Fifty-two per cent of respondents’ purchasing behaviour was inspired by the 
interesting and stylish design of the products. Every anime production has at 
least a couple of CDs on the market—a soundtrack album and the theme 
songs. Some also publish comic books simultaneously. Forty per cent were 
attracted by the content or theme songs of the animation. Popular characters of 
animation also motivate thirty-two per cent of school children to buy them 
(ibid., p. 72).  
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His research outcome contrasts with that of Iwabuchi’s (1999), who argues that 
Japanese pop cultural products (i.e. the three C’s: comics/cartoons, consumer 
technologies and computer games) are ‘culturally odourless’ (p. 178) in an attempt to 
neutralise audiences’ potential psychological resistance as a result of Japan’s 
imperialist past.  
 
In the case of regional TV drama’s consumption, Xiao-ming Hao and Leng-leng Teh 
(2004) suggest that those who watch more Japanese TV programmes and consume 
more Japanese TV drama VCDs tend to consider Japanese as cool, elegant and not 
stupid. Those who spend more time with Japanese media are more likely to buy 
Japanese products, imitate their idols’ dressing styles either in the dramas or as pop 
idols and are motivated to learn the Japanese language. Based on one of their findings, 
Hao and Teh argue that:  
 
Media audiences are more likely to see the Japanese in positive but superficial 
stereotypical ways, but consumers of Japanese popular cultural products, 
especially the games, are more likely to see the Japanese in some negative 
albeit superficial stereotypical ways (ibid., p. 31, my emphasis).  
 
Their findings on the consumption of Japanese TV dramas (as media audience) and 
cultural products (as consumers) seem to suggest a contradictory perception of Japan 
as a nation amongst young Singaporeans. One of several possible explanations is that: 
 
Media are more likely to exert a stronger effect in branding products than 
popular cultural products such as video games or flash cards because images 
presented by the media are seen as more realistic. For the same reason, 
exposure to the Japanese media also tends to have stronger effects than the 
consumption of popular cultural products in creating idols for the youngsters 
(ibid., pp. 30-31). 
 
Although in the article, Hao and Teh did not clearly state that the reception of 
Japanese TV programmes has led to a better conception of Japan as a nation, to a 
certain extent they do suggest that Japanese TV programmes somehow portray the 
right cultural images and represent Japan as a desirable modern society that inspired 




Both articles demonstrate that viewing Japanese TV programmes (either cartoons or 
TV dramas) has a certain level of influence on young people in relation to the 
purchase of Japanese products in Taiwan and Singapore. It seems fair to assume 
therefore that the audience of Japanese TV programmes is quite likely to become 
consumers of Japanese commodities. However, is this the way it really happens? Do 
audiences buy the products which they see on the programmes and then interpret the 
meaning of a particular product so that it in turn fulfils and expresses their feeling 
about real society?   
 
In order to interpret the meanings and narratives associated with any consumer 
commodity we need to pay close attention to the specificities of the place and period 
in which that commodity is consumed. The concept of ‘symbolic consumption’ was 
being used incessantly during early research findings into the popularity of Japanese 
Trendy Dramas and the consumption of its by-products (Y.-l. Su 1999, p. 135). Here, 
the notion of ‘symbolic consumption’ is close to Jean Baudrillard’s definition (2001) 
of sign-value, the images of things which through advertising, the media, displays and 
performances create the romantic, fantastic and aesthetic fabric of consumers in their 
daily life. For instance, fashion style, soundtracks, original novels, comic books and 
VCDs were employed as the industrial strategy for the promotion of Japanese Trendy 
Dramas in Taiwan. Initially, the production of Japanese Trendy Dramas was 
recognised as highly youth-oriented and depicting various kinds of consumerist trends 
which attracted large numbers of young Japanese female viewers at the height of the 
bubble economy (Toru 2004). According to Andre Jansson, ‘[a] good illustration of 
industrially encoded intertextuality is the product placement, which is essentially a 
strategy of positioning a branded product within a desirable media context, trying to 
strengthen the image of the product’ (2002, p. 19). In particular, the linkage between 
the product and media text, ‘the image, or the “aura” of the commodity contributes to 
the perceived characteristics of people and place in the film or TV programmes’ (ibid., 
pp. 19-20). Therefore, earlier research projects about the impact of Japanese Trendy 
Dramas on Taiwanese youth frequently argue that although the product placement in 
the TV dramas may not be intentionally encoded by the producer, it certainly 
functions as a cultural resource to allow young audiences in Taiwan and East Asian 
countries to reproduce a sense of youth cultural identification and to fulfil their desire 
for modernity (Chua 2000, p. 16, Lee and Ho 2002, pp. 38-39).  
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Nicholas Abercrombie suggests in his study of the relationship between authority and 
consumer society that:  
 
If images are at the centre of modern consumption and of the producer-
consumer relationship, then the control of their meaning is similarly central to 
the distribution of authority in that relationship… Producers try to commodify 
meaning, that is to try to make images and symbols into things which can be 
sold or bought. Consumers, on the other hand, try to give their own, new, 
meanings to the commodities and services that they buy (1994, p. 51).  
 
By the same token, Jansson points out that ‘the meaning of a particular act of 
consumption emerges to a great extent via the connotative link between the consumed 
object and the media-generated-image - like one text related to another’ (2002, p. 19). 
Moreover, as Yu-ling Su argues (1999), the format of Japanese popular culture is 
highly concentrated on the re/presentation of the images of Japan or the feeling of 
Japaneseness. However, what is this feeling or sense of Japaneseness? What “odour” 
or “aura” do young Taiwanese audience “sniff” which then becomes a concept or 
ideal that young consumers buy into? On the one hand, according to Koichi 
Iwabuchi’s primary observation: 
 
The recent popularity of Japanese TV dramas in Taiwan suggests that 
“Japanese odour” does have the potential to sell. … This “Japanesenesss” is 
quite different from Japanese traditional culture, the beauty of which was 
discovered by “the west”. “Japaneseness” with which modernised “Asia” 
finds resonance in Japanese TV dramas has more to do with a Japanese 
modernity which is not just a response to western modernity….popular culture, 
reminds Japan and ‘Asia’ alike of cultural similarities … The ascent of 
Japanese dramas is closely associated with the scent of a modernity in Asia 
that Japanese dramas embody (2001, pp. 55-56). 
 
On the other hand, Su (1999) argues that from comic books, anime to trendy dramas 
and their by-products, all these Japanese cultural products share the same system of 
signs and meaning. The meanings of Japanese popular culture and products are no 
longer just a matter of consumption but to an increasing extent used as sources for the 
expression of youth cultural identification and taste in Taiwan. A combination of these 
three statements seems to confirm the rise of an ‘image culture’, which Jansson 
defines as ‘the interaction between cultural products, cultural communities and 
cultural practices’ (2002, p. 8 original italics) in relation to three transitory processes 
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of producing and consuming images: ‘culturalisation, mediatisation and simulation’ 
(ibid., p. 12 original emphasis). The notion of image culture or image bank19 from 
cultural globalisation and an intensified regional cultural flows perspective both 
suggest that the consumption of cultural commodities is not merely the act of 
consuming but rather a process of integration, negotiation and cultural appropriation.   
 
I argue that the use of the phrase “Japanese Idol/Trendy Dramas” creates certain 
images and feelings that are often depicted in TV dramas. These images and feelings 
are rarely described or written about in relation to a particular drama. As different 
consumers have their own different favourite Japanese Trendy Dramas, what they buy 
into is the concept and the “atmosphere” that the phrase implies. As Jia-ling pointed 
out: 
 
The difference between Japanese and Korean TV dramas is that Japanese TV 
dramas often give you a sense of “belief” or “faith” – something that you can 
incorporate into your life. Whether it is about personal love life or choice, e.g. 
what is happiness or what you are searching for in a relationship, or the 
difficulties that you encounter in your life. To me, some Japanese TV dramas 
can really encourage you and give you a sense of direction (age 21, Female). 
 
Yi-jun responded similarly by saying that:  
 
Those characters in Japanese TV dramas often give me a sense of courage, 
even though they might not be from the best background or lack support. 
Somehow, they still manage to survive or turn the situation around (age 22, 
Female). 
 
From this perspective foreign TV dramas provide a cultural imaginary space that is 
not grounded in place and traditions but in a combination of imagined and “semi-
realistic” place. This was translated by local youth to articulate their sense of 
temporal-synchronous collective cultural identification in modern society, conceived 
of as a general experience rather than a national one.  
 
As I mentioned before, the impressions of Japanese TV dramas have often been 
referred to as “elegant”, “sophisticated”, and “romantic”. Therefore, the idea of 
                                                 
19
 The concept of ‘image bank’ which is mentioned in Chapter 2, according to Chua (2000, p. 16), is 
when youth in Asia draw from an image bank to construct their sense of youth identity within the 
cultural globalization context.  
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buying certain products which are closely related to the TV dramas is not only part of 
the symbolic consumption of certain products but is also a way of life, a 
representation of cultural capital and taste. What has been more frequently used by, 
and to intertwine with Japanese TV dramas is an “odour”, a kind of imaginary 
semiotic representation that it created. In other words, the reception of Japanese TV 
dramas is not only the process that provides and reinforces image culture but also 
connects the realm of cultural industry in Taiwan. What is particularly interesting to 
note regarding the promotion of content is that the term “Japanese TV dramas” is 
often used as a representation of the romantic and desirable, a form of cultural 
‘imaginary appropriation’ (Lee and Ho 2002, p. 22). This is a general assumption 
concerning images, ideas and atmosphere in Japanese TV dramas rather than a 
critique of specific programmes. The promotion of new music albums, for example, 
often includes notes on the CD cover that “there is the romantic odour or aura of 
Japanese TV dramas pervading the atmosphere”. For instance, in 2005 the promotion 
of Taiwanese singer Chi-jin Chen’s song, The meaning of travelling, focused on 
selling the graceful tune of the song which is infused with “Japanese Idol Dramas’ 
taste of love”. Likewise, travel agents promote Japanese honeymoon package trips 
indicating a specific location, such as Oadiba (located in Tokyo) which often appears 
in the TV dramas that are portrayed as a romantic location. There is also the 
frequently used phrase “Japanese Idol Drama” frequently found on fiction book 
covers, such as When love encounters Japanese TV dramas (Renata, 2000). In a 
similar situation, after a series of romantic Korean TV dramas (such as Winter Sonata, 
Lovers in Paris) was well received in Taiwan, this cultural marketing strategy trend 
has been promoted by local media industries and travel agencies. During my research, 
it was a less significant approach and phenomenon and therefore I only focus on this 
discussion in relation to Japanese TV dramas.    
 
The consumption of Japanese commodities is often overly simplified by researchers 
who relate it to a high level of exposure to Japanese TV dramas and equate this with 
the desire to own Japanese products. However, what has been neglected is that the 
definition of Japanese Idol/Trendy Drama is not merely being decoded as TV drama 
but is being re-encoded as desirable cultural consumption and a way of life. Therefore 
I suggest that the audiences’ cultural knowledge of the Japanese Trendy Drama has 
made this particular TV genre not just an entertainment programme or an object of 
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promotion but also a vocabulary with specific cultural meaning, or a code word, and a 
promotion in itself within Taiwanese society. The concept of Japanese Idol/Trendy 
Drama has gained importance as a form of cultural reference among Taiwanese youth 
and its contribution to the development and maintenance of particular cultural 
communities. This phrase, which signifies romanticism, desirability and 
sophistication has accumulated meaning over the years and has been maintained, even 
after the decline of Japanese trendy dramas from the early 2000s when Korean TV 
programmes successfully gained recognition in Taiwan. The phrase Japanese 
Idol/Trendy Drama became a generally understood message with a symbolic cultural 
meaning as well as a common emotional resonance. As indicated in the section 
comparing the difference between these two types of regional TV dramas, many of 
my informants expressed their points of view on the differences, for example the 
complaint the Japanese being more sophisticated than Korean programmes; Japanese 
TV dramas being more realistic with greater diversity in their contents; better 
structure; featuring relatively more attractive idols and so forth. There are also some 
negative opinions about Japanese Idol/Trendy Dramas, such as that the storylines are 
superficial and family values and traditional sentiments are often absent. However, 
overall most university students have largely positive views and feelings towards 
Japanese Trendy Drama regardless of how many programmes they have actually 
watched. As I stated earlier, many advertising and promotional strategies for cultural 
products (sometimes food and drink as well) constantly associate their wares with 
Japanese Idol/Trendy Drama in modern Taiwan. Hence the symbolic consumption 
and circulation of Japanese Idol/Trendy Drama is a matter of taste, status or semiotics 
rather than just a TV show. Youth consumption of Japanese popular culture as a 
means to demonstrate their socio-cultural status also reflects the emptiness of cultural 
subjectivities amongst young generations in Taiwan. A lack of a definite Taiwanese 
popular culture field is apparent in this instance. 
 
By and large, the prominence of design, packaging and advertising of Japanese 
Idol/Trendy Drama in Taiwan has exposed youth to a certain image of everyday life 
in Japan, and various kinds of media texts provide audiences/consumers with images 
of goods and services that might be acquired and incorporated as meaningful 
components of their expressive style. As Jansson puts it, ‘consumers often have a 
quite extensive knowledge of the meanings of things before they actually acquire 
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them’ (2002, p. 14). It is indisputable that those Japanese popular cultural 
commodities have established their own consumer markets in Taiwan, and that these 
now permeate consumption in social contexts as well. Although it would be naïve to 
believe that the consumption of Japanese commodities in Taiwan or the consumption 
behaviour of young people is manipulated by Japanese Idol/Trendy Drama, without 
doubt Japanese Idol/Trendy Drama does play a significant role in the proliferation of 
Japanese popular culture and products in Taiwanese society. The representations of 
modern Japanese society in dramas have encouraged local young audiences to 





In this chapter, I have analysed the reception of Japanese and Korean TV dramas 
(mainly Idol/Trendy Dramas) amongst university students to demonstrate the cultural 
consumption of these two regional TV dramas in terms of the audience’s programme 
preference and general reading of the drama’s narrative, the sense of personal 
emotional connection with dramas, and their perceptions of both countries. These 
dimensions are connected to their choice of programmes and reinforce their cultural 
misconceptions to a certain extent. This is different from previous researchers’ 
emphasis on the notion of ‘pleasure of recognition’ and ‘cultural proximity’ to explain 
the modern imaginary appropriation of Japanese TV dramas in Taiwan (Ho and Lee 
2002, pp. 15-49) or the desire of ‘becoming culturally proximate’ and ‘a sense of 
coevalness’ with modern Japan (Iwabuchi 2002). As I have shown in this chapter, 
university students’ reception of Japanese and Korean TV dramas has developed into 
more complicated ways of viewing and reading, such as paying attention to details of 
TV drama production, ranging from the quality of the screenplay and camera work to 
the relative merits of acting skills. The viewers’ experience of transnational TV 
dramas and popular cultural products also intertwines with the notion of Asian 
modernisation and the construction of a sense of Taiwanese identity. In this analysis, 
university students’ transnational consumption of TV dramas and cultural 
appropriation should therefore be seen as more than simply a common audience study 
of the relationship between media culture and young people. Regional media 
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consumption in this case should not be seen just as a powerful source of dominant 
ideologies but rather as an alternative cultural symbolic resource which is often 
negotiated and re/appropriated by local young audiences. My intervention is neither 
from a perspective emphasising Western versus Eastern cultural difference nor a 
historical, colonial perspective on the sentiments that drive the reception of foreign 
TV dramas. Rather, I argue that young university students, after many years of 
regional TV drama viewing experience, have developed their own way of 
appropriating Japanese and Korean TV dramas, and the cultural perceptions of both 
countries encourage them to take a reflexive distance from their own life and 
stimulate their awareness of cultural differences and/or similarities between Taiwan, 
Japan and South Korea.  
  
By articulating my data in relation to previous research, I have been able to 
demonstrate how the university students that I surveyed and interviewed are able to 
actively incorporate these transnational TV dramas into their daily lives and use them 
as a resource in the construction of their own sense of Taiwanese identity. Making this 
connection between the transnational consumption of popular culture and national 
cultural identity will set the scene for the main topic of discussion in Chapter 6. There 
we will explore in more detail the relationship between cultural identity and popular 
culture. As Martin-Barbero has argued in the Latin American context ‘understanding 
the process of mass communication implies recognising the rearticulations of 
symbolic boundaries and how these new boundaries confirm the value and power of 
collective identities’ (1993, p. 26). The transnational expansion of communications, 
which weakens local traditions, has produced a world folklore or, as Renato Ortiz 
calls it, an ‘international-popular culture’: 
 
communities of consumers are organised less and less according to national 
differences, and above all among the younger generations, they define their 
cultural practices in terms of homogenised information and styles that can be 
received by audiences in different societies independently of their political, 
religious, or national backgrounds’ (cited in Garcia Canclini 1997, p. 11).  
 
To understand the notion of Taiwanese identity we therefore need to think about the 
nature of the nation and national identity and to ask how it is mediated by youth 
consumption of foreign TV dramas as a way to negotiate young people’s sense of 




A comparative reading of secondary school students’ reception of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas  
Introduction 
 
This chapter is based on the analysis of one hundred and eighteen questionnaire 
responses and four group discussions which I conducted amongst secondary school 
students on different occasions between 2003 and 2005. My findings suggest that the 
viewing pleasure of foreign TV dramas in terms of cultural practice amongst 
secondary school students is sometimes limited by their life experience. This 
particular group often has less sentimental connection and emotional involvement 
compared to university students. Moreover, social activities amongst teenage 
audiences such as television viewing with the family can yield a more self-reflexive 
social attitude, incorporating familial socio-cultural changes through interaction with 
and the exploration of imagined identity within the media space of television. 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas are both representations of imported programmes in 
Taiwan, in which local young audiences bring their own cultural context to bear on 
the content and read them accordingly (c.f. Chua 2004, pp. 211-212). However one 
should not take local audiences’ reading or meaning-making as one fixed position but 
rather consider how it generates difference within the local cultures of a specific 
audience group.    
 
The first section illustrates the general reception and consumption of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas amongst secondary school students. It focuses in particular on a 
comparison between university and secondary school students in terms of textual 
interpretations, the influence of programme merchandising, and the diverse range of 
emotional connections to the programmes in relation to the students’ own social and 
educational status. In doing so, I argue that different young generational audience 
groups and their “making-sense” of narratives in the consumption of foreign TV 
dramas not only intertwines with their social and cultural status but also represents a 
possible generational cultural difference.  
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The second section demonstrates that the place and space of television viewing 
amongst secondary students has proved to be rather different from that of university 
students. Different programmes often involve different family members as viewers 
(Morley 1986). The viewing of TV dramas in most Taiwanese families often involves 
the mother, elderly family members and young teenagers. Occasionally, relevant 
discussions in relation to the contents of these programmes are raised while watching. 
Television viewing for most secondary students is considered a family activity during 
or after the evening meal. Nevertheless, the young also demonstrate a desire for a 
personal viewing space, especially where Japanese or Korean TV dramas are 
concerned. Unlike university students, secondary school students’ viewing time and 
space is limited and confined within the household, hence their reception of local or 
foreign TV dramas can sometimes become more of an immediate cultural 
interpretation and interaction with family members in comparison with university 
students. From this perspective, teenagers’ reading of TV dramas is less about self-
reflexivity than on “TV dramas talks” as a means of social and cultural formation 
through discussion and negotiation among family members. 
 
In the third section I will discuss the distribution and consumption of Japanese 
animation in Taiwan in the context of their historical-cultural roots and image 
appropriation by the Taiwanese creative industry. I explore the reasons why Japanese 
animation is popular with secondary school students and the possible connection with 
an understanding of Japan as a creative country. Although Japanese animation was 
not part of my initial research subject, when I conducted my research with secondary 
school students their interest in Japanese cartoons was constantly on display. Some 
junior secondary school students in the age range between thirteen and fifteen years 
old admitted to spending more time watching Japanese cartoons than TV dramas. In 
contrast to the idea of Japanese animations as ‘culturally odourless’ products 
(Iwabuchi 2002, p. 27), Herng Su’s (1999) research shows that the consumption of 
Japanese cartoons and related production  has created its own, to borrow Lee’s term, 
‘Japanised cultural consumption space’ in Taiwan (Lee 2003, p. 48). Therefore it is 
important to examine to what extent the popularity of Japanese animation amongst 
teenagers facilitates their positive perception of Japanese TV dramas. 
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Differences in the consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas  
 
My four group discussions with secondary school students indicate that their heavy 
study schedule and almost daily examination practice at schools meant that most of 
the students have limited time to watch television, especially during school terms.
20
 
The young interviewees from secondary schools mention that they do not get to 
watch television as much as they wish, either because of time restrictions imposed by 
their parents or because they do not have the power to access the remote control. 
Most of the time they simply follow whatever other family members are watching – 
in most of the cases mothers or grandparents make this choice. Yu-ya, a junior 
secondary student, explained to me: 
  
Oh, I rarely watch either Japanese or Korean TV dramas because my mother 
does not allow me to watch them. She often watches local traditional 
Taiwanese TV dramas
21
, so I just watch whatever programme she is watching 
at the time (age 13, Female).  
 
A similar response came from Ying-hong, a 13-year-old boy, who said ‘Most of the 
time I watch local traditional Taiwanese TV dramas with my parents but 
occasionally, I watch Japanese or Korean TV dramas on my own’. Yuan-xuan, a 
senior secondary student who showed great interest in Japanese TV dramas and 
culture during the group interview states:  
 
I do not like local traditional Taiwanese TV dramas and [I think] they are for 
old people but because my grandmother likes them, the rest of my family 
members watch the programme with her (age 17, Female). 
 
Since most secondary school students still live at home
22
 it is no surprise that the so-
called ‘politics of the living room’ (Cubitt cited in Morley 1986, p. 19) have a certain 
impact on programme choice and exposure, which I will explore further in the second 
section of the chapter. 
 
                                                 
20
 During term time, normally secondary school students will be at school from seven-thirty in the 
morning until four in the afternoon and right after that some will attend after-school.  
21
 Most local traditional TV dramas (bentu ju similar to soap opera) are broadcast between 7 and 9pm 
during weekdays. Students normally get to watch a bit of TV during that time slot after dinner before 
they go back to their studies in preparation for examinations the next day, or to bed.  
22
 A few of the students study outside their hometown, which means that they live in school 
accommodation away from the parents. 
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In contrast most university students who live alone or share a flat with their friends 
can generally choose what to watch and where. These students can even watch 
programmes in VCD format or on their computer in their individual room. 
Nevertheless, all secondary school students who I interviewed have some experience 
of watching both Japanese and Korean TV dramas. Similarly to university students, 
many of them express a certain degree of knowledge/opinion about Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas and rather positive perceptions of these two types of dramas in 
comparison to Taiwanese-made TV programmes. The common impressions are that 
these TV dramas offer a greater diversity of content; higher production values; a 
clearer representation of cultural difference and ways of life; and the celebrity status 
of the actors. However this does not necessarily suggest that there is a similar degree 
of participation in the consumption and interpretation of Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas amongst these two different audience groups. 
 
In terms of their general readings of content some secondary school students state that 
Japanese TV dramas are more interesting and diverse than Korean ones, whereas 
others believe that Korean ones are more romantic or funnier. A few boys admitted 
that they do not take much of interest in reading the plots or storylines of these 
dramas. However, like most university students the teenagers believe that Japanese 
and Korean TV dramas are better, regardless of whether the content is interesting to 
them or not. Based on the open-ended questions in the last section of the 
questionnaire common responses from teenaged audiences included: “Taiwanese 
dramas are boring, often you can predict the ending or they are just copycats of 
Japanese or/and Korean TV dramas”; “The acting skills and storyline are not good”; 
or “Taiwanese TV programmes often look ‘cheap”’. These statements highlight a 
fundamental question, namely what makes the young audience think so highly of both 
imported dramas compared to Taiwanese dramas? TV dramas (soap operas, 
telenovelas, and melodramas) are supposedly often viewed as a genre which depicts 
domestic life, and has a closer sentimental value and feeling for the local audience 
compared to other imported dramas. Yet, the young audiences still show a greater 
interest in and appreciation of foreign TV dramas (e.g. a few state that they prefer 
American TV dramas) to local ones. One of the reasons is that those programmes 
have been consciously promoted by local TV companies to target a young audience 
according to my interview with Xiao, who is a member of staff of the Korean TV 
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Programmes Importation Section at Taiwan GALA TV station in 2005. She points 
out that:  
 
Each year the company purchases a certain amount of Korean TV dramas and 
programmes. Some dramas are considered more ‘modern’ and seen as similar 
to Japanese Trendy Dramas. We target teenagers as the main audience group 
and therefore we tend to broadcast them during summer and winter vacation if 
the timing is not too far off from the original broadcasting time in South 
Korea. In terms of genre, some of them are closer to Taiwan local TV dramas 
with more “traditional values” or “comedy elements” – these dramas often run 
up to 50 or 100 episodes. In this case, our audience target is middle-aged 
housewives. Overall, the station’s strategy aims to establish the GALA drama 
channel as a Korean TV dramas channel (Interview conducted in 2005).  
 
As noted previously, the popularity of Japanese Trendy Drama in Taiwan owes a lot 
to the promotional strategies employed by Channel V in the early 1990s. This means 
that Japanese and Korean TV dramas do not merely function as entertainment 
programmes for youngsters, but also represent cultural products that surpass the 
home-grown Taiwanese product in some sense. The meaning of Japan or South Korea 
has been commodified and marketed by the local media to be purchased and 
consumed by a Taiwanese audience.  There is a lack of confidence in local cultural 
commodities perhaps because of this level of marketing manipulation. The resultant 
general distrust of or distaste for local Taiwanese cultural commodities is an issue 
that needs to be explored further. 
 
In spite of the fact that young Taiwanese teenagers might feel a sense of ‘coevalness’ 
with Japanese culture or lifestyle (Iwabuchi 2002, p. 154) Japan is often represented 
as a more advanced and modernised nation; a nation to aspire to and fantasise about. 
As Yu-ling Su (1999, pp. 132-133) points out, before Japanese TV dramas began 
broadcasting legally in Taiwan in 1991 it was not difficult to find evidence that 
Taiwanese society was under the influence of Japanese popular culture since the 
1970s – through pop songs, images of young pop idols and comic books. Equally, the 
older generation who have a vivid experience or memories of Japanese colonisation 
often demonstrated a preference for a “Made in Japan” outlook. One example is the 
high regard for anything electrical that is made in Japan, from televisions, cameras 
and refrigerators to rice cookers.  
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The responses to the questionnaires and group discussions from secondary school 
students reveal that younger audiences have become accustomed to both Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas. This is in contrast to university students who had much earlier 
access to Japanese TV dramas in the early 1990s and only later to Korean TV dramas. 
Most secondary school students have had equal opportunities to access foreign TV 
dramas on Taiwanese television stations. In my research, most university students 
appreciated Japanese TV dramas to a greater degree than Korean TV dramas but this 
preference is less apparent amongst secondary school students. This noticeable 
difference between university and teenage audiences indicates that the reception of 
foreign TV dramas is to a certain extent pre-determined by the audiences’ expectation 
of genres and their viewing habits. For instance, university students often refer to 
their preference for Japanese TV dramas compared to Korean TV dramas due to their 
being ‘more familiar with’ or ‘used to’ the genre. In the case of the secondary school 
students ‘familiarity’ with a particular TV genre was hardly mentioned. Rather, 
during group discussions some boys considered Korean TV dramas more interesting 
because the plots were funnier or the ‘snowy scenery’ looks beautiful. To some of 
them the popularity of Korean and Japanese TV dramas is an example of the social 
and cultural importance of foreign entertainment programmes that can now be easily 
accessed in Taiwanese society. Typical statements in the questionnaires that illustrate 
this point are that ‘Japanese and Korean cultural products, packaged food and 
restaurants are everywhere in Taiwan’, ‘They are popular, everyone is watching 
them’ or ‘Their storylines are better than Taiwanese ones’. To teenage audiences the 
popularity of Japanese and Korean media and cultural products is about their high 
accessibility and the dissemination of cultural information such as lifestyle, TV 
dramas and commodities. This interpretation of these socio-cultural phenomena in 
their daily life means that teenagers see regional cultural and media flows as a norm 
in modern Taiwanese society.  
 
Nonetheless, these foreign TV programmes may be part of their daily life but hold 
less significant cultural meanings or emotional implications for teenagers than for 
most university students. Says Zhi-wei: 
  
I watch Japanese and Korean TV dramas very occasionally; my family do not 
take much interest in either dramas or countries. To me, when we talk about 
Korea, it is the food that interests me more than anything else (age 13, Male).  
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 Wei-ren responds in similar fashion:  
 
I watch both Japanese and Korean TV dramas but do not have a particular 
interest in either, I prefer Taiwanese idol dramas. I do not have much interest 
or knowledge about either countries but I do like Japanese playstation games 
(age 14, Male). 
 
Thus it is evident that the young audience’s reception of foreign TV dramas is not 
only associated with their social and cultural status but also more often than not with 
the programmes’ availability and the marketing strategy employed by the local media 
industry. Hence teenagers’ consumption of regional popular culture and commodities 
should not simply be generalised on the basis of the notion of ‘cultural proximity’ or 
‘postcoloniality’. 
 
Teenage audiences’ cultural appreciation of foreign TV dramas also represents a 
more materialist approach (with an emphasis on cuisine, music CDs, idols posters) 
and less of an emotional attachment to storylines or TV characters. It is characterised 
by a relative lack of interest in forms of cultural appropriation (for instance only 41.5 
per cent showed an interest in learning Japanese and 26.2 per cent in learning Korean) 
in comparison with university students (72.1 per cent and 46.8 per cent respectively). 
In terms of the “idols effect,” secondary school students demonstrate their affections 
for their idols in a much more materialistic and enthusiastic way than university 
students. Based on the evidence of the questionnaires and group discussions, 
secondary school students are more likely to spend money on buying CDs, posters, 
comic books, original novels and fashion items related to their idols (35.5 per cent), 
favourite programmes (37.3 per cent) and theme songs (e.g. sound tacks) (62.6 per 
cent). Wen-ling, a 16-year-old senior secondary school girl, openly admitted that 
‘because I am a fan of Kinki Kids23 whenever they have new TV dramas or songs 
released I will watch and buy them’. Qiao-zu, a junior secondary student says: 
 
My first Japanese trendy drama is God, Please Give Me More Time, because I 
really like Fukada Kyōko and Kaneshiro Takeshi24. I think she is very cute 
and he is very good looking and that is why I chose to watch the programme. 
Gradually, I enjoy the storyline more (age 13, Female). 
                                                 
23
 A male group who made their debut in 1997 under Johnnys & Associates, Inc., a talent agency that 
trains and promotes groups of male idols in Japan. They are relatively popular among Taiwanese young 
girls.  
24
 Kaneshiro Takeshi (金城武) is half Japanese and half Taiwanese and grew up in Taiwan.  
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Fang-ling, a 17-year-old devoted female fan of Japanese TV dramas confesses that:  
 
I am addicted to this drama called Hero
25
, I bought the sound track and watch 
every single episode, and will watch again when it reruns on the television, I 
really like both actor and actress. 
 
Jia-ling, a 13-year-old girl who generally enjoys watching Korean TV dramas more, 
says that “I really like Lovers in Paris26, Park Shin-yang is very attractive and a good 
actor, too. Often, I would buy the sound tracks of the TV dramas that I enjoy 
watching”. Jia-ling shyly admits that she is a big fan of Korean heartthrob actor, Bae 
Yong-joon
27
: “I watched all the TV dramas with him as protagonist, such as Hotelier, 
Winter Sonata and would watch them over and over again even after they have been 
rebroadcast several times”.   
 
Devotion to such idols is a common socio-cultural practice amongst youngsters.  
Branded as “Japanophile” or “Koreanophile” it is frequently frowned upon by some 
Taiwanese media and cultural critics. Nevertheless, their transnational cultural 
admiration for the idols is often invoked as a representation of individual cultural 
differentiation vis-à-vis their peer groups and forms a sense of individual collective-
identification with people who share the same affection for the same idol. 
 
In general, this great appeal of idols  does not just apply to Japanese and Korean TV 
programmes; most secondary students also show an interest in Taiwanese Idol 
Dramas especially where idols are involved, even if they exhibit a  general distaste 
for these dramas during group discussions. Junior secondary school students take 
more of an interest in and appreciate local idol dramas more than senior secondary 
and university students. Xin-hua a 14-year-old girl says: 
 
I do not watch Japanese and Korean TV dramas that much; I prefer Taiwanese 
Idol Dramas. I watch For the Roses’ Sake28  (starring Taiwan female idol 
group S.H.E and two male models) because I like S.H.E. 
 
                                                 
25
 Hero, starring Kimura Takuya and Takao Matsu, first aired on the Fuji TV station in Japan in 2001.  
26
 Lovers in Paris was first broadcast on SBS in 2004. In January 2005, the leading characters, Park 
Shin Yang and Kim Jung Eun were on a promotional tour to Taiwan. The programme broke the 
previous viewing record held by Winter Sonata, according to the GTV station.  
27
 Bae Yong-Jun is best known as the protagonist in Winter Sonata (Winter Love Story). 
28
 For the Roses’ Sake (also known as 薔薇之戀) was first broadcast on TTV from 25 May 2003 to 23 
November 2003. The series won the Most Popular Drama of the Year at the 2004 Golden Bell Awards 
in Taiwan. The drama was based on a Japanese josei manga series (Bara no Tame Ni). 
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Jia-ling, who enjoys watching Korean TV dramas also mentions her favourite 
Taiwanese Idol Dramas: “I like Mars29, because the male protagonist is good looking 
and the storyline is not bad”. Mong-xian a 13-year-old boy notes: “I like The 
Outsiders
30
, it has fighting and violent scenes which I quite enjoy”; a similar response 
from Wei-ren:  
 
I like Westside Story
31
, the storyline is good and interesting; it feels real 
because it is about teenagers
32
. Japanese and Korean TV dramas are all about 
romance or love relationship which is kind of boring to watch (age 14, Male). 
 
In contrast to junior secondary school students, senior students still show 
disappointment in Taiwanese Idol Dramas. Xiao-han, a 16-year-old girl simply says 
“I do not like Taiwanese young actors or pop idols” and for Xiao-han the attraction of 
idol dramas (either local or regional) is closely related to the notion of “idol effects”. 
Indeed, the young audience frequently regard local idol dramas as unoriginal. Fang-
ling, a seventeen-year old girl, comments that ‘Taiwanese Idol Dramas often lack 
creativity; often they just borrow ideas from Japanese TV dramas’. Chun-han, a 
seventeen year old girl, also says that “The storyline is more or less the same in all 
Taiwanese idol dramas, the production is very bad and unattractive. They are 
unoriginal and just copy each other”. Another disappointment concerns the quality of 
local production and the lack of exotic locations. For example, Wen-ling, a 16-year-
old girl, states, that “the locations are not good, all based in Taiwan, there is no major 
financial investment and storyline and actors are no good”. Overall, the impression 
given of Taiwanese Idol Dramas is rather mixed and relatively negative for these 
teenager audiences (mainly senior secondary students). Nonetheless, Taiwanese Idol 
Dramas are increasingly attracting a younger audience which believes that local 
production depicts the realities of daily life better than Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas. Certainly, they find the plots more comprehensible.   
 
                                                 
29
 Mars (also known as 戰神) was first broadcast on CTS from 31st July 2004. The series won the Most 
Popular Drama of the Year 2005 at the Golden Bell Awards in Taiwan. The drama was based on a 
Japanese shojo manga series (Mars). 
30
 The Outsiders (also known as 鬥魚 ) was first broadcast on GTV from 2 April 2004 to October 2004. 
The series was based on an internet love story. 
31
 Westside Story (also known as 西街少年) was first broadcast on CTS from 21 September 2003 to 8 
January 2004. It starred Taiwanese popular boys group, 5566.  
32
 The age range of the characters in this drama is between 16 and 20 years old. 
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Taiwanese Idol Dramas are largely a hybrid programme format encompassing various 
cultural elements.  They star Taiwanese actors (sometimes combining actors from 
Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and China), often with a storyline based on a 
Japanese manga series with theme songs performed by local musicians. These types 
of drama tend not to contain many explicit local cultural elements. 
 
Taiwanese Idol Dramas from the outset were custom-made to attract young teenage 
audiences. Arguably, the first successful Taiwan-made idol drama is Meteor 
Garden,
33
 which is based on a Japanese comic book entitled Hana yori dango (Boys 
before Flowers). It focuses on the lives of privileged school students and it was 
produced by Comic Ritz International Production with Zhi-ping Chai as producer and 
Yue-xun Cai as director in 2001. The series is tailored to target a young Taiwanese 
audience, through its use of a combination of the Japanese TV genres, comic books, 
idol effects (good-looking actors)
34
 and other recognisable Japanese elements, such as 
Japanese character names (with some alterations) pronounced in Mandarin. Later on, 
this type of hybrid drama
35
 was produced and appeared on Taiwanese television 
channels as a regular genre in its own right.   
 
Describing the popularity of Meteor Garden in Taiwan and most East Asian 
countries, Hsiu-Chuang Deppman states that 
 
Taiwanese idol dramas like Meteor Garden combine two interrelated genres 
in Japanese TV programme: “trendy dramas” and “post-trendy dramas.” The 
former focus on  ‘depictions of stylish urban lifestyles and trendy nightspots 
abundant with extravagant designer clothes and accessories, sets with the chic 
interiors designs, and the latest pop music, all of which clearly reflected the 
then prevailing highly materialistic consumerism Japanese young people 
enjoyed under the so-called bubble economy’ (Iwabuchi, 2004: 9). The “post-
trendy dramas”, on the other hand, give more weight to plot development, 
‘sympathetically depicting young people’s yearnings for love, friendship, 
work and dreams’ (Iwabuchi, 2004: 10), even though trendy consumerism is 
still vital to the sub-genres’ success (2009, p. 92). 
 
                                                 
33
 It was first broadcast on CTS channel in April 2001. Meteor Garden 2 was produced in 2002.  
34
 The main four male characters are known as F4 (Flowers 4) who later became a successful 
phenomenon in Taiwan and other East-Asian countries, such as Japan, South Korea, China, Philippines 
and Thailand.  
35
 A few examples are Mars, It started with a kiss, For the Rose’s Sake. 
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Arguably, Meteor Garden was the first Taiwanese idol drama that was exported to 
and was well received in most Asian countries, such as Hong Kong, China, 
Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Korea and Japan
36
. According to Hafez:  
 
The mark of cultural globalisation, rather than the transfer of cultural goods 
through import and export, is its influence on the indigenous entertainment 
industry, which it stimulates, generating new variations on form and style. In 
short, globalisation ushers in comprehensive modernisation (2007, p. 97).  
 
The success of Taiwanese idol dramas in other countries demonstrates that the 
cultural meaning of idols has gained a general attraction amongst young Asians when 
consuming TV dramas. As Chua rightly suggests, the term “idols” has come to 
characterise a specific segment of popular cultural products (2004, p. 203) in East 
Asian media markets. The consumption of “idols” has become a social phenomenon 
and the audience’s “gaze” is not merely one of admiration but also incorporates the 
desire to assimilate their idols. This assimilation is visible through different levels of 
involvement, for example mimicking their fashion styles, the purchasing of 
sentimental objects depicted in the TV programmes, and learning the languages. 
Although some might argue that this idol effect is rather shallow in relation to a sense 
of transnational cultural sharing or identification, it nevertheless indicates that this 
type of TV genre has created a unique media and cultural consumption field amongst 
young Asian audiences. The main attractions of East Asian idol dramas, as Deppman 
suggests, are ‘trend-setting representations of how young East Asian urbanities 
skilfully consume, fashion, and capitalise on the materiality of their new “glocal” 
culture’ (2009, p. 93).  
 
The (un)realistic qualities of content are scarcely mentioned amongst young 
teenagers, and some of them state that they prefer Korean TV dramas over Japanese 
dramas, either because Korean TV dramas are “funnier”,37 or because they cannot 
understand the Japanese TV dramas. Some of them note in the questionnaire that 
“Korean TV dramas are more exciting and vigorous; Japanese ones are rigid and 
boring” or “Japanese pop music is easy to listen to”. Despite the question’s focus on 
their preference for regional TV dramas, it is not unusual for respondents to mention 
                                                 
36
 It was first broadcast on the SKY channel in 2003 in Japan. In 2005, Japanese TV station TBS 
remade the show, which was then broadcast on Taiwan’s Wei-Lai TV station in July 2006. 
37
 There are two well received Korean long-series TV dramas (similar to soap operas) in Taiwan, called 
男生女生向前看 (Non Stop) and 順風婦產科 (Soonpoong Clinic). Both are comedies.   
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their interest in other popular media products, such as pop music/theme songs in the 
programmes or cartoons. I shall return to the case of popular consumption of cartoons 
and its possible implications for the perception of Japanese popular products later in 
this chapter.  
 
The primary concerns (categorised as important or very important in the 
questionnaire) of teenage audiences in their programme choices are: “storyline” (44.4 
per cent in Japanese dramas and 46.3 per cent in Korean ones); “entertainment value” 
(30.3 per cent in Japanese and 27.8 per cent in Korean); and “fun and kill time” (31.3 
per cent in Japanese and 27.8 per cent in Korean). The remaining reasons given such 
as “obtaining fashion information”, “releasing emotional pressure”, “gaining new 
acknowledge” and “learning language” are all considered to be less important and not 
relevant to their programme choices. In the group discussion, female senior secondary 
school students Chun-han and Yuan-xuan both mention that they usually get home at 
around seven in the evening and still have to prepare for examinations the following 
day although they usually get a bit more time to watch TV programmes during winter 
and summer vacations. Japanese and Korean TV dramas are still not necessarily their 
first choice; rather, it depends on the family’s choice.  
 
In view of such responses, it can be suggested that the daily lives of secondary school 
students revolve around study and family rather than issues of individual space and 
growth into adulthood. Therefore Japanese TV dramas which often depict urban 
lifestyles, professional skills and office romance fail to attract these teenagers. Hence 
their possible emotional involvement and lifestyle connection with the programmes 
are weaker among most secondary school students than for university students. In the 
field of audience reception research, it is accepted that viewers use elements of their 
shared social knowledge to determine the relative quality and significance of a 
programme. In accounting for teenage audiences’ pleasure in watching foreign TV 
dramas we witness a distinction between light comedy and romantic elements 
(interesting (female students)/boring (male students)). This highlights a different 
focus from earlier research on soap opera with its emphasis on fantasy (fiction) and 
escapism (reality) (Ang 1985, Livingstone 1991). The attraction of ‘realistic’ or 
‘fantasy’ elements may still be relevant, however, for a younger audience in Taiwan, 
in particular in the choice of foreign TV programmes, viewing preference is often 
 133 
shaped by personal tastes and socio-cultural sensibility and therefore cultural 
appropriation takes a variety of forms. 
 
When making sense of the information offered in foreign TV dramas and applying it 
to their own everyday life experience, the ability and sensibility of secondary school 
students to adopt information is generally more limited than that of university 
students. Indeed, their appreciation of foreign cultures is often reduced to simple food 
referents with Kimchi (pickled cabbage) standing in for Korea and Ramen (noodles) 
indicating Japan. The consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas by university 
students has a more dynamic and purposeful realisation in their daily lives. Examples 
of this influence include language learning, self-reflexivity in relation to their social 
life and individual collective-identification. The resulting deeper cultural 
understanding of “others” through imaginary appropriation and transcultural 
consumption is circumscribed by personal life experience. The notion of ‘a 
‘community of sentiment’ – a group that begins to imagine and feel things together’ 
because of the conditions of collective reading via mediascapes’ (Appadurai 1996, p. 
8) – is challenged by transcultural consumption of TV dramas which is often confined 
within the viewers’ particular socio-cultural parameters. For instance, Jia-ling, a 
junior secondary female student, who prefers Korean over Japanese TV dramas and is 
a devoted fan of Bae Yong-joon (she states that she watches all the Korean TV drama 
series starring Bae Yong-joon  broadcast in Taiwan), claims that:  
 
I have never bought anything related to Bae Yong-joon, I still prefer 
Taiwanese pop idols. I do not consider myself as Ha-Ri zu (Japanophile) or 
Ha-Han zu (Koreanophile). Whenever I save enough money I would rather 
buy CDs of my favourite Taiwanese pop idol (basically, I have all the 
collections). But I would like to know more about (South) Korea as a country, 
and I am especially interested in their food. I would like to learn the language 
and visit the county, because I like Korean TV dramas (age 13, Female). 
 
In this case, Jia-ling who enjoys watching Korean TV drama neither shows much of 
an emotional connection to the drama’s storylines or self-reflexivity in relation to the 
narrative. Nor does she spend money purchasing foreign idol-related commodities. 
Instead, her transcultural consumption of Korean TV drama is closely related to its 
culinary culture. A similar response is given by Yan-xiu a junior secondary student:  
 
I like Winter Sonata, because both male and female protagonists are good 
looking and the storyline is very interesting and quite realistic unlike those of 
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Japanese and Taiwanese ones. I never buy any programme related by-products 
though, although I quite enjoy trying out their food such as Kimchi or check if 
any Korean food products can be found in the local store (age 13, Female). 
 
Although both students have a level of general knowledge of and a preference for 
foreign TV drama viewing, they do not form a community of sentiment through their 
collective reading of the TV programmes. Rather, as consumers they are more 
actively engaged with foreign culinary culture and consider the TV programmes as a 
cultural representation of their countries of origin.  
 
 
Living room culture: Teenagers’ interaction with family members and 
social formation  
 
Television viewing is a common activity in most families and early research has 
established that it is not just an individualised activity but more commonly a social 
one, conducted within the context of the family as a set of social relations (Lull, 1990; 
Morley, 1986; Silverstone, 1994). Although most families in Taiwan have more than 
one TV set in the household, television viewing is still very much considered a family 
activity. Different TV programmes are commonly aimed at different family members, 
and because most secondary school students in Taiwan are at school until the late 
afternoon they only get to watch television in the late afternoons and evenings. 
During prime-time (7-9pm), several television stations screen a diverse range of TV 
drama which includes: Taiwanese local dramas, Korean, Japanese, Chinese and Hong 
Kong TV dramas. It is therefore not surprising that most secondary school students 
watch TV dramas with their mother or grandparents, although sometimes fathers join 
in too. Apart from Yu-ya’s case, which I mentioned earlier, Ying-hong, a junior 
secondary boy, also claims: 
 
I don’t get to watch Japanese or Korean TV dramas when I am watching 
television with my parents, they often watch local dramas. But sometimes I 
would watch Japanese or Korean TV dramas alone (age 13). 
 
Although most secondary students have experience (although some have relatively 
limited access) of watching Japanese and Korean TV dramas, many of them also 
admitted that most of the time it is up to parents or older family members to decide 
which programme to watch. However, the reception of Japanese and Korean TV 
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dramas is not always limited by the accessibility of TV viewing; the circulation of 
both TV dramas also greatly relies on the general distribution in VCD
38
 and DVD 
formats and as these formats are inexpensive, young audiences can easily purchase 
them or borrow them from their peers. The outcome of my questionnaire
39
 suggests 
that VCDs or DVDs is the second (69 out of 158) and third (26 out of 118) most 
common way to view Japanese and Korean TV dramas amongst university and 
secondary school students respectively.  
 
Arguably, Korean in contrast to Japanese TV dramas, attract more middle-age female 
audiences in Taiwan, which is also partly reflected in the preference of secondary 
students when asked to choose between these two types of TV drama. Yu-ling a 
senior secondary student says: 
 
I prefer Korean TV dramas, especially comedy ones, because I am more 
familiar with the genre, I have watched them with my family since I was a 
kid. With Japanese TV dramas, I need to watch from episode one; otherwise, I 
find it hard to make sense of the rest of episodes, therefore I do not watch 
Japanese ones much (age 17, Female). 
 
In the questionnaire, 47.2 per cent indicate that family members are present during 
teenagers’ viewing time while 41.5 per cent watch the programmes on their own. In 
addition, during my group discussion with secondary school students, when I asked 
who they normally watch television with at home, most replied with their mother or 
grandparents. It seems that due to the popularity of Korean TV dramas among 
middle-aged women and housewives, most secondary students develop their 
preference for and familiarity with this genre in the process of watching the 
programmes with their mothers. Having said that, it is not uncommon for students to 
watch Japanese and Korean TV dramas alone and to develop their own preferences. 
During school term time, most students have limited spare time to watch television 
and are often burdened with a heavy homework load or constant examinations. 
Despite this the general consumption of both TV dramas is prevalent, especially 
during winter and summer holidays
40
. Moreover, students such as Jia-ling, Mong-
                                                 
38
  In general, pirated VCDs can cost as little as £4-5 for whole box sets (c.f. Hu, 2004, p. 205-226). 
39
 Q. 3: What is your main medium for viewing Japanese and Korean TV dramas? (Please tick all 
applicable), main medium is Cable/ Satellite TV. 
40
 As I mentioned earlier, in my interview with member of staff Miss Xiao from GALA TV station she 
states that most Taiwanese television stations (or at least its GALA Korean TV dramas channel’s 
marketing strategic plan) deliberately choose more ‘student audience’ oriented programme to broadcast 
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xian, Jia-ying, Wei-rong and Wen-ling all stated during the group discussions that 
they prefer to watch Japanese or Korean TV dramas alone if possible. The reason 
given for choosing one form of TV drama over another is varied but the desire to 
watch it alone is common. Reasons such as: ‘it is more relaxing without parents 
asking you why you are watching those foreign TV dramas’ or ‘most of time it’s 
about a love story so it feels strange watching the programme in the presence of 
parents or grandparents’ or ‘my parents sometimes get annoyed because I am into 
Japanese pop idols, they think it is a distraction from my studies’. The desire for 
personal viewing space amongst secondary school students indicates that the 
reception of foreign TV dramas is still considered as more of an individual preference 
among younger audiences in Taiwan. 
 
In general, television viewing is considered primarily as a family activity amongst 
secondary school students and the content often provides topics for conversation or 
discussion during the viewing or commercial breaks. Such topics can vary from 
socio-political issues to traditional family values or generational differences. Yuan-
xuan says:  
My family often watches Taiwanese local TV dramas because my 
grandparents generally quite enjoy them, although sometimes they would 
criticise the content as being too politically oriented or biased, especially 
during an election campaign season. They think that particular programmes 
try to promote certain candidates
41, and my father would say ‘oh, it’s all 
messed up’ but he still likes watching them (age 17, Female). 
 
She continues:  
 
But sometimes when we watch foreign television programmes together and 
when it comes to issues of conventional family values, such as, when Western 
youths do not live with their parents or send them to a care centre or 
retirement house, my parents then ask me whether I would take care of them 
in a similar fashion when they get old? 
 
                                                                                                                                           
during winter and summer vacations in order have higher successful viewing rate. Moreover, the 
promotional strategy often involves inviting the protagonists of the show to visit Taiwan during 
vacation periods so that students have more free time to ‘chase’ after their idols.   
41
 Here she refers to the Formosa Television (FTV) which is acknowledged as pro-DPP and the Taiwan 
Independence Television Company, which has an established reputation for producing Taiwanese local 
drama. The content of those programmes is considered as representative of daily life by the general 
public. Another characteristic is that Taiwanese or a local colloquial dialect is used throughout the 
programme.   
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Yuan-xuan stated during the group discussion that “I am more than happy to take care 
of my parents because it is an obligation and it is also a traditional Taiwanese family 
value which is very different from foreign countries”. 
 
Yuan-xuan’s family members, although they feel uneasy about the local soap operas 
content and occasional biased political views, continue to watch these programmes. 
Thus the young people’s awareness of political socialisation and a sense of local 
engagement is invoked by traditional local TV dramas and the process of negotiating 
the issue is practised by family members within the domestic viewing space. On the 
other hand, in the case of Yuan-xuan’s perception of foreign dramas, the issues that 
are raised often surround the difference between Eastern and Western culture, 
traditional social values, and parental expectations. Foreign TV dramas (in particular 
Western ones) invoke and sometimes reinforce generational and family moral 
conflicts. Furthermore Yuan-xuan’s self-reflexivity suggests that she feels obliged to 
look after her parents but also believes that this is how Taiwanese culture is 
distinctive. The interactions within the space of family viewing of TV dramas are 
often more immediate and dynamic; therefore young audiences are constantly 
negotiating and articulating their sense of cultural identification and national 
consciousness. 
 
The media sometimes afford powerful resources for counter-identity that the young 
can project against parental wishes and desires. As Schuerkens points out:  
 
Even in the field of the family, which is one of the most important places of 
cultural reproduction and transmission of traditions, external influences 
appear due to processes of globalisation: a transgenerational continuity of 
attitudes, representations and desires is thus more and more undermined 
(2003, p. 216).   
 
Watching foreign TV programmes in the case of Yuan-xuan’s family is not merely a 
form of media consumption but it also provides an understanding of possible areas of 
conflict between parents and children around the ideas of traditional family and 
cultural values in modern society. To conclude with Appadurai’s argument: 
 
The sort of transgenerational stability of knowledge that was presupposed in 
most theories of enculturation can no longer be assumed … family 
relationships can become volatile, new commodity patterns are negotiated, 
debts and obligation are recalibrated (1996, pp. 43-44).  
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Because of the complex entanglement of modern society and traditional values and 
the daily engagement with various cultural resources both national and transnational, 
analysing Taiwan young’s socio-cultural interaction within the family viewing space 
is a useful way of gaining insight into their contemporary negotiation of social 
identification and a sense of cultural belonging.  
 
 
Cultural consumption of Japanese cartoons: The perception of a nation 
and the meaning of cultural “odourlessness”  
  
When I conducted my research amongst secondary school students, I found that both 
male and female students show more interest in discussing Japanese cartoons than TV 
dramas. This influence is vital to our understanding of TV consumption in Taiwan as 
most Taiwanese children have grown up watching Japanese cartoons since the late 
1970s. According to Herng Su’s research (1999) Japanese cartoons were the most 
popular foreign programmes in Taiwan in the late 1990s: almost 42.7 per cent of his 
respondents watched Japanese programmes regularly. In Taiwan there is a wide 
variety of cartoons, most of which are broadcast between 4 and 6pm in order to suit 
elementary children’s free time between after school and evening meals. Common 
cartoon themes include science fiction adventures and romance. Before the mid-
1980s contact with Japanese mass culture was kept to a minimum in Taiwan; 
Japanese songs, publications and TV programmes were officially banned. However 
from the late 1970s Taiwanese children were able to access Mandarin-dubbed 
Japanese cartoons such as Doraemon
42
 and Candy Candy
43
 through local television 
channels. During the 1990s numerous animation programmes (e.g. Sailor Moon, 
Dragon Ball, Detective Conan, Slam Dunk) were imported from Japan and today 
many Japanese cartoons are broadcast daily on television channels in Taiwan. 
 
Doraemon is considered a timeless cartoon in Taiwan and has been highly popular 
since it was first imported during the late 1970s (Shiraishi 2000, p. 303). The cartoon 
                                                 
42
 The series is about a robotic cat named Doraemon, who travels back in time from the 22nd century 
to aid a schoolboy, Nobita Nobi.  
43
 Candy Candy first appeared in a prose novel by famed Japanese writer Kyoko Mizuki in April 1975 
and illustrated by Yumiko Iigarashi. The cartoon series was dubbed in Mandarin and broadcasted by 
CTS in 1979 and re-ran five times between 1981 and1989. (see, http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki; Shirashi 
(2000) ‘Doraemon goes abroad’).  
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is now recognised inter-generationally. Just as I watched it as a child, so does my nine 
-year-old nephew who has been a devoted Doraemon fan since he was four, and is a 
member of the latest generation to culturally consume this Japanese product. 
Everything he uses has Doraemon’s image, from toys, stationery, bags, socks, 
underwear to pillow cases, and he often calls himself Doraemon. He might not know 
that Doraemon is a Japanese cartoon yet and the pronunciation of Do-ra-e-mon does 
not mean anything literally in Chinese. As Japanese scholar Shiraishi states in the 
article ‘Doraemon goes abroad’, ‘Doraemon has become a virtual family member for 
many Japanese, and most children and young adults can quickly produce a sketch of 
the robot cat upon request’ (2000, p. 288 my emphasis). For many Taiwanese children 
and young teenagers, Doraemon not only crosses cultural boundaries and travels 
through time and space to their homeland but it is also their earliest encounter with 
Japanese popular culture. Cartoon-related products such as comic books, stationery, 
stuffed dolls and other accessories are widely distributed in shops and widely 
consumed in Taiwan. This reinforces the popularity of these favourite and famous 
characters in the programmes amongst the young.  
 
Leo Ching discusses the relationship between popular culture and imagined regional 
community using the popularity of Doraemon as an example. He suggests that:  
 
The popularity of Doraemon among Asian youth has been attributed to a 
similar allegorisation from the national to the regional. Sakurai Tetsuo, for 
instance, argues that Doraemon has provided for children a haven from the 
increasing ‘storm of [the] controlled education and examination system,’ a 
storm that has engulfed even the youngest of Japanese children since the 
1970s. […] Sakurai argues that Doraemon, which he erroneously claims is 
shown only in Asia, has tremendous appeal to children in Asia precisely 
because these countries are going through rapid economic industrialisation 
and facing immense social competition reminiscent of conditions prevalent in 
Japan two decades ago. Thus Doraemon as a sociocultural allegory is not 
relevant only to Japan, but applies well throughout the Asian region, 
providing a refuge for children who feel buffeted by the educational demands 
of accelerated Asian economies (2000b, p. 250). 
 
Ching is right to suggest that the children’s consumption of Japanese cartoons is 
closely related to their sociocultural context (namely, escape from intensive 
educational demands). However he fails to elaborate further the implications of the 
young viewers’ recognition of the cultural sensibilities and the uniqueness of 
Japanese animation. For instance, according to Su: 
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The extent of viewing Japanese cartoons and viewers’ preferences for 
animation are significantly related to the attitudes and purchasing behavior of 
young Taiwanese viewers. The same variables can also be used as predicting 
factors for a positive opinion about Japan in general (1999, p. 77).  
 
Some might argue that Japanese cartoons and comic books are often regarded as 
products that are relatively autonomous from the cultural images of their country of 
origin (e.g. cultural odourlessness) and do not attempt to sell Japanese culture or way 
of life (see Iwabuchi 2002, Iwabuchi 2007). However, according to my research 
Japan has come to be regarded by Taiwanese teenage audiences as an artistic country 
with advanced technology that produces cartoons with delicate images and interesting 
texts. Chun-Han, a senior high school girl, said during the group discussion:  
 
Japanese cartoons and comic books are so much better than Taiwanese ones, 
their skills and special effects are excellent; Taiwanese ones are too simplified 
and skills fall far behind. You know, in Japan they work in small groups, each 
individual in charge of different parts of the project (age 17, Female). 
 
I was astonished by the extent of her knowledge of the Japanese animation industry.
44
 
In a different group discussion, Qiao-zu’s comments on Japanese cartoons showed 
another kind of appreciation among the young:  
 
Japanese people are brilliant, for instance, Doraemon has been broadcasting 
for a long time but still every time there are new storylines and different 
elements; hence you do not get tired of it (age 13, Female). 
 
At least five of my respondents emphasised that they watch a fair amount of Japanese 
cartoons and often buy the paraphernalia and comic books. The storylines and 
characters of Japanese cartoons are a major attraction for a young Taiwanese 
audience (ages 7 to 15). The content provides many sub-genres such as cyberpunk, 
science fiction, animals, fantasy worlds, romance, or detective stories. According to 
McCarthy (1993), Japanese animations are ‘generally aimed at appealing to either 
boys or girls; stories for girls normally contain as much action and adventure as those 
for boys, while those for boys often have strong, positive female characters as well as 
the expected young heroes’(cited in Herng Su 1999, p. 64). The strong 
characterisation of protagonists can also be found in various Japanese TV dramas. For 
                                                 
44
 Although, ‘in 1980, [the] Japanese animation industry set up studios in Taipei and Seoul and by the 
middle of the 1980s, 50 per cent of all animation programmes broadcast in Japan were made overseas, 
where artistic talent was available at lower wages than in Japan’ (Shiraishi, 2000, p. 300).  
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instance, the first major successful Japanese idol drama, Tokyo Love Story featured a 
strong-minded and modern female character who was an inspiration for young female 




Based on the above comments, the general assumption is that these cultural products 
made in Japan are considered more delicate and up-to-date and their style has been 
absorbed by Taiwanese youth, generating in turn a positive perception of Japan as a 
nation. The consumption of Japanese cartoons amongst junior secondary school 
students has developed from an early childhood enjoyment to the recognition and 
appreciation of, and admiration for the creativity and artistic ability of the Japanese 
creative industries. Early research on the popular consumption of Japanese TV 
dramas has argued that the deep-rooted preference for Japanese cultural productions 
in Taiwanese society has been defined as a postcolonial sentiment and nostalgia for 
the colonial past. This idea partly explains why the idea of being ‘cultural proximate’ 
(Iwabuchi 2001, 2002) with Japan was positively used as way to celebrate Taiwan’s 
own unique political, historical and cultural experience. The cultural meanings and 
representations of the images inscribed in these products have created a specific 
cultural attraction for Taiwanese youth in the present. As Su and Chen point out, 
although US cartoons were also available on the Disney and Cartoon Network 
satellite channels in Taiwan, Japanese cartoons remained the most popular and 
frequently watched. They also suggest that both culture and generational proximity 
have lured young audiences to Japanese programmes (2000, p. 229). Their research 
shows that the popularity of Japanese cartoons declined with older age groups; 
nevertheless, it is evident in my research that the younger generations still favour 
Japanese popular cultural products such as TV dramas, music and fashion.  
 
Yu-ling Su (1999, p. 135) points out that Japanese popular culture has a high 
condensation of “images alliances” products, from comic books, cartoons to idol 
dramas and their by-products, which all share the same set of image signs. Through 
textual reading and recontextualisation, the consumption of Japanese popular culture 
has created its own consumer space, consisting of an abundance of images and 
cultural codes. In a similar vein, Choiu argues that ‘Japanese animation, manga 
(comic books) together with anime merchandise was not only meant to construct a 
                                                 
45
 For further reference, see Koichi Iwabuchi (2002) pp. 122-157. 
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cute mass-merchandise image, but also created an image alliance to increase young 
people’s consuming desires’ (cited in Yu-ling Su 1999, p. 62 my emphasis). To put it 
in Baudrillard’s terms:  
 
In order to become an object of consumption, the object must become sign; 
that is, in some way it must become external to a relation that is now only 
signifies, a-signed arbitrarily and non-coherently to this concrete relation, yet 
obtaining it coherence, and consequently its meaning, from an abstract and 
systematic relation to all other object-signs. It is in this way that it becomes 
“personalised,” and enters in the series, etc: it is never consumed in its 
materiality, but in its difference (2001, p. 25).  
 
Hence consumption is no longer just a material practice, but a ‘virtual totality of all 
objects and messages presently constituted in a more or less coherent discourse’ 
(ibid.). The concept of cuteness (kawaii) has been an important element of Japanese 
popular culture, ranging from pop idols, animation, fashion sense, stuffed toys (e.g. 
Hello Kitty). This cultural significance has been translated into daily cultural practice 
amongst young Taiwanese consumers. Research on the consumption of Hello Kitty 
has been conducted by several scholars from different perspectives. Yu-fen Ko argues 
in her article ‘Consuming differences: “Hello Kitty” and the identity crisis in Taiwan’ 
that ‘Hello Kitty is a commodity from the capitalist mode of production, but that fact 
doesn’t mean that the Kitty fans are necessarily alienated and obscured colonised 
objects’ (2003, p. 186). According to Ko, ‘Hello Kitty was ranked the third most 
popular figure in Taiwan in 1999
46’ (ibid., p. 176). Anthropologist Brain J. McVeigh 
comments that ‘in Japan “cuteness” operates symbolically as a daily aesthetic and 
qualifies as a standard attribute, rather than as a mere fad’ (Mcveigh 2000, p. 230), 
while Larissa Hjorth explores the relation between cuteness and mobile technology 
(keitai) culture in Japan, focusing in particular on the sexual and gender 
reappropriations and identifications between kawaii and keitai consumer spaces 
(2003, pp. 158-179). Japanese animation, TV dramas, comic books and stuffed dolls 
all represent different signs and carry different meanings for their consumers but they 
are also a set of images that convey cultural distinction. Consumption certainly does 
not necessarily lead to identity and consuming popular cultural commodities from 
Japan does not necessarily mean that young Taiwanese have a special identification 
with Japanese culture. Nevertheless, the symbolic meaning of Japan still carries 
                                                 
46
 According to Ko’s research, more than 1.78 million Hello Kitty sets were purchased with meals 
when McDonald’s offered a Hello Kitty meal deal in the early 2000s (2003, p. 176).    
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weight among the younger generation in comparison to the relative unfamiliarity of 
South Korean culture. It is therefore important to question further, to what extent the 
social familiarity, cultural proximity and consumption habits lead to the acceptance of 






Nowadays there are at least six Korean and four Japanese TV dramas broadcast daily 
in Taiwan on various television channels.
47
 It is fair to say that both Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas have become significant cultural resources in Taiwan, especially 
amongst younger audiences. A series of Japanese and Korean popular cultural 
products, culinary tastes and lifestyles have been successfully if unconsciously 
embedded in Taiwanese society through experience and practice. “Otherness” has 
become ordinary fare and while everyone has a local life, the ways people make sense 
of the world are now increasingly interpenetrated by ideas and clues from many 
diverse settings. As Bennett rightly points out:  
 
Images, information and products provided by the media and cultural 
industries become resources for use by individuals in the negotiation of the 
everyday, a process that involves the construction and articulation of 
reflexive identities and the carving out of habitable spaces (2005, p. 70).  
 
In a similar vein, according to Kim (2007, Kim 2008), TV dramas are often seen as a 
source of aspiration and reflexivity in transnational society and globalised dramas can 
serve this function of extending the space for reflexivity.  
 
Meanwhile, due to the popularity of Japanese Idol Dramas amongst the young since 
the late 1990s, Taiwanese television companies have started to pay more attention to 
their younger market, targeting idol dramas at young audiences both in Taiwan and 
abroad. Although Taiwanese idol dramas are better received amongst secondary 
school students than university students, the hybrid form of Taiwanese idol dramas 
has nevertheless also led to them being steadily established in East/Southeast Asia 
                                                 
47
 This information is based on more recent TV drama broadcasting schedules on the Yahoo Taiwan 
web site, accessed 12/11/2009. 
 144 
countries, including South Korea and Japan. The transnational flow of TV dramas 
between most East Asian countries has created what Iwabuchi described ‘“familiar 
differences” and “bizarre similarities” which interconnect on multiple levels within 
the dynamics of unequal global cultural encounters and which are engendering a 
complex perception of cultural distance’ (2007, p. 74).  
 
Over the past few years, it has become evident that Japanese and Korean TV dramas 
provide an abundant reservoir of symbolic forms and practices that can be 
appropriated and orchestrated as a cultural resource in Taiwan. The cultural 
trajectories for this generation emerge at the intersections of national identity and 
institutionalised ideology, education reforms and the practice of globalisation, 
modernisation and hybridisation through media consumption. If print media were 
instrumental in summoning up the ‘imagined community’ of the nation (Anderson 
1991) then electronic media now contributes to our understanding of an ‘imagined 
social reality’ (Barker and Andre 1996, p. 36). The “advanced” Japanese lifestyle and 
Korea’s combination of traditional and modern living illustrated through TV dramas 
have become a source of inspiration and confrontation for young Taiwanese 
audiences as they search for a distinct cultural identity.  
 
According to Straubhaar and Viscasillas’s research in the Dominican Republic 
(1991), viewers’ general opinions of countries seem related to their preference for 
broadcasts from those countries. Thus the emergence of pro-Japanese sentiment 
among younger Taiwanese audiences seems inevitable. The continued appreciation of 
Japanese cartoons and comic books amongst junior secondary students and children 
can be seen as evidence that Japanese culture already has deep roots in the emotional 
structure of Taiwanese society. Arguably, the cultural distance between Taiwan and 
Japan or the rest of East Asia has reduced and invoked the possibility of re-creating a 
political fantasy of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
48
 It would be naïve to 
jump to this conclusion immediately: the political difficulties between Taiwan and 
China, the power and historical conflict between Japan and China, and the post-
colonial trauma of Japan and South Korea cannot be ignored. However as long as 
popular cultures are enthusiastically consumed by younger generations with a 
                                                 
48
 The original concept was created by Japan Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro on 29
th
 June, 1940 (see 
Gordon, William. "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." March 2000; William Theodore De Bary 
(2008) Sources of East Asian Tradition: The modern period, p. 622). 
 145 
lessened sense of historical conflict between East Asian countries and this generation 
is able to reflect upon the new definitions of cultural identity in the age of 
deterritorialisation and regionalisation, the possibility of an imagined ‘Asian cultural 
community’ remains. 
 
My research also suggests that the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas has 
certainly enhanced and transformed audiences’ text reading and socio-cultural 
knowledge of others. This process also facilitates certain types of TV genre that 
emphasise a hybrid format yet with a sense of a local cultural element which is 
deliberately designed to cater to the taste of modern young audiences. The 
consumption of foreign TV programmes and its cultural implications and practices by 
university and secondary school students also outlines the importance of not reducing 
audience studies to a generalised individual’s interactions with texts, but to 
conceptualise it as a multi-layered act of (cultural) interpretations and negotiations.  
Ien Ang argues that ‘a more thoroughly cultural approach to reception [is to] address 
the differentiated meaning and significance of specific reception patterns in 
articulating more general cultural negotiations and contestations’ (1996, p. 137). 
Hence it is also important to understand how regional media flows and popular 
cultural consumption changes become integrated into specific cultural forms and 
practices under specific historical and political circumstances.  
 
Examining the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas from the perspective of 
youth transnational consumption and cultural practice in Taiwan has demonstrated the 
possible generational differences and multi-layered cultural articulations with cultural 
others in Taiwanese society. This therefore challenges the concept of ‘cultural 
proximity’ (Straubhaar 1991) when examining audience reception of foreign TV 
dramas or cultural products. This sense of ‘coevalness’ or ‘becoming culturally 
proximate’ (Iwabuchi 2001, pp. 54-74, Iwabuchi 2002, Chapter 4) often fails to 
explain a society’s construction of its own cultural consciousness and identification. I 
argue that the appropriation of foreign popular culture is a manifestation of the 
constant struggle to negotiate the forces of cultural proximity and assimilation in 
relation to cultural identity which is the burden of contemporary Taiwanese youth.    
 
During my discussion with secondary school students of their reception of Japanese 
and Korean TV dramas and their popularity, several unexpected responses and 
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perceptions of the issue of cultural imperialism and Taiwanese identity have led me to 
further explore the relationship between youth transnational popular cultural 
consumption and the construction of Taiwanese national cultural identity. It appears 
that their readings do not simply reflect the content itself but rather their negotiation 
and interpretation of their viewing experience and their (non-)preference for regional 
TV dramas is a way of making sense of what Taiwan is and why it is important to be 
Taiwanese. Having said that, I do not wish to suggest that secondary school students 
have a clear idea and vision of what national identity meant. What is most intriguing 
are their assertions or confidence about what Taiwanese identity is and their attitudes 
towards the relation between Taiwan, China, Japan and South Korea. From their 
responses, I get a better sense of their understanding of national identity as more 
based on the political and social discourse of “Taiwanisation/localisation” and a sense 
of local community, which was imposed and reconstructed through the educational 
curriculum during the period of the early 2000s while the pro-independence political 
party (DPP) was in power. Based on these unexpected outcomes, I will further 
explore how secondary school students negotiate the concept of “Taiwanese identity” 
or “being Taiwanese” within the context of regional popular cultural flows and 


































































Literature Review Ⅱ: 
 
Chapter 5   
 
Taiwan: Conceptualising the Nation  
 
The reason why Japanese and Korean TV dramas and pop culture are popular 
(in Taiwan) is because we do not have our own identity and culture.  
(Male, 22, questionnaire) 
 
Taiwan lacks its own identity that is why we accept foreign culture so easily. 






As I have explained in Chapter 1, initially this thesis set out to explore young 
audiences comparative readings of Japanese and South Korean popular TV dramas in 
Taiwan. However, during my fieldwork the idea of Taiwanese ‘identity’ (rentong), 
‘consciousness’ (yishi) and ‘spirit’ (jingshen) were mentioned on several occasions 
during discussions about the popularity of regional TV dramas in Taiwan amongst 
university and secondary school students. To a certain degree, the popularity of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas has been interpreted by young people as a form of 
“cultural invasion” one made possible due to the impression that Taiwan does not 
have its own culture. The notion of the pleasure of recognition (see Ang 1985) 
combined with a sense of social and cultural articulation associated with the pleasure 
of the text (Iwabuchi 2002) cannot fully explain the role of regional TV drama flows 
and its implications in the wider political and social context, particularly in the case 
of the young audiences’ consumption of regional TV dramas. My research outcomes 
derived from questionnaires, group discussions and interviews have suggested 
another interpretation of the media reception and cultural consumption of regional TV 
dramas, especially in relation to the construction of a sense of “Taiwaneseness” and 
Taiwanese identity by these young audiences. It indicates that media and cultural 
research on youth consumption of these TV dramas in Taiwan yields another field of 
investigation due to radical political transformations, social changes, education 
reforms and the construction of the “Taiwan as a nation” movement since the 1990s.  
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Arguably, with the government’s policy of emphasising the political discourse 
involved in the (re)construction of Taiwanese identity, the current popularity of 
regional TV dramas amongst the younger generation has reflected young people’s 
feelings what Tain-Dow Lee and Hwei-Wen Ho call ‘an “emptiness” of cultural 
subjectivities’ (2003, p. 15). Lee and Ho’s approach, I would argue, was due to the 
fact that the field of youth popular culture has been long overlooked or ignored by the 
government both pre and post-martial law. In the 1970s and 1980s American pop 
music, movies and TV series were the major imported entertainment media products 
consumed by highly educated middle class urban young people (see Yeh 2005). In the 
1990s the popularity of Japanese pop culture and mass media productions suggested 
that ‘Taiwanese youths indeed negotiate and translate their cultural identities through 
repeated gazing, imagining, and travelling “Japan”’ (Lee 2003, p. 43), and in the 
2000s Korean pop culture and TV dramas became another popular sensation amongst 
Taiwanese people (Kim 2007, p. 144, Yang 2008, pp. 209-213). Having suggested the 
possible absence of local youth popular culture, I do not wish to underestimate its 
local pop music and film industry which has developed since the late 1980s (e.g. 
Mandarin pop songs, Tai-kar music). Nonetheless, the popularity of Japanese and 
South Korean TV dramas, pop music and films in the past decade and notably since 
the liberalisation of the media industry is striking. On the one hand, this reflects the 
“emptiness” or absence of a local popular culture which young people can relate to. 
On the other hand, it shows how, due to a lack of any common ground for 
consolidating a sense of Taiwanese culture, young people often express a so-called 
“identity crisis” in relation to their experience and appropriation of regional popular 
cultural flows in modern Taiwanese society.        
 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I focused on the reception and consumption of regional TV 
dramas amongst university and secondary school students respectively, thus 
providing an insight into how young audiences in Taiwan perceive a modern ideal 
way of life. I also explored the manner in which, through a variety of transnational 
media and cultural appropriations, negotiations and articulations these young 
audiences developed their own sense of cultural recognition and self-reflexivity. In 
the last section of my questionnaire, I asked students “In your opinion, do you think 
the consumption of Japanese and Korean pop culture can lead to any potential impact 
on the younger generations in Taiwan?” Most of those who responded to the question 
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displayed rather negative thoughts, for instance citing the threat of cultural 
imperialism, the loss of a sense of national identity, and so forth. However, during 
some of my interviews, it was revealed that due to the popular phenomenon of 
Japanese and Korean cultural products in Taiwan, university students actively 
question “What is Taiwanese identity?,” and they are more aware of the issues of 
intra-regional cultural difference and similarity.      
 
Therefore, the second part of this thesis further explores questions of national 
identity, cultural nationalism and the relationship between regional popular culture 
and local youth cultural identification, focusing on popular foreign television 
programmes (from Japan and South Korea), and everyday life in the formation of a 
national imagination amongst youngsters in Taiwan, all within the context of 
globalisation and regional popular cultural flows.   
 
This chapter reviews the conceptual literature appropriate to these topics by placing 
them in the context of Taiwan’s modern history. This history shapes the particular 
phenomena this thesis examines and is the political and social reality in which they 
have developed. Owing to Taiwan’s peculiar geo-political history, and particularly its 
entanglement with mainland China, the urge to create a sense of Taiwanese identity 
after the democratic transition in the mid-1980s has generated several conflicts within 
its territory and amongst its people. It is nothing new that people have more than one 
identity or nationality. In the case of Taiwan, however, the reinterpretation of what 
being Chinese and/or Taiwanese means in relation to national and cultural identity 
has been a central element of contention in the island’s daily experience. According 
to Tu (1996), the problematik of cultural identity in Taiwan is important not only to 
intellectuals but – through the mass media – to the public as well. He believes that 
‘The question of where Taiwan is going is intertwined with complex issues of what it 
has been, what it is now, what it ought to be and what it can really become’ (ibid., p. 
1116). In other words, through the construction of Taiwanese consciousness, political 
and cultural identity has become an important point of reference for the self-
definition, ethnic consciousness, political loyalty and life orientation which most 
people in modern Taiwanese society have to engage with. These observations accord 
with the findings of my thesis, where both secondary school students and university 
students responded to the opportunity to make open-ended comments by relating the 
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popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas and pop culture to issues of Taiwanese 
cultural identity. Their responses reveal interesting insights on postcolonial 
narratives; they also offer a powerful illustration of the agency of cultural discourse in 
making a distinctive political community and generating a sense of collective 





Modern Taiwan’s self-conscious nation-building project took shape after the lifting of 
martial law in 1987, as a means of creating a distinction, not only from the KMT 
government’s (Nationalist Party of China also known as Kuomingtang) political 
ideology, but also disavowing the myth of “unified China.” This attempt has 
provoked the more immediate question which asks whether Taiwan is part of the 
Chinese nation-state or a nation in its own right. These oppositional approaches 
roughly correspond to two major political parties and ideologies (KMT vs. DPP) in 
Taiwan. A pronounced exploration of local culture and identity has been many years 
as people have struggled to articulate a sense of Taiwanese consciousness. We can 
cite as evidence here socio-political movements such as the Community Construction 
Movement (shequ zongti yingzao) in 1993; the promotion of the discourse of a 
‘community of shared fate’ (shengming gongtong ti) in 1995, through to more radical 
enunciations of the ‘new Taiwanese’ movement in 1998. These developments 
occurred when the KMT party led by Lee Teng-Hui, which did not encourage strong 
sense of Taiwan as an independent nation, was still power. Nevertheless, by 
emphasising the concept of local community or “locality” (see Appadurai 1996) with 
which people can identify with these movements created a sense of belonging and 
enabled local people to see Taiwan as the “homeland.” During the post-martial law 
era, the KMT government’s attempt to reconcile the principle of a single China with 
the rise of Taiwanese consciousness has, ironically, paved the way for the success of 
the DPP party and Chen Shui-bian’s election to the presidency in 2000. 
 
According to Bi-yu Chang (2004), when the DPP party came to power in 2000, the 
discourse of Taiwanese subjectivity had already taken shape and grown. However, in 
contrast to the KMT’s emphasis of a China-centric ideology and Taiwan’s cultural 
links with China, Chen Shui-bian and the DPP government have systematically 
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adopted a cultural and educational ‘de-sinicisation’ policy and focused on a ‘Taiwan-
centric’ policy (Cabestan 2005, p. 39, Chang 2004, p. 40). Moreover, the DPP 
government’s ‘Taiwan-centric’ policy, to a certain extent, has intertwined with post-
Japanese colonial sentiment and nostalgia. According to Leo Ching’s argument: 
 
There is the desire for Japanese colonialism in the formation of an 
oppositional political identity. (Japanese colonialism has induced, the 
argument goes, a historical rupture that enabled the dis-identification from 
Mainland China and the construction of a uniquely Taiwanese subjectivity) 
(2000a, p. 764). 
 
For Taiwanese nationalists, Taiwan’s specific historical path (emphasising the 50 
years of Japanese colonisation), constitutes a unique Taiwanese consciousness 
(Taiwan yishi) and Taiwanese identity (Taiwan rentong) which alienate any 
connection with the Chinese identity that the KMT had promoted previously. The 
concept of the nation as an ‘imagined political community’ (Anderson, 1991), 
consisting of nationalism, a sense of nationhood, a unique ‘cultural subjectivity’ and 
so forth, has, in the case of Taiwan, proved to be less straightforward and remains to 
be defined.   
 
Apart from its intricate historical, cultural, geo-political and ethnic relations with 
mainland China, other difficulties that Taiwan faced included lack of recognition as 
an independent nation in the international community, as well as its previous complex 
colonial experience which has also added another peculiar variable when 
conceptualising national and cultural identity in Taiwan. In recent debates on the 
terms of its postcoloniality, Leo Ching has acknowledged that: 
 
The definition and periodisation of postcolonialism in Taiwan is contentious. 
The ruling Kuomintang (KMT) government considers 1945, the year of 
Japan’s defeat, as the beginning of Taiwan’s decolonisation and hence of its 
postcoloniality. But the so-called Taiwanese – those of Minnan and Hakka 
ethnicity- refer to 1987, the year martial law was lifted, as the beginning of 
postcoloniality in Taiwan (2000a, p. 785, note 3, see also Liao 1999, pp. 199-
211). 
 
Terms such as ‘internal colonisation’ (Chiu, 1995, cited in Liao 1999, p. 201), or 
‘quasi-colonial society’ (Harrison 2009, p. 54) in relation to the KMT government’s 
fifty year regime in Taiwan (1947-1987) have been suggested. Indeed, the question is 
posed as to whether one should consider that, before the democratisation of the 
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island, Taiwan had in fact experienced a ‘double colonisation’. According to Fang-
ming Chang, a major force in Taiwanese studies:  
 
It is only after 1989, the year Lee Teng-hui assumed presidency, that Taiwan 
finally entered its postcolonial phase. However, due to the 50 years of  
Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945) and another 50 years of the “second 
colonisation” by the KMT (1945-1987), Taiwanese suffers a great deal from 
the loss of language and the loss of memory (cited in Liao 1999, p. 207).  
 
Thus, did the KMT regime liberate Taiwanese people from Japanese colonial 
brutality or does it represent merely another conquest from overseas?  
 
Given this confused and contested political discursive space, in this chapter I examine 
the discourses of national identity and nationalism using Anderson’s (1991) notion of 
the ‘imagined political community’ and Anthony Smith’s (1999) approach to the 
‘myths and memories of the nation.’ In so doing, I seek to illustrate the historical 
entanglement between mainland China and Taiwan, highlighting the notion of the 
cultural Chineseness-building project in postwar Taiwan, which was carefully and 
systematically carried out by the regime between 1945 and the late 1980s. I also 
examine the recent political construction of Taiwan as an (independent) nation since 
the lifting of martial law in 1987, looking at political discourses such as the 
(re)connecting and searching for Taiwanese local cultural consciousness. Moreover, I 
explore the absence of Taiwanese subjectivity and the concept of the politics of 
identity in Taiwan within the fields of post-colonialism and cultural hybridisation, 
focusing on Homi Bhabha’s ‘narrating the nation’ and his concept of the ‘third space’ 
in relation to the idea of globality. According to Bhabha’s definition: 
 
The intervention of the Third Space, which makes the structure of meaning 
and reference an ambivalent process, destroys this mirror of representation in 
which cultural knowledge is continuously revealed as an integrated, open, 
expanding code (1988, p. 21, my emphasis).  
 
From a postcolonial perspective, within the discourse of global cultural flows, I found 
that the term ‘third space’ is most relevant when understanding the process of 
narrating a sense of Taiwanese consciousness and rediscovering its grassroots culture 
in the advent of a changing political landscape since the late 1980s. That is to say, the 
openness and instability in the construction of national and cultural identity in Taiwan 
means that its cultural position at the present time, as well as its reference to the past 
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as well as to the future in relation to cultural identification, results in an inherent 
ambivalence during moments of interpretation and negotiation.     
       
In Anderson’s (1991) conceptualisation of the nation as an imagined community, 
national identity is a particular mode made possible by underlining historical 
continuities, suggesting future destinies as well as making itself geographically and 
spatially conceivable. Paradoxically, in my opinion, this serves as a crucial concept 
with which to comprehend the abstract notion of Chinese identity as well as a modern 
sense of “Taiwaneseness”. Section 1 discusses two major components which 
underline the understanding of Taiwanese national consciousness in this thesis. In so 
doing, I wish to suggest that Anderson’s attempt to denaturalise the nation and his 
central contention that ‘print-language is what invents nationalism, not a particular 
language per se’ (ibid., p. 134) and that it constitutes a ‘sociological organism moving 
calendrically through homogenous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of 
nation’ (ibid., p. 26), has provided an alternative understanding of Taiwan’s nation-
building project in relation to its others and colonisers: China and Japan. Japan as a 
former coloniser has, bizarrely, become an important “modern” political and cultural 
indicator, one deployed by the pro-independence political party and its grassroots 
activists as a way to emphasise Taiwan’s historical and cultural distinction from 
mainland China (see Lu 2002, p. 16-23). For instance, since 1994 Taiwan has 
followed a similar path to that of Japan in promoting its local revitalisation and 
community-building movements. Intellectuals and state officials frequently use Japan 
as a reference point for the construction of a Taiwanese local grassroots social and 
cultural movement (ibid., p. 23). To a certain extent, the younger generations’ 
perception of Japan as a “positive other” and its cultural influence was evident in the 
nation-building project in Taiwan in the 1990s. It is therefore important to understand 
how young people weave Japanese culture into their understanding of Taiwanese 
identity and their sense of Taiwan as a nation. And what role do Japanese popular 
cultures (here, TV dramas) play in mediating the political ambivalence (or tension), 
historical memories and cultural connections between two countries. Added to this we 
might ask how this helps constitute the discursive conditions of Taiwanese identity? I 
will examine these issues in terms of university students’ cultural consumption and 
interpretations of the popularity of regional TV dramas in Chapter 6.   
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Section 2 will examine Taiwan’s depiction of itself as the guardian of “traditional” 
Chinese culture under the KMT regime in terms of Smith’s (1999) the notion of a 
‘nation of memories and myth’. This necessitates a discussion of the authority of 
statements about shared values as embodied in language, ethnicity, and custom, as 
well as shared myths (memories) encoded as genres of knowledge, such as history, 
ideology and beliefs. Smith’s approach to the construction of the nation often stresses 
the importance of historical sentiments and aspirations, such as memories, myths, 
traditions, rituals, symbols, ceremonials, artefacts etc. and provides another 
opportunity to understand different aspects of nationalist ideology and language, as 
well as national identity in relation to the rediscovery and reinterpretation of a 
communal past. He suggests that nationalism often involves ‘the nation depicted as 
one great family, the members as brothers and sisters of the motherland or fatherland, 
speaking their mother tongue’ (1991a, p. 79). From this perspective, a sense of 
Chineseness which was (re)created under the KMT regime in Taiwan suggests that all 
Chinese people are ‘descendants of the Dragon’ or the ‘children of the Yellow 
Emperor’, and unified by a single origin myth. This shared sacredness in the 
formation of Chinese identity which attempts to transcend ethnic identities and 
political reality cannot be overlooked when we discuss cultural nationalism and 
traditional cultures in postwar Taiwan. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the old 
phrase ‘descendants of the Dragon’ has been gradually replaced as well as challenged 
by the new enunciation of the “Children of the Sweet Potato” or “Son of Taiwan”, 
both of which have featured in recent Taiwanese political and cultural debates. The 
shape of the island of Taiwan is considered by some to closely resemble a sweet 
potato, in addition to which after the war most people did not have enough money for 
rice and sweet potato was used widely as a food supplement. The political innovation 
of “Sweet Potato” also functions as a signifier of grassroots culture in Taiwan. 
 
In Section 3, I outline recent debates about national and cultural identity and the 
decline of the nation state in the age of globalisation. Globalisation in relation to the 
modern nation-state has been appeared in a variety of ways including, for instance, 
David Harvey’s (1989) notion of ‘time-space compression’; Anthony Giddens’ 
(1990) idea of ‘time-space distanciation’ or Appadurai’s (1996) ‘deterritorialisation’. 
All of these underline the discontinuity, fragmentation and dislocation involved in 
forming a sense of the nation. In the midst of a self-conscious nation-building project 
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it is important to acknowledge that how the use of the language of globalisation and 
the simultaneous emphasis on the local Taiwanese search for a national and cultural 
identity has created not just a field of tension, but also a hybrid mode of identification 
in Taiwan.  
 
To summarise, drawing on Anderson, Smith and Bhabha’s approaches to the nation 
enables us to recognise different mobilisations of the idea of community and identity, 
thereby apprehending the ambiguities and limitations of Taiwanese identity. 
Furthermore, by questioning the (un)importance of a sense of place, rootedness and 
belonging in relation to ‘imagined community’ and cultural identity in the world of 
global cultural flows, I suggest that, in the eyes of the younger Taiwanese generation, 
the notion of “being” Taiwanese is as critical as “becoming”, namely that it is a 
continuous process of negotiation. This is manifested in the way they respond to 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas. In Chapter 6, I discuss how university students 
draw attention to the notion of “foreignness” and how that in turn calibrates their own 
sense of political self-awareness, thus enhancing their ability to translate cultural 
difference and similarity which also invokes their sense of being/becoming 
Taiwanese. In Chapter 7, I demonstrate that secondary school students often apply the 
cultural practice of “locality” (festivals, culinary habits) and textbook knowledge 
(“Taiwanese spirit,” “Taiwan consciousness”) to interpret and articulate their sense of 
being Taiwanese.   
 
 
The nation as an imagined political community: How and what do we 
“imagine” in Taiwan?  
 
In Benedict Anderson’s influential book, Imagined Communities (1991), he argued 
that no nation is essential and all are constructed through a process of collective 
imagining. This form of collective imagination is made possible by the production of 
‘print capitalism’, for instance newspapers and popular literature (such as novels, 
plays and poems). The imaginary elements of nationality and national identity has 
been discussed in relation to media studies by scholars such as Philip Schlesinger 
(1987), who focuses on (mis)conceptions of national identity. Meanwhile John 
Tomlinson (1991) argues against the notion of cultural imperialism. One crucial point 
is that they both suggest a sense of ‘imaginary belonging’, whether it is bound up 
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with the specific social space of the nation-state (Schlesinger 1987, p. 249) or as a 
means to ‘imagine a community’ to which they belong (Tomlinson 1991, p. 81). 
Anderson’s approach has offered a useful starting point to understand why 
identification with the rather abstract notion of “a nation” becomes possible in 
postwar Taiwan and how this has been deployed in the (re)construction of Taiwan as 
a nation since the late 1980s.  
 
Drawing on this conceptualisation, in this section I examine how Taiwan’s postwar 
nation-building project as undertaken by the KMT has positioned the country as a 
political unity constructed on the notion of Chinese cultural nationalism, not only as 
an ‘imagined’ entity, but also an ‘invented’ one. My intention here is to understand 
what national and cultural identity means to a country which in the past designated 
itself as the only legal representative of the entire Chinese community. I argue that 
this sense of nationhood and “Chineseness” was politically manipulated and 
culturally constructed which made it imaginable and available to its populace via 
fixing a vernacular language as the national language (i.e. Mandarin), mass education 
and media control.       
 
Anderson argues that nation as imagined political community is imagined ‘as both 
inherently limited and sovereign’ (1991, p.6). He claims that the nation is an 
imagined community limited by territorial boundaries and offering certain freedoms 
to its nationals regarding the sovereign power of the nation state. He famously 
suggests that ‘it is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will 
never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (ibid.). In this respect, political 
communities are not distinguished by social reality but rather by their own ways of 
national collective imagination. The idea that the nation is created in the imagination 
means that it is the contingent result of social and political processes and practices. 
This approach provides an important reference point to understand the early 
construction of Chinese consciousness in postwar Taiwan which was fostered by an 
“invented” political ideology (i.e. the KMT’s), thereby making “reunification” 
imaginable. This sense of community, nevertheless, does not represent itself as a 
nation but instead as a temporary political and military bastion, a floating island. I 
would argue that the notion of “imagining from distance” and “imagining without 
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territorial connection” have an explanatory importance in understanding the abstract 
sense of nationhood and nationalism evident in KMT-dominated postwar Taiwan. 
 
A critical and historical view of the nation as socially constructed suggests that the 
formation of national consciousness within a particular space has been shaped by 
several different manoeuvres and as an invented tradition (Hobsbawm 1983); as an 
imagined community (Anderson 1991). To this we can add that it can also be seen as 
an outcome of industrialisation linked to a centralised political, educational and 
linguistically unified entity (Gellner 1983) as well as a communal historical-
sentimental past, cultivated by myths, rituals, symbols, traditions and so on (Smith 
1995, Smith 1999). Given these frameworks, a sense of ‘nation-ness’ involving a 
shared homeland results in the emergence of national identity as a by-product, that is 
as an object to be politically and culturally constructed. Such approaches demonstrate 
how ‘the nation itself is the unit of analysis’ (Wiley 2004, p. 82) as well as drawing 
attention to ‘how a national culture is continually redeveloped and the contours of 
national identity chronically redrawn’ (Schlesinger 1987, p. 250). The modern 
concept of a nation and its relevance to nationalism, nationality and national identity, 
therefore, has to be considered in terms of ‘workable texts’, that is whether it is 
invented, imagined, mediated and/or narrated (Wiley, 2004, p. 82). In other words, 
viewing the postmodern nation-building project as a non-essentialist construction 
allows the gap left by the national cultural space to be elaborated and negotiated.   
 
To provide a more adequate interpretation of the anomaly of nationalism has been 
one of Anderson’s intentions in Imagined Communities. He acknowledges that  
 
Nation, nationality, nationalism – all have proved notoriously difficult to 
define, let alone to analyse. In contrast to the immense influence that 
nationalism has exerted on the modern world, plausible theory about it is 
conspicuously meagre (1991, p. 3).  
 
Anderson also suggests that ‘nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with 
self-consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that 
preceded it, out of which – as well as against which – it came into being’ (ibid., p. 12, 
my emphasis). Additionally, he argues that nationality or nation-ness as well as 
nationalism are ‘cultural artefacts of a particular kind’, which involve the notion of 
invention and imagination as a basic social transformation that constitute a nation. By 
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the same token, reflecting on Ernest Renan’s essay ‘What is a nation?’, Mark 
Harrison believes that Renan ‘systematically refutes theories that locate the nation in 
any essential characteristic, such as race, kinship, language, or geography, and 
suggests instead that national identity is fundamentally an idea’ (2006, p. 26). Both 
Renan and Anderson’s general position suggest that the nation is a modern 
phenomenon, and the construction of a national identity and nationalism is not 
historically predetermined but rather a process of continual reconstruction and 
negotiation. Therefore, they remind us of the need to map the transformation of lived 
experience and subjectivity, which needs to be taken seriously in the context of socio-
political and economic-cultural changes.    
 
On the one hand, present-day Taiwan is a democracy and a polity with a sense of 
nationhood and is recognised as such by the international community. The constant 
threat of military invasion and the deliberate constraints Taiwan is forced to operate 
under on the international stage by mainland China have, to a certain extent, 
strengthened people’s desire to claim independence as a nation. On the other hand, 
there is the historical and cultural connection; the “being Chinese” sentiment and a 
recent increased economic dependence on the mainland which means that anti-
independence oppositional voices remain. There is no consensus in Taiwan regarding 
the composition of the nation or the relationship between political institutions and 
cultural identity. Rather there is a consistent nationalist impulse and anxiety to fit the 
political together with the cultural, whether by changing political institutions to fit 
cultural and linguistic communities, or by changing culture and identity to fit political 
institutions. The notion of a divided and ambiguous form of national identity and 
nationalism in Taiwan has continually tormented people on the island, and it makes 
the process of nation-building even more complicated and uncertain.   
 
In the matter of constructing “new” national identities, the central approach of 
Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983) to the ‘invention of tradition’ in 
forming a sense of unbroken continuity also suggests that  
 
The ideology of nation, state or movement is not what have actually been 
preserved in popular memory, but what has been selected, written, pictured, 
popularised and institutionalised by these whose function it is to do so 
(Hobsbawm 1983, p. 13). 
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Therefore, in the process of constructing a nation, the innovation of national cultures, 
the representation of traditions and reinterpretation of histories to a certain extent 
sided inevitably with the dominant political power. The politicisation of the nation in 
this instance is apparent. Given this I wish to use the idea of the construction of a 
national consciousness in relation to political ideologies, historicised memories and 
cultural continuities as a point of entry for a critical reflection on the modern nation-
building project in Taiwan. Thus, the question is how (un)important is it to invoke the 
ideology of nationalist language and the idea of a “national” history given the 
increasing “sameness” of commodified modern life in order to build a nation? Is it 
possible for people to identify politically with one nation and culturally with its 
“others” (i.e. China, Japan or South Korea)? How important is it for someone to 
recognise Taiwan’s nationhood as well as having a sense of “cultural subjectivity” 
(wenhua zhutixing) in order to form a sense of common solidarity and as an escape 
from a so-called ‘identity crisis’? And in what way have regional popular culture 
flows and youth transnational media consumption and cultural appropriation 
intertwined with the construction of cultural identity in Taiwan and the idea of “being 
Taiwanese”?   
 
For Anderson (1991) the idea of the nation as an imagined political community does 
not only depend on continued acts of imagination for its existence. He also 
emphasises the connection between the nation, nation state and national culture. In 
historical terms, there was little question that “China” – Zhong Guo – was a term that 
represented a nation, a culture and an ‘ancestral homeland’ (Zu Guo) to most of the 
people on the island of Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-
kuo’s governments (1949-1988). In postwar Taiwan, nationalism (namely the 
formation of a Chinese national identity) is an extreme case of cultural consciousness 
claiming to be based on the existence of discrete traits, beliefs or customs that have 
been aligned with hard and fast geopolitical boundaries or actually existing groups of 
people (see Chun 1994, Chun 1996b). However, imagining a Chinese nation state 
combining complex sentiments and modes of promoting self-identification – a sense 
of “Chineseness” – has since collapsed under a series of challenges, both political and 
cultural, in Taiwan. The reconstruction of a sense of Taiwanese consciousness and the 
construction of a localised national culture (e.g. grassroots culture) in post-martial 
law Taiwan, deliberately reconnects the meaning of home and belonging to its absent 
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locality and cultural traditions, thus creating a ‘split consciousness’ (Bhabha 1994, p. 
244) amongst Taiwanese people. According to Bhabha: 
 
Splitting is a form of enunciatory, intellectual uncertainty and anxiety that 
stems from the fact that disavowal is not merely a principle of negation or 
elision; it is a strategy for articulating contradictory and coeval statements of 
belief (ibid., p. 132). 
 
It is the process of splitting that allows the attempt to disarticulate the voice of 
authority. I have found Bhabha’s concept of ‘split consciousness’ a particularly useful 
insight into the political, cultural and social discourse surrounding the construction of 
national and cultural identity in Taiwan after the lifting of martial law. This can be 
seen in the attempts at writing Taiwan as a nation, the ambivalent social awareness of 
a sense of “Chineseness” and the growing receptiveness to a cultural temporality 
intertwined with nativisation (localisation) and transnational encounters. The absence 
of any consensus regarding national identity and the selectiveness of cultural 
identifications with China is, in this regard, a Taiwanese example of Bhabha’s 
‘neither One nor the Other but something else besides, in-between’ (ibid., p. 219, 
original emphasis). It is the ambivalence of cultural nationalism and the nation state 
and its implications given the context of constructing Taiwanese identity in relation to 
regional popular culture flows that I will explore in the second part of this thesis. 
 
The construction of a modern nation or nation state relies heavily on the 
dissemination of national consciousness and social imagination, as I briefly 
mentioned earlier. One of Anderson’s central contentions is that ‘Print-language is 
what invents nationalism, not a particular language per se’ (1991, p. 134). He 
suggests that ‘the important thing about language is its capacity for generating 
imagined communities and building in effect particular solidarities’ (Anderson, 
1991, p. 133, original emphasis). The construction of a national consciousness within 
a national territorial space is enabled by the circulation of printed materials which 
create a ‘unified field of exchange’ in which the consumers of print could ‘imagine’ 
the simultaneity of events across territorial space and the discourse within it. In Philip 
Schlesinger’s words, it represents ‘the sense of nationhood as one looks outward from 
within, therefore, the position is quite centrally about the constitution of national 
identity’ (1987, p. 247), that is, how nationhood is made available to people and how 
this experience forms a so-called sense of national identity (Tomlinson 1991).  
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Reviewing the relationship between cultural imperialism and the nation state John 
Tomlinson summarises Anderson’s definition of a nation as follows:  
 
National identity is a particular style of ‘imagining the community’ made 
possible by and also, in a sense, required by the processes of social modernity: 
secular rationalism, a calendrical perception of time, capitalist-driven 
technological development, mass literacy and mass communications, political 
democratisation, the modern nation-state. All these features combined in 
complex ways to promote identification with the nation as the dominant form 
of cultural identity (1991, p. 83).   
 
It is within this context that Tomlinson questions strongly the idea of cultural 
imperialism.  He argues that the notion of ‘national identity is a highly mediated 
imaginary belonging which, in a sense, replaced earlier forms of cultural belonging’ 
(ibid.). Namely, national identity is not place bounded or culturally predetermined.  
He further emphasises the point that:  
 
National identities are not cultural belongings rooted in deep quasi-national 
attachments to a homeland, but, rather, complex cultural constructions that 
have arisen in specific historical conditions. There is a ‘lived reality’ of 
national identity, but it is a reality lived in representations – not in direct 
communal solidarity (ibid., p. 84).   
 
This argument provides a conceptualisation of national identity as a progressive and 
contingent experience interacting with modern daily life, and therefore constantly 
under challenge by various modern developments. According to Tomlinson, the 
formation of national identities can be, and often is, influenced by the modernisation 
of media and communication systems demonstrating that ‘national identity is a highly 
mediated imaginary belonging’ (ibid., p. 83). Moreover, its popular imagination and 
cultural practice are often not passively, but rather actively, engaged with different 
elements which people encounter and appropriate. Following on from Anderson’s 
‘imagined community,’ which was made possible by advances in the means of 
communication, Tomlinson is able to argue against a conceptualisation of cultural 
imperialism which was predominately rooted in the idea of a fixed national culture.  
 
However, the emphasis in Anderson’s book is on national novels and newspapers, 
which inevitably suggests that the illiterate populace were excluded from the 
narratives in the construction of a national consciousness. In this sense, the use of 
print-language reinforces class divisions and also suggests that the writing of national 
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consciousness was something in which only the privileged few participated. The 
origins of national consciousness and nationalism, arguably, were not collective 
political identification or national destiny but rather a concept that was imagined and 
represented by an educated minority. The idea of national consciousness was 
therefore only imagined by those who had access to the narratives via various means 
of communication. I am not suggesting that the idea of national consciousness has to 
be imagined as a whole within a community, but rather I am more interested in 
investigating how people integrate and negotiate their concepts of nation, nationality, 
nationalism and cultural identity through various communication systems and 
interaction with diverse media contents. 
 
As Anderson more explicitly acknowledged in subsequent work, modern electronic 
media, such as television, can have an even more powerful influence than print media 
in the formation of nationalism, which includes the possibility of ‘long-distance 
nationalism’. To him, ‘television makes it possible to communicate instantaneously 
the same images and symbols through different languages, even to the barely literate 
and the very young’ (2001, p. 42). In this account, modern cultural imagination can 
depart from “traditional” societies because of a complex of technological and 
representational changes, such as transnational media flows and the internet. 
However, this form of transnational cultural imagination and consumption in relation 
to national identity, one may argue, is temporal, fragmentary and shallow and 
therefore difficult to sustain (Smith 1990a, 1990b, 1995). I will elaborate further on 
Smith’s argument in the following section, focusing particularly on his questions 
about the idea of cultural globalisation in relation to national identity.   
 
The formation of national consciousness, following Walter Benjamin’s notion of ‘a 
simultaneity of past and future in an instantaneous present’, which Anderson calls 
‘homogeneous empty time’ (1991, p. 24), is ‘the idea of a sociological organism 
moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue of the 
idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily 
down (or up) history’ (ibid., p. 26). The nation is imagined as a community through 
time, with its own past, present and future destiny; it is imagined across space, 
embracing the inhabitants of a particular territory. Print capitalism also creates a 
mode of temporality or ‘meanwhile’ which is measured by clock and calendar and the 
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vision of the modern nation can be imagined with this transformation. However, the 
concept of ‘temporality’, according to Bhabha’s interpretations: 
 
is the mark of the ambivalence of the nation as a narrative strategy - and an 
apparatus of power – that is produces a continual slippage into analogous, 
even metonymic, categories, like the people, minorities, or ‘cultural 
difference’ that continually overlap in the act of writing the nation (1990, p. 
292).  
 
Bhabha criticises Anderson’s concept of ‘homogeneous empty time’ in which the 
idea of historical linear representation is imposed from above by a colonial state. 
Instead he proposes ‘a temporality of representation that moves between cultural 
formations and social processes without a ‘centred’ causal logic’ (ibid., p. 293). 
Based on this perspective he argues that ‘Such an apprehension of the ‘double and 
split’ time of national representation leads us to question the homogeneous and 
horizontal view familiarly associated with it’ (ibid., p. 295). To Bhabha, the 
importance of thinking of ‘double-time’ or ‘temporality’ in the context of a historical 
event is that it allows us to question the ‘fixity’ of national time-space and thus 
opening up the possibility of a transcendent tendency of dialectical contradiction 
which he calls a ‘third space’ (1988, pp. 20-22, 1994, pp. 36-38, 1990, p. 297). In this 
respect, the writing of a nation should not to be considered as fixed.  Following 
Bhabha, we should consider the notion of nation in relation to time and space: 
 
In the production of the nation as narration there is a split between the 
continuist, accumulative temporality of the pedagogical, and the repetitious, 
recursive strategy of the performative. It is through this process of splitting 
that the conceptual ambivalence of modern society becomes the site of writing 
the nation (1990, p. 297).  
 
Furthermore, he views the nation as a narrative in which ‘the people as an a priori 
historical presence, a pedagogical object; and the people constructed in the 
performance of narrative, its enunciatory ‘present’ marked in the repetition and 
pulsation of the national sign’ (ibid., p. 299). In his discussion of national discourse 
and the national fidelities of individuals, Bhabha distinguishes between pedagogical 
narratives – identity makers expressed in the ‘official’ discourses of a state apparatus; 
and performative narratives – the ways in which official discourses are negotiated in 
daily life. It is in this contested field of nation-making and identity construction in the 
case of Taiwan, that Bhabha’s approach allows more than the simple connection of 
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political changes (such as, the lifting of martial law or official acknowledgment of the 
2-28 Incident
49) to the “emergence” of identity; it helps to develop an understanding 
of both the continuities and complex changes that have occurred since the late 1980s 
(Harrison 2006, p. 170). Another useful element is the emphasis on the individual 
performance of identity which is drawn on and interrupted by reference points 
established in a nation’s pedagogical narratives.  
 
By paying attention to Anderson’s notion of ‘homogeneous, empty time’, one can 
begin to understand the notion of nationness and collective identities in relation to 
‘timelessness’; ‘outside history’ is in fact a form of what Bhabha calls ‘time-lag – a 
temporal break in representation’ (1992,p. 59, 1994, p. 245). This mode displaces 
Anderson’s homogeneous temporality of the modern nation: ‘the non-synchronous 
temporality of global and national cultures opens up a cultural space – a third space 
– where the negotiation of incommensurable differences creates a tension peculiar to 
borderline existences’ (Bhabha, 1994, p. 218, my emphasis). Furthermore, 
Anderson’s interpretation of time also echoes his other important argument that the 
historical process of nation-building often involves a deliberately political exercise of 
‘memory and forgetting’ (1991, Chapter 11). He suggests that: 
 
Awareness of being embedded in secular, serial time, with all its implications 
of continuity, yet of ‘forgetting’ the experience of this continuity – product of 
the ruptures of the late eighteenth century – engenders the need for a narrative 
of ‘identity’ (ibid., p. 205).  
 
In other words, a sense of national collectivity and connectivity is a product of the 
simultaneous (dis)association of past and present – a temporality of time – a 
‘meanwhile’ which according to Bhabha’s interpretation means that: 
 
Anderson’s notion of ‘meanwhile’ is cut across by the ghostly simultaneity of 
a temporality of doubling and repetition, to be obliged to forget – in the 
construction of the national present – is not a question of historical memory; it 
is the construction of a discourse on society that performs the problematic 
totalisation of the national will (1990, p. 310).  
 
                                                 
49
 The 2-28 Massacre also called 2-28 Incident by Kuomintang (KMT), was an anti-government 
uprising in Taiwan that began on February 27, 1947 which was violently suppressed by the KMT-led 
Republic of China government and resulted in the massacre of numerous civilians, beginning on 
February 28. The subject was officially taboo for decades. On the anniversary of the event in 1995, 
President Lee Teng-hui addressed the subject publicly, a first for a Taiwanese head of state. 
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In the case of Taiwan, it is in the political act of “collective amnesia” in the formation 
of a nation in relation to its past that the problematic identification of people becomes 
more explicit. This is particularly relevant when the meaning of “meanwhile” is 
disturbed by various articulations such as postcolonial nostalgic sentiment (in the case 
of Taiwan, fifty years of Japanese colonisation); radical socio-political changes 
(lifting of martial law in 1987, first oppositional political party-DPP in 1986); or 
rediscovering and regenerating absent historical memories (such as the 2-28 Incident 
in 1947). To me, the conjuncture of these ruptures not only destabilised the sense of 
Chinese identity but also a “meanwhile” sense of Taiwanese identity. The notion of 
Taiwanese identity as a collective cultural identity and “imagined community” as a 
political reality is always in the process of coming into being. And therefore the sense 
of Taiwaneseness is always open to be negotiated and contested by the state and 
agency. 
 
To sum up, the virtue of Anderson’s approach to nations and nationalism is that it 
refutes, in Mark Harrison’s words, ‘the possibility of defining national identity in an 
essentialist way, as something that is immanent in the subjectivity of nationals, as, for 
example, a unique national character’ (2006, p. 26). Anderson’s discussion of 
nationalism suggests the notion of nation as ‘coming into being’ and ‘imagined’, 
which includes both political communities and their modes of representation in 
novels, plays and newspapers. His approach is a useful framework for an examination 
of the contemporary political situation in Taiwan, in particular the idea of 
‘imagination’ and that ‘national identity is a highly mediated imaginary belonging’ 
(Tomlinson 1991, p. 63). For the KMT, this imagination is about ‘us as Chinese 
people’ acting to cultivate a unitary societal consciousness and thus reproduce the 
nation-state. During the postwar era, this idea focused on China as motherland, 
although few Taiwanese people had ever been there, and the people as ‘brothers and 
sisters by blood’ (tong bao) whom they cannot meet. For the DPP, this is about 
legitimating Taiwan as a nation and combining this with the trend of Taiwanisation 
by emphasising local cultural signification, historical colonial experience and the 
representation of social life and modernity which enables people to imagine that 
‘Taiwan belongs to the Taiwanese’ (Taiwan bixu shi Taiwanren de).   
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Second, the contribution of Anderson’s account of print-capitalism and the 
construction of a colloquial language is that the ideological dissemination on a large 
scale created the conditions where people could begin to think of themselves as a 
nation. One’s recognition of a collective political identity and the possibility of a new 
form of imagined community is therefore not constrained by speaking a particular 
language and occupying particular territories but by the ‘interplay between fatality, 
technology and capitalism’ (1991, p. 43). Following this argument, old notions about 
national identities being embedded in a specific place or self-evidently belonging to 
particular cultures and societies seem to have been challenged and complicated by the 
vast, expanding transnational media cultural flows. In the case of Taiwan, the lifting 
of martial law, the process of political democratisation and the media liberalisation of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s have created an irrefutable presence of a national 
searching for a sense of collective political identity. The manifestation of nation-
building desire among the Taiwanese population has occurred alongside irreducible 
political differences in the making of national culture, history and consciousness on 
the island and Anderson’s approach can illuminate the modern construction of 
Taiwanese identity.   
 
Third, Anderson’s discussion of time – as a national temporality of ‘meanwhile’, an 
idea of ‘homogeneous, empty time’, permits ‘transverse, cross-time, marked not by 
prefiguring and fulfilment, but by temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and 
calendar’ (ibid., p. 24). This insight enables us to discriminate between the notion of 
historical linkage and memories as a prerequisite element of the nation-building 
project and the construction of nationness in the disjunctive forms of displacement 
and repetition of time in writing a nation. On the one hand, Anderson acknowledges 
that ‘homogenous empty time and space’ enables people to imagine and reproduce 
the idea of nation moving back and forwards without limit. On the other hand, he also 
recognises that the idea that a nation is actively constructed in the imagination means 
it is the contingent result of social and political processes. Hence, the question of 
whether to retrieve five thousand year old Chinese culture or four hundred year old 
Taiwanese history and culture in making sense of Taiwanese identity has 
paradoxically highlighted the ambiguities and peculiar situation in Taiwan.  
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British scholar Anthony D. Smith has criticised Anderson’s conceptualisation of 
nation ‘as a community narrated in a particular print language, which suggest that 
nation is a kind of modern ‘text’ and nationalism a form of political discourse, rather 
than an ideology’ (1991b, pp. 361-363). He argues that Anderson’s description of the 
nation is in danger of seeing that nation as it has been/is being ‘narrated’ by its 
devotees. He is also concerned that Anderson’s approach is largely subjectivist: the 
nation as text to be deconstructed, a series of narratives or ‘inventions of the 
imagination’ (ibid., p. 361). Here Smith (mis)interprets Anderson’s idea of 
‘imagination’ as modern fantasy or pure invention and therefore he criticises 
Anderson’s concept as ‘ultimately denying the power of past (or received structures) 
to determine the products of human agency’ (ibid., p. 364). This leads to an important 
question, namely in what sense can the notion of historical connections or cultural 
heritage create what he calls ‘culture-specific’ or ‘a collective culture’ in the modern 
reconstruction of a nation.  
 
 
Myths and memories of the nation: The construction of “Chineseness” – 
Descendants of the Dragon? 
 
In this section, I focus on Smith’s approach to nation, national identity and 
nationalism, in which he often stresses the importance of historical sentiments and 
aspirations such as memories, myths, traditions, etc. in the formation of “nationness”. 
In doing so I wish to discuss how these two different representative approaches to the 
study of national identity have awkwardly combined in the modern nation-building 
project in Taiwan and their referential importance in the questioning of the concept of 
national and cultural identity within the context of intra-Asian popular cultural flows 
and cultural practices.  
 
Whereas Anderson extends our understandings of nationalism as ‘coming into being’, 
emphasising the instability of national identity, Smith claims that ‘nationalism is a 
form of political archaeology’ (1999, p. 176), emphasising that: 
 
the ideology of nationalism prizes historical authenticity, because later 
generations of any particular community are formed in their collective life 
through the memories, myths and traditions of the community into which they 
are born and educated (Smith 1991b, p. 358). 
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Differing from Anderson, who contends that nation-states were uniquely the product 
of the post-eighteenth century transformations of society and consciousness, Smith 
(1995) argues that the construction of nationalism derives from the imperishability, 
durability and special traits of the national in myths, memories, values and symbols. 
He suggests that nationality is a much older phenomenon which although transformed 
by modern political and economic forces is more deeply rooted and enduring.  
 
Additionally, according to Smith (1991a), a non-Western model or ‘ethnic’ 
conception of the nation is different from a Western model of nation which composes 
the historic territory, legal-political community and equality of members, and 
common civic culture and ideology. Thus, a nation was first and foremost a 
community of common descent. For Smith, a community is constructed by a sense of 
“togetherness”, operating through kinship and inclusion. In this regard, nationalism is 
understood as those ideologies or beliefs which attribute a communality of experience 
(memory) to the members of a particular regional, ethnic or linguistic category. One 
famous old representation of common descent in Taiwan is a myth of a sacred origin 
symbol (e.g. Dragon). Myth in this sense is singular. For example, in the early 1970s 
there was a popular folk song, Descendants of Dragon written by Hou De-jian (1978), 
which can been seen as an expression of the myth of a sacred origin: 
 
There was a dragon called China in the ancient East. 
There was a group of people who were descendants of the dragon. 
We grow up under one dragon’s protection 
Black eyes, dark hair, yellow skin we will always be descendants of the dragon   
 
It is important to note that this myth of shared sacredness is a definition of the 
historical continuity of Chinese empires, which transcends ethnic identities and 
political realities. In post-war Taiwan, as Allen Chun (1994, 1995, 2000b) emphasises 
in several articles, the solidarity of the nation involved a devotion to a symbolic 
collectivity which surpasses territorial boundedness and the imagining of a 
community as one people, one culture, one blood and one family. In this sense, 
modern Taiwan’s request for independence represents a threat to unification, because 
it is a rejection of that myth of a common destiny, a reunified China.  
 
Smith’s central contention is that national culture is a collective culture rooted in a 
territorially bounded place and sharing unique historical symbols, myths, memories 
 170 
and traditions. It is also a way of constructing meanings which influence and organise 
both our actions and our conception of ourselves. In a similar vein, Walker Connor 
suggests that the ‘nation-as-family’ metaphor is not a rational feeling, but rather an 
emotive one; it is a bond beyond reason appealing ‘not to the brain but to the blood’ 
(1993, p. 384). From these perspectives, it is not surprising to hear the comments 
from some Chinese nationalists: Taiwan and China are supposed to share the same 
ancestry (blood), the same history, language and culture. Apart from political and 
historical connections this is one of the main reasons why China has proclaimed its 
rights to Taiwan on the grounds that ‘the people of Taiwan are our kith and kin’ (cited 
in Connor 1993, p. 381).  
 
If the nation is, according to Connor, ‘a psychological bond that joins a people and 
differentiates it, in the sub-conscious conviction of its members, from all non-
members’ (ibid., p. 377), national consciousness is based on a perception of similarity 
and of difference such as the place you stay, the language you speak, the food you 
eat, your cultural heritage and religion. To be aware of or to be involved in groups 
one relies on the formation of a national identity shared by all members to establish 
congruence. The fundamental aspects of national identity can therefore be 
summarised as containing the consciousness and sentiments of ‘a historic territory, or 
homeland, common myths and historic memories, a common, mass public culture, 
common legal rights and duties for all members and a common economy with 
territorial mobility for all members’ (Smith 1991a, p. 14). In short, a national identity 
which comprises both cultural and political identity is made up of memories from the 
past and the living together within a fatherland or motherland. In this regard, the 
KMT government consistently maintained its role as the sole guardian of “traditional 
Chinese culture” in the post-war era, despite Taiwan not being territorially connected 
to China. Since the retreat of Chiang Kai-shek and his followers in 1949, Taiwan has 
been designated as the bastion from where to counterattack the Communist party in 
mainland China. Its historical, political and cultural continuity therefore remained 
closely intertwined with its “motherland” (Zu Kuo), China, under the KMT regime. 
And it is under this spell that the modern concept of Taiwanese consciousness or 




Arguably, national identity constitutes the relationship between the present 
configuration of a national collectivity and its past. Traditions and social memory are 
considered as imaginary, continual and selective. Their formation through cultural 
institutions and practices present a chronological chain of identity linking past and 
present. Smith believes that ‘there is a deeper reason for the drive to rediscover an 
ethnic past, or ‘ethno-history’. This is the need to reconstruct the modern nation and 
locate it in time and space on firm and authentic foundations’ (1999, p. 177). In this 
sense, national identity is constructed within a definite social time and space. In the 
construction of a national identity, shared feelings of primordial bonds of kinship and 
a perceived common “blood” are assimilated to a feeling of political community, ‘in 
other words, what we mean by national identity comprises both a cultural and a 
political identity’ (ibid., p. 99). However this form of identification neglects the 
notion of becoming, as Stuart Hall puts it:  
 
cultural identities come from somewhere, [they] have histories. But, like 
everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation. Far from 
being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the 
continuous “play” of history, culture and power (1990, p. 225).  
 
Following Hall’s argument, my critique is that Smith (1991b) invokes the role of 
nationalism and of nationalists’ involvement in the rediscovery, reinterpretation and 
regeneration of the community in order to reproduce national identity or a sense of 
cultural intimacy. What binds the various classes and ethnicities together has limited 
the elements of the (re)construction of national identity within a historical time and 
space trajectory. Within such a framework, ‘nation-building’ becomes naturalized, a 
unifying discourse of ‘nation’, ‘peoples’, or authentic ‘folk’ traditions which is 
embedded in the myths of culture’s particularity (Bhabha 1994, pp. 162-173). In ‘The 
Question of Cultural Identity’, Stuart Hall mentions that ‘national identity seeks to 
unify them [its members] into one cultural identity, to represent them all as belonging 
to the same great national family’ (1992, p. 296). Therefore, he argues that when the 
implied unity was absent, the nation-state often tried to create it through a uniform 
national language, national history, and more often than not a mythologised version 
of identity (ibid.). Indeed, the enduring myth of a unified nation and a collective 
cultural identity rooted in historical, subjective and symbolic terms is highly 
problematic. It is problematic because it sees the nation as a readily available 
reference and ignores the fluid and complex processes involved in the construction of 
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culture and the invention of tradition, and their combined role in the production of the 
modern nation.  
 
In post-war Taiwan, the concept of culture operates at many different levels of public 
discourse – such as through the feeling of moral consciousness, habits of custom, 
shared political ideology and historical trajectory. The process of nation-building 
under the KMT regime represented not only the construction of a sense of 
“Chineseness”, but of becoming “authentic” Chinese, a representation of originality, 
purity and continuity (Chun 1994). In this regard, the KMT government felt 
compelled to define national identity not only in terms of race, language and history 
but also in the way it attempted to invoke, resuscitate and reinvent tradition for the 
purpose of legitimising its own vision of the modern society. Nationalism or societal 
consciousness in this regard is close to Anthony Giddens’ definition, ‘cultural and 
psychological sentiments that feed upon the rootlessness of an everyday life in which 
what Geertz calls the “primordial sentiments” of social reproduction, [are] grounded 
in tradition’ (1981, p. 13). The idea of one nation, one party, one family and even one 
mind intertwined with an imaginary motherland underlies the mythical sentiment of 
unification which remained for many generations in Taiwan. Once this “oneness” has 
been challenged or even collapsed, the discourse of Chinese identity in Taiwan 
becomes a central contested field with many dimensions, but in particular in the 
construction of a sense of “Taiwaneseness”, a sense of nationhood.   
 
Plausibly, national culture allows ‘us’ to define ourselves against ‘them’ understood 
as those beyond the boundaries of the nation (see Hall 1992, pp. 292-293, Schlesinger 
1987, p. 261, Smith 1991a, p. 61, Smith 1995, p. 114). Schlesinger also points out 
that:  
 
National cultures are not just simple repositories of shared symbols to which 
the entire population stands in identical relation [but] rather [are] to be 
approached as sites of contestation in which competition over definitions takes 
place (1987, p. 260).  
 
Hence, national cultures are composed not only of cultural institutions but also of 
symbols, ideology and representations; producing and constructing meanings which 
affect and establish both our actions and our conception of us (e.g. Hall 1992, 
Schlesinger 1987). Nevertheless Stuart Hall also suggests that ‘national identities are 
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not things we are born with, but are formed and transformed within and in relation to 
representation’ (1992, p. 292), a set of meanings that people identify with. In a 
similar approach, as Bhikhu Parekh (1994) rightly suggests, there is no single and 
homogenous discourse of national identity but a multiplicity of discourses, sharing 
some aspects in common but differing in their logical structures and ways of defining, 
debating, representing and reconstructing national identities.  
 
The old concept of reproduction of national identity is limited to the nation-state 
system in which territorial and legal-political factors are given. National identity acts, 
according to Smith (1991a), as a powerful means of defining and locating individual 
selves in the world through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive 
culture. For Smith, the attraction of national cultures as forms of social solidarity is 
that they are ‘particular’, ‘time-bound and expressive’ (1990b, p. 178). Therefore he 
argues that concepts of global culture are an empty and shallow threat to national 
cultures due to ‘their lack of reference to language or history, their indifference to 
family tradition and religion, above all, their lack of a popular base’ (1990a, p. 5). In 
contradiction to Smith’s cultural nationalism approach, Bhabha views the nation as a 
narrative in which the national is both speaking to it and speaking it: 
 
The people are not simply historical events or parts of a patriotic body politic. 
They are also a complex rhetorical strategy of social reference where the 
claim to be representative provokes a crisis within the process of signification 
and discursive address. We then have a contested cultural territory where the 
people must be thought in a double-time; the people are the historical ‘objects’ 
of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on 
the pre-given or constituted historical origin or event; the people are also the 
‘subjects’ of a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary 
presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principle 
of the people as the continual process by which the national life is redeemed 
and signified as a repeating and reproductive process (1990, p. 297 my 
emphasis).  
 
This argument suggests that the non-national also operates in this ‘contested cultural 
territory’. The foreigner and foreignness are as much implicated in the inscription of a 
nation’s narrative as the national. I have quoted Bhabha’s ‘The time of the nation’ 
note at length here because his effort to suggest a liminal or in-between space of 
ambivalence in the narration of a nation allows people to go beyond the contained 
grid of fixed identities and binary oppositions, against Smith’s proposition of a sense 
of historical continuity in the formation of collective cultural identity. This allows us 
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to further question how in the age of intense global and regional culture and media 
flows, the idea of a nation or national/cultural identity is no longer shaped or 
restricted by the territorial (space/place) and historical (time) connections. Rather this 
field is constantly contested and complicated by foreignness amongst young people.  
 
In debates on national identity different kinds of complicated choices and confusing 
sentiments exist, and these are composed of the interlacing forces of historical burden 
and the open need to change this. However, as national cultures become more 
exposed to outside influences, it becomes difficult to preserve cultural identities 
intact, or to prevent them from becoming weakened through cultural bombardment 
and infiltration, especially within the contexts of globalisation, postmodernity, 
cultural imperialism and cultural hybridity.  
 
 
Nostalgia and cultural hybridity: The construction of Taiwanese identity 
within the discourse of postcoloniality and globalisation  
 
This section examines the debates about dynamic influences on the concepts of 
nation/nation-state and the definitions of national and cultural identities within the 
debate on cultural globalisation and hybridisation. The section argues that the 
constitution of the nation-building project in modern times has shifted away from a 
stress on the importance of ethnicity, nationhood and kinship towards an articulation 
of the populace’s cultural positionality, self-reflexivity, and national subjectivity, 
which are all key elements in the development of national identity in modern society.  
 
Anderson and Smith offer two representative approaches which demonstrate the idea 
of the nation as historically constructed and its dependence on hegemonic processes 
to forge a unified whole. The formation of national identity or a sense of belonging to 
an ‘imagined political community’ is situated within a defined territory and is 
governed by political pre-givens. However, the question of the annihilation of 
nationhood and fragmentation of identity looms as a determining issue in any 
discussion on both national and cultural identities in the age of globalisation. In this 
respect, globalisation refers to the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that 
transcend the nation-states which make up the modern world system. Within the 
context of national space, globalisation promotes the mutation of national identity 
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resulting from ‘the imposition of the conceptual grid of nationality on exchanges and 
interactions in the global arena’ (Cubitt 1998, p. 14).   
 
Eric J. Hobsbawm made a rather adventurous prediction about the decline of nation-
states in Nations and Nationalism since 1780, arguing that nations and nationalism 
are becoming irrelevant to ‘the new supranational restructuring of the globe’ (1990, p. 
182). The future of nations and nation-states in the age of globalisation remains area 
of open debate: some argue for the imminent demise of the nation and/or nation-states 
(Held 1989, pp. 191-204, Ohmae 1995, Jessop 1994, p. 274) while some insist on its 
immortality (Smith 1990a, pp. 6-12, 1995, chapters 1 and 4). The tension between 
globalisation and nation/nation-state is an ongoing phenomenon and remains an 
unsettled issue. This section will present these debates with a focus on cultural points 
of view and their relationship to the construction of nation/nation-states and national/ 
cultural identities in the age of globalisation. The clash between the ideas of cultural 
rootlessness (as in cultural globalisation) and cultural rootedness (as in 
indigenisation/locale) suggests that the politics of identity is a constant struggling 
with a sense of “fear of’” and “security” within political discourses that interweave 
with notions of hybridity and authenticity in the (re)construction of national cultures.   
 
Arguably, globalisation retains some aspects of Western power domination but 
cultural identities everywhere are being relativised by the impact of ‘time-space 
compression’ (Harvey 1989). According to David Held, ‘nation-states were never as 
autonomous or as sovereign as they claimed to be’ (1992, p. 71). The processes of 
globalisation are diminishing differences and space between nations as well as 
fragmenting the imagined unity within those nations. The most distinctive 
contribution in this field may come from Arjun Appadurai in his five dimensions of 
global cultural flows: ethnoscapes, technoscapes, finanscapes, mediascapes and 
ideoscapes. He notes that ‘people, machinery, money, images and ideas now follow 
increasingly non-isomorphic paths’ (1996, p. 37). By the same token, Ulf Hannerz 
proposes four organisational frameworks for examining cultural processes: forms of 
life, market, state and movement (1992, pp. 46-52). He suggests that cultural 
meanings are socially organised and result from the varying combinations and flows 
of those frameworks, ‘these entanglements, involving often mutually contradictory 
tendencies, also keep the totality alive, shifting, continuously unstable’ (ibid., p. 51).  
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These aspects of globalisation in relation to the nation-state and the politics of 
identity also recall on Hall’s (1991) three important observations: national identities 
are being washed away due to the growth of cultural homogenisation and ‘the global 
post-modern’; they are being challenged by the particularistic forms of identity which 
provoke resistance to globalisation; and being replaced by ‘hybrid’ identities. To this 
extent, globalisation seems to generally erase the boundary between nation-states and 
separate national and cultural identities. This uncoupling of culture from bounded 
territories – locales, regions, nation-states – is characterised by Hall as ‘the processes 
of globalisation, that form of relationship between a national cultural identity and a 
nation-state that is now beginning to disappear’ (ibid., p. 22). He argues that national 
identity no longer enjoys its supremacy as the psychological identity that claims the 
extreme loyalty of the individual. Instead, it must compete with other identities in a 
free and open shopping mall of identities. I agree with most of these propositions in 
relation to the process of national cultural (trans)formation and identity recreation. 
However, what these arguments fail to consider is the case of a “state without 
nationhood” such as we found in Taiwan.  
 
Granted, nationhood is never a pre-given condition or the sole means of self-
identification with a nation. In this sense, national cultural identity has never been an 
always/already condition. The concept of globalisation may therefore also be 
regarded as a tool to mediate this ambivalent space, or in Bhabha’s term – ‘a space of 
“translation”’, which is: 
 
a place of hybridity, figuratively speaking, where the construction of a 
political object that is new, neither the one nor the Other, properly alienates 
our political expectations, and changes, as it must, the very forms of our 
recognition of the ‘moment’ of politics. The challenge lies in conceiving of 
the ‘time’ of political action and understanding as opening up a space that can 
accept and regulate the differential structure of the moment of intervention 
without rushing to produce a dialectical unity of the social antagonism or 
contradiction (1988, pp. 10-11). 
 
It is only with an attempt to acknowledge the historical transformations of political 
identity and to negotiate the contemporary socio-political situation that one can start 
to make sense of and articulate the sense of belonging and the meaning of collective 
identification in the modern nation. To me, the role of regional TV dramas may not 
necessarily have direct influence on youth’s political identity formation. However, it 
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provides important referential cultural, social and political dimensions in terms of 
negotiating and articulating a sense of modern Taiwanese identity amongst the 
younger generations, which I will discuss further in Chapter 6 and 7.  
 
The penetration of global cultural products and the concept of internationalisation 
have given Taiwan Independent nationalists a strong statement which deliberately 
articulates both the global and the national, with which to construct a new identity 
that can be differentiated from China both historically and culturally (c.f. Wang, 
2000, p. 102). The concept of globalisation or internationalisation is regarded by the 
government and some scholars as a way to constitute modern Taiwanese culture 
alongside a reinforced local culture. Therefore, the reinvention of traditional cultures 
in Taiwan is inevitably intertwined with global culture or a ‘third culture’ in Mike 
Featherstone’s words (1990, p. 259). Taiwanese intellectuals such as Qing-chu Yang 
(2004) appeal for a resolution of the crisis of Taiwan’s identity: 
  
Taiwan must internationalise, and internationalisation should be the direction 
for the cultural pluralism of every ethnicity on Taiwan. No matter if it is 
‘localism’ or ‘place-ism,’ this is the way Taiwanese subjective consciousness 
must go. But without ‘localism’ or ‘place-ism’ from which to jump to 
internationalisation, is to be without a personal history or culture, and so be 
rootless (cited in Harrison 2009, p. 59).  
 
Almost sharing the same anxiety, Wei-ming Tu suggests that the appropriation of 
‘cultural China’ is an inescapable component in the making of Taiwanese cultural 
identity and comments: 
 
The irony is that as nativisation has become a dominant discourse, imported 
cultural products, outgrowths of the ubiquitous transnational capitalism, have 
inadvertently formulated an alternative discourse. The combination of these 
two seemingly asymmetrical ideological trajectories creates a new cultural 
vortex; Taiwan is a fascinating place for research on ‘glocalism’ (an awkward 
coexistence of globalism and localism) (1996, p. 1122).   
  
The concept of cultural glocalisation often refers to global culture being reshaped by 
local content. In this view locals still have their power either to resist or to appropriate 
such forces. Global cultures must be adjusted to local conditions because external 
cultural influences are meaningful only if they can be integrated with local social 
experience and cultural understandings. Or as Smith (1990a) argues, global culture 
cannot be sustained because of a lack of collective past. He believes that a global 
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culture without a perceived collective past has no popular resonance and without 
popular resonance no images and traditions will be maintained; therefore, a global 
culture is just a ‘memory-less’ and ‘context-less’ culture. Instead Smith insists that:  
 
The central difficulty in any project to construct a global identity and hence a 
global culture, is that collective identity, like imagery and culture, is always 
historically specific because it is based on shared memories and a sense of 
continuity between generations (1995, p. 180).  
 
In contrast, Appadurai (1996) argues that people are fascinated neither with 
‘originality’ nor with ‘tradition’, but are actively constructing their own images and 
meanings of vernacular modernity at the receiving end. However, these arguments 
rest largely on the undiminished notion of “national tradition” or “local rooted” 
cultural identity, which can allow local actors to negotiate with global culture flows. 
 
In other words, globalisation actually more explicitly exploits local differentiations, 
such as culture, way of life, social value, customs, and so on. It is therefore important 
to acknowledge that: 
 
By understanding globalisation as both a process of material flows and a basis 
for meaningful localisation, one can [then] begin to see how different societies 
receive global flows while at the same time accommodating them within given 
social-political and cultural-ideological frameworks (Chun 1996a, p. 68).  
 
In the case of Taiwan, what has been presented as a problematic issue is the political 
dislocation and upheaval in the construction of national and cultural identity 
throughout the country’s history. For instance, the recent burgeoning movement of 
the reinstallation of its locality has produced bizarre political catchwords such as 
‘Richly cultivating Taiwan while reaching out to the world’ (shen-geng Taiwan buju 
quanqiu) or ‘Putting Taiwan’s interest first, while maintaining global perspective’ 
(Taiwan youxian quanqui buju) (cited in Morris 2005, abstract). Hence, the question 
becomes one of whether the government’s obsession with incorporating the idea of 
globalisation into a nation-building project while insisting on constructing a 
“localised” or “indigenised” national consciousness and place-bound loyalty has in 
fact deepened the confusion amongst the Taiwanese populace. 
 
The phenomenon of “cultural homogenisation” is a concept of uniformisation, a sort 
of global currency in which interchangeable but not necessarily equal identities 
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become detached, disembedded and translated from specific places, times, histories, 
and traditions. Indeed, the immediacy and intensity of global cultural confrontations 
challenge the continuity and the profundity of collective identities as well as the idea 
of the nation-state and of nationhood. However, Stuart Hall also rationally points out 
that on the one hand global differences are softened and consumed pleasurably in 
certain regions and on the other hand, traditionalism is also keenly advocated in what 
he calls ‘the final moment of the global post-modern’ in which exotic cuisine and 
traditionalism coexist (1991, p. 33). Generally speaking, because of transnational 
cultures, a large number of people are in many dimensions more systematically and 
directly involved with more than one culture and effectively become so-called 
cultural hybrids.  
 
What is “cultural hybridity”? Hall describes it as ‘identity formations which cut 
across and intersect national frontiers’ (1992, p. 310). Hybridity, from a postcolonial 
point of view, is according to Bhabha ‘the “third space” which enables other positions 
to emerge. This third space displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new 
structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood 
through received wisdom’ (1990, p. 211).  
 
The apparent distinction between concepts of cultural globalisation and cultural 
hybridisation is that one flattens cultural diversity (e.g. cultural homogenisation, 
cultural synchronisation) and reduces culture to the ‘singular’, whilst the latter 
highlights the ‘mixtures’ and ‘discountinuities’ of culture (see Appadurai 1996, 
chapter 2, Hannerz 1992, Hannerz 1996) which are appropriated through the 
encounter between the modern and the traditional in history. As an analytical 
framework, Robert J. Holton suggests that:  
 
the hybridisation approach avoids the pitfalls of homogenisation and 
polarisation theory by drawing attention to the signification of inter-
culturalism for cultural identity, as well as the syncretic historic-making of 
cultural forms, which social actors may subsequently come to regard as 
indigenous rather than partly borrowed or blended (1998, p. 184).  
 
In the case of Taiwan, Taiwanese sociologist Horng-luen Wang argues that 
‘cosmopolitanism and global culture have played an important role in the making of a 
Taiwanese identity, as ‘globalisation’ or ‘internationalisation’ is now regarded by 
Taiwan Independent nationalists as constitutive of Taiwanese culture’ (2000, p. 102).  
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Wang’s comments on Heng-zhe Lin’s book Craving the Dream of Taiwanese Culture 
(1989) suggest that Lin insisted that Taiwanese culture is characterised by a rich 
collection of “international colours” ranging from: Chinese, Japanese, Spanish and 
Dutch cultures, intertwined through complicated and fragmented historical legacies 
(Wang, 2000). In other words, the notion of cultural heterogeneity and hybridity 
rather than cultural homogeneity and authenticity are currently recognised as another 
defining characteristic of Taiwanese culture. Since ‘hybridity’ is a central term in 
some variants of globalisation theory, globalisation again is represented as a positive 
image in Taiwan. Whilst the Taiwanese tried to “rediscover” their traditional 
Taiwanese local culture based on parochialism and localism during the 1990s, they 
ironically syncretised globalism at the same time. Moreover, under certain political 
circumstances, globalisation has become recognised as the best strategy for building 
Taiwan into a nation or at least for maintaining its current nation-like status. 
Globalisation has been deeply and positively embedded in Taiwan both for political 
and cultural reasons. For instance, Shu-mei Shih argues that ‘In the view of its 
domestic ethnic and political tensions, globalisation is also good for Taiwan’ (2003, 
p. 146). She suggests that ex-president Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian’s 
employing of the concept of ‘New Taiwanese’ ‘relies heavily on the rhetoric of 
multicultural, multiethnic “new” Taiwan [that], is circulating precisely at the moment 
when Taiwan most wants to pursue globalisation. Hence globalisation appears 
inevitable for Taiwan for it gives something to everyone’ (ibid.). 
   
The nation- and identity-building project in Taiwan since the late 1980s has not only 
been challenged by the concepts of nationhood, national culture and the selectiveness 
of popular memory but also by the process of identity formation, which negotiates the 
possible global deconstruction of identity in theory as it self-consciously works to 
reconstruct a basis for Taiwanese identity. In regard to the importance of constructing 
of native Taiwanese consciousness, Angelina Yee argues that ‘To many, the people of 
Taiwan have long been subjected to a succession of colonizers’ myths that deny their 
existence and suppress their locality in subservience to a grand national narrative’ 
(2001, p. 83). By the same token, Chiou (1994, p. 29) argues that the quest by the 
Taiwanese to find their native roots, to establish a Taiwanese consciousness, and an 
independent Taiwanese national identity has been an important part of the anti-KMT 
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political campaign as much as a resistance to Chinese cultural hegemony and political 
threats. The absence of a locally based cultural subjectivity has proved to be one of 
most urgent and challenging issues for Taiwanese nationalists to enforce the bentuhua 
movement since the 1990s (translated variously as: Taiwanisation, localisation, 
indigenisation, nativisation). 
  
One the one hand, the deconstructing of pre-martial law nationhood (Chinese 
identity), the rewriting of “national” history and the revitalising of local cultures in 
order to create a unique sense of Taiwanese national and cultural identity since the 
1990s has, to a certain extent, generated what Homi Bhabha suggests is ‘an instability 
of cultural signification’ (1990, p. 303). The historical trajectories and territorial 
boundedness in relation to cultural consciousness and identity-building remain 
important elements to articulate in this regard. This also reflects on Anderson’s notion 
of the nation as constructed and the temporality of cultures which makes Taiwan as a 
nation imaginable. Wei-ming Tu (1991) argues that although the ‘new Taiwanese 
culture’ has been enriched by Taiwan’s involvement with the West, rapid 
industrialisation and the search for Taiwan’s native roots, it is still part of ‘cultural 
China’. In his article ‘Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center’, Tu (1991) clearly 
falls for the very idea which the KMT government had deliberately espoused as the 
only authentic and legitimate guardian of “traditional Chinese culture”; he sees the 
relationship between China and Taiwan more of as one ‘filiation’ than ‘affiliation’, to 
borrow Edward W. Said’s term (1983, p. 23). In this instance, filiation refers to lines 
of descent in nature and affiliation refers to a process of identification through 
culture. 
 
In fact, the phrase national identity did not gain popular recognition in Taiwan until 
the late 1980s, a period saturated with varied confrontations brought about by rapid 
political democratisation, media liberalisation and economic growth. Questions such 
as ‘What is cultural China ?’; and ‘Why must Taiwanese culture be part of that 
culture?’ have been debated by the different sides of the cultural identification camps: 
China-oriented and Taiwan-oriented. The concept of cultural China is also used by 
those who are more inclined to retain the status quo, defining national (political) 
identity (as Taiwanese) and cultural identity as part of Chinese culture. In the series 
of Taiwanisation movements, the sense of ‘what we might become’ is just as 
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important as ‘who we actually were/are’, simultaneously looking forward and 
backwards in the rediscovering and rewriting of cultures and histories in order to 
make sense of, or to articulate with its long lost identity. Thus, the struggle of nation-
building and identity-constructing in Taiwan since the late 1980s, involves a constant 
repositioning in relation to China as much as a simple redefinition and reinvention of 
an “original” local past. 
 
This process often combines with the influence of globalisation which inevitably 
emphasises the ability of the subject’s ‘temporality of negotiation’ (Bhabha 1994, p. 
26). According to Bhabha, ‘Cultural globality is figured in the in-between space of 
double-frames: its historical originality marked by a cognitive obscurity; its decentred 
“subject” signified in the nervous temporality of the transitional, or the emergent 
provisionality of the “present”’ (ibid., p. 216).  
 
In this instance, he posits hybridity as such a form of liminal or in-between space 
where the ‘cutting edge of translation and negotiation’ (Bhabha 1988, p. 22) occurs 
and which he terms the third space. In an interview with Jonathan Rutherford (1990, 
p. 211), Bhabha also suggests that the third space is a mode of articulation, a way of 
describing a productive and not merely reflective condition, or a space that engenders 
new possibility. It is also an ‘interruptive, interrogative, and enunciative’ (1994) 
space of new forms of cultural meaning and production blurring the limitations of 
existing boundaries and calling into question established categorisations of culture 
and identity. To me, the concept of the third space is useful for analysing the 
displacement of hegemonic national narratives of cultural structures and practices in 
relation to postcolonial and cultural globalisation arguments. To end with a note from 
Homi Bhabha:  
 
The challenge to modernity comes in redefining the signifying relation to 
disjunctive “present”: staging the past as symbol, myth, memory, history, the 
ancestral – but a past whose iterative value as sign reinscribes the “lessons of 
the past” into the very textuality of the present that determines both the 
identification with, and the interrogation of, modernity: what is the ‘we’ that 









Anderson and Smith both apply the critical-historical view in the construction of 
nations, nationalism and cultural identity, though their approaches to this process are 
rather different. The attractions of Anderson’s account of the ‘nation as imagined 
political community’ is its connection of national identity with the processes of social 
modernity while superseding the essentialist elements promoted by nationalists, for 
instance, a unique national character. However, his approach focuses on cultural 
systems (such as religious communities and dynastic realms) and print capitalism 
(e.g. novels and newspapers) in the formation of nationalism bounded and imagined 
within national territory, which has, to a certain extent, been challenged in the context 
of globalisation and transnational flows. Smith argues that without the heritage of 
pre-modern ethnic ties, memories, myths, traditions, rituals, symbols and artefacts, 
etc., the construction of a nation is inconceivable, which has limited the idea of 
national identity and nationalism to historical bounds and cultural particularity. This 
approach has influenced his own view on globalisation; he attacks the concept of 
global culture (which he refers to as American culture) as empty and shallow (1990a, 
p. 5). In a way, Smith is not wrong in criticising the idea of a global culture, and 
globalisation did not demolish the nation-state; however, he neglects the fact that a 
negotiating space has been opened up within the state via the global context.   
 
Nonetheless, cultural and national identity is more than just a sense of belonging. In 
the case of post-war Taiwan, ‘cultural construction has been a complex process of 
writing, socialisation and politicisation in ways which have always been intricately 
tied to ongoing socio-political conditions’ (Chun 1994, p. 68). For instance, the three 
phases of cultural movements in post-war Taiwan since the late1940s were operated 
by the KMT government, focusing on the (re)writing of cultural articulation with 
“traditional Chinese cultures”. Following political democratisation and economic 
growth, the lifting of martial law in 1987, media liberalisation in the early 1990s, the 
legacy of forty years KMT authoritarian rule on the island has gradually came to an 
end. The notion of Chinese identity has been greatly debated and challenged by 
politicians, scholars and the populace. The beginning of the deconstruction of 
Chinese identity brought out the deepest confusion, suffering and lost identity in 
which Chun (1994) suggests that mainland China was neither ‘self’ nor ‘other’ both 
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in terms of cultural and national identity and self-identification. If Taiwan had been 
“reborn” as a new state when the National Assembly elections were held in 1991 it 
may also be seen as the “death” of Chinese cultural and national identities. Has this 
moment even happened, or are we still uncertain and in the middle of the process? 
Globalisation has been recognised as the best strategy (or the way out) so far for some 
scholars and politicians in Taiwan in order to build Taiwan as a nation in a global 
context and celebrating the multicultural interactions to create a distance from 
Chinese culture. However, what needs to be considered more, apart from the rather 
bizarrely optimistic view about globalisation in the construction of new national and 
cultural identities in Taiwan, is youth’s cultural translation and negotiation in the 
context of transnational culture flows.  
 
While the Taiwanese try to recover their own repressed and neglected histories and 
cultures, in the age of globalisation, inevitably they have to retell the story both from 
the bottom up and from the top down. Over the past twenty years, the Taiwanese have 
been trapped in the ambivalence of counter-identities of their own. It may be that for 
the first time the Taiwanese can represent their own lives, and begin to speak about 
their own communities even though they are still under the shadow of China. 
Particularly relevant to Bhabha’s postcolonial definition is that a series of 
community-making programmes and cultural localisation movements (bentuhua) 
have come into being since the l990s which emphasise the concept of ‘locality’ and 
also suggest that a sense of nationhood and Taiwanese identity was discursively 
constructed and celebrated in the name of cultural difference. According to Bhabha, 
‘cultural difference is the process of the enunciation of cultures as ‘knowledgeable’, 
authoritative, adequate to the construction of systems of cultural identification’ (1988, 
p. 18, original emphasis). He further contests that the concept of cultural difference 
marks the establishment of new forms of meaning and strategies of identification 
through processes of negotiation where no discursive authority can be established 
without revealing the difference in and of itself. In the context of Taiwan’s 
revitalisation of local cultures one cannot ignore its colonial experience in particular 
under Japanese occupation.  
 
To conclude, the debates about nation-building and the construction of national and 
cultural identities in Taiwan, to borrow Ien Ang’s view, are ‘a confrontation of the 
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past and the future, a tug of war between “identity” as essential being, locked in (in 
the image of) the past, and “identity” as open-ended becoming, invested in a future 
that remains to be struggled over’ (2000, p. 9). Therefore, the framework I have 
created for understanding the process of Taiwanese national and cultural building 
actively links concept of national consciousness and the notion of cultural 
imperialism and media influence, focusing on the socio-cultural phenomenon of 
youth popular consumption of Japanese and South Korean TV dramas. The second 
part of this thesis (Chapters 6 and 7) argues that the modern politics of identities 
should not be seen from an antagonistic perspective, such as past and present, here 
and there, or tradition and invention, but something in-between, a space to be 
constantly negotiated, articulated and translated.  
 
Chapter 6 shall demonstrate that by acknowledging the popularity of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas and regional popular culture flows, university students are 
actively identifying with cultural difference and similarity amongst the three nations, 
which constitutes their sense of cultural positionality. In other words, their 
recognition of Taiwanese cultural identity is derived as well as transformed through 
the process of their negotiation of a sense of “Otherness”, which is represented on the 
screen and which they encounter in everyday life. In Chapter 7, I shall illustrate how 
secondary school students as younger generations who underwent national education 
reforms and the introduction of “Understanding Taiwan” (Renshi Taiwan) textbooks 
have consolidated their sense of Taiwanese identity within the “Taiwanisation” 
discourse. The Chapter also focuses on the process of being as well as becoming 
Taiwanese as an inevitably hybrid product which is formed through the daily 
articulation with local grassroots culture and media consumption and negotiation with 
















“There is ‘Taiwanese identity’, but …”:  





The first part of this thesis investigated and analysed the media reception and 
transnational cultural appropriation and consumption amongst university and 
secondary school students. Chapter 3 argued that university students’ reception of 
regional TV dramas is not reduced to either emotional connections or pure 
entertainment values. Regional TV dramas have rather become important cultural 
resources and references for young adults, influencing the development of their self-
reflexivity and guiding their general social formation and modes of transnational 
cultural appropriation in everyday life. In addition, I pointed out that regional TV 
reception amongst secondary school students has less sentimental connection and 
emotional involvement than university students. I also discussed the manifestation of 
generational cultural identification differences between university and secondary 
school students in terms of the consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas and 
its possible social implications. However, when I conducted my fieldwork amongst 
university and secondary schools students somehow the issue of ‘Taiwanese cultural 
identity’ was constantly mentioned when we discussed the popular consumption of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas, pop music, idol groups and so on. Comments 
ranging from “Is Taiwan an independent country, I am not sure”, “What is cultural 
identity in Taiwan, if there is one?” to “Because we do not have (or lack) our own 
culture we accept others easily”. This rather unexpected yet crucial linkage made by 
university audiences between the popularity of regional TV dramas as a common 
social phenomenon and its implications for an ongoing nation-building project in 
Taiwan has shed a different light on the relationship between youth transnational 
media consumption and cultural identity in the field of media research.  
 
Admittedly, I was at first concerned that my research findings do not “fit into” my 
initial research project. In the field of media and young audience research when 
studying the relationship between young people, popular culture and media reception, 
scholars often focus on its negative implication within a cultural imperialism or 
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cultural globalisation framework. This view includes a focus on young people’s 
consumption behaviour and idol worshipping, which have often led to the formation 
of a hegemonic youth cultural identification. However, I do not wish to suggest that 
because university students are more actively self-reflecting or self-monitored in the 
reception of Japanese and Korean TV dramas their resistance to the potential cultural 
homogenisation is therefore trouble free. Nor do I wish to suggest that we should 
return to celebrate the notions of autonomous readers and polysemy of texts in media 
and cultural studies. We should question to what extent young adult audiences’ socio-
political awareness and the debate on the current nation-state status has interwoven 
with their transnational media experience and negotiation, or how this experience has 
formulated different layers of interpretation during the process of the state’s 
construction of national cultural identity in Taiwan.  
 
Based on university students’ responses this chapter draws attention to the concepts 
of ‘cultural proximity’, ‘cultural imperialism’, ‘cultural hybridisation’ and 
‘Taiwanese cultural localisation’ in relation to the notion of the ‘nation as a imagined 
political community’ (Anderson 1991, Gellner 1983) within the context of regional 
popular cultural flows and globalisation. Questioning the idea of an antagonistic 
relationship between national identity and cultural hybridity, instead I suggest an 
approach based on the openness of cultural space – a ‘third space’ (Bhabha 1988) in 
modern society. According to Homi Bhabha ‘the intervention of the Third Space, 
which makes the structure of meaning and reference an ambivalent process, destroys 
this mirror of representation in which cultural knowledge is continuously revealed as 
an integrated, open, expanding code’ (1988, p. 21). Focusing on Bhabha’s notion of 
negotiation rather than negation in particular, I suggest that university students draw 
attention to the notion of “foreignness” through cultural negotiation, which informs 
their own national and cultural identity, and also their ability to articulate cultural 
difference and similarity to enrich their cultural diversity. I argue that “making sense” 
of Japanese and Korean TV dramas has come to be a way of exploring the question 
‘what is Taiwanese identity?’ for university students, not only by recognising cultural 
difference or similarity but by negotiating and translating their concept of Taiwan’s 
identity both politically and culturally. In the process of this temporality of 
negotiation, articulation and integration of regional cultural flows, young university 
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students constantly reposition their idea of Taiwan as a nation in relation to Japan and 
South Korea.   
 
Thus I suggest that the reception and consumption of regional TV dramas amongst 
young Taiwanese audiences provides an insight into how young people perceive the 
modern ideal way of life through a series of transnational cultural appropriations, 
negotiations and articulations, which are facilitated and interrelated into their sense of 
cultural identification and self-reflexivity. Furthermore, I illustrate how young 
Taiwanese make sense of Japanese and South Korean TV dramas and how they come 
to recognise that cultural differences or similarities between these three countries 
provide a way to negotiate and articulate their perspective of Taiwan as a nation. This 
realisation also reflects their cultural positionality and subjectivity which forms one 
of the key elements in the development of the idea of “Taiwan as a nation” in the 
contemporary period. 
 
This chapter demonstrates university students’ perceptions of youth media reception 
of regional TV dramas and cultural consumption of popular commodities, ranging 
from the fear of cultural invasion to the necessity of cultural mixing/blending in terms 
of the formation of modern Taiwanese identity. In addition, it focuses on how 
university students, through the rationalisation of the popularity of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas and mass culture, create a space for cultural imagination and 
intersection within the process of making sense of Taiwanese identity. Drawing on 
the concept of cultural hybridisation and ‘third space’, I shall discuss how university 
students are becoming active cultural observers through their transnational cultural 
practices (such as through tourism or student exchanges) in the process of recognition 




Japanese and Korean popular culture as other: Cultural homogenisation 
or appropriation? 
 
This section discusses the notion of cultural homogenisation and cultural 
appropriation in terms of how the consumption of regional popular culture and TV 
dramas, according to university students, has created a sense of “identity crisis” 
(rentong weiji) in Taiwan. However, this sense of fear of foreign culture obliterating 
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Taiwan’s culture is always a fear that other people (mainly referring to teenagers or 
fans) will be overwhelmed by it, but this worry never seems to concern the person 
actually articulating such fears.  
 
In response to the last open-ended question in the questionnaire – “In your opinion, 
do you think the consumption of Japanese and Korean pop culture can lead to any 
potential impact on young generations in Taiwan?” – most students answered “Yes”, 
although most of them did not elaborate further. Forty-seven out of 158 university 
students gave further explanations. Most had a negative perception, such as their 
worries about ‘the loss of their “own” cultural identity’. Some are more concerned 
about the “twisted” social values amongst the younger generation especially those 
youngsters labelled “Japanophile” (Hari zu) and “Koreanophile” (Hahan zu). The 
overall impression among university students of the popularity of regional TV dramas 
and pop culture in Taiwan is that it has a negative impact on youth. Their sense of 
unease is closely associated with the notion of displacement, both political and 
cultural, which is manifested in the discourse of the politics of identity in Taiwan.  
That is to say, the regional cultural flows have inspired a sense of longing amongst 
younger Taiwanese:  a desire to be modernised and globalised. Paradoxically, at the 
same time, these flows have reinforced the urge to search for a sense of belonging: to 
be Taiwanised.   
 
For instance, the possible impacts on the idea of “cultural identification” (wenhua 
rentong) are often suggested and interpreted by university students as social value and 
moral judgment; language influence; the disappearance of one’s own culture; the 
increasing popularity of plastic surgery (mainly referring to the influence from South 
Korea); and imitation of the Japanese and Korean ways of dress and behaviour. The 
questionnaires indicate that their general concern is closely related to the issue of 
Taiwanese culture which is identified by university students as something that we are 
in danger of losing or having replaced by others. Nonetheless, this sense of anxiety 
and displacement has also produced another form of desire in which young people 
believe that by appropriating regional or global languages or cultures one can 
improve Taiwan’s international status.  
 
Some show their concern about the pervasiveness of social and behavioural imitation 
(mo fang): “walk on the street, those young people you see just look like Japanese and 
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Korean”; “those Japanophile or Koreanophile are completely crazy, for me they are 
neither Taiwanese nor real Japanese or Korean”; and “young people mimicked their 
idols all the time, such as fashion, hair-style and way of speaking, it is rather silly”. 
The above comments show that some university students’ perception of the impacts 
of Japanese and Korean popular culture is mainly superficial, drawing on youth 
behavioural mimicking and negative association with the idea of fandom. In this 
sense, they distinguish themselves as a different type of audience or consumer of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas, being more rational and not influenced by either of 
these two cultural commodities. University students’ critical response and distaste for 
the consumption of Japanese and Korean popular culture amongst youngsters 
interestingly suggests that there are perceptions of good or bad ways of transnational 
cultural appropriation. For instance, being a devoted fan is considered to be bad and 
pointless cultural imitation. They often consider this youth subculture phenomenon as 
a representation of negative and shallow cultural mimicking of foreign culture. 
Ironically, their perception of good ways of transnational cultural appropriation 
seemingly suggest a deeper level of cultural engagement; for instance through 
language learning and appreciation of their national spirit, cultural character, and 
authenticity as a means of progressing in modern-day Taiwan.   
 
Others express fear of “cultural invasion”50 (wenhua ruqin ) and assimilation: “it is 
kind of like assimilation (tonghua), culture is gradually changing and influencing 
unobtrusively and imperceptibly”; “local culture will be dissolved”; “Taiwanese 
people often show their admiration for foreign cultures and easily adopt them, thereby 
neglecting their own culture or national character”; and “most people who watch 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas have a desire for or yearn for different ways of life, 
therefore they can develop a sense of identification with them”. From the above 
remarks, one can see that some university students contemplate the problem of 
identification and assimilation with foreign culture since it can lead to losing one’s 
own national cultural identity. A sense of cultural invasion grips university students’ 
imaginations causing them to perceive in Japanese and Korean pop culture and 
                                                 
50
 The term “cultural invasion” is most commonly implied by university students both in 
questionnaires and during interviews. Based on my interview discussions, I identify this term with 
Beltran’s definition, ‘cultural imperialism is a verifiable process of social influence by which a nation 
imposed on other countries it set of beliefs, values, knowledge and behavioural norms as well as its 
overall style of life’ (Beltran, 1978, p. 184 cited in Salwen, 1991, p. 29).  
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commodities the power to negate Taiwanese culture. In contrast, there are also some 
positive comments: “the motivation to learn about other languages and countries can 
also stimulate our own cultural capital”; and “the impact can be rather positive in 
terms of developing Taiwan as a modern and multicultural country”. Given that the 
construction of a modern nation or nation-state relies heavily on the dissemination of 
national consciousness and socio-cultural imagination, the media reception of 
regional popular culture and TV dramas has promoted a more complicated and 
unstable form of cultural identification. The tension between one’s own cultural 
identity and identification with cultural otherness also raises the question of whether 
it is cultural homogenisation or cultural hybridisation that matters in the construction 
of cultural identity. From this perspective, university students characterised the 
consumption of regional TV dramas as a form of cultural invasion or cultural mixing 
which has its importance in cultural formation and social recognition. Moreover, it 
can be said that the popularity of regional media flows and youth consumption of 
popular culture should not be simply explained as cultural proximity or the process of 
cultural modernisation pursued by a young audience.  Rather, it is equally important 
to understand how the young audience makes sense of the notion of national cultural 
identity and how they envisage a nation in relation to cultural others in the age of 
globalisation and regionalisation.  
 
Some university students suggest in the questionnaire that the popularity of regional 
popular culture can lead to the rejection of ones’ own culture: “the young are under 
the influence of Japanese and Korean popular cultures, even to the extent that they 
reject their own”; “the more they watch the more they will have doubts about national 
identity and nationalism”; and “young people cannot thoroughly experience and 
appreciate their own local culture”. This sense of cultural rejection concerns 
university students and it also expresses the reality of young people’s struggle to 
grasp just what Taiwanese identity might mean. As one student puts it well: “We all 
say we ‘love Taiwan’ but often without a sense of pride”. From this point of view, the 
daily exposure to different foreign cultures and the local appropriation of regional 
culture suggests not only a challenge to young people’s perception of Taiwanese 





Yi-jun stated in an interview: 
 
[I think] due to the fact that Taiwan as a nation is lacking legitimate 
recognition in the international community, the general public doubt the idea 
of Taiwanese identity or Taiwan as a nation. For instance, a lot of people have 
adopted English or Japanese names in the workplace. However, I do think it is 
good thing that we started learning English as a second language in 
elementary school. In doing so our English standard will be much improved 
(age 22, Female). 
 
Yi-jun’s interpretation of the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas and 
youth consumption of regional popular products is that it makes no difference as to 
why a lot of Taiwanese are learning English at an early age or have English names. 
To her, it is a way to gain better international recognition and of presenting Taiwan as 
a modern, advanced and globalised nation. To draw out her point further, it is difficult 
to imagine “Taiwan as a nation” without giving way to the idea of 
“globalisation/regionalisation as a way of modernisation”. The interaction between 
global/regional culture and local culture is, in this sense, mediated and negotiated by 
Yi-jun as a positive input in creating a modern Taiwan. The notion of cultural 
globalisation is then viewed as a process of positive cultural mixing and learning and 
perceived rather differently from the idea of cultural imperialism. Whereas some see 
the popularity of regional media commodities in Taiwan as a proof that we do not 
have culture or that it is under threat, others see the acceptance of them as an 
opportunity to create a “globalised” modern Taiwan. Thus, the popularity of regional 
popular culture and its relationship to a sense of Taiwanese identity is paradoxical, 
simultaneously constructive and undermining.  
 
The government’s nation-building has created a dynamic contested field (see Chang 
2004, pp. 33-44, Wang 2000, Chun 2000a, Law 2004, pp. 253-277). In my opinion, 
university students’ responses to the popularity of regional popular culture reflect this 
generation believes that adopting different foreign cultures is a way to mediate the 
ambivalent spaces between national subjective authenticity and cultural objective 
hybridity. For instance, one male student stated in the questionnaire that ‘The 
government tries to emphasise the notion of nativisation (localisation) in the 
education system and attempts to reintroduce local culture (the bentuhua movement), 
nonetheless, the foreign cultural invasion has caused some confusion in terms of the 
formation of a sense of Taiwanese identity’. Another noted that ‘as far as culture is 
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concerned, there is always a tendency for interweaving and merging with foreign 
culture, the important thing is to find the balance’. The meaning of foreign culture 
and its implications in this context is translated by university students as a way to 
formulate what cultural identity means in Taiwan and how we should selectively 
incorporate positive elements into our own. Their reactions to the consumption of 
regional popular culture and media reception of TV dramas can be explained as an 
important indication of how under the Taiwanisation paradigm, university students 
have accepted the meaning of cross-cultural media reception and the cultural logic of 
globalisation as a necessary nation-building strategy which can be used to fill 
Taiwan’s national cultural void. 
 
In another example which is more in tune with youth social behaviour, a female 
student writes that ‘There are some good and bad points. For instance, if we 
appropriate Japanese polite behaviour (politeness) and fashion sense, it is good. But if 
we imitate the character or behaviour from certain dramas such as when young girls 
become prostitutes to fulfil their materialistic desires then it is rather bad’. To me, 
university students displayed the symptoms of cultural anxiety which they constantly 
negotiate between their social-moral understanding of regional popular culture 
influence and transnational cultural imagery and appropriation. They often explore 
the extent to which “we are similar yet different from each other” or pose the question 
“which nation is more developed or advanced than the other” as well as frequently 
categorising what is “good” or “bad” for other young people in terms of their 
behaviour and consumption of regional popular media products. It occurred to me 
that university students’ reception of Japanese and South Korean popular culture in 
Taiwan over time is not simply about emotional connections and to be viewed as part 
of their daily practice of regional popular culture, but also inculcates a sense of socio-
political recognition that they strongly associated with the regional cultural flows. 
Therefore, it is necessary to view arguments about the transnational TV reception as a 
form of cultural intervention. The critical, sometimes self-righteous responses of 
these students to the popularity of regional media in Taiwan invoke complex political 
issues and cultural sensitivities, themselves hinging upon the conceptualisation of 




(Post)coloniality, modernity and locality: Taiwanese identity in the eyes 
of university students  
 
As I discuss in Chapter 3, the notion of cultural otherness and similarity represented 
in regional TV dramas has generated a particular form of media consumption 
amongst university students. This section explores how the national construction of a 
sense of Taiwanese identity is negotiated and questioned amongst university students 
in relation to regional popular culture flows. I argue that in the recognition of 
transnational media reception and cultural consumption of TV dramas, university 
students’ interpretations of the popular phenomenon of regional TV dramas also yield 
different understandings of the idea of “national identity” in Taiwan. The popular 
consumption of regional media and culture phenomenon generates different ways of 
social and cultural observation amongst university students. These ways enhance their 
awareness of the local historical past and current political discourse as the site of 
recognition and transformation of their understandings of Taiwanese identity. 
 
Taiwanese scholar Guo-cheng Sung in his Chinese book Postcolonial Discourse: 
From Fanon to Said (2003)argues: 
 
After the Second World War, Taiwan “skipped over” the historical process of 
decolonisation thanks to the supreme development of political and economic 
status which resulted in what I call Taiwan as a ‘modernised post-colonial 
nation. It manifests itself, on the one hand, in cultural dependency and 
consumption; on the other, the lack of national self-respect in relation to the 
circulation of popular culture and the phenomena of the ‘Japanese crazy tribe’ 
among the youth. Hence, the Taiwanese are in favour of global products, and 
have high acceptability and toleration towards Western cultural industries. 
The concrete evidence of this postcoloniality is the excessive cultural 
consumerism and fragmentary mimicry of urban cultures (Preface, pp. 16-17, 
my translation ). 
 
He further suggests:  
 
Taiwan’s modernisation was conceived by its colonial experience (Japan) and 
imperialist hegemony (America), under ‘dependent development’. A lot of 
Taiwanese have certain ‘nostalgic’ and ‘infatuation’ feelings towards both. 
Therefore, the idea of resisting cultural imperialism is always blurred and 
never urgent. Moreover, when globalisation is seen as a form of 
Americanisation around the world, the concept of globalisation is applied 
rather positively in Taiwan, as it represents advancement, modernisation, 
power and equality (ibid., p. 17, my translation)  
 
 195 
The notion of cultural imperialism, globalisation and postcoloniality, according to 
Sung’s observation, has been either neglected by or positively incorporated into 
modern national development within political and economic discourse in Taiwan. 
Thus the idea of national culture and nationalism has been purposely represented as 
either “Chinese”, “Taiwanese” or ‘hybrid’ accordingly. One student writes in his 
questionnaire, “Taiwan is very culturally hybrid, any foreign cultural products can be 
easily accepted and consumed in Taiwan; moreover Japan and Korea are both Orient 
(dong fang)” (my emphasis). From this perspective, the ideas of cultural hybridisation 
and geo-cultural proximity are justified by university students in making sense of 
youth consumption of Japanese and Korean popular culture. Although this respondent 
believes Taiwan is a “culturally hybrid” country and therefore can accept foreign 
cultures relatively easily, it seems nonetheless that the level of “foreignness” is only 
acceptable within the context of regional cultural “similarity” – we are all Oriental.  
 
When Japanese popular culture took Taiwanese society by storm in the early 1990s, 
apart from politicians and scholars warning that this is another form of “Japanese 
colonisation”, most people had a rather ‘nostalgic’ feeling and a positive attitude 
towards Japan in comparison to China or South Korea (Deans 2002). A twenty-three 
year old female student, Jia-ling, who I interviewed in a Japanese fast-food restaurant 
said: 
 
As a nation, I prefer Japan over South Korea, I have more positive feelings 
towards Japanese culture, people and things in general. I want to go there one 
day in search of unforgettable memories (age 21, Female, my emphasis).  
 
What she means by ‘unforgettable memories’ here is certainly not based on the past 
colonial experience but rather a memory in the making through the consumption of 
Japanese TV dramas and cultural products. In this sense, the reception of Japanese 
TV dramas has provided her with a sense of transnational connection with Japan. She 
further stated that: 
  
I enjoy reading Japanese travel magazines and watching Japanese TV 
programmes and therefore I have vivid images and cultural knowledge about 
Japan even though I have never been to the country. But one day I would like 
to go to see if Japan is just the way I imagine it would be. Japanese TV 
dramas (culture) have certainly impacted on me; it is very different from 
American culture, or other foreign culture for that matter. I think the level of 
memory connection is different.  
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When I asked her what she meant by “memory connection”? She replied, “I meant a 
historical connection, I am more familiar with the historical connection between 
Japan and Taiwan and therefore personally I am in favour of Japan in comparison to 
South Korea”. Jia-ling is an interesting example of, the way in which over the years, 
the popularity of Japanese TV dramas and cultural commodities has facilitated a 
sentiment of ‘nostalgia without lived experience or collective historical memory’ 
(Appadurai 1996, p. 78) even though in the tick box questionnaires she does not 
consider herself as an enthusiastic viewer of Japanese TV dramas. Yet when I 
interviewed her, she was able to provide a rather resourceful response about the genre 
of Japanese TV dramas and vividly reflected on her personal experience. In this 
instance, the modern transnational media reception and the consequence of 
postcoloniality somehow work together and facilitate her sense of shared sentiment 
and abstract connection, which she has never actual experienced in real life. In other 
words, Japanese TV dramas and their popular cultural products have created an 
imagined nostalgia which is close to what Fredric Jameson (1991) described as 
nostalgia without lived experience or collective historical memory, an “unforgettable 
memory” to use Jia-ling’s phrase to describe a memory that had never occurred in the 
first place.  
 
Thus in the case of Jia-ling, her cultural identification is not simply either with 
Taiwan or Japan. The notion of postcoloniality, in this instance, has been modified by 
her, becoming a positive historical conjuncture which is facilitated by the modern 
consumption of Japanese TV dramas. In this regard, the interplay between Taiwanese 
postcoloniality and Japanese modernity formulate a sense of ‘connectivity’, which led 
to Jia-ling’s positive identification with Japan not just in terms of its cultural 
supremacy but also as a nation. As a result, the modern cultural imagination 
expressed in Japanese TV dramas has become part of the repertoire of everyday life 
which is consumed, appropriated and reproduced amongst university students in 
culturally and politically complex ways. 
 
Another interviewee, Yi-jun, explicitly associated the term “strong nationalistic 
character” and “traditional value” with South Korea as a nation and ‘individualistic’ 
and ‘superior and modernised’ with Japan when we discussed her impression of the 
difference between these two regional TV dramas. It became obvious that her 
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viewing experience of these two regional TV dramas led her to construct personal 
perceptions of and comparison between these two nations rather than the TV dramas 
themselves. Hence, our conversation moved inexorably to questions concerns the 
nature of national identity. In response to my asking, what she thought about national 
and cultural identity in Taiwan, she responded:  
 
I do believe that there is a national identity in Taiwan but a rather superficial 
one; the older generation have a stronger and solid sense of belonging and 
more tradition. Nowadays, the [traditional] social values and beliefs have 
vanished, and therefore we can easily accept and be influenced by foreign 
cultures (age 22, Female). 
 
Such observations are repeated by Wan-yi, who said: 
   
I think the concept of national or cultural identity is really blurred in Taiwan, 
because it is the result of the pan-politicisation movement (fan-zhengzhi hua) 
in the late 1980s and of manipulation by the government and political parties 
(age 20, Female, my emphasis). 
 
The term ‘pan-politicisation’ is often used by local media, scholars, and cultural 
critics alike when suggesting that in post-martial law Taiwanese society people 
experience this politicisation of the everyday and of all identity-forming or 
confirming moments. In this context, Wan-yi’s association of ‘pan-politicisation’ and 
political manipulation with the construction of Taiwanese identity indicates how this 
generation has become alienated from such explicitly political acts. Arguably, in the 
late 1990s the DPP government adopted “Taiwanisation” as the ideology of nation-
building in its bid to forge national and cultural identity and to deemphasise Taiwan’s 
cultural connection with ‘traditional Chinese cultures’ and historical and political 
entanglement with the ‘motherland’ – China. Hence the concept of “Taiwan as an 
independent nation” is a form of political enunciation and ideological discourse 
which is not grounded in “popular cultural sensibility”. The formation of a national 
culture is narrowly based on the emphasis on the alternative language (i.e. Minnan) 
and manipulated for political purposes. What I mean by a lack of “popular cultural 
sensibility” is that the government’s emphasis on grassroots culture and the notion of 
locality (e.g. a sense of “our” community) has had the result that the notion of culture 
is often politicised and institutionalised as a way of distinguishing between being 
Taiwanese or Chinese. This choice between opposite political poles of the local or the 
(Chinese) national has not suited the sensibilities of younger generations.  Indeed, a 
 198 
lack of definite self-positioning in cultural subjectification promotes an unstable 
ground for this generation, which is reflected in this case in Yi-jun and Wan-yi’s 
sense of distrust and uncertainty about the notion of national and cultural identity.  
 
When we discussed why Japanese and Korean TV dramas and popular culture are 
easily accepted in Taiwanese society, Wei-ren, a 22-year-old male student who 
majors in Japanese Studies says:  
 
When I was child, I did not learn much about what is called ‘Taiwanese 
culture’ nowadays at school. I learnt things mainly about Chinese cultures. 
Therefore, for me Taiwanese culture is blurred and rootless. As a result, 
Taiwanese people are so easily influenced by foreign culture because 
Taiwanese people cannot find their own roots. Hence, in era of the cultural 
globalisation, we should try to prevent Taiwanese culture from being 
demolished (my emphasis).  
 
Within the discourse of cultural nationalism, Wei-ren’s sense of confusion is an 
example of this generation’s anxiety about losing a sense of “national/cultural 
identity” which was constructed through Chinese culture51: but not yet becoming 
Taiwanese. Despite, his sense of “rootlessness” in the end he insists there is such a 
thing as a Taiwanese culture, which needs to be defended. This suggests that the 
nation-building project in modern Taiwan remains culturally bounded. In other 
words, Taiwanese culture is something that is already there and waiting to be 
(re)discovered. 
 
The responses from the four university students (Jia-ling, Yi-jun, Wan-yi and Wei-
ren), based on their reading of the popular consumption of Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas in Taiwan, should therefore not be simply considered as cultural fads or 
young consumers who buy into the idea of the Japanese or Korean way of life. 
Rather, we should further explore and examine why, and in what particular context, 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas become alternative popular cultural elements and 
references that university students articulated and how that articulation is relates to 
the process of Taiwanisation. Our investigations show that university students’ 
general concerns and uncertainties, in particular in relation to the historical and 
cultural connection between Taiwan and China, are further complicated by the current 
                                                 
51
 I have previously discussed how the concept of culture or the cultural operates at many levels of 
public discourse – such as through a feeling of moral consciousness, habits of custom, shared political 
ideology in Chapter 5, Section 2. For further detailed discussions, see also Chun (1994a).  
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popularity of regional TV dramas and cultural products. Their anxiety or confusion 
manifested itself in several different ways. For instance, Yi-jun’s suggestion that 
traditional social values and beliefs are less solid amongst younger generations or in 
the comments of Wan-yi and Wei-ren, who both raised the issue that ‘cultural identity 
is blurred in Taiwan’ due to political manipulation and educational reform introduced 
in an attempt to construct a sense of Taiwanese national cultural identity.  
 
To a certain extent then, their sense of confusion has roots in changes to the state 
educational system in postwar Taiwan (see Chapter 5). The political transition 
subsequent upon the 1987 lifting of martial law facilitated the education reforms that 
have taken place since the mid-1990s. According to Thompson, ‘Education in Taiwan 
is a contested terrain, and is tied to debates over pedagogies and narratives of national 
identity’ (2009, p. 194). Some suggest that the educational reforms of the 1990s have 
provided a clear picture of Taiwan as an independent country or at least one aiming 
for that goal. By and large, the ‘Understanding/Knowing Taiwan’ (Renshi Taiwan) 
textbook was created within the ‘cultural localism’ discourse: generating, for 
example, a romantic nostalgia for communities past (grassroots culture) and the 
Japanese colonial experience and embracing optimistic interpretations of today’s 
globalism (see Mao and Chang 2005, Thompson 2009, pp. 182-197, Harrison 2006, 
pp. 194-197, Wang 2005, pp. 55-99).  
 
However, the constant reform of the education system and the ever changing contents 
of school textbooks have led to some confusion, especially as the ideological vision 
motivating the curriculum is often closely related to whichever political party is in 
power.
52
 The idea of Taiwan having a new spiritual ‘national’ identity, without 
clearly recognised nationhood within and beyond its geographical borders, can be 
viewed as being as perplexing for students as the lessons emphasising preparations 
required for the recovery of the mainland China from the Communists were the 
students in the past (Law 2002). It is clear from the university students’ responses that 
                                                 
52
 In 1997, a new subject was added to the new junior secondary school curriculum 
“Understanding/Knowing Taiwan” (Renshi Taiwan). However, it was attacked for being full of errors 
and over-politicised, e.g. the deliberate omission of Japanese colonial suppression, editorial prejudice 
against aborigines and women and the attempt at de-sinicisation. In 2001, a brand new education 
system, the Nine Grade Curriculum Alignment for Elementary and Junior High Education, was 
launched, integrating the curriculum of elementary and junior-secondary schools. The Renshi Taiwan 
textbook was removed from the new curriculum. Instead, the content covering Taiwan was distributed 
across a range of subjects (B-y Chang, 2004, pp. 36-40). 
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although effective politicisation (Taiwanisation) and socialisation means that 
educational institutions can provide a substantial definition of national culture and 
identification, the words ‘blur’, ‘ambivalence’, ‘confused’, ‘ambiguous’ and 
‘problematic’ were often applied when we discussed cultural and national identity. In 
short, far from being stable, cultural elements of national identity are increasingly 
contested, negotiated and subject to change in modern Taiwan. 
  
The fact that national identity is contestable and problematic has been explored by 
many Western scholars (see Anderson 1991, Gellner 1983, Smith 1991a, 1999, 
Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Anderson has noted that national identity is always 
used in the sense of its having ‘come into being’ (1991, p. 12). Gellner has defined it 
as an outcome of centralised political, educational and language unity via 
industrialisation; Hobsbawm and Ranger have underlined the notion of “invention” in 
the formation of national identity; while historical consciousness and sentiments 
which are territorially bounded and shared by a collective of individuals are 
emphasised by Smith. Thus, a sense of “nationness” as a shared place emerges as a 
by-product or as an object to be politically and culturally constructed.  For instance, 
Japanese researcher Satoshi Ota (2006) points out that when he conducted his 
fieldwork in Taiwan, the problem of translation arose because the English word 
‘identity’ is not easy to translate into Chinese. In Taiwanese academia, the term 
rentong is used as the translation of the word identity. However, rentong is initially 
closer in meaning to ‘agree with’ in Chinese. Ota considered that the term ‘Taiwanese 
consciousness’ (Taiwan yishi) might be better accepted by most Taiwanese people in 
order to grasp what Taiwanese identity might or could mean. Mark Harrison in his 
article ‘Where is Taiwanese identity?’ argues that ‘identity has become a key factor in 
the narrativisation of Taiwanese politics’ and furthermore ‘although much of [this 
scholarship] attempts to describe the historical, political and cultural processes by 
which the “rise of Taiwanese identity” is occurring, the act of description of identity 
slips into to becoming a statement of it’ (2005, p. 12). He also comments:  
 
Despite the claims of nationalists, politicians, and scholars to make definitive 
statement about Taiwan, Taiwan-as-meaning is never fixed. Rather, as it is 
being continually named by the production of statements about it, Taiwan is 
always at the moment of coming into being (Harrison 2006, p. 6).  
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From this perspective, a negation of other identities occurs; we are not Taiwanese yet 
we are not Chinese either. The search for a unique Taiwanese identity can only begin 
when we can selectively eliminate this sense of Chineseness. 
 
In my questionnaires, I used the term rentong (i.e. identity) but instead of referring to 
it as “Taiwanese identity”, (Taiwan rentong) I used ‘cultural/national identity in 
Taiwan’ (wenhua/guojia retong zai Taiwan). Although the term “national/cultural 
identity” is subject to a lot of debate, I chose to use it for two reasons. Firstly, the 
overall acceptance of the term identity in Taiwanese academia explains the search for 
national/cultural identity in Taiwan. Secondly, the term suggests a sense of ‘self-
identification’ (rentong) with Taiwan or/and China amongst the younger generation. 
Arguably, the political discourse on identity or identification has become a key factor 
in locating who is benshengren or waishengren
53
 and narrating Taiwanese or Chinese 
identity. In other words, the public understanding of the concept of identity has been 
shaped into ‘which side do you agree with’. As I have detailed above, the political 
transformation and the social phenomenon of Taiwanisation or localisation 
(bentuhua) has been pursued by the government since the mid-1990s. In this context, 
the younger generations’ arbitrary enunciation of “we are Taiwanese” is, to me, the 
result of a political construction of national identity cultivated by educational reforms 
and informed, for better or worse, by the separation between benshengren (as us) and 
waishengren (as them) discourse. Therefore the concept of identity or identification 
has interchangeable elements and is always in the process of ‘becoming’ in Taiwan’s 
context.  
 
In effect, national identity has been treated as a socio-political agenda. The anxiety 
about the search for Taiwanese identity amongst the younger generations who 
simultaneously embrace and consume globalisation and modernisation to varying 
degrees has proved to be an urgent social issue in Taiwan. With the government’s 
attempt to rewrite and reconstruct authentic and traditional Taiwanese histories and 
cultures at present, how do the young generations depict and imagine their cultural 
identification in relation to their experience of the consumption of foreign popular 
                                                 
53
 Benshengren, in effect, refers to two groups of Han Chinese who speak the Chinese dialects Minna 
or Hakka and migrated to the island pre-1945. Waishengren, is used to describe the mainland Chinese 
who followed Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan after the defeat of the Chinese Nationalist Party in 1949 and 
all their descendants born in Taiwan. Yuanzhumin refers to the original inhabitants of the island. 
During KMT rule they were forced to adopt Han Chinese customs. 
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cultures? And how might Japanese and Korean popular cultures (in this case, TV 
dramas) function in a mediated role in merging tradition with the modern to fulfil the 
younger generation’s desire and formulate a sense of awareness of cultural difference 
and political reality? The following analysis will provide new insights into the role of 
transnational media productions and their additional cultural and social meanings as 
they are assessed and constructed by a young audience attempting to make sense of 
political and social changes in Taiwan.  
 
 
University students as transnational cultural observers 
 
In the previous section I discussed how university students interpreted and 
incorporated the social and cultural phenomenon of the popularity of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas in the context of the question “what Taiwanese identity is” and to 
an extent, how we lack one. To a certain degree, Taiwanese youth’s consumption of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas can be seen as the formation of a new type of 
cultural imaginary community that transcends territorial boundaries. However, this 
‘cultural intimacy of TV drama’ (Ang 2004, pp. 303-309) shared by the young in 
modern East Asian societies through the consumption of popular cultural products 
does not necessarily form a ‘pan-East Asian identity’ or a sense of  “Asiannesss”. 
Rather it is a process of recognition of difference and similarity with respect to the 
foreign culture that is represented on screen – a cultural space that young people 
appropriate, negotiate, articulate and sometimes integrate into their daily practices. 
This research suggests the existence of complex levels of cultural recognition and 
reflectivity during the process of transnational media consumption and appropriation 
amongst young people. It seems indispensable therefore to look at the issues of 
cultural nationalism and hybridisation within the context of the current state effort to 
reconstitute national consciousness around globalisation and regionalisation. For this 
reason, this section focuses on young adult audiences as cultural observers and how 
the concept of ‘transnational cultural imagery’ has been shaped by regional popular 
culture flows and media consumption since the early 2000s. I apply the concept of 
‘cultural hybridisation’ and Homi Bhabha’s definition of ‘third space’ to emphasise 
university students’ transnational media consumption experience and their 
interpretations of this socio-cultural phenomenon. In so doing, I will suggest that their 
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sense of national identities, cultural positionalities and social practices are 
underpinned by their daily foreign culture encounters in Taiwan.  
 
Arguably, post-martial law Taiwan was not formed on a model of territorial 
belonging, but was based upon the idea of the local community (shequ zongti 
yingzao) and Taiwanisation, yet at the same time there has been openness to 
globalisation and regional integration (see Sung 2003, Wang 2000, pp. 93-117). 
Hence the construction of Taiwaneseness implies both the task of producing locality
54
 
and the notion of ‘cultural hybridisation’. According to Mark Harrison, ‘Taiwanese 
identity does not simply have a location and Taiwanese identity is as much nowhere 
as everywhere’ (2005, p. 10). In other words, Taiwan’s national consiousness is a 
highly mediated imaginary belonging which, in a sense, opens up a cultural space – a 
third space – where the negotiation of difference creates a sense of Taiwanese 
identity. From this perspective, it is important to explore how young Taiwanese 
incorporate their remembered past in their present sense of identity, and the role 
media consumption (in this case, Japanese and Korean TV dramas) plays in this 
process of cultural articulation and identification. 
 
In some countries, such as Brazil and India, the telenovelas/soap operas became a 
prime vehicle for creating elements of a national culture and spreading them amongst 
local and regional audiences (see Porto 2011, pp. 53-69, Gokulsing 2004). In Taiwan, 
locally produced soap operas might have similar elements that provide various 
traditional Taiwanese values such as the vernacular language, family values, local 
community commitment, moral correctness, cultural parochialism and so on.  
However, the audience is made up mainly of the older generation (mostly female) for 
this type of TV drama (Lin 2000, pp. 86-93). Most young female adults are more in 
favour of Japanese or Korean TV dramas than local-made ones (Iwabuchi 2002, 
Chapter 4, Lin 2006) although there has been a recent rise in popularity of Taiwanese 
Idol Dramas amongst teenagers (AGB Nielsen, 2008). For most university students, 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas are primarily resources consumed through their 
adolescence and later adulthood. This first encounter with Japanese TV dramas dated 
                                                 
54
 The term ‘locality’ is close to Appadurai’s definition of ‘a structure of feeling, a property of social 
life, and an ideology of situated community’ (1996, p. 189). 
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back to when they were junior secondary school students, and a few years later for 
Korean ones. However, Wan-yi admits that: 
    
I did not start watching Japanese TV dramas until I entered university. 
Because friends around me discussed them a lot, so I started to watch them 
and became quite interested in plots and storylines. I even bought some VCDs 
to catch up with those I missed (age 20, Female).  
 
Based on his research with young female audiences in Taiwan, Koichi Iwabuchi 
suggests that ‘the popularity of Japanese TV dramas is best measured not by ratings 
but by their central role in the daily gossip of young people’ (2002, p. 142) My 
research has suggested that the intensity of daily discussions on Japanese (and 
Korean) TV dramas has declined based on the outcome of the questionnaires (around 
47.4 per cent – Sometimes; 15.1 per cent – Often and 5 per cent – Always, see 
Appendix 3). Nonetheless many university students display a more “critical” attitude 
to youth popular consumption of these two regional TV dramas. For instance, either 
through questionnaires or interviews, university students often confidently point out 
what they like or dislike about Japanese and Korean TV dramas. Furthermore, they 
actively compare these two types of dramas in terms of different approaches, e.g. 
storyline, professional shooting skills, setting, acting and so on. Arguably, since the 
early and late 1990s Japanese and Korean TV dramas have settled nicely on 
Taiwanese TV channels and they are penetrating young people’s everyday lives. 
However, the idea of ‘TV dramas as daily gossip’ no longer adequately explains the 
media consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas, and the phenomenon has 
manifested itself in a more complicated fashion over the years. Thus, one needs to 
question the role which Japanese and Korean TV dramas play in the formation of 
youth cultural identification within Taiwan’s nation-building process and cultural 
localisation (bentuhua) movement. This should not be in terms of media effects or 
impacts but rather how university students incorporate the otherness into their 
everyday life, which in turn generates their sense of cultural and social belonging.      
 
The consumption of foreign TV dramas certainly does not necessarily provide 
insights into what actual lives are like “over there”, considering the melodramatic 
content (e.g. kidnapping, baby switching, love affairs, etc.). Yan-chi, a twenty year 
old female exchange student at university in South Korea for one year, said:  
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Even though I study Korean language in the university and watched a fair 
amount of Korean TV dramas while I was in Taiwan, it still was a bit of 
cultural shock when I arrived in Seoul. I thought that the average living costs 
in Korea would be cheaper than in Taiwan, but in fact they were more 
expensive.
55
 I also saw many Korean people spit on the streets and a lot 
homeless people wander around the tube stations (age 19, Female). 
 
When I asked her ‘what was the most memorable experience when you were there?’, 
she replied: 
 
the drinking culture; a lot of university students meet up at the pub for drinks 
after class, it seems a typical way to socialise with others which I found rather 
interesting and very different from university life we have in Taiwan. 
 
After living in South Korea for one year, she recognised a certain degree of socio-
cultural familiarity and difference. In this instance, Yan-chi’s early transnational TV 
viewing experience encouraged her to be an active cultural observer.  
 
In another interesting perspective on the popularity of Korean TV dramas in Taiwan, 
Wang-wang
56
 a 21-year-old male student, emphasises the changes in the general 
public’s attitude and perception towards Koreans or South Korea as a nation: 
 
When I was in elementary school, because of my accent and my background 
sometimes I got bullied. Because at that time most people did not have much 
knowledge about South Korea as a country and in a way looked down on us. 
Nowadays, I can really feel the difference and how being able to speaking 
Korean is kind of trendy and being Chinese-Korean is more acceptable in 
Taiwanese society. I think our status as Chinese-Korean has much “improved” 
due to the popularity of Korean TV dramas and its cultural popular products 
in Taiwan.    
 
Exposure to Korean and Japanese TV dramas has created an information resource to 
be appropriated and interpreted. Government discourses constructed around both 
tradition and modernity are navigated by young Taiwanese audiences in the light of 
reflexive interpretations of this resource. Ya-chi’s experience in Korea illustrates this 
complex mediation of cultural difference.  
                                                 
55
 Based on my interviews and from questionnaire responses (see Chapter 3), I conclude that many of 
them believe that Taiwan was more ‘advanced’ and ‘modernised’ than South Korea both culturally and 
economically. They also often categorised Taiwan as a nation ‘behind’ Japan but ‘ahead of’ Korea in 
terms of modernisation.  
56
 Wang-wang is my informant’s nickname. His parents are both from Taiwan but had spent ten years 
in Seoul before moving back to Taiwan permanently. Wang-wang was born in Seoul and spent part of 
his childhood in South Korea, nonetheless, he did have most of his school education in Taiwan. He 
was in Grade 3 when his family moved back to Taiwan.    
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Many Taiwanese postcolonial studies scholars believe that Japanese culture has been 
deeply imbricated into everyday life even after the end of colonisation. It is not 
perceptible because to some extent it is already embodied within Taiwanese society 
(Chen 2000). When Japanese researcher Satoshi Ota conducted his research about 
Japanese popular culture in Taiwan, people often told him: “Oh, you can see that 
everywhere” (2006, p. 116, my emphasis). According to John Tomlinson, the idea of 
complex connectivity and global-spatial proximity is not the same thing. Rather, 
through the process of connectivity the sense of proximity can be elaborated. He 
views proximity as a primarily phenomenological issue that arises in people’s lived 
experience of globalisation as inherently local and embodied (1999, pp. 2-4). For 
instance, he points out how the relationship between air travel (as a means of 
connection) and a sense of global “closeness” (i.e. cultural proximity/intimacy) has 
falsely celebrated the idea of globalisation, which ignored the complicated 
interactions and uneven accessibility from the local level. Nonetheless, I find that 
both the terms connectivity and proximity are particularly useful in terms of 
understanding the relations between the audience’s “sentimental connectivity” and 
“cultural proximity” in the transnational media consumption of TV dramas. I would 
argue that a sense of connectivity indeed facilitated a notion of cultural proximity but 
more importantly one should also question: ‘Whose cultural connectivity and 
proximity?’ In other words, have we as Taiwanese culturally practised and inscribed 
Japanese beliefs, values, knowledge, behaviour norms as well as its overall style of 
life without noticing? For example, Wei-ren said during an interview: 
 
I have been to Japan six times in the past three years. Although I visited 
several different cities, I went to Hokkaido three times alone. I like the climate 
and people there and feel a sense of connection and familiarity with the place 
when I am there. And also it corresponds closely to Japanese life as I imagine 
it. I think], Japanese TV dramas depict quite well what real life is in Japan 
(age 22, Male, my emphasis).   
 
Thus these TV dramas can serve to confirm our own images of other nations 
(themselves obtained through media consumption). Wei-ren’s preference for the city 




a ‘mediated worldliness’: our sense of the world which lies beyond the sphere 
of our personal experience, and our sense of our place within this world, are 
increasingly shaped by mediated symbolic forms (1995, p. 34).  
 
We know about places and times that we have not personally visited and such 
knowledge informs our subsequent encounters. In other ways, even though they do 
not occupy the place, it was like finding again, in one’s imagination or memory, an 
already familiar idealised landscape. Wei-ren’s sense of connection with the city of 
Hokkaido in Japan also warns us that the idea of “a place bounded sense of 
belonging” is under challenge from the disjuncture of global media flows (Appadurai 
1996, chapter 2). His transnational imagination of Japan is close to ‘deterritorised 
memory’ (Martin-Barbero 1993, p. 27), which is highly mediated by media 
consumption (e.g. the way of life depicted in TV dramas).  
 
The definition of ‘deterritorised memory’, according to Spanish-Colombian media 
scholar Jesus Martin-Barbero, ‘is the appearance of cultures or subcultures not linked 
to territorial memories’ (1993, p. 27, original emphasis) but bound to the 
transnational commercial media markets. He argues that:  
  
In contrast with written cultures that are linked directly to languages and 
therefore to a territory, the cultures of images and music of television and 
video that produce new cultural communities [are] difficult to compare or 
understand in relation to a given territory. These are not only new cultures, but 
youth cultures, and are frequently accused of being antinational because they 
have no roots in a given territory. However, they are not so much antinational 
as they are a new way of perceiving identity. They are identities with shorter, 
more precarious time spans and a flexibility allowing them to bring together 
ingredients from different cultural worlds …. (ibid., my emphasis) 
 
The dynamic interactions between youth and transnational media and the formation 
of youth culture and identification have mobilised and created a notion of cultural 
hybridisation (see Garcia Canclini 1995, 1997, Kraidy 2005, Chapter 1) across the 
territorial boundary, which activates social imagination. The fact that Japanese and 
Korean popular media/cultural products have become a key referential cultural 
element and social practice in everyday life in Taiwanese society suggests that the 
link between transnational media flows and the formation of cultural identification 
has become intensified and profoundly hybridised. And this relationship should also 
be looked at from the point of view of the construction of national and cultural 
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identity, which itself is highly imagined, mediated and negotiated, unruly, 
deterritorised and hybridised.  
 
On the issues of “What is Taiwanese identity?” in relation to the cultural consumption 
of regional popular media products, Jia-ling stated in an interview that:  
 
I believe that this sense of ‘cultural identity’ is (re)created in Taiwan, it is not 
permanent, [is] often fragmented and without a sense of solidity. Therefore, 
the appropriation of other cultures just another way of understanding ‘what is 
Taiwanese identity’. I think it has a positive impact on me. For example, I 
sometimes compare the difference between Japanese and Korean culture or 
American culture, I often find myself more drawn to Japanese culture, which 
gets me thinking why. But of course, it does not necessarily mean that I want 
to live in Japan or become Japanese (age 21, Female).  
 
In this instance, Jia-ling’s interpretation of the relationship between cultural identity 
and foreign cultural influence is through reflexively self-applied knowledge. To her, 
the popularity of Japanese and Korean culture in Taiwan is a social phenomenon that 
developed out of transnational cultural entanglements and media flows. In her view, 
transnational media consumption has paved the way for rethinking what it means to 
be Taiwanese and what constitutes a sense of Taiwaneseness proving that this 
meaning of being/becoming Taiwanese is always debatable and often fragmented on 
the island.  
 
During my interview with Wan-Yi, she was rather reluctant to talk about the issue of 
‘cultural identity’, but towards the end of out time together she suggested that: 
 
I think the reason why Taiwanese people embrace the idea of globalisation or 
Japanese and Korean popular culture is because we often emphasise the idea 
of having an ‘international point of view.’ Personally, I think it is difficult to 
answer the question ‘what is Taiwanese cultural identity?’ To me it is 
something that the government tries to scrape/patch together (age 20, Female).  
 
Wan-yi’s response highlights the problematic political construction of a sense of 
Taiwanese identity which has generated a new form of anxiety and precariousness 
amongst young generations since the 1990s. In other words, local political transitions 
in combination with the idealisation of globality in the attempt to formulate Taiwan 
as a hybrid and internationalised country gives the impression that cultural 
identification is always fragmented and subject to change. And it is from this 
perspective that the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas and pop culture as 
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a socio-cultural phenomenon are often negotiated by local young adults in terms of 
making sense of cultural/national identity. 
 
In a similar vein, Wei-ren adds: 
 
Personally, I am quite disappointed and frustrated with the government and 
politicians. I think that they have not made any effort to develop Taiwanese 
(popular) culture. Besides I really do not think that university students talk or 
care about cultural identity in general. The consumption of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas is just part of youth popular culture. There are still many 
young people who are anti-Japan or anti-Korea in Taiwan. If you look on the 
internet, the political dispute between Japan and Korea is rather obvious as 
well. I think the important thing is that we need to learn and educate younger 
generations about Taiwanese identity itself (age 22, Male). 
 
Wei-ren’s comment is an illustrative example of how young people’s sense of identity 
anxiety is made manifested by frustration with and distrust of government policy and 
lack of faith in the competence of politicians. Yet they still believe that the 
government should establish Taiwanese culture and identity to consolidate a sense of 
being Taiwanese. Furthermore, he rationally points out the political tension and 
historical entanglement amongst Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, which also suggests 
that despite the intra-Asian popular cultural flows and its popularity amongst young 
people in the region the idea of “pan-Asian identity” remains questionable and 
contested. The regional popular cultural/media flows might have inspired a sense of 
cultural intimacy and created a transnational collective cultural imagery amongst 
younger generations in East-Asian countries but this flow is neither symmetrical nor 
without resistance from the local level.   
 
Based on the above responses, I would argue that the Taiwanese young adult’s 
consumption of regional popular culture and commodities should not simply be 
considered as a form of disconnection between national identity and its local 
revitalisation through a community-building project. It should be considered through 
an analysis of the tensions between cultural similarity and difference, which are 
negotiated by young people in different ways. This appropriation of transnational 
cultural imaginary should not be explained merely as short span youth infatuation 
with foreign popular culture but as a more complex cultural articulation and 
embodiment which can be maintained in different contexts. Consequently, regional 
popular cultural flows may be understood as necessary elements that are integrated 
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into the process of the construction of cultural identity in Taiwan, which does not rule 
out the possibility of formulating a sense of national stability.      
 
Following early research on the consumption of Japanese TV dramas and cultural 
indeterminacy, according to Taiwanese scholar Yu-fen Ko: 
 
The criticism and debates concerning Japanese popular culture in Taiwan in 
many ways portray the anxieties circling around Taiwan’s cultural 
imaginations….the Japanese colonisation of Taiwan in the past is surely 
traumatic, while today’s Japanese culture, especially the television drama, 
ironically provides Taiwan with a blueprint of modernity. Thus, Taiwan’s 
nationalistic imagination is torn – and born – between the haunting trauma 
from the past and the flattering modernity of the future (2004b, pp. 115-116). 
 
In other words, with its cultures often suppressed or used as a political tool in Taiwan, 
the island marginalised its own political authority and consistently searched for 
hegemonic powers (America or Japan) in order to survive under the threat of China. 
As Yang rightly observed, the Taiwanese government views culture as central to 
identity politics which is rooted in the local community and the traditional way of 
life, and thus is seen as central to the formation of Taiwanese consciousness. This 
view of culture coincides with and is part of the Bentuhua (localisation/nativisation) 
movement of the early to mid-1990s (Yang 2008, p. 199). Within the context of this 
cultural movement and socio-political changes, university students are not only filled 
with anxiety about losing their “not so solid” identification as Taiwanese, but also 
anxious about engaging a new identity as “Asian citizens” when they are lured by 
Japanese and Korean popular cultures. The complex of subjectivities is evident in a 
variety of levels of media consumption. One student writes in her questionnaire: 
‘Nowadays, Taiwan is in the process of cultural construction through its education 
system, and meanwhile the invasion of foreign popular cultures makes most of young 





University students generally believe that the consumption of Japanese and Korean 
TV dramas have more negative than positive effects on the younger generations, 
which I suggest is partly because they contribute to the perception of cultural 
imperialism. For them, Japanese and Korean TV dramas function as ‘image banks’ 
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not only for beliefs, values, knowledge and behavioural norms, but also as a way of 
life. More importantly their representations as regional cultural otherness can 
potentially threaten but at the same time enrich Taiwanese identity. Robertson’s 
(1992) notion of ‘glocalisation’, how people in local settings translate global cultural 
flows, depends very much on the cultural and social background from which they 
come. What they generally believe is that a nation can avoid being culturally totalised 
or homogenised as long as they have a culture that is distinctly theirs. Nonetheless, 
Taiwanese national cultural development, “Taiwanisation” or 
“localisation/nativisation”, has been guided by a multicultural conception that 
pursued integration of Taiwaneseness and globalisation and separation from 
Chineseness. Hence, we might ask once more is there a distinct Taiwanese culture? 
Maybe not, but to a certain extent what has happened to younger generation’s 
identities is what Martin-Barbero famously defined as, ‘the forging of identities ever 
less rooted in the past, more precarious and yet also more flexible, capable of 
amalgamating, of allowing to coexist within single subject, elements from highly 
diverse cultural universes’ (2002, p. 639).  
 
To conclude, I argue that the process of making sense of Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas comes to be a way of constructing an answer to the question ‘What is 
Taiwanese identity?’ for university students, not only by recognising cultural 
difference or similarity but by negotiating and translating their concept of Taiwan’s 
identity both politically and culturally. In the process of this temporality of 
negotiation, articulation and integration of regional cultural flows, young university 
students constantly reposition their idea of Taiwan in relation to Japan and South 

















We have “Taiwan Jingshen”!:  
Teenage audiences’ negotiation of regional popular TV dramas, 





Chapter 6 discusses university students’ perceptions of regional popular culture flows 
and the popularity of media products in Taiwan as inescapable foreign cultural 
elements that are intertwined with the nation-building process. Their perceptions are 
often closely associated with concepts such as “cultural assimilation”, “cultural 
proximity” and “cultural Taiwanisation”, modernisation and globalisation. Some have 
more negative approaches than others, yet it is undeniable that regional popular 
culture is important for the formation of their daily life and the conceptualisation of 
others, whether this is positive admiration or negative. Their anxiety is often rooted in 
the relationship between the popularity of regional popular culture and how youth 
have been subjected to this foreign cultural “invasion” due to a lack of their own 
culture. For instance, the fear of Japan’s colonising soft power and/or younger 
generations drowning in the Korean wave is to them a sign that they are edging 
towards displacing local culture. In addition, university students displayed a sense of 
distrust and confusion about the notion of Taiwanese identity in terms of political 
enunciations and local cultural reinvention, and how this manifested itself in their 
negotiation of regional popular culture consumptions and appropriations. 
 
Chapter 7 shows the outcome of four group discussions with secondary school 
students, in which the notion of national/cultural identity in Taiwan was semi-
constructed in our discussion. The concept and definition of identity caused some 
confusion amongst students which I shall discuss and elaborate upon in the second 
section. It is necessary to emphasise that during my group discussions the follow up 
question was ‘why do you think Japan or South Korea as a nation is better than 
Taiwan?’. It was not my initial intention to discuss the concept of Taiwanese identity 
nor did I imply that regional popular culture consumption affects the idea of cultural 
identity in Taiwan. Nonetheless, the use of the term Taiwanese identity during the 
group discussion with secondary school students led me to an engagement with 
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education curriculum reforms and the reproduction of locality (bentu wenhua/xiangtu 
wenxue
57
), which has been incorporated in school textbooks and extra-curricular 
activities since the late 1990s. 
 
The young viewers whom I interviewed between 2003 and 2005 were still in the 
process of receiving formal education; therefore their understanding and 
interpretation of national and cultural identities often immediately referred to school 
textbooks (e.g. Renshi Taiwan). The new curriculum, ‘Understanding Taiwan’ 
(Renshi Taiwan), was introduced to junior secondary students from 1997 onwards. 
According to Wing-wah Law (2002, p. 35) there were four major differences with 
political and cultural identity policy under KMT rule. First, Taiwan is no longer 
described as peripheral to the Republic of China but as a political entity, the ‘ROC of 
Taiwan’ in, of and by itself. Second, the Taiwan government appeals for the 
construction of ethnic solidarity and the fostering of a common and shared identity, 
the ‘Taiwanese people’ (Taiwan ren) with ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ (Taiwan yishi), 
rather than Chinese. Third, the ‘Taiwan people’ are encouraged to further develop the 
‘spirit’ (jingshen) or ‘soul’ (hun) of Taiwan, which is inherited from the attitudes and 
lifestyles of the ‘Taiwan people’ who have fought for their own independence against 
external powers for centuries. Fourth, ‘Taiwan people’ are described as ‘masters’ of 
their past and future (ibid., p. 75).  
 
For example, the notion of “Taiwan spirit” (Taiwan jingshen) was raised on different 
occasions in group discussions by participants to consolidate their understanding of 
being Taiwanese. It is worth highlighting also that this is the generation that went 
through the drastic political and educational transformation of Taiwan since the late 
1990s. Based on the group discussion, I suggest that secondary school students have 
begun to view themselves in relation to a reconstructed sense of place (i.e. Taiwan as 
a nation/political polity) via the state education system, replacing the space of the 
polity, discourse and culture that was previously defined as the “Republic of China”. 
This became a starting point for my consideration of the reform of the educational 
system and school curriculum in combination with an emphasis on locality (i.e. 
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 According to Mark Harrison (2006, p. 145) ‘The term xiangtu that can be translated as “nativist” or 
literally “native soil” has been most fully elaborated in the debates associated with the nativist 
literature movement in the 1970s as xiangtu wenxue ... Another term, bentu wenhua, or “local culture,” 
is part of broader debates on Taiwanese identity and nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s around the 
transition to the democracy, the end of KMT rule, and the continuing threat of mainland China’. 
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grassroots culture) since the mid-1990s. This consideration also included the 
(re)discovery of Taiwaneseness (as opposed to Chineseness
58
), the construction of 
native Taiwanese consciousness (e.g. Taiwan jingshen) and how they are shaped 
through shared points of commonality in local culture (such as language, community 
spirit). Another key element is the grounding of Taiwaneseness in the Renshi Taiwan 
textbook as an educational guideline in the process of narrating a sense of Taiwanese 
identity.  
 
If the notion of Taiwanese identity is always subjective and relational as Mark 
Harrison suggests in Legitimacy, meaning, and knowledge in the making of 
Taiwanese identity (2006), it is within this political context that the younger 
generation often experience a sense of displacement. My review of regional popular 
culture flows and their implications for the local social formation of Taiwanese 
identity suggests that the younger generation’s attempt to incorporate their desires for 
national independence with a transnational cultural identity into a new elucidation of 
Taiwanese consciousness is discussed more explicitly in third section.  
 
The relationship between the state education system reforms and socio-political 
change in Taiwan can be examined by focusing on curriculum design and the 
introduction of the Renshi Taiwan textbooks to junior secondary schools in 1997. 
These reforms are significant for the formation of a sense of Taiwanese identity and 
what it means to be Taiwanese to young people, which will be the central discussion 
in this chapter. Overall this chapter explores the following questions: do regional 
popular media products challenge local youth’s cultural and national identity 
formation, and what is the role of the education system in their affirmation of being or 
becoming Taiwanese? Can this process of self-reflexivity and cultural differentiation 
be seen as a more productive way by a consideration of transnational TV dramas? 
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 According to Gungwu Wang ‘the Chinese never had a concept of identity, only a concept of 
Chineseness, of being Chinese and of becoming un-Chinese’ (1988, p. 1).  
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Transnational TV viewing and cultural impressions of its others: The 
(un)importance of modernisation and “Asianisation”  
 
As I stated in Chapter 6, university students often perceive the popular consumption 
of regional TV dramas and pop culture in Taiwan as a foreign threat to Taiwanese 
youth’s cultural identity, leading to the destruction of local culture. University 
students recognise this crisis of identity, which is both cultural and national, as a 
reason why Japanese and Korean TV dramas are well received and widely consumed 
in Taiwan. The linkage between (the lack of) cultural identity and the popularity of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas made by university students suggests that identity as 
a problem or crisis is deeply rooted in modern Taiwanese society, becoming 
complicated further by regional popular culture flows. This section demonstrates how 
secondary school students respond to the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas and the differences that they exhibit when compared with university students 
in terms of their engagement with regional TV dramas. 
 
Taiwanese identity was not my initial research concern; rather my interest was in the 
reasons why young audiences like or dislike those regional TV dramas in terms of 
differences in content and elements of attraction in regional TV dramas and 
transnational viewing experiences. Yet the research participants inevitably discussed 
the term culture (wenhua) or local Taiwanese culture when referring to the cultural 
differences between the three nations. At the beginning of the group discussions 
comments on what young audiences found attractive or enjoyable elements from 
those TV dramas ranged from:  
 
Japanese culture is more attractive, their cultural literacy (wenhua suyang) is 
more advanced, people are polite and sophisticated, have a good fashion sense 
and appearance (Yi-zhen, age 17, Female); 
 
I am quite interested in the history of the Korean War and (South) Korea as a 
country in general. Their culture and tradition seems rather different from us. 
This sense of curiosity also gives me motivation to learn the Korean language 
so that I can understand this country better (Jia-ying, age 17, Female);  
 
My first impression of the Korean people in terms of appearance is that most 
of their eyes are with single-edged eyelid. I want to know the country and its 




Their transnational viewing experience and overall cultural impression of Japan and 
Korea takes place at a comparative level, not only in terms of the dramas’ content and 
production quality (discussed in Chapter 4) but also in relation to its appearance, 
cultural similarities/differences, ways of life, national characters and so forth. It is 
with this sense of “comparativeness” that some students begin to mention the term 
Taiwanese identity and culture difference between Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. 
 
In the discussion on cultural differentiation amongst these three nations some are 
more self-critical than others and less confident about their view of Taiwan as a 
nation and its reputation:  
 
I don’t think other countries have a good impression of Taiwan (Wen-ling, 16 
Female) 
 
I feel that Taiwanese people do not respect others. When I am watching 
Japanese TV dramas, I often feel that to a certain degree Taiwan can never 
achieve what Japan has accomplished as a nation (Yu-ling, 17, Female).  
 
Despite the above comments being made separately during different group 
discussions, what they represent collectively is that young teenagers differentiate 
between Japan, Taiwan and South Korea in several respects. In the following 
comments, a pro-Japanese sentiment was still relatively recognisable amongst 
secondary school students: 
 
Japanese culture is very attractive and modernised, they have better self-
discipline, people are generally polite, have a good fashion sense and look 
cute (Jia-ying age 13, Female); 
 
I like Japan and have a good impression of the country. I would like to visit 
the country and also learn the language, I think Japanese guys are cute 
although they are rather short (Wen-ling, age 16, Female);   
 
I think products made in Japan are generally of better quality and more 
delicate than Taiwan-made. But not (South) Korea I think the country is less 
developed in comparison to Taiwan. When I watch Korean TV dramas it 
seems that they are not really modernised (Xiao-han, age 16, Female, my 
emphasis).  
 
Overall the cultural affection toward Japan does not exclude a link to the reception of 
Japanese TV dramas or programmes; the younger generations often yearn for Japan-
inspired modernity according to Ko’s article ‘The Desired form: Japanese idol dramas 
in Taiwan’ (2004b). This yearning can be found in the audience’s interpretation of 
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real settings and the reality of the TV dramas. This sense of reality or what I call the 
“representation of better reality” becomes a common form of cultural desire and 
practice amongst young generations in Taiwanese society. This ranges from language 
learning, visiting popular TV shooting/sight-seeing spots, pop culture consumption to 
culinary culture obsession (i.e. Japanese restaurants, supermarkets and department 
stores). The popularisation of these common cultural activities and practices by TV 
dramas and other media products discussed in Chapter 3 and 4 has become an 
important cultural referential resource for younger generations.  
 
Despite the political transformation and economic growth in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the interpretation of local Taiwanese culture in relation to traditional Chinese 
culture has been left out of the public sphere, political discourse and the state 
education curriculum. It was not until the late 1990s that the recognition of local 
values, traditions and grassroots culture became deliberately inscribed into the school 
curriculum. The government has redefined the meanings attributed to the Taiwanese 
people (Taiwan ren) in the school curriculum by focusing on the learning of native or 
aboriginal languages and their cultures and histories. This reform occurred in parallel 
to the political power shifting from the KMT government to the DPP after the 
Presidential election in 2000. As Ho Wai-chung notes: 
 
Localisation (or indigenisation or Taiwanisation) is a political term used 
within Taiwan to support the view of Taiwan as a unique place, rather than as 
solely an appendage to mainland China…. Localisation is also regarded as a 
way to de-sinicisation. In the political culture of Taiwan, de-sinicisation refers 
to a decrease in cultural ties with mainland China in favour of local Taiwanese 
culture. This involves the teaching of Taiwanese history, geography and 
culture from a local perspective, as well as promoting languages native to 
Taiwan, including Holo, Hakka and aboriginal languages (2007, p. 467).  
 
Parallel to the Taiwanisation movement, the consumption of Japanese TV dramas 
generates another desired form of postcolonial mimicking amongst young audiences, 
ranging from cultural preference, nationality, quality of life, etc., which is arguably 
less obvious in the case of Korean dramas.
59
 The idea of modernisation and its 
association with Japanese culture as desirable is represented in TV dramas and 
popular cultural products, suggesting that youth transnational viewing of regional TV 
                                                 
59
 The popularity of Korean popular culture and its cultural implications in the formation of youth 
cultural practice has gradually become more explicit since I conducted my research (see. H-m. Kim, 
2005; S-y Sung, 2010). 
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drama and its cultural implications within the on-going nation-building project has 
generated a complex and contested field of cultural identification. In the course of 
searching for national and cultural roots in Taiwan within the context of regional 
popular culture flows, young Taiwanese are driven forward to discover, recognise and 
negotiate their understandings of Taiwanese consciousness and identification. From 
the point of view of rediscovering and embarking on a quest for a sense of 
Taiwaneseness, one can conclude that Japan as a cultural other remains an important 
reference point in the imagination of Taiwan as a nation. To a certain extent, the 
modern transnational media consumption of Japanese culture amongst the younger 
generations echoes Phil Deans’ point: 
 
Taiwan is perhaps unique in Asia as the only country where the Japanese are 
regarded in a positive light by large sectors of the population of all 
generations… Furthermore, as younger Taiwanese attempt to establish an 
identity that is distinct from the preferred meaning of ‘Chinesenesss’ 
promoted by Beijing, pro-Japanese sentiment is used as a means of 
demonstrating difference (2002, p. 89)  
 
This complexity of inspirations in the search for Taiwanese identity can also be found 
in the political discourse on pan-East Asian identity. For example, Chun-han’s 
response to the popularity of regional TV dramas and the possibility of transregional 
cultural identity suggests that her sense of anxiety is informed by a conflict between 
locality cultivated by the local government and a desire for modernisation. She states: 
 
I think that pan-Asian identity as a way of modernisation will create cultural 
conflicts (wenhua chongji) in Taiwan. For instance, the government wants to 
preserve some local elements and cultural traditions in order to attract tourists, 
but the general public might prefer a more modernised and better lifestyle. In 
this sense, it would create a certain degree of tension (age 17, Female).  
 
Her comments indicate that locality and traditional values are less important for her 
than modernisation which in turn suggests that her understanding and feeling of the 
reality of being Taiwanese is contested within the global vs. local and modern vs. 
tradition debate. The connection she made between the popularity of regional TV 
dramas and their impact on local life is evidence of her ambivalence in her ‘desire 






A similar remark is made by Yuan-xuan: 
 
I think there is a possibility of ‘pan East-Asian identity.’ Nowadays the flow 
of information and communication products [occurs] without any territorial 
restriction. For instance, you can easily see another country’s lifestyle and 
cultural similarity and difference on television programmes. In this sense, you 
have more knowledge about other counties and can understand each other 
better (age 17, Female).   
 
Transnational media reception and the cultural image flows in everyday life play a 
crucial role in this respect. In contrast, Singaporean scholar Chua considers this 
question to be ‘conceptually and substantively ambitious’:  
 
The process of individual identity formation is one of unending layering and 
interaction of cultural knowledge acquisition. In this constellation of inputs 
leisure activities, such as pop culture consumption, are for most people largely 
residual, engaged in only after the necessary routines of everyday life are 
done. Unlike other spheres of everyday life, such as family, formal education 
or work, there are no social institutions that can enforce compliance and 
payoffs in pop culture consumption. In addition, pop culture products are 
always short-lived (2006, p. 35).  
 
For Chua, the relationship between the consumption of popular culture and its 
consumers is weak and temporary. Ironically he also points out that under certain 
circumstances popular culture can alter or interfere with personal relationships and 
perceptions of others. For instance, he believes that ‘one cannot deny the possibility 
that many middle-aged Japanese women may have permanently changed their 
attitudes towards Koreans as a consequence of watching the Korean TV drama Winter 
Sonata and idolised its star, Bae Yong Joon’ (Chua 2008, p. 109). Regional TV 
dramas in this perspective are seen as a cultural medium producing a sense of 
admiration for other nations (or a particular individual). This change of attitude or 
stereotype is often seen as irrational and often happens with a female or young 
audience. Thus it can be easily discredited as temporary or weak in terms of 
transnational cultural identification (also see Kim 2009). The experience of secondary 
school students with transnational media and cultural otherness as everydayness 
means that their regional TV drama viewing experience has been partly integrated 
into their formation of a sense of Taiwanese identity. Their cultural impressions of 
Japan and Korea have been cultivated by TV, pop music and idol group worship and 
have become gradually incorporated into their sense of their own national identity. To 
sum up, the identity dimension of the development of the national idea in Taiwan is 
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closely interwoven with regional popular culture flows and structured around the 
notions of modernisation, nationalism and cultural uniqueness. This process of 
cultural differentiation for the younger generation has gradually become inscribed 
into their sense of Taiwanese identity and what it means to have a cultural and 
national identity.   
 
 
The Narration of Taiwaneseness: Teenage audiences’ translation of 
Taiwan Jingshen and the role of Renshi Taiwan textbooks  
 
During my field research in 2003 and 2005 the construction of Taiwanese 
consciousness through educational reforms was reflected in secondary students’ 
responses to and perception of the popularity of regional popular cultural 
commodities. The politics of identity formation in Taiwan in particular often 
appeared in either a self-consciously analytical approach or arbitrary enunciation (e.g. 
Taiwan Jingshen (Taiwan spirit); Taiwan zhi guang (Taiwan’s glory)). Empirical 
analysis of how the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas is experienced, 
interpreted and negotiated by young Taiwanese audiences, allow me to further 
explore the ways in which education reforms highlight cultural localisation and 
national anxiety in the process of Taiwanisation.  
 
The introduction of Renshi Taiwan textbooks and the Taiwanisation of education 
provide a way of narrating a new collective identity and identification within Taiwan. 
This initiative was politically grounded in an assumption about the importance of 
territorial belonging (for example, the study of a geographic area begins with the 
villages or towns where students live), which is culturally reinvented and associated 
with vernacular (grassroots) culture. These seemingly authentic cultural forms and 
practices were suppressed and erased by the KMT government. This educational 
reform discourse was in many ways in direct opposition to the previous sinocentric 
curriculum (1949-1994) which mainly emphasised the teaching of Chinese history, 
geography and literature (see Mao and Chang 2005, Wang 2005, pp. 63-64, Hsiau 
2000, pp. 58-64). This drastic change in the elementary and junior secondary school 
curriculum as well as the dynamic local political logic of the past two decades has 
stimulated a contestation of the notion of Taiwanese identity.  
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Through the inclusion of Taiwanisation and localisation in the school curriculum, 
secondary school students read the narrative of their own national identity in school 
textbooks and are encouraged to envision a future as a complete Taiwanese people 
through the abstract notions of “Taiwan spirit” or “Taiwan glory”, proposed by 
scholars, historians and politicians. This section illustrates how the secondary 
students affected by these education reforms articulate and integrate their ideas about 
Taiwanese national/cultural identity by incorporating school textbook knowledge 
(e.g. Renshi Taiwan) and the cultural practice of locality in an age of globalisation 
and intensive regional popular cultural flows.  
 
During my group discussions with secondary students it emerged on several 
occasions that it was difficult to explain ‘what is national or cultural identity’ or ‘what 
are Taiwanese identities?’ On one occasion, when asked ‘What is identity (rentong)?’ 
when the term “Taiwanese cultural identity” (Taiwan wenhua rentong) was 
mentioned by others during the group discussion, Wen-ling (age 16, Female) 
continued without further explanation of the term: ‘a weak one means less 
‘recognition’ (rentong)?’ I realised that on this particular occasion that she 
misunderstood rentong thinking it was a question whether other countries approve of 
Taiwan as a nation and how others perceive Taiwan.  
 
In contrast to most university students, most secondary students found the concept of 
national and cultural identity difficult to understand. I often had to rephrase the 
questions I asked to entice a reflective response. This led to questions such as: ‘Can 
you think of anything that we have only in Taiwan in terms of culture or everyday life 
and nowhere else?’ or ‘Are you proud to be Taiwanese?’ To some these rephrasings 
might seem subjective and misleading. However, it can also lead to a recognition and 
understanding of the extent to which the narrative of the concept of nationality, 
Taiwanese identity or local and national cultures has been both performative and 
rooted in their references to school textbooks. 
   
After the concept of identity had been established and understood by the students, my 
explanation of the term in the group discussion continued to be somewhat 
problematic. One example of this was evident in Yi-zhen’s response “To identify 
with Taiwan (rentong Taiwan) is having ‘Taiwan jingshen’ (Taiwan spirit/soul), 
because that’s what the textbook says. For instance, speaking Taiwanese”. Yi-zhen 
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reacted quickly to my questions: ‘When we talk about Taiwan as a nation what is the 
first thing that comes to mind?’ and ‘What defines Taiwan, in your opinion?’  
Arguably, ‘Taiwan jingshen’ has been used as a political slogan during election 
campaigns or praised as an inspirational achievement individually or collectively in 
the public sphere and media coverage since the 1990s. According to Law (2002) the 
term Jingshen is an important ‘perceptual change’ introduced by the ruling DPP 
government (2000-2008) in the political and cultural identity of Taiwan. Law’s 
interpretation of the “spirit” or “soul” of Taiwan is based on the analysis of textbooks: 
 
it is described as those who love openness; have a spirit for adventure; enjoy 
working hard; love equity and freedom; and pursue dignity in the international 
community, and do not bow down to the ‘threats through the mass media and 
military force’ from the PRC (ibid. p.75).  
 
However, Yi-zhen’s understanding of “Taiwan spirit” or Taiwan cultural identity 
refers above all to the speaking of the Taiwanese language (i.e. Hokkien/minnan). 
“We are Taiwanese”: this also indicates that, through years of emphasis on speaking 
Taiwanese in the public political sphere and the search for Taiwanese identity and 
independence, not only the use of the language itself is significant but it also acts as a 
political enunciation. Therefore the modern construction of Taiwan and its narrative 
address not only draws attention to its language and historic events. It also attempts to 
construct an “imagined unity and a sense of pride”, hence the Jingshen.  
 
Another often mentioned modern concept of Taiwanese cultural identity emerges 
through a localised focus on meaningful cultural artefacts and practices. Students are 
encouraged to master their knowledge of the local community through the study of 
geographical areas, famous local agricultural products, prestigious local ancestors, 
and such matters. General comments from the secondary students often relate and 
respond to the contents of textbooks and local cultural practices. As Law 
acknowledged, the change of ‘the role of the school curriculum is now reversed from 
suppressing to promoting ethnic cultures and identities as points of a new collective 
identity: “Taiwan people” with Taiwan as their ultimate homeland’ (2002, p. 61). In 
other words, the notion of homeland is redefined as Taiwan (i.e. no longer mainland 
China – a distant motherland) and creates a sense of collective belonging which is 
place-bound. The ideology and political discourse to be found in the reformed school 
curriculum and Renshi Taiwan textbooks therefore emphasise ideas of indigenous, 
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authentic Taiwanese local grassroots culture which was deliberately suppressed 
during the KMT regime. Chun-han, a senior secondary student, believes that 
Taiwanese cultural identity is certain and obvious:  
 
I consider that the local culture has been positively approved, for instance, by 
the Taiwanese Puppet show (budaixii). Also I am more aware of aboriginal 
languages, dances, customs and clothes which are different from Han-Chinese 
cultures. However, Taiwanese industriousness and stamina has gradually 
disappeared under the influence of foreign cultures, such as America and 
Japan (age 17, Female). 
 
She went on to male further distinctions between North and South Taiwan: 
 
People in the North (beibu ren)
60
 are more interested in Japanese and Korean 
popular cultures than people in the Southern part of Taiwan. I think North and 
South are very different in terms of language, accent and youth fashion sense; 
they are more interested in fashion but without good taste or appropriation.   
 
Chun-han’s statement, from a cultural self-identification perspective, manifests 
several layers of articulation and differentiation. By acknowledging the local culture 
and aboriginal cultures as unique Taiwanese culture, her impression of Taiwanese 
cultural identity is firmly rooted in the context of locality and a sense of community. 
Furthermore, this recognition of a sense of cultural belonging enhances her concern 
about losing this sense of Taiwanese cultural identity due to the foreign culture’s 
influence. Therefore, in distinguishing the cultural difference between North and 
South, she shows a rather hostile attitude towards the consumption of Japanese and 
Korean popular culture and its appropriation in the North, which is very different 
from her appreciation of Southern (Nanbu) traditional culture and its strong 
grassroots.  
 
Another interesting comment Chun-han made is that “people in the North” are more 
interested in Japanese and Korean popular culture. Hence people in the North and the 
South are rather different, both in terms of cultural difference (e.g. language, fashion 
taste) and easily swayed by other regional pop cultures (mainly referring to young 
people in Taipei). In this regard, the consumption or acceptance of regional pop 
culture becomes a cultural indicator for Chun-han to distinguish between the North 
and the South. She comments positively on the localisation (bentuhua) movement 
                                                 
60
 The term beibu ren often refers to people who live in Taipei. 
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(e.g. grassroots and aboriginal culture) and a sense of community as something 
Taiwanese, whilst feeling almost disgusted by how “people in the North” easily 
accept foreign culture and subject themselves to foreign influence. 
 
Localisation (bentuhua) might have created a sense of Taiwanese identity and 
consciousness amongst youngsters via educational reforms and local community 
cultural practices over the years. Nevertheless it also seems to reinforce local 
differences on the island. The search for a more unified national identity in 
contemporary Taiwan is not only complicated by its political conflict, historical 
sentiment, cultural reinvention and more recent economic entanglement with China, 
but also by the popularity of regional popular culture flows. The educational reforms 
have generated political dispositions, economic survival anxieties, and ever shifting 
reference to cultural identifications amongst younger generations. All these elements 
have contributed to student audiences’ interpretations and perceptions of the 
popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas. 
 
In contrast to Chun-han’s certainty, Yuan-xuan, a senior secondary student, posed the 
following question in response to Chun-han’s comment: 
 
Is there a Taiwan cultural identity? I don’t know, to me all the textbooks are 
just for the purpose of passing examinations. We will probably have a 
Taiwanese history class in the third year
61
 because it is going to be part of 
university entrance exam (age 17, Female). 
 
What she considered as a representation of Taiwanese culture is more closely related 
to her childhood experience and memories. She recalls:  
 
I grew up in a village and there are memorial ceremonies for Gods/Ghosts in 
the temples on several occasions each year, a lot of local activities were held 
such as Taiwanese Puppets show (budaixi), Taiwanese Opera or folk customs 
(gezaixi). Also people outside the village would join the celebration; for me 
this is local Taiwanese culture (zaidi Taiwan wenhua). 
 
On the one hand, Chun-han’s question ‘Is there a Taiwanese identity?’ can be read as 
a double indication of ‘What is Taiwanese identity?’ or ‘Do we have a sense of 
Taiwanese identity (i.e. being Taiwanese)?’ The meaning of Taiwanese identity is 
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 Both Chun-han and Yuan-xuan are senior secondary students. The ‘Taiwanese history’ textbook was 
not included in Nine-Year Integrated Curriculum when it was first announced in 1998 and carried out 
in 2001. It is only later on that Taiwanese History became part of the History Curriculum Plan (see 
also A-c Hsiau 2000; F-c Wang, 2005).  
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always in a process of being as well as becoming and more often than not remains 
questionable. On the other hand, her reflection on “being Taiwanese” involves an 
inward-looking approach to historical traditions and folk culture practice, which are 
bound by a sense of place; a place that is constructed by the notion of locale. 
According to Appadurai, ‘Local knowledge is substantially about producing reliably 
local subjects as well as about producing reliably local neighbourhoods within which 
subjects can be recognised and organised’ (1996, p. 181). Chun-Han’s recognition 
and identification with the local community was constituted by what Appadurai 
called ‘a structure of feeling, a property of social life and an ideology of situated 
community’ (ibid., p. 189) and is practised in most rural places in Taiwan. The 
concept of “nativist consciousness” (bentu yishi) was promoted by local elite groups 
in the early 1990s and nourished in the school system
62
 through extra-curricular 
activities, and has gradually been incorporated in the curriculum by the government 
over the last decade. From the above statements, it became evident that younger 
generations in Taiwan are more aware of and identify with Taiwan’s histories, arts, 
literatures, local dialects and the nation’s contemporary developments as a result of 
the curriculum reforms.  
 
As Taiwanese educational reform in the past two decades has oscillated between 
globalisation and localisation, it is important to consider how the conflict and 
inconsistency of textbooks in relation to the local national imaginary and international 
competition has transformed the younger generations’ concept of Taiwanese identity. 
Furthermore, this involves the implications of the way the bentuhua movement was 
incorporated in the first major school curriculum reform – the Indigenisation 
Curriculum (1994-1999) – in elementary and junior secondary school for the 
(re)invention of cultural identity and locality on the island. Arguably Taiwan’s state 
ideology and cultural policy has undergone a drastic transformation and reconnection 
since the late 1980s, including important education reforms since 1990. The 
re/definition of the territorial and social components of Taiwanese national identity in 
relation to mainland China has produced more Taiwan-centric, yet ambiguous, local 
elements as a counterpoint to transnational cultural flows (see Law, 2002a; Mao and 
                                                 
62
 Also known as “Native education” (xiangtu jiaoyu), the preservation of local cultures and identities 
has been consolidated in the Nine-Year Integrated Curriculum, which both the KMT and DPP have 
developed and gradually introduced into primary and junior secondary levels since 2001 (Law, 2004, 
pp. 263-264). 
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Chang, 2005). The public disputes over the Renshi Taiwan textbooks in 1997, 
involving politicians, academia and the general public, led to at least five press 
conferences and initiated four mass demonstrations (see Wang, 2005, p. 73). 
According to Harrison, ‘the controversy over Understanding Taiwan (Renshi Taiwan) 
has itself become a received component of Taiwan’s identity discourse, and stitched 
into the narrative fabric of Taiwanese identity’ (Harrison, 2006, p. 194). In other 
words, the invention (or reconnection, some might argue) of local Taiwanese culture 
represents an important means of enabling people to construct their sense of territorial 
belonging and Taiwanese identity, to know who we were/are. 
 
Taiwanese scholar Yun-wen Yeh put forward a crucial argument about the notion of 
subjectivity in the development of the national idea in Taiwan: 
 
Based on its historical trajectories, the diversification of Taiwanese culture 
has become evident, but this does not imply that Taiwan has its own “cultural 
subjectivity”63 (wenhua zhutixing): a type of fundamental/dominant culture 
which is initiated by its own nation from within – the absence of cultural 
subjectivity. The notion of cultural subjectivity is the opposite of ‘Others.’ 
However, the transcultural developments in Taiwan society have indicated the 
lack of a Taiwanese cultural identity. Therefore foreign cultures can easily 
infiltrate Taiwanese society and coexist with local cultures (2005, p. 4 my 
translation). 
 
I argue that the national education system reformation can be seen as an institutional 
definition of culture as bounded, tied specifically to place and essentially inward-
looking, while foreign TV programmes are derived from a mediated illustrating 
culture as a ‘translocal learning process’ that stimulates creativity (Nederveen 
Pieterse 1994, p. 177) and are essentially outward-looking. TV dramas portray a way 
of life that compresses every aspect of life, culture, the geographical features of place, 
etc., which provides an imaginary reality to its audience without boundaries. 
 
The impact of transnational cultural consumption (in particular TV series and pop 
music) on everyday life in East Asia since the 1990s has been discussed in various 
                                                 
63
 According to A-chin Hsiau, ‘“cultural subjectivity” (wen-hua chu-ti-hsing) has been the catch word 
of Taiwanese nationalist intellectuals since the late 1980s. A great enthusiasm for “establishing the 
subjectivity of Taiwanese culture” or “creating subjective Taiwanese culture” formed the fourth 
element of the nationalist cultural discourse. The Chinese term chu-ti-hsing in this context derived 
mainly from the sense of the word “subject” as in Western idealist philosophy instead of grammar and 
political theory. In this usage subjectivity means the state of being, the thinking subject as the site of 
consciousness’ (2000, p. 108). 
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scholarly works (e.g. the edited book Feeling Asian Modernity by Iwabuchi, 2004), 
and Media Consumption and everyday life in Asia by Kim, 2008). The issues 
discussed generally concern matters like transnational TV reception; audience self-
reflection and meaning-making within different social contexts. Consumer behaviour 
and its socio-cultural symbolic implications or regional consumption in relation to 
pan East- Asia identity are covered in these two edited books, looking at various 
degrees of youth engagement with regional popular cultural products. However, the 
discussion about youth consumption of foreign popular culture, particularly in so far 
as it is articulated with ideas about national identity, often limits the debate to the 
notion of cultural imperialism, a sense of identity displacement or as a mean of 
cultural hybridisation. I argue instead that the consumption of popular cultural 
commodities is only one form of cultural engagement and exchange amongst 
youngsters in Taiwanese society. The complicated interplay between democratisation, 
localisation and the pursuit of national identity in both education and wider 
Taiwanese society since the 1990s often provides significant immediate knowledge 
and vital references for the students’ identification with the idea of nation and 
nationhood.  
 
It is therefore important to examine the cultural contexts and political discourses 
which constrain and enable narration and interpretation of the educational curriculum 
in the 1990s and its relationship with youth’s construction of a sense of national 
identity and belonging. Arguably, effective socialisation means that educational 
institutions can provide a substantial definition of national culture without collective 
confrontation from the student body. Moreover, social activities amongst the young, 
such as the incorporation of foreign TV dramas into local everyday life, have yielded 




Where is Taiwanese identity?: In the vortex of regional popular culture 
flows  
 
Based on the discussion in the previous two sections, I suggest that most secondary 
school students have deepened their roots in Taiwan as a nation and their general 
knowledge and awareness of Taiwanese history and culture after the education 
reforms and the introduction of Renshi Taiwan textbooks in contrast to university 
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students’ distrustful attitude towards the idea of Taiwanese identity. However, it is 
also evident that most of them still have a certain degree of anxiety about foreign 
cultural influence, particularly Japanese and Korean popular cultures. The impact of 
Japanese and Korean TV dramas on the cultural practices and cultural changes 
amongst the Taiwanese teenagers is noticeable and traceable, from lifestyle, youth 
fashion, the learning of foreign languages, to the discussion of traditional family 
values. For instance, the possible moral confrontation and the desire for reassurance 
between parents and children in relation to traditional family values in modern 
Taiwanese society has become part of ‘living room culture’ (Morley, 1986) through 
the reception of foreign TV programmes, as discussed in Chapter 4. This section 
suggests that regional popular cultural flows and transnational media consumption 
have stimulated the desirability of the construction of Taiwanese identity amongst 
secondary school students, which inevitability integrates a sense of cultural otherness 
and translates into political enunciation. This enunciation itself is an expression of a 
sense of Taiwanese consciousness. 
 
The previous section discussed Yi-zhen’s association of speaking Taiwanese with a 
strong sense of Taiwan Jingshen, Chun-Han’s acknowledging multi-ethnic cultures 
and ‘South and North cultural difference’ to Yuan-xuan’s personal childhood memory 
which is deeply rooted in the local community. To a certain extent their 
understandings of Taiwanese identity are very much part of the Bentuhua movement. 
The narrating of local culture has been regarded as a central element to the formation 
of Taiwanese identity in the mid-1990s. The Community Construction Movement 
(shequ zongti yingzao) supported by the KMT in 1995 and the political ideology of a 
“community of shared fate” (shengming gongtong ti) have formulated a sense of 
national solidarity which used land to locate Taiwanese consciousness. In these 
circumstances, younger generations in Taiwan are now capable of identifying their 
sense of cultural belonging. Meanwhile, their collective identity remains limited by 
the idea of territorial boundedness and ethnical separation. 
 
The construction of national and cultural identity in post-martial law Taiwan (as well 
as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia), according to Hong Kong scholar Allen Chun 
(1996), has led to a nation ‘where the spaces of everyday life are institutionally highly 
administered within reinvented local ‘traditions’ aimed at eliciting conformity from 
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the populations’ (cited in Chua 2000, p. 16). Within this ambiguous cultural 
identification context and always in the process of narrating a nation, the prevalence 
of Japanese and Korean popular culture amongst the younger generation in Taiwan 
has added an additional cultural resource that can be used to complement their 
learning and understanding of Taiwan as a nation.  
 
When I asked ‘What do you think of the popularity of Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas in Taiwan’? Zhi-wei, a junior secondary male student said: 
 
I am worried that our culture will be replaced by Japanese culture because 
Japan is a powerful country. It is not a good thing being replaced (by others). 
It is better if Taiwan is an independent country; we need to distinguish the 
difference between Taiwan and China (age 13).  
 
A key element of the process of identification especially in the case of national 
identity is the drawing of boundaries between self and other. In this instance, Zhi-
wei’s anxiety not only lies in the possible cultural threat from the other (i.e. Japan) on 
the outside but also in the uncertainty about self – ‘What is Taiwan?’ For him China 
represents a major threat to the idea of Taiwanese identity in comparison with the 
popular consumption of Japanese and Korean cultural products. Within the debate on 
cultural imperialism (Tomlinson, 1991) in relation to cultural identity, I suggest that 
Zhi-wei’s anxiety reflects on his lack of a sense of belonging, authenticity and local 
culture. Therefore he associates the popularity of Japanese culture as cultural 
replacement and invasion in Taiwanese society. In particular, he is concerned that 
‘Japan is a powerful country’ and therefore poses more of a threat to Taiwan than 
South Korea. This also points to his awareness of the power dynamic between the 
three countries. He concludes that Taiwan needs to be recognised as an independent 
country to differentiate itself from China and he also indicates the increased need and 
desire to establish a distinctive version of Taiwanese identity which is motivated by 
the recognition of its cultural others. The meaning of this statement is twofold: firstly 
it signifies that the discourse of the Taiwanisation of Taiwan since the mid-1990s has 
promoted conscious awareness among young people on the island of the ambivalent 
relationship with China. China’s military actions against Taiwan could potentially 
threaten the island’s independence. Secondly, it raises the highly arguable question as 
to whether and how the popularity of Japanese popular culture generates national 
anxiety among young generations. The ‘meaningfulness’ of the Japanese programmes 
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is now relocated to ‘the horizon of relevance of the audience’s own cultural context’ 
(Chua, 2007, p. 128), as the role of the drama series is not just to provide 
entertainment but has become a significant sign of the need to be vigilant in relation 





Since the lifting of martial law in 1987, the discussion on national and cultural 
identity in Taiwan amongst scholars, politicians and historians has always been based 
on a dichotomous approach (ROC vs. PRC, Taiwanese vs. mainland), which was 
represented in various forms and different levels of reinvention, disconnection and 
reproduction in the political, cultural and historical discourse. What has been 
constantly ignored and overlooked is the important connection between young 
people, popular culture and national identity in everyday life contexts.  
 
This chapter indicates that secondary school students have a stronger and more solid 
belief in the definition of Taiwanese identity, which they often reference to school 
textbooks and associate with the notion of locality. Despite the focus on nation-
building and identity construction, the education reforms emphasise the ways in 
which locality and identity have been shaped through the colonial past and in an 
historical and political context as well as its grounding in multiple ethnicities (such as 
aboriginal groups, Hoklo, Hakka etc.). It has become evident that regional popular 
culture flows since the 1990s have overlapped with the political transformation on the 
island and as a result the flow of culture and information was inevitably negotiated 
and integrated into the youth’s formation of modern Taiwanese identity. 
 
This chapter also argues that the issue of Taiwanese identity should not be restricted 
to the choice between Taiwanese and/or Chinese identity. Instead the young 
generations’ national and cultural identification has been complicated by the 
consumption of regional popular culture, lifestyles and commodities as well as local 
socio-political changes on the island. The construction of national identity amongst 
younger generations is often shaped by the discourse on local identity politics and by 
state institutions (in this case, via the education reforms). It is then reconstituted not 
only in global consumer culture via the consumption of media but also in regional 
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cultural flows (exchanges), which are intensified by notions such as cultural 
proximity, similar but different, and cultural hybridisation as a means of national 
modernisation.  
 
The term cultural subjectivity (wenhua zhutixing) might be an important catchword of 
Taiwanese nationalist intellectuals (Hsiau, 2000, p. 108). However, this enthusiasm 
for establishing the subjectivity of Taiwanese culture is reinvented and represented in 
the form of local heritage and the common local past rather than a common future or 
even a common present (Roche, 2000 cited in Edensor, 2002, p.17). Although it is 
accepted by the local young generations it is difficult for them to articulate and 
consume (apart from culinary products and festivals). This notion of Taiwanese 
culture is narrativised and constructed based on political ideology as a means to 
distance the primordial ties with China such as ethnicity and cultural heritage. This 
top-down “politicisation” of Taiwanese local culture over the years has failed to 
create a dialectical relationship between the young population and the government. In 
other words, Taiwanese culture is “localised”, “politicised” and even 
“internationalised” but never “popularised” as mass culture that young people can 
relate to and identify with in everyday life.     
 
Arguably Renshi Taiwan textbook might have established the idea of Taiwanese 
consciousness amongst secondary school students, associating their knowledge and 
identification with the political and cultural meaning of “Taiwan as a nation” and 
“being Taiwanese”. Yet it is always a political enunciation, a self-conscious assertion, 
while also containing echoes of a sense of disconnection. Because of the complex 
relationship between the subjective enunciation and objective knowledge of identity, 
the consumption of Japanese and Korean popular culture has been used by young 
people to mediate this ambivalence. It is in this sense that younger generations do not 
have to limit themselves to the idea of a Taiwanese identity or sense of Taiwan’s 
distinctiveness by reference to textbooks or by claiming not to be Chinese. Rather the 
popular consumption of regional media products opens up endless possibilities for 
younger generations to engage in active dialogues and establish their sense of 






Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This study has explored and examined the role of Taiwanese young people’s 
experience of regional popular culture flows and their reception of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas in their cultural appropriation and practice in daily life. It brought 
together the study of youth transnational media consumption and that of cultural 
appropriation, while contextualising the pleasure of recognition and cultural 
proximity, and assessing TV reception and the narrative negotiation process. A 
comparative reading of Japanese and Korean TV dramas was employed to 
comprehend the extent to which cultural similarity and familiarity are relevant to 
regional TV dramas, and how cultural proximity has been used in the process of 
building an emotional connection and culture-relational positioning within the context 
of ‘geo-cultural regions’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). My empirical findings demonstrate 
that young Taiwanese audiences construct their personal narratives and the structure 
of cultural imagery as a result of different levels of identification with “sameness” 
and “otherness”. In other words, they are always in a process of self-repositioning, 
which is interwoven with and formulated by their daily consumption of regional 
popular culture and media products.  
 
This study contributes to the field of transnational media studies by presenting much 
needed empirical findings from a more regional context of media reception and by 
shedding light on their implications for the formation of cultural identification and 
social transformation. It emphasises that transnational cultural appropriation and 
articulation by young people should not be underplayed against the relatively 
overemphasised notion of cultural imperialism or cultural proximity in the study of 
transnational media flows. Rather, the complexity of their narrative-sentimental 
reflexivity and the various levels of their articulation with a sense of sameness and 
otherness suggest the ‘temporality of negotiation’ (Bhabha, 1994, p. 26) in 
transnational media consumption. This transnational cultural negotiation is close to 
Appadurai’s (1996) proposition that people are fascinated neither with originality or 
tradition but are actively constructing their own images and meanings of vernacular 
modernity at the receiving end. 
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In order to understand how regional TV dramas are received and experienced and in 
what way they are appropriated in young people’s everyday life, questionnaires were 
distributed in five educational institutions (secondary schools and universities), 
followed by in-depth interviews or small group discussions with voluntary 
participants. This combination of quantitative survey and qualitative approach helped 
map the general scale of transnational TV reception and cultural consumption habits 
amongst young people while acquiring much needed empirical findings on individual 
self-reflexive viewing experiences and social formation.  
 
This research project answered the question originally asked, namely how Taiwanese 
young audiences experience regional TV drama flows in their daily lives. In addition, 
it also revealed another form of transnational media reception and cultural negotiation 
within Taiwan’s unique political and social context, one that is inevitably intertwined 
with the on-going process of its nation-building project. This study has demonstrated 
that Taiwanese youth are experiencing the regional popular cultural flows as a 
possible alternative choice and a way of achieving modernisation in the construction 
of their sense of national and cultural identity.  
 
A difference between my thesis and earlier research on local audience viewing 
experiences of a popular foreign TV drama/soap opera is an emphasis on its cross-
culture reception and meaning-making of contents, which are often predetermined 
and articulated using an individual’s social status and cultural background (see Ang, 
1987, Katz and Liebes, 1990, Miller, 1994). This thesis is not about one single TV 
drama and its transnational audience reception. Instead I have attempted to make 
observations about Taiwanese young people’s transnational viewing experiences and 
cultural appropriation of two different regional TV dramas, Japanese and Korean. I 
hoped to present a more comparative reading and complex vision of young audiences’ 
reception of foreign TV programmes within an East Asian context. However, as 
argued in Chapter 1, this thesis has progressed into a wider socio-political 
understanding of transnational media reception and consumption, in particular in 
relation to youth cultural identification and nation-building in Taiwan. Hence a 
significant contribution of this study is to illuminate the role of transnational TV 
dramas and regional cultural flows as a possible cultural third space and its use in the 
formation of Taiwanese youth’s sense of Taiwanese identity. 
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Having acknowledged the study’s limitations and contributions, I shall briefly 
reiterate some of my findings, summarise the overall argument and suggest possible 
directions for further research. 
 
East Asian regional popular cultural flows have been a steadily growing socio-
cultural phenomenon since the late 1990s, ranging from pop music, pop idols, TV 
idol (trendy) dramas, fashion styles, games, animation and comic books, etc. Why did 
I choose to examine regional TV idol dramas in particular? Japanese Idol Dramas 
took young audiences by storm in Taiwan in the late 1990s and at the time this 
phenomenon was explained with reference to issues such as colonial experience, 
cultural proximity, historical connection, or Japan being represented as “a superior 
other” amongst Asian countries. However, these explanations are often associated 
with political, historical and sometimes economic points of view, which did not 
sufficiently account for the popularity of Korean TV dramas in Taiwan since the early 
2000s. 
 
As I highlighted in Chapter 2, in a departure from previous researchers’ emphasis on 
the notions of colonial experience, colonial legacy, cultural proximity in the modern 
imaginary appropriation of Japanese TV dramas in Taiwan (Lee and Ho 2002, pp. 15-
49), what is important here is the desire to become culturally proximate, and a sense 
of ‘coevalness’ with modern Japan (see Iwabuchi, 2002, Chapter 4). My intervention 
is neither devoted to a Western versus Eastern cultural difference perspective nor to 
the historical understanding of colonial sentiment in the reception of foreign TV 
dramas. Rather I argue that after many years of viewing regional TV dramas young 
people have developed their own way of appropriating Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas and developed their own cultural perceptions of both countries. This process 
of cultural negotiation facilitates their ability to take a reflexive distance from their 
own lives and stimulated their awareness of cultural difference and/or similarities 
amongst Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. In this sense, the consumption of foreign 
TV programmes and its cultural implications, as observed amongst university and 
secondary school students, also outlines the importance of not reducing audience 
studies to generalised individual interactions with texts. Rather we should 
conceptualise it as a multilayered act of interpretation, articulation and cultural 
negotiation.  
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Chapter 3 demonstrated that university students’ narrative-sentimental reflexivity on 
Japanese TV dramas is similar to Iwabuchi’s approach of ‘a story about us’ (2005, p. 
24) and to Ang’s notion of ‘pleasure of recognition’ (1985, p. 20). Japanese TV 
drama as a cultural other transcends national boundaries and cultural differences, 
which is actively translated by university students as a way of exploring their 
identities and adulthood, oscillating between a sense of “reality representation” and 
“romantic fantasy”. Nonetheless, their ‘cultural translation’ (Gillespie, 1995, p. 207) 
of Japanese and Korean TV dramas is neither limited to emotional connections nor to 
pure entertainment value. They are often very confident in their application of 
(mis)perceptions and opinions about these two nations, such as their ways of life, 
cultures, traditions or social morale, based on knowledge obtained while viewing the 
programmes over the years. In doing so they also exhibited a sense of cultural 
discrimination against (or preference for) and misconceptions about these two 
nations. The Japanese way of life or “Japaneseness” is more positively adapted into 
university students’ daily lives through conscious cultural consumption and 
appropriation (e.g. literature, lifestyle, language) than the Korean one. One of the key 
elements in the formation of this preference, according to university students’ 
responses, is familiarity with the genre, plots, actors and textual forms of Japanese 
TV dramas. This finding raises questions for transnational audience reception 
research in two respects: first, have we overemphasised on the notion of culture (e.g. 
language, ethnicity, common sense) as predetermining the audiences’ meaning-
making of foreign media products? Second, in the field of mediascapes which 
provided large and complex repertories of images and narrative (Appadurai, 1996, p. 
35), it is necessary to take a cautious view of the overoptimistic approaches to the free 
flow of information and resources and question the different aspects of the audience’s 
transnational media consumption in relation to cultural identification.    
 
In Chapter Four I outlined the generational cultural differences in regional TV 
consumption between university and secondary schools students. This difference is 
demonstrated in content reading and cultural interpretation as well as emotional 
connection and self-reflectivity. I have argued that the notion of cultural proximity or 
the force of cultural assimilation, emphasised in earlier research, cannot fully explain 
the transnational reception of Japanese and Korean TV dramas in Taiwan. Equally, I 
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suggest that the penetration of regional cultural forms into local cultures is a far more 
complex process than the cultural imperialism thesis allows for.  
 
This thesis questions the ideas of cultural imperialism and cultural proximity as well 
as the concept of authenticity in relation to modern cultural identification within the 
context of the transnational media system. Earlier research conducted by Miller 
suggested that in the late 1980s, an American soap opera (The Young and the 
Restless) became a key instrument for forging a highly specific sense of Trinidadian 
culture, revealing the way in which the local can construct its syncretic, postmodern 
brand of cultural identity through the consumption of the global. As Daniel Miller 
usefully concludes, ‘“authenticity”, if we still want to retain that word, has 
increasingly to be judged a posteriori not a priori, according to local consequences not 
local origins’ (cited in Ang, 1996, p.160). Japanese and Korean TV dramas in Taiwan 
on the one hand reinforce young people’s uncertain attitudes to the political definition 
of Taiwanese identity. On the other hand, they might encourage young people to 
integrate cultural otherness into their sense of modern Taiwanese culture as distinct 
from traditional Chinese culture. Hence, in the eyes of the young Taiwanese, the 
popularity of Japanese and Korean TV dramas and regional popular culture flows are 
alternative cultural resources. Young people’s different levels of engagement with 
and differentiation of regional popular cultures is one of the key cultural elements in 
the development of their sense of Taiwanese identity. 
 
It would be naive to assume that their transnational cultural negotiation and 
appropriation is a collective effort and therefore suggests a unified Taiwanese identity 
amongst young generations. As highlighted in Chapters 6 and 7, generational 
differences in making sense of Taiwanese identity are especially pronounced. For 
instance, university and secondary school students have quite different 
understandings of Taiwan or Taiwanese identity. University students often exhibited 
ambiguous attitudes to the idea of Taiwanese identity while secondary school 
students showed a great deal of assertion in identifying themselves as Taiwanese.  
 
The debate on “Who is Taiwanese?” and the discussion about the politics (or crisis) 
of identity in the public sphere has been an on-going and unresolved socio-political 
issue on the island. The political transition, social movements, economic development 
and media liberalisation in the early 1990s have created a dynamic and contested field 
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of national and cultural identification in Taiwan. Chapter 5 delineated the recent 
political construction of “Taiwan as an (independent) country” and the contrasting 
approaches adopted by the two major political parties, the DPP and the KMT. The 
concept of a nation was explored through Benedict Anderson’s notion of the ‘nation 
as imagined political community’ (1991, p. 6) and Anthony Smith’s (1999) emphasis 
on the importance of myth and memories of the nation. In addition, focusing on 
Bhabha’s (1990) concept of narrating the nation and the ‘third space’ (1988, p. 21) in 
relation to national culture, I discussed the absence of Taiwanese subjectivity and 
politics of identity through postcolonial approaches and cultural hybridity as a result 
of the cultural logic of globalisation (see Kraidy, 2005). Taiwanese identity is ‘a 
confrontation of the past and the future, a tug of war between “identity” as essential 
being, locked in (in the image of) the past, and “identity” as open-ended becoming, 
invested in a future that remains to be struggle over’ (Ang, 2000, p. 9). It is always in 
the process of becoming and being lost ‘in-between’, where the ‘cutting edge of 
translation and negotiation’ (Bhabha, 1988, p. 22) occurs. I highlighted this issue in 
Chapter 6 by looking closely at the way in which university students’ efforts to make 
sense of the popularity of regional TV dramas reinforced their awareness of national 
and cultural identity. This realisation also reflected their sense of cultural positionality 
and national subjectivity, which encouraged them to become active cultural observers 
in the age of transnational culture flows.  
 
In contrast to university students’ approach to Taiwanese identity, the secondary 
school students’ political assertions and arbitrary enunciation of being Taiwanese 
(e.g. Taiwan spirit, Taiwan glory) is highly marked. My observations indicate that the 
Taiwanese identity they believe in was fabricated through the introduction of a series 
of Renshi Taiwan (Understanding Taiwan) textbooks in 1997, which I discussed in 
Chapter 7. In addition, the combination of the cultural bentuhua (localisation/ 
nativisation/Taiwanisation) movement and educational reforms unexpectedly 
reinforced secondary school students’ perception of the cultural difference between 
the North and the South of Taiwan. In other words, the clash between one’s 
identification with local and foreign culture is used by secondary school students as 
an indication of being or not being Taiwanese. 
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Over the years, researchers have presented different conclusions in the analysis of 
regional popular cultural flows in East Asian counties, investigating the relationship 
between youth cultural identification and modern regional popular culture flows 
through the lens of scepticism, resistance or incorporation. Some believe that the 
consumption of Korean popular culture amongst youngsters has constructed a new 
image of South Korea in Taiwan (e.g. Sung, 2010), and others make a hopeful 
prediction about the possibility of a pan-Asian cultural identity (see Ching, 2000). 
According to my observations, the proliferation of regional popular culture flows 
intensified highly mediated transnational interactions with implications for the 
national formation and cultural construction in Taiwan. This thesis has provided an 
insight into how young people make sense of the idea of nationality and Taiwanese 
identity, which is articulated using new cultural resources and negotiated in a cultural 
third space. However, given that this study was conducted on a relatively small scale 
and only focused on the case of Taiwan, it would not be justified to assume that 
regional TV dramas and popular culture flows have generated a dynamic cultural 
third space amongst all East Asian countries.  
 
There are several directions in which this research can be developed further, 
particularly regarding the changing markets of the cultural and media industry in East 
Asia which have generated an Asian audio-visual media industry, including film, 
anime, TV dramas, etc. This poses a question about the homogenisation of regional 
cultural productions in terms of genre, content, format and audience taste. Is media 
production designed to cater for an “Asian taste”? And what is this “Asian taste”? Or 
is it just a simulation of ‘culturally odourless’ (Iwabuchi, 2002, p. 27) media products 
that cut across national boundaries without having any cultural impact on others? This 
also raises the question as to how and if young audiences actively construct their 
sense of cultural identity through the notion of regional cultural sameness and 
otherness and whether this affects the notion of cultural identity in a more profound 
way. These are just some of the issues that can be expanded on and developed further.  
 
An exploration of the notion of a “story about us” and cultural proximity in the 
viewing of regional TV dramas highlighted the different levels of emotional 
engagement and cultural negotiation, articulation and translation amongst young 
people in Taiwan. These experiences and recognition have ultimately shaped their 
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Appendix 1: Sample Questionnaire 
 
Request of Questionnaire for PhD Dissertation Writing 
 
 
This dissertation examines the transnational viewing and consumption of Japanese 
and South Korean TV dramas in Taiwan. It focuses on young audience’s media 
reception, consumer behaviour and cultural practice in relation to regional TV 
programmes within the context of the construction of national and cultural identity in 
Taiwan.   
 
I will be very grateful if you could take your time to fill in this questionnaire. Thank 




Sex: □ Male  □ Female 
Education Background: □Junior High □Senior High □College/ University  
                    □ Postgraduate 
Monthly Allowance: 
□ under TSD 500    □ TSD 501-1000        □ TSD 1001-2000       
□ TSD 2001-4000    □ TSD 4001-6000       □TSD 6001-8000      
□ TSD 8001-10000   □ above TSD10000 
 
* Unless it states otherwise, all questions require a single answer* 
 
Section One: Media reception of Japanese and South Korean TV 
dramas  
 
1. How much time do you spend per week viewing the following 
television dramas programmes? 
 
   Less than 1 hour  1-3 hours   4-6 hours   7-9 hours  more than 10  
Japanese dramas     □     □    □     □     □ 
Korean dramas             □     □   □     □        □ 
Taiwan idol dramas  □     □    □     □     □ 
Hong Kong dramas   □      □    □     □     □ 
American TV series   □     □    □     □     □ 




2. Do you have any experience viewing Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas? 
□ Both 
□ Only Japanese TV dramas 
□ Only Korean TV dramas 
□ Neither (please skip to Third Section on the questionnaire, Thank you) 
 
3. What is your main medium for viewing Japanese and Korean TV 
dramas? (Please tick all applicable): 
 
   □ 1. Terrestrial TV ( Including FTV)         □ 2. Cable/ Satellite TV  
   □ 3. VCDs / DVD                        □ 4. Video Tape 
          □ 5. Others : _________ 
 
4. In general, who else would be present during your television 
viewing? (Please tick all applicable): 
 
   □ 1. Friends/Classmates                    □ 2. Family members  
   □ 3. Alone                               □ 4. Others :__________ 
 
5. Would you discuss the programme with others after viewing?  
□ 1.Never (0%)      □ 2. Rare (25%)     □ 3. Sometimes (50%) 
□ 4.Often (75%)       □ 5. Always (100%) 
 
6. Do you fully engage with the programme during viewing?  
□ 1. Low engagement (under 25%)   □ 2. Average (50%)   
□ 3. Relatively high (75%)          □ 4. High engagement (100%) 
 
7. Do you normally watch from the first to the last episode of the 
programme?  
 
□ 1.Never (0%)      □ 2. Rare (25%)  □ 3.Sometimes (50%) 
□ 4.Often (75%)       □ 5. Always (100%) 
 
      8.Would you watch the programme again when it is rebroadcast?  
□ 1.Never (0%)      □ 2. Rare (25%)  □ 3. Sometimes (50%) 
□ 4.Often (75%)      □ 5. Always (100%) 
 
      9. Do you consider the viewing of Japanese and Korean TV dramas 
as important part of your daily life? 
 
             □ 1. Only Japanese ones      □ 2. Only Korean ones  
 □ 3. Both                               □ 4.Neither   
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   10. Are you interested in the information in relation to Japanese and 
         Korean TV dramas (e.g. culinary culture, fashion)? 
 
□ 1. Not at all     □ 2. less than average      □ 3. Average    
□ 4. Interest        □ 5. Very interest 
 
11. What is your main motivation in the viewing of Japanese and  
       Korean TV dramas: (Tick □ as Japanese ;○ as Korean ) 
 
                                        not important    not v/important   average        important          v/important   
      
        storyline                    □/○       □/○       □/○      □/○        □/○ 
    idols/actors                   □/○       □/○       □/○      □/○        □/○ 
     entertainment                 □/○       □/○       □/○      □/○        □/○ 
     killing time                    □/○       □/○       □/○      □/○        □/○ 
     fashion information       □/○       □/○       □/○      □/○        □/○ 
     emotional connection     □/○       □/○       □/○      □/○        □/○ 
         new knowledge              □/○       □/○       □/○      □/○        □/○ 
     favour the culture          □/○       □/○       □/○      □/○        □/○ 
     language learning          □/○       □/○       □/○      □/○        □/○ 
     Other :__________        □/○       □/○       □/○      □/○        □/○ 
 
12. During your viewing or in terms of programme choice, how much 
attention do you pay in the following options:  
(Tick □ as Japanese ; ○ as Korean ) 
                                             no attention    no much        average      above average         focus   
  
          popularity of actors     □/○     □/○      □/○      □/○         □/○ 
acting skill                         □/○     □/○      □/○      □/○         □/○   
actor’s appearance             □/○     □/○      □/○      □/○         □/○ 
fashion/style                      □/○     □/○      □/○      □/○         □/○ 
storyline/content                □/○     □/○      □/○      □/○         □/○ 
dialogue/narrative              □/○     □/○      □/○      □/○         □/○ 
background scenery           □/○     □/○      □/○      □/○         □/○ 
       culture/custom                    □/○     □/○      □/○      □/○         □/○ 
      screenwriter                       □/○     □/○      □/○      □/○         □/○ 
       director                               □/○    □/○      □/○       □/○         □/○ 









Section Two: Consumer behaviour on the consumption of idol 
dramas by-products 
 
1. How often do you purchase Japanese and Korean TV drama by- 
products? (Tick □ as Japanese ; ○ as Korean ) 
               never          rare        sometimes      often        very often 
       idols’ posters                   □/○      □/○        □/○             □/○            □/○   
         idols’ albums                   □/○       □/○        □/○             □/○            □/○ 
        TV soundtracks                 □/○       □/○       □/○              □/○           □/○ 
        original comic books         □/○       □/○       □/○              □/○           □/○ 
        original novels                  □/○       □/○        □/○              □/○          □/○ 
        VCDs/ DVDs                   □/○       □/○        □/○              □/○           □/○ 
        Fashion clothes                 □/○        □/○       □/○              □/○           □/○ 
       (depicted in the programmes)  
        commodities                     □/○        □/○       □/○               □/○          □/○ 
        (depicted in the programmes)  
        others :  ___________       □/○        □/○        □/○              □/○          □/○ 
 
2. On average how much do you spend on purchasing Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas by-products per month?  
 
□ under TSD 500      □ TSD 501~1000        □ TSD 1001~1500 
□ TSD1501~2000     □ TSD 2001~2500       □ above TSD 2500 
 
3. What is your main motivation in the purchasing of Japanese and 
Korean TV dramas related commodities?  
 
                        not important   not v/important   average   important    v/important   
practicality              □           □               □             □            □ 
collection purpose   □         □               □               □            □ 
memorial purpose    □         □              □               □            □  
fan of idols              □         □              □               □            □ 
favour of programmes □     □              □               □            □ 
favour of soundtracks  □     □              □               □            □ 
pleasure of recognition □    □              □               □            □ 
self-expression        □         □              □               □            □ 
fashionable              □         □              □              □             □ 
quality of products    □       □             □               □             □  







Section Three: Knowledge and recognition of Japanese and South 
Korean culture in general  
 
Please state your opinions and knowledge in relation to Japanese and 
Korean lifestyle, culture, custom and so on in the following category: 
(Tick □ as Japan; ○ as South Korea) 
 
not well   not very well  average    well-enough   very well 
In terms of  
national status                      □/○        □/○          □/○          □/○         □/○ 
(e.g. politics, economic, foreign policy) 
historical attractions                □/○        □/○           □/○          □/○        □/○ 
people/character                     □/○        □/○            □/○          □/○        □/○ 
lifestyle                                   □/○        □/○            □/○           □/○        □/○  
festival celebration                 □/○        □/○           □/○           □/○        □/○ 
 
          despise        dislike       average          like          favour 
    In terms of             
            nation                                     □/○        □/○         □/○            □/○          □/○ 
            historical attractions                □/○        □/○          □/○           □/○          □/○ 
            people character                       □/○       □/○          □/○           □/○          □/○ 
lifestyle                                   □/○       □/○           □/○          □/○          □/○ 
culture                                      □/○       □/○           □/○           □/○         □/○ 
                      
   no intention   low desire      average     desire      highly desire 
         visiting the country             □/○             □/○           □/○        □/○         □/○ 
       language learning                   □/○             □/○           □/○         □/○         □/○ 
       making acquaintance             □/○             □/○           □/○         □/○         □/○ 
       lives in Japan/Korea              □/○             □/○            □/○        □/○         □/○ 
                     
     strongly disagree   disagree    undecided     agree      strongly agree 
            good impression            □/○            □/○        □/○         □/○        □/○  





Section Four: Comparative reading on Japanese and Korean idol 
dramas  
       
1. Do you think Japanese and Korean idol dramas are alike? 
□ Yes 
□ No 
□ Not sure 
Please explain your opinions, if desired: 
_____________________________________________________________ 
        _______________________________________________________________ 
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     2.  Which genre/programmes do you in favour? 
        □ Japanese       □ Korean      □ Both       □ Neither 
       Please state you reasons:________________________________________ 
       ________________________________________________________________ 
       _______________________________________________________________ 
3. In your opinion, do you think the consumption of Japanese and Korean pop 
culture can lead to any potential cultural impact on young generations in 
Taiwan? 
□ Yes           □ No     □ Not sure 
      Please explain your opinions: ___________________________________ 
       _______________________________________________________________ 
       _______________________________________________________________ 
 
★ In attempt to further examine the audience consumption of 
Japanese and Korean TV drama, I would like to conduct 
interviews/group discussions. If you are willing to participate in 
these events please leave your name and contact details. 
 


























Appendix 2: List of Interviewees 
 
A. One to one interview with university students 
 
       
Name Age Sex Date  Place  
Jia-ling 21 F June, 2003 Restaurant, Taipei 
Wan-yi 20 F June, 2003 Cafe, Taipei 
Yi-jun 22 F July, 2003 Restaurant, Taipei  
Yan-chi 19 F July, 2003 email 
Pei-xin 22 F July, 2003 Cafe, Taipei 
Ya-wen 21 F January, 2005 Cafe, Taipei 
Wei-ren 22 M January, 2005 University, Taipei 
Wang-wang 21 M January, 2005 University, Taipei 
Xin-hui 20 F January, 2005 Phone 
Ying-yan 21 F January, 2005 Email 
 
 
B. Group discussion with secondary school students  
       
     Group A:  July 2003 (classroom, junior secondary school, Tainan) 
       
Zhi-ying 13 M 
Fang-ming 13 F 
Yan-xiu 13 F 
Jun-huang 13 M 
Wei-zhi 13 M 
Zhen-hua 13 F 
Qiao-zu 13 F 
Yu-ting 13 M 
 
      Group B: July 2003 (canteen, senior secondary school, Tainan) 
     
Name Age Sex 
Yuan-xuan 17 F 
Wei-rong 16 F 
Chun-han 17 F 
 
       
Group C: February 2005 (classroom, private secondary school, Tainan) 
 
Name Age Sex 
Jia-ling 13 F 
Mong-xian 13 M 
Yu-ya 13 F 
Ying-hong 13 M 
Zhi-wei 13 M 
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Wei-ren 13 M 
Xin-hua 13 F 
 
Group D: February 2005 (classroom, private secondary school, Tainan) 
       
Name  Age Sex 
Xiao-han 16 F 
Wen-ling 16 F 
Fang-ling 17 F 
Yu-ling 17 F 
Jia-ying 17 F 
Yi-zhen 17 F 
       
 
C. Interview with member of staff at Gala Television Station 
    
    Interviewee: Zu-Shun Xiao 
Date: 20/01/2005   































Appendix 3: Outcomes from questionnaire (given in numbers) 
 
 
University students: 158  
 
Male respondents: 33  
Female respondents: 125 
 
Section 1: Media reception of Japanese and Koran TV dramas 
 
Q. 1 hours/per week 
 
                                  never    -1 hour        1-3 hours     4-6 hours      7-9 hours      10+ hours 
Japanese dramas        7             75             46               19                  4                    7 
Korean dramas          15            93            34                13                 3                     1 
Taiwan idol dramas   15           90             45                 6                  3                    0 
Hong Kong dramas    17          113            23                 3                  0                    2 
American TV series   13            75            52               11                  2                    8 
Taiwan local dramas   15          103           18                 7                  3                    2 
 
 
Q. 2—Q. 4 
                                            both          only Japanese           only Korean       neither 
Viewing experience                123                     24                            6                    6  
                                      
                                    terrestrial       cable/satellite   VCDS/DVD   video tape    others 
Viewing medium           27                   135                            69                   4                 2 
(multiple Response)  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------- 
                                               
                                   Friends/housemate        family members        alone    others 
Viewing companionship        52                                 68                                109            1 




Q. 5—Q. 8 
                                  never (0%)    rare(25%)   sometimes(50%)  often(75%)  always 
(100%)  
 
Discussion after viewing  10               34                 75                     24               8       
 
                                   low  (-25%)     average (50%)      relative high (75%)    highly (75+%) 
Engagement                  9                        72                       56                              15               
 




                                never(0%)    rare(25%)   sometimes(50%)  often(75%)  always (100%)  
Watch whole programme  11               33                53                  48                  9 
(1
st
 to last episode)             
 
Watch again when rebroadcast 
                                           10               60                75                    7                  0 
Q. 9—Q. 10 
                                          only Japanese         only Korean                 both              neither 
Importance on viewing  
the programmes                      27                        18                         20                    96 
 
                not interest(0%)     less than average(25%)   average(50%)  interest(75%)   v/interest(75%+ 
)   
Information             
related to                1              22                            69                        47                     13 
the programmes  
 
 
Q. 11  Viewing motivations (J: Japan; K: Korea) 
 
                            not important     not v/important      average          important        v/important  
                             J  //  K              J // K                  J // K                J // K              J // K 
 
storyline/plots              5 //  9                 4 // 9                17 // 14             63 // 51            56 // 48  
idols/actors                   5 // 11             11 // 16              30 // 37             67 // 46            34 // 21 
entertainment               5 // 7               10 // 15              53 // 48             59 // 45            19 // 14              
killing time                   5 // 9               13 // 13              66 // 58             46 // 41            16 // 11 
fashion info.                24 // 20             37 // 38             62 // 53             13 // 17            10 // 6   
emotional connection  12 // 18            29 // 28             58 // 57              37 // 25              8 // 5  
up-to-date knowledge  14 // 15           29 // 35              69 // 48             22 // 22             11 // 6           
favour the culture        9 // 23             29 // 33              52 // 51              38 // 20            19 // 8 
language learning        10 // 26           24 // 27              31 // 38              45 // 22            36 // 21  
 
 
Q. 12  Viewing choices and focus point during viewing (J: Japan; K: Korea) 
 
                              no attention       low attention       average        focused       highly focused  
                                 J  //  K              J // K               J // K           J // K              J // K 
 
popularity of actors     6 // 11              20 // 25             48 // 54             60 // 31            13 // 11    
acting skill                  4 // 10                 5 // 9               35 // 37             66 // 51           35 // 26   
actor’s appearance      4 // 9                10 // 14              37 // 39             75 // 57           21 // 18 
fashion style               4 // 7                 11 // 13             48 // 48             58 //  46           26 // 18 
storyline/plots            3 // 10                 5 // 8                13 // 14             69 // 57           57 // 43 
dialogue/narrative      1 // 9                  7 // 11               38 // 36             74 // 54           27 // 21 
scenery                       2 // 9                  7 // 10               46 // 40             67 // 57           25 // 18  
culture/custom           2 // 8                  10 // 12             55 // 50             57 // 45           23 // 16 
screenwriter               9 // 15                28 // 31             46 // 43             36 // 28           28 // 18 





Section 2: consumer behaviour - the consumption of idol dramas by-products  
 
Q. 1  Products (J: Japan; K: Korea) 
    
                                       never               rare               sometimes           often          very often 
                                       J  //  K              J // K               J // K           J // K              J // 
K 
 
idols’ poster                      95 // 99              30 // 25             16 // 9              5 // 3               1 // 1 
idols’ music albums         77 // 90               31 // 25            25 // 12          13 // 8                5 // 2 
TV soundtracks                61 // 84               37 // 26            29 // 19          14 // 7               2 // 1 
original comic books        91 // 110             30 // 24            18 // 8             6 // 0                2 // 0  
original novels                  92 // 106             29 // 20            20 // 8             2 // 0                2 // 1 
VCDs/DVDs                     86 // 99              25 // 20            18 // 13          16 // 2                4 // 3 
fashion style (e.g. clothes)      
(depicted in the programmes) 95 // 101           32 //20            18 // 15            4 // 1                0 // 0 
commodities 
(depicted in the programmes)  95 // 98               33 //26               17 // 9               2 // 3                    1 // 1 
 
 
Q. 2  Motivations/desirability    
 
                             not important      not v/important   average       important    very important 
 
practicality                       14                        19                  40                   48                     24             
collection purpose            16                       17                   36                   48                     27 
memorial purpose            22                        14                  33                   55                     23 
fan of idols                       23                       20                   34                   53                     15 
favour of programmes     18                        10                  33                   55                     29  
favour of soundtracks      10                         8                   27                   66                     34 
pleasure of recognition    16                        12                  44                   48                     25 
self-expression                 26                        37                  60                   17                       5        
fashionable                      23                        41                  55                   19                       7  
quality of products          11                        14                  31                   55                     34 
 
 
Section 3: Knowledge and recognition of Japanese and South Korean culture 
 
(J: Japan; K: Korea) 
 
 (knowledge)                 not well         not v/well       average          well-enough         very well 
                                     J  //  K          J // K               J // K              J // K              J // K 
  In terms of         
national  status       
(e.g. politics, economic,  4 // 22           22 // 38             91 // 67             35 // 18              5 // 2 
foreign policy)  
historical attractions        4 // 22           31 // 53             88 // 55             26 // 16              6 // 1  
people character              3 // 11           11 // 34             88 // 62             41 // 31            12 // 8 
lifestyle                           3 // 13            14 // 42            88 // 53              40 // 34            11 // 5 






(attitude)                         despise          dislike             average               like                  favour 
                                      J  //  K            J // K             J // K              J // K               J // K 
   In terms of  
nation                             4 // 9               4 // 14            60 // 82               74 // 38              16 // 4    
historical attractions       2 // 5               3 // 11            72 // 91              67 // 37              14 // 5 
people character             3 // 13            18 // 33           91 // 87              33 // 13              11 // 2     
lifestyle                          5 // 8                6 // 15           68 // 97              49 // 25              14 // 2 
culture                            2 // 7                3 // 12           81 // 98              54 // 25              18 // 3 
 
 
                                       no intention      low desire      average            desire         highly desire 
                                    J  //  K            J // K             J // K              J // K               J // K 
 
visiting the country        2 // 5                 2 // 9               23 // 46             55 // 40            71 // 43 
language learning           3 // 9                6 // 24              35 // 44             62 // 33           52 // 35 
making acquaintance     2 //  4                1 // 11             47 // 55             65 // 42            41 // 34 
live in Japan/Korea        4 // 12             17 // 31             59 // 60             45 // 27            31 // 15 
 
 
                               strongly disagree      disagree         average            agree        strongly 
agree 
                                        J  //  K            J // K             J // K              J // K               J // K 
 
good impression              2 // 9               11 // 22          63 // 77              61 // 29             20 // 8 
Japanophile/ 
























Appendix 4: Outcomes from questionnaire (given in numbers) 
 
 
Secondary school students: 118  
 
Male respondents: 57 
Female respondents: 61 
 
Section 1: Media reception of Japanese and Koran TV dramas 
 
Q. 1  hours/per week 
 
                                  never    -1 hour        1-3 hours     4-6 hours      7-9 hours      10+ hours 
Japanese dramas        14          82              17                 2                 2                     1 
Korean dramas          11          73              27                 4                 2                      1 
Taiwan idol dramas   10         54              37                 9                  5                     3 
Hong Kong dramas    12         86              14                 5                  1                     0 
American TV series   6           60              33               13                  4                     2 
Taiwan local dramas   14        70              26                 7                  1                     0 
 
 
Q. 2—Q. 4 
                                              both          only Japanese           only Korean       neither 
Viewing experience            87                   2                            10                         19  
                                      
                                      terrestrial       cable/satellite   VCDS/DVD        video tape    others 
Viewing medium               39                   71                       26                      4                 3 
 (multiple Response)  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                
                                         Friends/housemate     family members           alone       others 
Viewing companionship    16                                 67                            59              0 
(multiple Response)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
Q. 5—Q. 8 
                              never (0%)    rare(25%)   sometimes(50%)  often(75%)  always (100%)  
 
Discussion after viewing 7            31                    40                        17               6       
 
                              low  (-25%)     average (50%)      relative high  (75%)    highly(75+%) 
Engagement                  6                        58                       26                                  9               
 
                                never(0%)    rare(25%)   sometimes(50%)  often(75%)  always (100%)  
Watch whole programme  10               35                       31                   17                     6 
(1
st
 to last episode)             
 
Watch again when rebroadcast 
                                            14              33                        39                  15                    1 
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Q. 9—Q. 10           
 
                                          only Japanese         only Korean                 both              neither 
Importance on viewing  
the programmes                      3                         7                         13                     76 
 
                not interest(0%)    less than average(25%)   average(50%)  interest(75%)  v/interest(75%+ )   
Information             
related to                3                      20                              57                        16                     3 
the programmes  
 
 
Q. 11  Viewing motivations (J: Japan; K: Korea) 
 
                            not important     not v/important      average          important        v/important  
                             J  //  K              J // K                  J // K                J // K              J // K 
 
storyline/plots              9 //  7                 9 // 11              36  // 34            29 // 27            15 // 28  
idols/actors                   8 // 7               17 // 18              41 // 46             24  // 16             8 // 10 
entertainment                6 // 5               15 // 10              48 // 55             24  // 21             6 // 6              
killing time                   6 // 4                9  // 13              53 // 53             24 // 42              7 // 5 
fashion info.                15 // 15            28 // 31              62 // 53              13 // 17            10 // 6   
emotional connection    8 // 8              26 // 26             45 // 46              15 // 15              5 // 4  
up-to-date knowledge  16 // 15           26 // 29              37 // 34             16 // 17               4 // 2           
favour the culture        13 // 11            20 // 24              41 // 41             20 // 18               5 // 3 
language learning        18 // 19            29 // 34              33 // 32             15 // 9                 4 // 2  
 
 
Q. 12  Viewing choices and focus point during viewing (J: Japan; K: Korea) 
 
                              no attention       low attention       average        focused       highly focused  
                                 J  //  K              J // K                J // K           J // K              J // K 
 
popularity of actors     13 // 13             34 // 36              35 // 33            13 // 12              2 // 3  
acting skill                    9 // 8                14 // 15              39 // 37           32 // 31               5 // 6   
actor’s appearance       4 // 4                 12 // 10              43 // 42           25 // 26            14 // 15 
fashion style                 5 // 4                11 // 13              42// 42            32 // 31               8 // 7 
storyline/plots              7 // 5                 6 // 7                  36 // 31           34 // 40            15 // 15 
dialogue/narrative        7 // 4                10 // 11               41 // 43           32 // 30               8 // 9 
scenery                         7 // 3                  7 // 10               46 // 40           26 // 24            12 // 14  
culture/custom            10 // 7               22 // 23               35 // 39           20 // 19             11 // 9 
screenwriter               26 // 22              20 // 18               34 // 38           13 // 14               5 // 4 












Section 2: consumer behaviour – the consumption of idol dramas by-products  
 
Q1.  Products (J: Japan; K: Korea) 
    
                                         never             rare               sometimes           often          very often 
                                      J  //  K              J // K               J // K           J // K              J // K 
 
idols’ poster                      53 // 54            31 // 27              14 // 12             3 // 2               2 // 0  
idols’ music albums          48 // 48            26 // 27              22 // 20             6 // 1               2 // 1 
TV soundtracks                51 // 51            26 // 25             18 // 16             6 // 3                1 // 2 
original comic books        48 // 56            39 // 27             20 // 13             4 // 2                3 // 0 
original novels                   49 // 56            31 // 27             17 // 12            4 // 2                1 // 0 
VCDs/DVDs                     57 // 61           33 // 27              13 // 9              1 // 1                0 // 0 
fashion style (e.g. clothes) 
(depicted in the programmes) 53 // 60          30 // 24             13 // 11             8 // 3                1 // 1  
commodities 
(depicted in the programmes)  57 // 59          25 // 24             14 // 11            4 // 2                1 // 0 
 
 
Q. 2  Motivations /desirability    
 
                              not important      not v/important   average       important    very 
important 
 
practicality                       15                        18                  35                   22                     10             
collection purpose            16                       14                   22                   39                       9 
memorial purpose            18                        12                  25                   35                     10 
fan of idols                       17                       14                   33                   27                       8 
favour of programmes     15                        12                  35                   30                       7  
favour of soundtracks        7                         6                   24                   43                     19 
pleasure of recognition    14                        12                  36                   32                       5 
self-expression                 23                        30                  38                     8                       2        
fashionable                       21                       16                  39                   18                       6  
quality of products           12                         9                  32                   32                      15 
 
 
Section 3: Knowledge and recognition of Japanese and South Korean culture 
 
(J: Japan; K: Korea) 
 
 (knowledge)                 not well         not v/well       average          well-enough         very well 
                                     J  //  K          J // K               J // K              J // K              J // K 
  In terms of         
national  status       
(e.g. politics, economic,  10 // 13           32 // 41          57 // 59                18 // 5              1 // 0 
foreign policy)  
historical attractions        11 // 21           41 // 48           44 // 38              20 // 11              2 // 0  
people character                7 // 10           36 // 42           57 // 55              15 // 9                3 // 1 
lifestyle                              4 // 9            31 // 39           59 // 55              20 // 14              3 // 0 





(attitude)                         despise          dislike             average               like                  favour 
                                      J  //  K            J // K             J // K              J // K               J // K 
   In terms of  
nation                             3 // 5               10 // 10          53 // 72               41 // 26              11 // 3    
historical attractions       1 // 3              12 // 16           58 // 72               37 // 24              10 // 1 
people character             1 // 4              12 // 24           83 // 78               15 // 11                7 // 0     
lifestyle                          0 // 1              13 // 25           75 // 75               22 // 16                7 // 0 
culture                            3 // 4              10 // 16           78 // 76               28 // 20                8 // 1 
 
 
                                       no intention      low desire      average            desire         highly desire 
                                    J  //  K            J // K             J // K              J // K               J // K 
 
visiting the country        2 // 5                6 // 15              38 // 51             42 // 36             28 // 11 
language learning           6 // 12             25 // 30            38 // 44              30 // 25             19 // 6 
making acquaintance      3 // 6               26 // 28            50 // 57              21 // 20             17 // 7 
live in Japan/Korea         6 // 9              25 // 31             48 // 58             20 // 17              17 // 2 
 
 
                               strongly disagree      disagree         average            agree        strongly 
agree 
                                        J  //  K            J // K             J // K              J // K               J // K 
 
good impression              6 // 6               8 // 8               66 // 83              30 // 18             8 // 3 
Japanophile/ 






























Chapter 1 Our land and people 
   Section 1 Our stage 
   Section 2 Our identity 
   Section 3 We are all Taiwanese* 
Chapter 2 We are not alone 
   Section 1 Who are we (traditional social affiliations) 
   Section 2 Walk with me (modern voluntary associations) 
Chapter 3 The rhythm of life 
   Section 1 Our life course 
   Section 2 Unforgettable dates (Han and Aboriginal festivals)* 
Chapter 4 The world of religious 
   Section 1 Temples of the many gods 
   Section 2 The essence of religious beliefs 
Chapter 5 Growing from learning 
   Section 1 The family as a classroom 
   Section 2 Life long education 
Chapter 6 An energetic culture 
   Section 1 Cultural assets 
   Section 2 The Taiwanese spirit * 
Chapter 7 Poverty and affluence 
  Section 1 Economic development 
  Section 2 Beyond affluence 
Chapter 8 A taste of democracy 
  Section 1 We can be our own masters 
  Section 2 We can reform our society  
Chapter 9 A sound society 
  Section 1 Let the home become heaven 
  Section 2 Let prisons becomes less crowded 
  Section 3 Let the environment becomes clean again 
  Section 4 Let learning become hobby 
Chapter 10 Building a new Taiwan* 
  Section 1 Our roles 
  Section 2 Our blueprint 
 
 




Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 Pre-history era 
   Section 1 Cultural evolution  
   Section 2 Aboriginal societies 
Chapter 3 The era of international competition 
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   Section 1 Activities of the Han and the Japanese 
   Section 2 Dutch and Spanish rule 
Chapter 4 Koxinga’s rule of Taiwan  
   Section 1 Politics, culture and education 
   Section 2 Settlement and trading 
Chapter 5 The first part of the Qing era 
   Section 1 Political change 
   Section 2 Economic activity 
   Section 3 Social and cultural development 
Chapter 6 The latter part of the Qing era 
  Section 1 The opening of ports and international trade 
  Section 2 Japanese military invasion and the Qing court’s change in policy regarding 
                  ruling of Taiwan 
  Section 3 Active construction after the establishment of the province 
Chapter 7 Politics and the economy during the era of Japanese colonial rule 
  Section 1 The Republic of Taiwan and the military resistance against the Japanese 
  Section 2 Political and social control 
  Section 3 The development of the colonial economy 
Chapter 8 Education, scholarship, and society during the ear of Japanese 
                  colonial rule 
  Section 1 Educational and academic development 
  Section 2 Social change 
  Section 3 Social movement  
Chapter 9 Political changes during the period of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan 
  Section1 Politics in the early stage 
  Section 2 Political development after the government’s retreat to Taiwan 
  Section 3 Diplomatic and cross-Strait relations 
Chapter 10 Economy, culture, and society during the period of the Republic of 
                    China on Taiwan 
  Section 1 Economic development 
  Section 2 Education and culture  
  Section 3 Social change 
Chapter 11 Future prospects  
 
(Original list from Fu-Chang Wang, 2005, p. 88-90) ‘Why bother about school 
textbooks?’ in Cultural, ethnic, and political nationalism in contemporary Taiwan 
(2005) edited by John Makeham and A-chin Hsiau 
 
For further detail analysis on both volumes, please see ‘Nation-building and 
curriculum reform in Hong Kong and Taiwan’ by Christopher Hughes and Robert 
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